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BADIL - Information & Discussion Brief
Issue No. 7, August 2002
UNHCR, Palestinian Refugees, and
Durable Solutions
Terry M. Rempel, Coordinator
of Research and Information, BADIL
BADIL-Briefs aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and international
debate about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refugees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.
Background
Brief No. 7 is one of a
series of three BADIL Briefs (5-7), which examine the special regime (See Brief
No. 1) established by the United Nations to provide international protection and
assistance for Palestinian refugees and promote durable solutions based on the
provisions of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948 and
international law. Briefs 5 and 6 provide an overview of the UN Conciliation
Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).
This Brief provides an
overview of the UNHCR vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees. The Brief examines the
unique and complex relationship between UNHCR and Palestinian refugees as set
forth in the 1950 Statute of the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and raises questions about a UNHCR role concerning
international protection and the search for and implementation of durable
solutions for Palestinian refugees based on a review of UNHCR’s mandate,
operational experience, and political environment.
This Brief was prepared by Terry Rempel, Coordinator of Research and
Information, BADIL Resource Center; Research Fellow, School of Historical,
Political and Sociological Studies, Exeter University. Brief No. 7 was prepared
in consultation with BADIL partners and independent experts.
Introduction
Between 1948 and 1949 the
United Nations General Assembly accorded mandates to two separate UN agencies to
provide international protection (including durable solutions) and
assistance to Palestinian refugees.[i]
This unique regime is comprised of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(UNCCP), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).
The UNCCP was established
under paragraph 2 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948.
The complex mandate of the Commission included provision of protection for
all refugees and displaced persons in Palestine and facilitation of durable
solutions as delineated in paragraph 11 of the resolution (i.e., return,
restitution, and compensation based on individual refugee choice).[ii]
UNRWA was established one year later under UN General Assembly Resolution 302
(IV), 8 December 1949 as a successor to the multi-agency relief operation in
Palestine to provide assistance for those refugees in need without prejudice to
and pending implementation of UN Resolution 194.[iii]
Palestinian refugees also
have a unique and complex relationship to a third UN agency - the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR was established as a
temporary agency under General Assembly Resolution 319 (IV), 3 December 1949, to
provide international protection and seek permanent solutions for refugees.
Generally, UNHCR has a mandate to provide international protection and search
for durable solutions for refugees world-wide, including persons defined as
‘Convention refugees’ under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention).[iv]
According to special provisions set forth in Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee
Convention[v],
Palestinian refugees are entitled to the benefits of the Convention (i.e.,
considered as ‘Convention Refugees’) when protection or assistance from other
organs or agencies of the United Nations has ceased for any reason, without the
position of the refugees being definitively settled in accordance with relevant
resolutions of the UN General Assembly.[vi]
UNCCP protection collapsed
in the mid-1950s.[vii]
Neither the UNHCR nor any other international agency, however, explicitly
stepped in to completely fill the subsequent gap created by the cessation
of comprehensive international protection for Palestinian refugees. This may be
explained by a variety of factors addressed below, including legal anomalies,
agency mandates, as well as political and economic constraints, which together
have militated against an effective institutional response to the protection gap
for Palestinian refugees. Today, UNHCR protection vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees
is characterized by a limited degree of protection for a limited number
of refugees based on geographical restrictions and subject to the cessation and
exclusion clauses in the 1950 Statute of the UNHCR (UNHCR Statute)[viii]
and the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNRWA does not have an explicit protection
mandate for Palestinian refugees.
The collapse of UNCCP
protection, limited intervention by the UNHCR, and lack of an explicit UNRWA
protection mandate, has resulted in severe gaps in international protection for
Palestinian refugees. No international agency is currently recognized by the
international community as having an explicit mandate to systematically work for
the realization of the basic human rights of all Palestinian refugees and search
for and implement durable solutions consistent with international law as
affirmed in UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III). Partial and inconsistent
application of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which delineates the rights of
refugees and concomitant obligations of states generally, by state and non-state
actors[ix],
varies according to geographical area. For many Palestinian refugees, it is
unclear what rights are subject to international protection, under what
conditions refugees may access international protection, and to whom to turn to
for international protection.
Practically this anomaly
means that most of the more than five million Palestinian refugees, or nearly
one-third of the world’s total refugee population, do not have systematic access
to international protection. The protection gap is evident in all areas where
Palestinian refugees reside in exile today, with the situation most severe in
Lebanon and in the 1967 occupied West Bank (including eastern Jerusalem) and
Gaza Strip.[x]
Palestinian refugees face varying degrees of arbitrary restrictions on the
realization of basic human rights, including, for example, freedom of movement,
the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the
right to education, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right
to work, as well as access to durable solutions.
The absence of international protection over
such a long period of time is particularly disturbing given the fact that the
United Nations has identified and expressed concern about the international
protection gap for at least several decades. In 1982, for example, the UN
General Assembly adopted Resolution 37/120 J (16 December 1982) in which it
called upon the UN Secretary-General in consultation with UNRWA “to undertake
effective measures to guarantee the safety and security and the legal and human
rights of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories.” This resolution
was reaffirmed annually through 1993.
The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), which
carried out a comprehensive review of UNRWA’s organization, budget, and
operations in 1982, was more explicit. “[The] JIU is convinced that this
anomalous situation should not and need not continue. It believes that the
problem of protection requires region wide consideration and that innovative and
acceptable measures that could be applied wherever and whenever warranted should
be sought. Humanitarian considerations should prevail over any political or
bureaucratic obstacles.”[xi]
The JIU further recommended joint consultations between UNHCR and UNRWA to
address the problem.
The UNHCR has also acknowledged the existence
of the problem. Following the massacre of several thousand Palestinian refugees
in Beirut in September 1982 by Israeli-allied Phalangist militiamen, the UNHCR
Executive Committee, the advisory body to the High Commissioner, “expressed the
hope that measures would be taken to protect refugees against such attacks and
to aid the victims.”[xii]
During the late 1980s and the early 1990s in the context of the first
Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the 1967 occupied territories, the
UNHCR issued numerous executive committee conclusions that “[e]xpressed concern
about the lack of adequate international protection for various groups of
refugees in different parts of the world, including a large number of
Palestinians, and hoped that efforts would be undertaken within the United
Nations system to address their protection needs.”[xiii]
[Italics added] These conclusions, in addition to recommendations from the UN
General Assembly, ceased following the commencement of the Oslo process (the
framework for Palestinian-Israeli political negotiations) in 1993, despite the
continued gap in both national and international protection for Palestinian
refugees.[xiv]
In March 2001, the UN Commission on Human
Rights, Human Rights Inquiry Commission - established pursuant to UN Security
Council Resolution S-5/1, 19 October 2000, to investigate violations of human
rights and humanitarian law in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories after
beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000 - once again called
attention to the severe gap in international protection for Palestinian
refugees. “There is, first of all, the anomalous status of Palestinian refugees
due to their exclusion from the protective mechanisms and responsibility of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). No other refugee
community in the world is so excluded.”[xv]
[Italics added]
Despite seemingly widespread recognition of the
severe gap in international protection for Palestinian refugees no remedy has
been forthcoming. While UNRWA continues to play an important role through the
provision of services that guarantee basic economic, social, and cultural rights
– i.e., “relief protection[xvi]”
– as well as the deployment of special monitoring officers[xvii]
during the first and second Palestinian uprisings (intifada) in
the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, the Agency’s humanitarian assistance
programs are not in themselves a guarantee of comprehensive protection. As
mentioned, UNRWA itself does not have an explicit mandate to provide
comprehensive international protection to Palestinian refugees, including
durable solutions protection.
The severe gap in
international protection is an obstacle to the realization of fundamental human
rights and freedoms for Palestinian refugees in their current areas of exile, as
well as the fundamental human rights associated with durable solutions (i.e.,
return, real property restitution, compensation). The remainder of this brief
examines a potential protection role for UNHCR vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees
based on a review of its mandate, operational experience, and political
environment. The Brief concludes with some basic recommendations concerning the
UNHCR, Palestinian refugees, and durable solutions.
Mandate
The UN General Assembly
established the UNHCR to: 1) provide international protection, and 2) to seek
permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. Paragraph 8 of the UNHCR
Statute delineates nine components of the Agency’s mandate, including promoting
the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection
of refugees; promoting any measures calculated to improve the situation of
refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection; and, assisting
governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or
assimilation of refugees within new national communities.[xviii]
Paragraphs 6 and 7 delineate those persons falling within or excluded from the
mandate of the UNHCR.[xix]
Over the course of its
fifty-year history, UNHCR has displayed a flexible approach towards refugee
protection and the search for durable solutions in keeping with the humanitarian
nature of its mandate. This has led to the “expansion” of UNHCR’s mandate to
encompass new categories of refugees and new approaches to refugee protection
and durable solutions. Flexibility is built into the UNHCR Statute. According to
paragraph 3, both the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
may issue specific policy directives to the High Commissioner that expand or
exceed the statutory provisions of the Agency’s mandate.[xx]
In 1956, for example, the UN
General Assembly instructed the UNHCR to provide protection for refugees who had
fled Hungary after the Soviet suppression of the 1956 uprising.[xxi]
UNHCR review of the drafting history of the 1951 Refugee Convention (then
limited to persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring before
1 January 1951[xxii]),
resulted in a legal interpretation recognizing Hungarian refugees as ‘Convention
refugees’ and the extension of the rights and concomitant obligations of states
thereto.[xxiii]
Several years later the General Assembly authorized the High Commissioner “to
use his good offices in the transmission of contributions for the assistance of
refugees ‘who do not come within the competence of the United Nations.’”[xxiv]
In 1972, ECOSOC directed the UNHCR for the first time to extend rehabilitation
and assistance programs to internally displaced persons.[xxv]
In the late 1980s and 1990s the UNHCR began to work more extensively with
returnees to ensure the sustainability of the return process.
UNHCR’s approach to refugee
protection and the search for durable solutions, moreover, has shifted
increasingly from a primary focus on the country of asylum to the country of
origin. The shift is related to a growing realization, dating back to the 1970s,
that “the post-[world war II] Western emphasis on integration in new communities
as the normal solution no longer corresponded with the predominant realities
elsewhere”[xxvi],
state imposed restrictions, particularly in western industrialized countries,
that prevent refugees from seeking refuge abroad[xxvii],
and an increasing awareness of the importance in addressing root causes of
refugee flows. Throughout the 1980s and after UNHCR began to develop more
detailed protection policies that emphasized voluntary repatriation as the most
durable solution to refugee problems.[xxviii]
In contrast, UNHCR has adopted a restrictive
approach towards international protection and the search for durable solutions
for Palestinian refugees. The restrictive approach is related to a number of
factors, including: 1) limitations imposed by UNHCR’s Statute; 2) incorrect
interpretation of the cessation and exclusion clauses in the 1951 Refugee
Convention; and, 3) ambiguity concerning the special regime for Palestinian
refugees. The restrictive approach towards international protection and the
search for durable solutions for Palestinian refugees is also related, as
addressed in the following section, to financial and other practical concerns
stemming from the potential inclusion of millions of additional refugees with
the mandate of UNHCR as well as internal and external political constraints
related to the nature of the Palestinian refugee issue.
UNHCR does not have an explicit mandate to
provide international protection and search for durable solutions for all
Palestinian refugees. The UNHCR Statute (Paragraph 7C) does not contain an
inclusion clause similar to the second sentence of Article 1D of the 1951
Refugee Convention, primarily due to the fact that the 1950 Statute was drafted
and adopted prior to the Convention. According to the Statute, the competence of
the High Commissioner shall not apply to a person: “Who continues to receive
from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or
assistance.” Palestinian refugees receiving assistance from UNRWA are thus
deemed to fall outside the mandate of UNHCR according to UNHCR’s interpretation
of Paragraph 7C.[xxix]
While paragraph 7C does not accord UNHCR an explicit mandate to provide
international protection for Palestinian refugees, UNHCR policy fails to account
for the fact that the national authorities in the primary areas of exile
currently do not provide comprehensive protection of Palestinian refugees’ basic
human rights on a day to day basis. Nor does the policy take into account the
fact that the majority of Palestinian refugees do not have access to
international protection. UNHCR policy may be explained, in part, by a failure
to accurately differentiate between the protection mandate (accorded to the
UNCCP) and the assistance mandate (accorded to UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees.
Paragraph 143 of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status (UNHCR Handbook) states, for example, that “it will be noted that
UNRWA operates only in certain areas of the Middle East, and it is only there
that its protection or assistance are given.” [Emphasis added] The Handbook
incorrectly credits UNRWA with dual mandate for protection and assistance as
well as a single assistance mandate. The UNHCR Handbook contradicts earlier
UNHCR memos relative to Palestinian refugees that indicate a clear understanding
of the division of international protection and assistance between the UNCCP and
UNRWA. In response to confusion raised by a prospective visit of the High
Commissioner to refugee camps in Lebanon in the mid-1950s, for example, a joint
UNRWA-UNHCR press statement was released to provide clarification.
As far
as the United Nations is concerned, and without prejudice to the responsibility
of individual governments, the material welfare of Palestine refugees in the
Near East is the exclusive responsibility of UNRWA, whereas the protection of
the interests of those refugees as regards compensation and repatriation is the
concern of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.[xxx]
[Emphasis added]
Despite the absence of an inclusion clause in Paragraph 7C, however, UNHCR
considers Paragraph 7C to include an implicit protection mandate for a limited
number of Palestinian refugees. According to Paragraph 143 of the UNHCR
Handbook, “a refugee from Palestine who finds himself outside [the area of UNRWA
operations] does not enjoy the assistance mentioned and may be considered for
determination of his refugee status under the criteria of the 1951 Convention.”[xxxi]
The number of Palestinian refugees who may qualify for protection under UNHCR’s
narrow definition of its mandate, however, is further limited by incorrect
application of cessation and exclusion clauses in the 1951 Refugee Convention.[xxxii]
Unlike other persons considered as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
the only exclusion and cessation clause applicable to Palestinian refugees is
Article 1D. The only criterion for the cessation of refugee status for
Palestinian refugees is the definitive settlement of the Palestinian refugee
issue in accordance with relevant resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly
– i.e., implementation of UN Resolution 194(III).[xxxiii]
The practical effect of UNHCR policy towards
Palestinian refugees is that the de facto trigger for the provision of
international protection for the majority of Palestinian refugees (i.e., those
refugees living in UNRWA areas of operation) is the cessation of material
assistance rather than the cessation of national and international protection.
The intent and purpose of Article 1D, however, is to ensure comprehensive
international protection and assistance for Palestinian refugees until their
situation is resolved according to relevant UN General Assembly resolutions.
Operational Experience
UNHCR has developed a wealth
of operational experience over five decades of providing protection and seeking
durable solutions for refugees worldwide. That experience has broadened with the
expansion of UNHCR’s mandate as described above. The range of UNHCR experience
in providing protection and seeking durable solutions has expanded from asylum
and resettlement assistance, to the provision of health, education and social
services, delivery of special programs for vulnerable groups (e.g. women,
children, and the elderly), special emphasis on the environment and HIV/AIDS,
mass repatriation operations, human rights monitoring, property protection
including restitution, community development and institutional capacity building
to ensure a durable reintegration of returnees, and large-scale relief
operations together with the coordination of UN and other international
humanitarian assistance efforts.
During the early years of its mandate UNHCR
operations focused predominantly on the provision of legal assistance in
countries of asylum and facilitation of resettlement of refugees. In 1951, for
example, UNHCR set up a pilot project, funded by the Ford Foundation, to
facilitate local integration of WWII refugees in European countries. By the
1960s and 1970s, mass refugee flows in Africa and Asia exacerbated by ongoing
conflict and the lack of secure conditions to facilitate durable solutions in
both the countries of asylum and origin led to the first of many large-scale
UNHCR humanitarian assistance programs. During this period, the UN requested the
UNHCR, for the first time, to act as the ‘Focal Point’ or lead agency for the
coordination of all UN assistance in a refugee crisis. The UN later appointed
the UNHCR as lead agency for the coordination of humanitarian assistance in the
former Yugoslavia following the outbreak of war in the early 1990s.
With the onset of several mass repatriation
movements in the 1990s, the UNHCR took on a series of new roles that included
coordination of reintegration assistance and monitoring the status of returnees.
UNHCR also began to focus more on the developmental needs of returnees in order
to ensure sustainable return. In Guatemala, for example, UNHCR and the UN
Development Program (UNDP) implemented Quick Impact Projects (QIPs),
micro-projects aimed at creating income generating opportunities for returnees.
The increasing number of refugees choosing to return to their homes of origin in
the 1990s also necessitated greater UNHCR involvement in issues related to the
regularization of citizenship and residency status as well as access to land and
housing. In the former Soviet Republics, UNHCR, together with the Commission
(Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brought together
various political actors in the context of a region-wide conference to find
solutions to issues of displacement, including harmonization of citizenship and
residency law in respect to the rights of displaced persons in the former Soviet
Republics.
The increasingly wide range of activities
associated with refugee protection and the search for durable solutions has
necessitated a greater emphasis on partnership between UNHCR, non-governmental
and governmental agencies, and other international organizations. The task of
providing protection and facilitating durable solutions for refugees is simply
too large for any one agency. The number of institutional partners working
together with UNHCR to provide protection and assistance to refugees has grown
to over 500 non-governmental organizations. In Bosnia, for example, the UNHCR
program consists of more than 250 staff and 30 implementing partners, including
24 non-governmental organizations, two international agencies and four
government ministries.[xxxiv]
The complex nature and overlapping interests associated with mass displacement
has also witnessed increased involvement of non-traditional partners such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (‘African Union’), and the World Bank. Over
five decades UNHCR has grown from an agency with 33 staff and a budget of US$
300,000 to an organization with an estimated 5,000 staff and an annual budget of
nearly US$ 1 billion.
UNHCR’s operational experience in relation to
Palestinian refugees is also limited geographically. As mentioned above, UNHCR
protection for Palestinian refugees is limited to areas outside the five
fields of UNRWA operations (i.e., West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria). Concern has been expressed within the Agency about opening up the
UNHCR’s doors to a large number of additional refugees. According to a former
Deputy Director of International Protection of UNHCR, this concern resulted “in
an amendment to the original policy statement [being] issued to the effect that
Palestinian refugees who were outside UNRWA’s area of operations were not to be
considered automatically as refugees within the UNHCR mandate but should
be examined and dealt with in the same manner as other cases of individuals
claiming UNHCR mandate status.”[xxxv]
The inclusion of Palestinian refugees in the five areas of UNRWA operations
(including non-registered refugees) alone, within the mandate of the UNHCR,
would increase the total population of concern (i.e., Convention refugees,
internally displaced, and returnees) to the Agency in the region by more than 10
fold. Applying the same increase to UNHCR’s budget for the region would
necessitate an additional US$ 150 million in voluntary contributions.[xxxvi]
UNHCR’s restrictive approach
towards Palestinian refugees also means that the refugee agency has fewer
institutional partners active in the provision of protection and search for
durable solutions for Palestinian refugees. Regionally, UNHCR has partnered with
member states of the League of Arab States and other institutions from 1984
onward in a joint drafting process for a regional declaration on the rights of
refugees and displaced persons, now known as the ‘Cairo Declaration.’[xxxvii]
The Declaration reaffirms that refugees are entitled to return to their country
of origin (Article 1) and urges Arab states, which have not yet acceded to the
1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol to do so.[xxxviii]
Moreover, the Declaration recognizes the absence of and need for international
protection for Palestinian refugees (Preamble, Paragraph 6). Article 9 states
that the Arab League “[s]strongly emphasizes the need to ensure international
protection for Palestinian refugees by competent international organizations
and, in particular, by the United Nations, without in any way prejudicing the
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, especially their right to
repatriation and self-determination.” Protection activities are further limited
by the fact that most Arab states where the majority of Palestinian refugees
have sought refuge are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. In
general, UNHCR does not intervene to protect Palestinian refugees through
negotiated agreements with Arab states that are not signatories to the 1951
Refugee Convention.[xxxix]
Israel, which is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has derogated from
key articles of the Convention that negatively affect Palestinian refugees.[xl]
Political Environment
According to Paragraph 2 of
the UNHCR Statute, “The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely
nonpolitical character.” State interests, donor country pressures, and gradual
or sudden shifts in international relations, however, all have an impact and
interfere in varying degrees with UNHCR’s mandate and operations. The very
nature of refugee protection and durable solutions, moreover, often requires
UNHCR to function as a political actor.
During the early years of
UNHCR’s existence economic imperatives in western Europe, which was facing a
labor shortage following WWII, coupled with political opposition from western
governments to international efforts to repatriate refugees (particularly those
from the former Soviet bloc countries) led to a primary focus on resettlement as
the most durable solution for existing refugee problems.[xli]
Western state interests dovetailed with the wishes of many refugees who, for
both economic and political reasons, did not wish to return to their countries
of origin. In contrast, changes in the international system in the late 1980s
and 1990s, including the end of the Cold War and several regional conflicts
created the opportunity for many refugees to return to their homes of origin.
The cessation of conditions which had led to mass displacement and prevented
refugees from returning to their homes of origin in safety and dignity was
accompanied by a growing reluctance of Western industrialized states to grant
asylum to large numbers of refugees. Together these factors generated a greater
focus on voluntary repatriation. UNHCR funds targeted towards
repatriation-related activities, for example, increased from an average of just
2 percent of the organization’s total budget prior to 1984 to some 14 percent in
the period 1990-1997.[xlii]
The UNHCR has also been the subject of more
direct or calculated political interference. According to some analysts, UNHCR
activities have been manipulated or exploited by states as a means of achieving
either expressed or covert political objectives. In Bosnia, for example, it has
been argued that UNHCR’s initial humanitarian operations provided a convenient
substitute for more effective, political intervention in the conflict. Moreover,
some observers have suggested that UNHCR became a major instrument for the
generalized Western policy of ‘containment’ of refugee and humanitarian
problems.[xliii]
Under pressure from states that refused to open their borders to refugees and
states of asylum seeking the early return of refugees, UNHCR was forced to
grapple with practices, such as ‘safe zones’, and ‘safe return’ (as opposed to
voluntary return), which many regarded as inconsistent with UNHCR’s protection
mandate.[xliv]
In Kosovo, on the other hand, the international community marginalized UNHCR’s
humanitarian operation in order to provide a more palatable raison d’etre
(i.e., humanitarian assistance) for NATO’s military intervention.[xlv]
The lack of an autonomous resource leaves the
UNHCR open to political interference.[xlvi]
UNHCR, like UNRWA, is dependent on voluntary contributions for the majority of
its funding, with the remaining funds coming from the UN’s regular budget. The
international community may authorize or request UNHCR to undertake specific
programs, but there is no guarantee that such programs will receive the
necessary voluntary contributions to cover expenditures. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s, for example, UNHCR humanitarian operations shifted away from
‘care and maintenance’ programs, in part, due to reluctance on the part of
donors to maintain and/or increase overseas expenditures.[xlvii]
In the 1990s, the UN had to plead and beg international donors repeatedly for
funds to help reintegrate Afghan returnees. While the United States, UNHCR’s
largest state donor, spent some US$ 2 billion on military aid to Afghans
fighting the Soviet-allied regime in Afghanistan in the 1980s it found only US$
14 million in cash for aid for 4.5 million Afghan refugees in 1992.[xlviii]
Aside from external political interference, the
very nature of refugee protection and durable solutions often requires UNHCR to
function as a political actor. “The difficulty arises,” notes one commentator,
“when UNHCR protection, motivated by concern for certain individuals in dire
straits, impacts ‘who governs’ or contradicts the general nature of governance,
or is linked to military coercion.”[xlix]
To protect housing and property rights of refugees and displaced persons in
Bosnia, for example, UNHCR – including partners such as the Office of the High
Representative, the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the OSCE – has
supported the repeal of discriminatory property law and sanctions against public
officials violating housing and property restitution procedures.[l]
The latter has included the removal of elected officials from office.
UNCHR’s restrictive approach towards
Palestinian refugees also appears to be colored by political interference. From
the beginning of its operations, “[t]he competence of the High Commissioner in
political issues surrounding the Palestinian question [was] thought incompatible
with the proclaimed non-political character of UNHCR’s work.”[li]
The UNHCR, Arab and western states, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
along with Palestinian refugees themselves have all expressed varying degrees of
opposition to greater UNHCR involvement in the Palestinian refugee case at
various points over the past five decades.
Since the drafting of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, numerous Arab states, particularly those that host large numbers of
Palestinian refugees, have been concerned that if Palestinian refugees “would
become submerged [in the general protection regime they] would be relegated to a
position of minor importance.”[lii]
Arab states have also expressed concern that in the context of continued Israeli
opposition to the return of the refugees, UNHCR and donor states may push for a
more “pragmatic” approach to durable solutions focused primarily on
resettlement. More recently, some Israeli officials and commentators have
suggested that UNHCR should replace UNRWA, in part, because it is thought,
incorrectly, that significant numbers of Palestinian refugees registered with
UNRWA who have acquired a second nationality (primarily in Jordan) would no
longer be considered refugees.[liii]
The potential for political interference is
heightened due to the lack of an autonomous resource base. Historically, Arab
states have expressed concern that UNHCR intervention in the Palestinian refugee
case would result in the redirection of donor contributions from UNRWA to UNHCR
accompanied by the devolution or erosion and termination of UNRWA’s mandate for
the provision of assistance for Palestinian refugees prior to an agreement on
and implementation of a durable solution based on UN Resolution 194(III). UNHCR
expenditures per refugee currently comprise half that of UNRWA. This concern
must be viewed within the context of Israel’s long held position that UNRWA has
prolonged the Palestinian refugee ‘problem’ and therefore should be phased out
as soon as possible.[liv]
The facilitation of durable solutions
consistent with the terms set forth in UN Resolution 194(III) may also be viewed
as highly political (but no more political, for example, than the return of
refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia) because it would inevitably impact the
general nature of governance in Israel. Facilitation of voluntary repatriation
of Palestinian refugees to their homes would challenge Israel’s
definition of itself as a ‘Jewish state.’ This definition is based upon the
principle that Jews form the majority of the state and a preferential legal
status for Jews, particularly in relation to citizenship and land ownership.[lv]
The ongoing political sensitivity vis-à-vis UNHCR and Palestinian refugees was
reflected in initial concerns expressed regarding the first visit of a UN High
Commissioner for Refugees to Israel in May 2000 just prior to the commencement
of final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) at Camp David. Speaking to an Israeli Jewish audience at
Ben-Gurion University, the High Commissioner first “express[ed] the hope that,
as in other situations of forced displacement, the Palestinian refugee problem
[…] be resolved in a humane manner which takes into account the wishes
and hopes of millions of people, including those who want to return.”
[Italics added] The High Commissioner then went on to note that the humane
solution she referred to must also take into account Israel’s security and
“specific identity.”[lvi]
While recognizing the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes,
the Commissioner also alluded to the apparent acceptability of arbitrary and
discriminatory restrictions on the exercise of Palestinian refugee rights,
including an apparent reference (i.e., “specific identity”) to Israel’s
definition of itself as a Jewish state rather than a state of all of its
citizens. UNHCR has opposed such arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions in
other refugee cases such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Rwanda.
Conclusion
The severe gap in
international protection for Palestinian refugees requires urgent legal
reappraisal and related institutional remedies. While UNHCR may provide an
immediate ‘address’ to fill the gaps in international protection for Palestinian
refugees, three primary issues must be resolved: clarification of mandate
(including UN Resolution 194), identification of the value-added components
UNHCR’s operational experience would bring to the Palestinian refugee case, and
consideration of potential political problems.
Currently, UNHCR does not
have an explicit mandate to provide international protection and seek
durable solutions for all Palestinian refugees. The technical aspects of
triggering UNHCR intervention, if and when necessary, are least problematic.
While Paragraph 7C of the UNHCR Statute does not contain an inclusion clause
similar to Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention, both the UN General
Assembly and ECOSOC could issue policy directives to the High Commissioner, as
they have done in other cases, that would bring Palestinian refugees within the
scope of the UNHCR Statute. More problematic are issues related to inter-agency
jurisdiction (e.g., UNRWA) and clarification of the constraints on an expanded
UNHCR mandate imposed by UN Resolution 194(III) (i.e., criteria for the
cessation of refugee status and restrictions on resettlement).
UNHCR, UNRWA and other UN
agencies should establish a coordination mechanism or secretariat for the
exchange of documents, information, data and reports regarding their respective
policies and operations. Such a mechanism would assist in the identification of
specific gaps (short-term and durable solutions) in the international protection
regime for Palestinian refugees. Palestinian institutions – official and civil
society – should engage UNHCR and other UN officials in a meaningful discussion
regarding Resolution 194(III) in order to clarify the specific framework for
durable solutions applicable to the Palestinian case and the status of
Palestinian refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
UNHCR’s operational
experience in the Palestinian case is limited. At present the Agency only
provides services to a fraction of the Palestinian refugee population.
Indicators of UNHCR effectiveness in other refugee cases – including, knowledge
of the people’s concerned, strong field presence, ability to mobilize financial
resources, and an established working relationship with local NGOs through its
field presence – all rank low in the Palestinian refugee case. UNHCR
infrastructure in the region where the majority of Palestinian refugees reside
in exile, moreover, is relatively small compared to other UN agencies such as
UNRWA. At the same time, UNHCR does have a long history of providing
international protection and facilitating durable solutions, experience which
may be useful in the Palestinian case.
Given the lack of specific
operational experience vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees, but broad experience with
regard to refugees generally, potential expansion of UNHCR’s mandate should be
considered within the context of a value-added formula. In other words, in what
areas can UNHCR’s operational experience serve to fill in current protection
gaps and/or enhance operational activities of existing agencies (such as UNRWA)
involved with Palestinian refugees? The same value-added formula should be
applied in relation to the search and implementation of durable solutions.
UNHCR, UNRWA, Palestinian institutions – official and civil society – and Arab
host states should establish a mechanism for discussion and debate about the
pros and cons of expanding UNHCR’s mandate in the Palestinian refugee case with
the aim of finding comprehensive solutions to the gap in international
protection.
Finally, careful
consideration must be given to the political environment in which UNHCR
operates. While mandate and operational experience are technical issues that can
be addressed in a relatively straightforward manner, the clearest and most
accurate interpretation of mandate and division of roles can go awry due to
untoward political influence, particularly given the already highly politicized
nature of the Palestinian refugee issue. What are the potential implications of
UNHCR intervention in light of the fact that Israel as well as the United
States, UNHCR’s largest state donor, remain opposed to durable solutions for
Palestinian refugees as set forth in UN Resolution 194(III) and international
law (i.e., right of return and housing and property restitution)? Can UNHCR
intervention be effective, moreover, in the absence of sufficient support from
Arab states? Would UNHCR intervention engender political pressure to dismantle
UNRWA?
The absence of a resolution
to any one of these issues could have negative consequences not only for
Palestinian refugees, but also for other refugees who seek and require the
international protection afforded by the UNHCR.
[i]
International protection involves the direct protection of refugees’ human
rights on a day-to-day basis, and the search for and implementation of
durable solutions. International assistance involves a range of activities
that meet the basic needs of refugees including food, shelter, health and
education. Certain assistance activities may also be considered to have
protection functions. See, note 16 below. Durable solutions include
repatriation, host country integration, and third country resettlement.
Housing and property restitution is among the rights associated with refugee
repatriation. The primary principle governing each of the three solutions is
voluntariness or refugee choice. Among the three solutions, only
repatriation or return is a recognized right under international law.
[ii]
For more information about the UNCCP, see, BADIL Information &
Discussion Brief No. 5, The United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine, Protection, and a Durable Solution for Palestinian Refugees,
(June 2000). The UNCCP mandate also includes specific provisions for
resolution of the issue of Jerusalem as well as a mandate to resolve all
outstanding issues between the parties. For more on durable solutions set
forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), see, BADIL
Occasional Bulletin No. 11, The Meaning of UN General Assembly Resolution
194(III), 11 December 1948 (The Right of Return) (April 2002).
[iii]
For more information about UNRWA, see BADIL Information & Discussion Brief
No. 6, The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and a Durable Solution for
Palestinian Refugees (July 2000). Also see the UNRWA website, http://www.unrwa.org.
[iv]
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered
into force April 20, 1954.
[v]
Article 1D states: “This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at
present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the
position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the
relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations,
these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this
Convention.” Analysis of the status of Palestinian refugees under the 1951
Refugee Convention is based on Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian
Refugees in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998;
and, Susan M. Akram and Guy Goodwin-Gill, Brief Amicus Curaie, Board
of Immigration Appeals, Falls Church Virginia, published in 11/12
Palestine Yearbook of International Law, 2000/2001.
[vi]
Article 1D addressed the factual circumstances of Palestinian displacement
which preceded both the establishment of the UNHCR and the adoption of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; concerns
about the institutional longevity of the special regime for Palestinian
refugees; bureaucratic concerns over institutional redundancy; political and
economic apprehension among Arab and western states about the potential
impact of integrating Palestinian refugees into the new global refugee
regime; the realization that the primary protection issue facing Palestinian
refugees, unlike most refugees at the time, was not refoulement, but
rather the inability to exercise their basic right to return to their homes
of origin; and, the belief that Palestinian refugees should receive
protection and assistance until their situation is resolved in accordance
with relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, the primary resolution being
UNGA 194(III), 11 December 1948.
[vii]
The decision by the UN General Assembly to merge the role of international
protection for the refugees with the larger task of Arab-Israeli
conciliation ultimately compromised the ability of the UNCCP to protect the
rights of the refugees and promote the durable solution set forth in
Resolution 194. Moreover, when the United Nations established the UNCCP in
1948 it was assumed that the refugees would return to their places of origin
within a short period of time. The Commission, therefore, was not provided
with the machinery or with the resources to provide protection and
facilitate durable solutions over an extended period of time.
[viii]
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
GA Resolution 428 (V), Annex, 5 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, UN Doc. A/1775
(1950).
[ix]
For an overview of state practice concerning interpretation of Article 1D of
the 1951 Refugee Convention, see, Takkenberg; and, Akram and
Goodwin-Gill.
[x]
For a summary of the legal, social, economic and political conditions of
Palestinian refugees in exile, see, BADIL survey of Palestinian
refugees (forthcoming 2002). Also see, Takkenberg, pp. 149-171;
Marie-Louise Weighill, “Palestinians in Exile: Legal, Geographical and
Statistical Aspects,” The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1998, Ghada Karmi
& Eugene Cotran (eds.). London: Ithaca Press, 1999, pp. 7-36.
[xi]
The JIU was established to address management and budgeting issues,
development coordination, inter-organization coordination and evaluation of
policies and methods. Takkenberg, pp. 283-84.
[xii]
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 27 (XXXIII) – 1982, “Military
Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements in Southern Africa and Elsewhere.”
[xiii]
ExComm. Conclusion No. 46 (XXXVIII) – 1987. See also, ExComm. Conclusion No.
50 (XXXIX) – 1988; ExComm. Conclusion No. 55 (XL) – 1989; ExComm. General
Conclusion on International Protection (XLI) – 1990; ExComm. General
Conclusion on International Protection (XLII) – 1991; ExComm. Conclusion No.
68 (XLIII) – 1992; ExComm. Conclusion No. 71 (XLIV) – 1993.
[xiv]
The cessation of UNHCR conclusions and General Assembly resolutions may be
attributed to at least two factors. First, following the beginning of the
Oslo process, the United States attempted to keep the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict off the United Nations agenda. The US considered UN resolutions on
the matter as unhelpful and prejudicial to the political process. Secondly,
there may have been the assumption that the Palestinian Authority,
established under the Oslo process, would fill the gap in national
protection, at least for Palestinian refugees in the 1967 occupied
territories. Recent reports by the UN Commission on Human Rights, Human
Rights Inquiry Commission and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territories Occupied by Israel Since 1967, however,
provide legal analysis which clearly rejects the notion that the Palestinian
Authority is able to provide the protection afforded by a sovereign state.
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel
since 1967. A/56/440, 4 October 2001; Report of the Human Rights
Inquiry Commission at 33-35. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121, March 2000.
[xv]
The commission was established on 2 January 2001 and visited Israel and the
occupied Palestinian territories between 10-18 February 2001. Ibid.
[xvi]
David Forsythe, UNHCR’s Mandate: The Politics of Being Non-Political.
Working Paper No. 33. Geneva: UNHCR (March 2001), p. 6. See also,
Takkenberg, p. 280.
[xvii]
During the first intifada, for example, UNRWA provided limited
protection for refugees through the Refugee Affairs Officer (RAO) program.
During the second intifada UNRWA has deployed Operations Support
Officer (OSO) teams to facilitate emergency field operations.
[xviii]
Other roles include promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those
in the most destitute categories, to the territories of States; endeavoring
to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and especially
those necessary for their resettlement; obtaining from governments
information concerning the number and conditions of refugees in their
territories and the laws and regulations concerning them; keeping in close
touch with the governments and inter-governmental organizations concerned;
establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private
organizations dealing with refugee questions; and, facilitating the
co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the
welfare of refugees.
[xix]
According to the UNHCR Statute, mandate refugees include: 1) any person
considered to be a refugee under earlier treaties or arrangements; 2)
refugees resulting from the events occurring before 1 January 1951, who are
outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to avail themselves
of its protection owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted or for
reasons other than personal convenience; and 3) any person who is outside
the country of his origin and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of the government of the country of his nationality or return to
the country of his former habitual residence because he has or had
well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion.
[xx]
The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program, established in
1957, exercises a similar role. Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in
International Law. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996, p. 9.
[xxi]
UN General Assembly Resolution 1006 (ES-11), 9 November 1956.
[xxii]
The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S 267
removed time limitations present in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
[xxiii]
A legal explanation is summarized in The State of the World’s Refugees,
Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action. Geneva: UNHCR (2000), pp. 30-31.
[xxiv]
For further details about the extension of the UNHCR mandate see
Goodwin-Gill, pp. 9-10. See also, The State of the World’s
Refugees (2000), pp. 33-35.
[xxv]
ECOSOC Resolution 1655 (LII), 1 June 1972. The mandate of the UNHCR
vis-à-vis internally displaced persons was further clarified by subsequent
conclusions issued by the UNHCR Executive Committee. See, e.g., UNHCR
Executive Committee Conclusion 75 XLV – Internally Displaced Persons (1994).
Today internally displaced persons account for one-quarter of all refugees
and others ‘of concern’ to the UNHCR. For more on the expansion of the UNHCR
mandate to cover internally displaced persons see, Goodwin-Gill, pp.
11-14.
[xxvi]
G.J.L. Coles, “Solutions to the Problem of Refugees and the Protection of
Refugees: A Background Study,” paper prepared for roundtable on durable
solutions and the protection of refugees convened by UNHCR and the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1989. Cited in The State of
the World’s Refugees (2000), p. 71. The change was also related
to a greater focus on individual rights with developments in human rights
law as well as the mass character of refugee flows in the 1990s.
[xxvii]
The reluctance of primarily western industrialized states to grant asylum to
large numbers of refugees also led to the development of temporary
protection. According to a review of UNHCR’s protection mandate, “[t]hese
schemes had both benefits and drawbacks. They allowed civilians to enter a
country speedily and with a minimum of red tape, but since there were no
binding universal standards that apply to temporary protection, the rights
accorded to asylum seekers were often fewer in number and less generous in
scope than those provide for under the [1951 Refugee] Convention. In
addition, beneficiaries were usually granted only ‘temporary’ residence, as
the term implies, and governments could end their protection arrangements at
their own discretion.” UNHCR website, http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/index.html.
[xxviii]
See, e.g., Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI) 1980,
Voluntary Repatriation; Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40 (XXIX),
1985, Voluntary Repatriation. UNHCR has referred to the emphasis on
voluntary repatriation as a “new proactive, homeland oriented and holistic
approach.” State of the World’s Refugees. Geneva: UNHCR, 1995. UNHCR
also began to develop more detailed protection positions on voluntary
repatriation as well as the specific protection issues with women and
children who continue to constitute the majority of the refugee population.
[xxix]
According to a 1967 UNHCR memo, “Under Paragraph 7 (c) the competence of
the High Commissioner shall not extend to a persons ‘Who continues to
receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or
assistance.’” Takkenberg, p. 306.
[xxx]
Press release No. 4-22/54, 29 January 1954. Cited in Takkenberg, p. 305.
[xxxi]
UNHCR, handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, paragraph 143
(1992 edition). More recently, see, Draft Report of the Twentieth
Mtg. Of the Standing Committee (12-14 March 2001), Executive Committee
of the High Commissioner Programme, Standing Committee, 21st
Mtg., UN Doc. EC/51/SC/CRP.10, paragraph 22.
[xxxii]
Paragraph 143 of the UNHCR Handbook states: “It should normally be
sufficient to establish that the circumstances which originally made him
qualify for protection of assistance from UNRWA still persist and
that he has neither ceased to be a refugee under one of the cessation
clauses nor is excluded from the application of the Convention under one of
the exclusion clauses.”
[xxxiii]
For a discussion of the phrase “definitively” settled, see, Akram and
Goodwin-Gill, p. 61.
[xxxiv]
Implementing partners include the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, the
Ministry for Civil Affairs and Communications, the Ministry for Human Rights
and Refugees, the Ministry for Refugees of the Republika Srpska, the
International Organization for Migration, United Nations Volunteers, the
American Refugee Committee, Catholic Relief Services, the Danish Refugee
Council, Save the Children Fund, among others. UNHCR Global Report 2000,
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
[xxxv]
Interview with I. Jackson, 16 March 1992, cited in Takkenberg, p. 306.
[xxxvi]
The figure is based on UNHCR’s 2002 program budget for the Middle East.
[xxxvii]
Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab
World, 19 November 1992 (Cairo).
[xxxviii]
Of the 21 members of the League of Arab States, only 8 (all of whom have
minimal numbers of Palestinian refugees) have acceded to the 1951 Refugee
Convention.
[xxxix]
“UNHCR has entered into scores of such ‘memoranda of understanding’ or
‘memoranda of agreement’ with non-Refugee Convention states to protect the
rights of refugees and displaced persons and promote human rights guarantees
in many areas of the world.” Susan M. Akram and Terry Rempel,
“Recommendations for Durable Solutions for Palestinian Refugees: A Challenge
to the Oslo Framework,” 11/12 Palestine Yearbook of International Law,
2000/2001. The Agency has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
Jordan and as of the end of 2001 was in the process of negotiating memoranda
with Syria and Lebanon.
[xl]
This includes Article 8 under which “Contracting States shall not apply such
[extraordinary] measures [against the person, property or interests] to a
refugee who is formally a national of the said State solely on account of
such nationality”; Article 12 on Personal Status; and, Article 28 on Travel
Documents, which is to be subject to the limitations which result from
Section 6 of Israel’s 1952 Passport Law.
[xli]
B.S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards A
Critical History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems. Working Paper
No. 2. UNHCR (May 1999), p. 4. Nevertheless, the UNHCR was able to
facilitate repatriation of some refugees choosing to return to the Soviet
bloc. See, e.g., the description of UNHCR activities in Hungary in
late 1950s in, The State of the World’s Refugees (2000), pp. 26-35.
[xlii]
Jeff Crisp, Mind the Gap! UNHCR, Humanitarian Assistance and the Development
Process. UNHCR Working Paper No. 43 (May 2001), p. 6.
[xliv]
To some observers UNHCR protection has become “increasingly pragmatic – to
do the best in difficult circumstances and to implement the least bad
options – and not chiefly to uphold universal principles.” Gil Loescher,
“UNHCR and the Erosion of Refugee Protection,” 10 Forced Migration Review
(April 2001), p. 29. According to one commentator, “UNHCR officials
concede [that] the decision to promote repatriation is based not only on the
refugees’ preference but more fundamentally on UNHCR’s objective assessment
of whether life is better at home relative to life in the camps.” Michael
Barnett, “UNHCR and the Ethics of Repatriation,” 10 Forced Migration
Review (April 2001), p. 34.
[xlviii]
B.S. Chimni, “The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary
Repatriation,” 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 3 (1993), p.
443.
[l]
For a comprehensive overview, see, Lynn Hastings, “Implementation of the
Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Implementation of the Property
Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 37 Stanford Journal of International
Law 221(2001): pp. 221-254.
[li]
Goodwin-Gill (1996), p. 91, referring to discussion within the Social
Committee of ECOSOC; cf. UN Doc. E/AC.7/SR.172 cited in Takkenberg, p. 305.
[lii]
U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 328th mtg., para. 52,
55 cited in Akram and Rempel.
[liii]
See note 33 above and accompanying text for a discussion of the
cessation of refugee status for Palestinian refugees under international
refugee law.
[liv]
For the most recent formulation see the Israeli response to the Palestinian
Position paper on refugees at the last round of final status negotiations
between the PLO and Israel in Taba, Egypt (January 2001). The response is
archived on the BADIL website.
[lv]
See the majority decision in Ben Shalom vs. Central Election Committee,
43 P.D. IV 221 (1988) in 25 Israel Law Review 219 (1991) cited in
Legal Violations of Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Shfaram: Adalah, The
Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 1998, pp. 44-45. For
commentary on the discriminatory character of the preferenced legal status,
see 1998 ‘Concluding Observations’ of various UN human rights treaty
monitoring committees, including the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights, and the Committee on Civil and Political Rights. Committee
observations are archived on the website of the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www.unhchr.ch.
[lvi]
Lecture by Mrs Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
at Ben Gurion University, “The Current Problems of Refugee Populations,”
Beer Sheva, Israel, 23 May 2000. See, the UNHCR website,
http://www.unhcr.ch. [last visited 20/06/00].
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