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Commentary
60 Years of Dignity and Justice Denied
How the unresolved
Palestinian refugee question stands for the failure of the international
human rights and humanitarian regime
by Ingrid Jaradat
Gassner*
Reflections on the
Palestine Return Movement
by Muhammad Jaradat*
60 Years of Dignity and
Justice Denied
How the unresolved Palestinian refugee question stands
for the failure of
the international human rights and humanitarian regime
by Ingrid Jaradat Gassner*

A t the
beginning of the 20th century,
most Palestinians lived inside the borders of Palestine, which is now
divided into Israel and the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Today, almost
75% of the Palestinian people are displaced, and Palestinian refugees
present the world’s largest and longest-standing unresolved refugee case.
Approximately half of the Palestinian people live in forced exile outside
their homeland, while another 23% are displaced within the borders of former
Palestine.1 Six decades after
the first and most massive wave of forced displacement in 1948, Palestinian
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) still lack access to durable
solutions and reparations, including return, restitution and compensation,
in accordance with international law and UN resolutions. While more
Palestinians are being displaced today, effective protection is still not
available for them.
Contrary
to conventional wisdom, the Palestinian refugee question is not primarily a
result of armed conflicts, but rather the outcome of a protracted and
ongoing process of colonization and forced population transfer (ethnic
cleansing). The latter is defined by the United Nations as the “ systematic,
coercive and deliberate…movement of population into or out of an area … with
the effect or purpose of altering the demographic
composition of a territory, particularly when that ideology or policy
asserts the dominance of a certain group over another” [emphasis added].
Forced population transfer constitutes a war crime and a crime against
humanity under modern international law.2
The origins of Palestinian
displacement date back to the early 20 th
century, when the Zionist movement began implementation of
its Basle Program (1897) with the aim to “create for the Jewish people a
home in Palestine secured by public international law”3
- i.e. a Jewish state in Palestine, where Jews at the
time constituted only 8% of the population and owned some 2.5% of the land.
In the period prior to 1948, Zionist colonization of Palestine was conducted
through the implantation of Jewish immigrants – by 1948, the portion of the
Jewish population in Palestine had grown to one third, primarily due to
immigration – and land purchases by Zionist agencies, such as the Palestine
Colonization Agency (PCA) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF).
The idea of transferring the
indigenous population out of the country played a key role in political
Zionism from early on, simply because most Palestinian Arabs were unwilling
to part with their land – Zionist landownership increased from 2.5% to
approximately 6% only between 1922 and 1945 4
- and because Palestinians resisted Zionist colonization.
Already Theodor Herzl, the founding father of political Zionism, had stated:
“We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by
procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any
employment in our own country. The property owners will come over to our
side. Both process of expropriation and removal of the poor must be carried
out discreetly and circumspectly.”5
During the British Mandate over
Palestine (1923 – 1948), leading Zionist thinkers developed numerous plans
to carry out the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, including the Weizman
Transfer Scheme (1930), the Soskin Plan of Compulsory Transfer (1937), the
Weitz Transfer Plan (1937), the Bonne Scheme (1938), the al-Jazirah Scheme
(1938), the Norman Transfer Plan to Iraq (1934–38), and the Ben-Horin Plan
(1943–48). 6 The Zionist movement
and its colony in Palestine, however, did not have the power to requiste
territory by force and implement a massive forced population transfer until
late 1947, when both became possible for the first time.
Zionist colonization of
Palestine and the massive forced displacement of the indigenous Arab
population in 1947 – 1949 would most likely not have occurred without the
active support of the international community at the time, which violated
its own standards and international law for this purpose. Since then, the
international community has failed to hold Israel to account for its
violations of international law. This explains why, 60 years later, the
Palestinian refugee question has remained unresolved, while Israel continues
to occupy and colonize Palestinian land and displace Palestinians.
World War I – 1947: Setting the stage for armed
conflict and population transfer
Until the First World War,
Palestine was one of several Arab territories that were part of the Ottoman
Empire, while the indigenous population aspired for independence and
sovereignty in an Arab state. Encouraged by a promise of the British High
Commissioner in Egypt to support Arab independence (Mac Mahon – Hussein
correspondence) 7, Arab forces
joined the Allied effort to bring down the Ottoman regime, and Palestine was
occupied by Allied forces under British command in September 1918.
Towards the end of the war,
Arabs in Palestine and beyond were inspired by U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination for the post-World War I order 8
and the Anglo-French Declaration signed in November
1918. The latter stated that the goal “[... was] the complete and final
liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks,
and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving
their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of
the indigenous populations” [emphasis added]. This and the doctrine of
self-determination were subsequently enshrined in the Covenant of the League
of Nations (1919).9
In 1919, the Allied powers
members of the League of Nations decided to establish a temporary “Mandate
System” in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations to
facilitate the independence of these territories. Article 22 of the Covenant
stipulates that “certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as
independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” 10
The August 1920 Treaty of Sčvres between the Allied
Powers and Turkey affirmed that Palestine“ be
provisionally recognised as an independent State subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they
are able to stand alone.”11
Parellel to the above, however,
Britain and France had signed already in 1916 a secret understanding
(Sykes-Picot agreement) in which they defined their respective spheres of
influence and control in West Asia after the expected down fall of the
Ottoman Empire. Palestine was reserved for British control under this
agreement. In November 1917, the British cabinet issued the Balfour
Declaration. The one-page letter from Arthur Balfour, British Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, to Lord Rothschild, head of the British Zionist Federation,
granted explicit recognition of and support to the idea of establishing a
Jewish “national home” in Palestine through immigration and colonization.
Despite widespread Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain
viewed Zionist colonization as a way to advance British interests in the
region. 12
Due to the above, Arabs,
including the indigenous population of Palestine, were strongly opposed to a
British Mandate over Palestine. Britain, however, insisted that, “in the
case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine, we do not propose even
to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants
of the country. Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in
age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder
import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit
that ancient land.” 13 In
1920, the League of Nations entrusted the temporary administration
(“Mandate”) of Palestine to Great Britain.
The British Mandate, which
eventually came into force in September 1923, thus included an inherent
contradiction which set the stage for armed
conflictin Palestine: although Palestine was classified as a “Class A” Mandate (i.e. the type closest to independence), the British Mandate incorporated
the political commitment to the Zionist movement set out in the Balfour
Declaration. In order to facilitate establishment of the Jewish “national
home”, moreover, the British Mandate accorded full political rights to the
Zionist colony in Palestine, while only civil and religious rights were
granted to the Palestinian Arab majority. 14
Subsequently, the British
administration in Palestine promulgated new laws, including the 1925
Citizenship Order and the 1928 Land (Settlement of Title) Order,
which facilitated Zionist colonization. Under these laws, tens of thousands
of Jews from around the world would immigrate and acquire citizenship in
Palestine, while thousands of Palestinian Arabs who were abroad were unable
to acquire citizenship 15; annual
land acquisitions by Zionist agencies increased twenty-fold. Although the
overall amount of land purchased remained small, the real impact of Zionist
purchases lay in the quality and strategic location of the land, and in the
unprecedented policy of forced eviction of indigenous tenant farmers.
Already in the 1930s, the British administration grappled with a new
phenomenon of landless peasants, and by the early 1940s, the average rural
Palestinian Arab family had less than half of the agricultural land required
for their subsistence.16
British support of Zionist
colonization led to a series of Palestinian uprisings, including the “Great
Revolt”, which lasted from 1936 to 1939. The British responded with a
combination of military force and administrative measures, including
emergency laws, that severely curtailed basic civil and political rights and
weakened Palestinian resistance. Palestinian Arab leaders were arrested,
jailed and deported. Thousands of Palestinian Arab homes were demolished.
Some 40,000 Palestinian Arabs fledthecountryduringthemid-1930salone. 17
Palestinian uprisings were suppressed in cooperation
with Zionist militias which were trained and armed for this purpose.
Following each uprising, the
British government dispatched an official commission of inquiry to Palestine.
These commissions invariably
identified fear of the political and economic consequences of Zionism among the
indigenous population as the leading cause of the conflict. British efforts
to appease Arab resistance by slowing down the rate of Jewish immigration
and a promise of sovereignty after ten years – which was conditioned upon a
power-sharing agreement between the indigenous Arab majority and the Zionist
colony (1939 White Paper) - triggered strong opposition of and armed
conflict with the Zionist movement.
British efforts at the time to
restrict Jewish immigration failed, among others, because western states, in
particular the United States, supported and facilitated the resettlement in
Palestine of displaced European Jews in violation of international
commitments not to resettle displaced persons in non-self-governing
territories without the consent of the indigenous population. [need a
reference here] Jewish immigration to Palestine was facilitated, while the
borders of many Western countries, including the United States, remained
largely closed to Jewish refugees, despite the knowledge of Nazi persecution
and atrocities.
In early 1947, the British
government informed the newly-established United Nations (the successor to
the League of Nations) of its intention to withdraw from Palestine.
1947 – 1949: from the UN Partition Plan to the
Palestinian Nakba

The United Nations took up the
“Question of Palestine” in 1947, when the atrocities of the Nazi regime and
World War II had given rise to new international legal norms that were
binding for states. The UN Charter, for example, prohibits the use of force
in inter-state relations 18,
including the acquisition of territory by force, and provides for the right
of nations to self-determination. The United Nations, however, sidelined the
right to self-determination of the Arab majority and prevented
de-colonization of Palestine, in clear knowledge of the likely disastrous
consequences for the Arab people of Palestine, the people of the region, and
international peace and security.
The UN Charter stipulated that
upon termination of a mandate, non-self-governing territories should become
independent or be placed under a “Temporary Trusteeship” of the United
Nations. In the case of Palestine, however, the UN General Assembly decided
to appoint a special committee to formulate recommendations concerning the
future status of the country. The Assembly rejected a request of Arab states
to discuss independence of Palestine as a possible option. It also rejected
requests, again submitted by Arab states, to obtain an advisory opinion from
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the appropriate legal
outcome of the British decision to terminate the Mandate in Palestine, as
well as the legal authority of the UN to issue and enforce recommendations
on the future status of the country. 19
In September 1947, the UN
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) presented its
final report which included a majority proposal and a minority proposal, because
Committee members had been unable to reach a consensus on the future status
of the country. 20 The majority
of the Committee members supported the partition of Palestine into two
states, one Arab and the other Jewish, although they conceded that
“[w]ith regard to the principle of self-determination, although
international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the
First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab
territories, at the time of the creation of the “A” Mandates, it was not
applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible
the creation of a Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said
that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run
counter to that principle.”20
The minority proposal was for
one federal state for Arabs and Jews. Committee members of the minority were
adamant in their warnings of the consequences of partition: “Future peace
and order in Palestine and the Near East generally will be vitally affected
by the nature of the solution decided upon for the Palestine question. In
this regard, it is important to avoid an acceleration of the separatism
which now characterizes the relations of Arabs and Jews in the Near East,
and to avoid laying the foundations of a dangerous irredentism there, which
would be the inevitable consequences of partition in whatever form. […]
Partition both in principle and in substance can only be regarded as an
anti-Arab solution. The Federal State, however, cannot be described as an
anti-Jewish solution. To the contrary, it will best serve the interests of
both Arabs and Jews.” 21
Also in the United States, the
State Department, the Department of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
staff of the National Security Council and the newly established Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) were united in warning of the dangers partition
might inflict to strategic US interests. In public and private statements they
also explained that the UN partition proposals were not workable and in
contravention to international law and the UN Charter: “[they] ignore
such principles as self-determination and majority rule. They recognize the
principle of a theocratic racial state and go even so far in several
instances as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons
outside of Palestine. We have hitherto always held that in our foreign
relations American citizens, regardless of race or religion, are entitled to
uniform treatment. The stress on whether persons are Jews or non-Jews is
certain to strengthen feelings among both Jews and Gentiles in the United
States and elsewhere that Jewish citizens are not the same as other
citizens.” 22
On 29 November 1947, however,
the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 recommending the partition of
Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, in which all persons
were to be guaranteed equal rights, and an international regime for the city
of Jerusalem. 33 states, including the United States, Canada and many
European states, voted for partition, while 13 states, including all Arab
states, voted against and 10 states, including Britain, abstained. The
proposed Jewish state was allotted 56% of the land, even though Jews
constituted less than one-third of the population and owned no more than 7%
of the land. The dispersal of the Arab and Jewish populations in the country
meant that nearly half the population of the proposed Jewish state consisted
of Palestinian Arabs, who owned nearly 90% of the land. 23
In Palestine, immediate massive
protests against the UN partition plan by the Arab population gave way
rapidly to armed
conflict between local Arab and militarily superior Zionist militias. The latter were
“trying to consolidate the advantages gained at the General Assembly by a
succession of drastic operations […]” 24
A
first major wave of Palestinian refugees was induced by the Zionist military operation
known as “Plan Dalet”, which was designed to achieve the military fait
accompli upon which the state of Israel was to be based, including
conquest of western Jerusalem and its surrounding Arab villages.25
The massacre of more than 100 men, women and children
in the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin in April 1948 is widely
acknowledged to have contributed to the fear and panic that led to the mass
displacement.
While some 300,000 Palestinians
were forcibly displaced by Zionist forces when Palestine was still under the
British Mandate regime (November 1947 - 14 May 1948), neither Britain nor
the United Nations intervened to protect Palestinians. The United Nations,
moreover, also failed to protect Palestinians from forced displacement
during the subsequent first Arab-Israeli war (15 May 1948 – 1949).
States voting for the UN
partition plan were aware of the fact that partition would have to be
imposed on the parties. 26
However, UN efforts for implementation of the plan through the Security
Council and a Palestine Commission set up for this purpose were soon
abandoned. As Palestine descended into the predicted violence, the United
States launched in March 1948 an initiative for UN Trusteeship in the UN
Security Council but failed to pursue it with determination. On 14 May 1948,
Britain concluded the withdrawal of its troops and terminated its Mandate
regime over Palestine without any formal arrangement for the transfer of
power. On the same day, the Zionist movement declared the establishment of
the state of Israel, and Arab states responded with a declaration of war on
15 May 1947.

As the
first Arab-Israeli war was fought in Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians more were forcibly displaced
from their homes as a result of Israeli war crimes, including shelling of
Palestinian communities with the aim to induce flight, massacres, rape, looting, destruction of civilian property and homes, and overt expulsion
of the civilian population of Palestinian towns and villages. Israeli
military forces systematically destroyed numerous Palestinian villages, as
one of six measures included in a “Retroactive Transfer” plan approved in
June 1948 in order to prevent Palestinian Arab refugees from returning to
their homes. The destruction of homes and entire villages was accompanied by
large-scale looting. 27
During the war, the United
Nations declared an embargo on arms sales, appointed a mediator, brokered
cease-fire agreements and provided emergency assistance to Palestinian refugees through its
Refugee Organization (later to be replaced by UNRWA). It also issued several
resolutions, including UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (11 December
1948), which affirmed Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their homes and
properties and established the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP).
The latter was mandated to ensure protection, including durable solutions,
for Palestinian refugees in accordance with UNGAR 194 and facilitate a peace
agreement between Arab states and Israel. None of these measures, however,
were able to prevent or reverse Palestinian displacement.
By the time the
first Arab-Israeli war ended in 1949 with cease-fire agreements between Israel and Arab states,
Israel had effective control over 78% of British Mandate Palestine,
including areas which had been allocated to the Arab state under the UN
partition plan. In several of the sub-districts of former Palestine that
were wholly incorporated into Israel – Jaffa, Ramla and Beersheba – not one
Palestinian village was left standing. In total, more than 500 Palestinian
villages, with a land base of more than 17,000 km 2,
were depopulated.28 An estimated
two-thirds of Palestinian refugee homes inside the new state of Israel were
destroyed; the remaining third were expropriated and occupied by Jews.29
In total, 750 – 900,000 Palestinians, representing
half of the pre-war Arab population of Palestine or 85% of those in the
territory that became the state of Israel, were displaced.30
Most of them became refugees; of the roughly 150,000
Palestinians who remained in those parts of Palestine that became the state
of Israel on 14 May 1948, approximately 30,000 were internally displaced
persons (IDP).
On 11 May 1949, the UN General
Assembly decided that “Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the
obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out
those obligations” 31 and
approved Israel’s membership in the United Nations.
For the purpose of the United
Nations and its dominant members states, Palestine and the Palestinian
people had disappeared. “They had become an indistinct mass of refugees –
not a nation, not a political entity, only a problem, and not a major one at
that.” 32 Palestinians refer to
the events of 1947 – 1949 as the Nakba, meaning the Catastrophe.
1949 – 2008: the “ongoing Nakba”
In May 1949, the UN General
Assembly had approved Israel’s UN membership without conditions. The
international community thereby prejudiced the outcome of parallel
UN-facilitated efforts for Arab-Israeli peace and a solution of the
Palestinian refugee question, and encouraged continuation of the Zionist
pre-war policy by the state of Israel.
Most western states and the
Soviet Union had recognized the state of Israel immediately following its
declaration on 14 May 1948. One year later, the UN General Assembly approved
Isarel’s UN membership without conditions; it only “recalled” UN resolutions
181 and 194 and “took note of” the explanations provided by Israel’s
representative, including the argument that the state of Israel had acted in
self-defense. The United Nations thereby provided implicit recognition of
Israel on the territory conquered in the
first Arab-Israeli war, in contravention of the UN partition plan and in violation of the
UN Charter-enshrined prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force.
Moreover, in an era when states
had endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), prosecuted
Nazi perpetrators for the crimes against humanity, including genocide,
committed against Jews and other people (Nuremberg Tribunals, 1945 - 1949)
and established war crimes under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), the
General Assembly failed to hold Israel to account for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed against Palestinians before and during the
first Arab-Israeli war, including the massive population transfer.
Lack of accountability to
international law created an environment in which UNCCP-facilitated efforts
for conflictresolutionbasedonUNGeneralAssemblyResolution194 were prone to
fail. The Palestinian refugee question featured central during the peace
conferences of Lausanne (1949) and Paris (1951), where Arab states insisted
that a solution must be based on the choice of the refugees and include
return to their homes and properties now located in Israel, while Israel
insisted that the solution of the refugee problem was to be sought primarily
in resettlement in Arab territory. By 1952, the UNCCP concluded that it had
failed in its task and held that the parties would have “to depart from
their original positions in order to make possible practical and realistic
arrangements towards the solution of the refugee problem,” even at the
cost of straying from the letter of Resolution 194. 33
Since the 1970s, the United
Nations has reaffirmed that Palestinians are a nation entitled to
self-determination, independence and refugee return, 34
but the lack of accountability has remained. Failure
to uphold the rule of law gave rise to a situation where Israel violates the
fundamental rights of the Palestinian and other Arab people and continues
its colonial enterprise with impunity:
Estimated Number of Palestinians Displaced, by
Period of Displacement
|
Year |
Number of Palestinians Displaced |
|
British Mandate: 1922–1947 |
100,000 – 150,000 |
|
Partition to Armistice (Nakba):1947–1949 |
750,000 – 900,000 |
|
Military rule in Israel: 1950–1966
|
35,000 – 45,000 |
|
1967 War |
400,000 – 450,000 |
|
Occupation: 1967–2006 |
300,000 – 400,000 |
|
Total |
1,585,000 – 1,945,000 |
By mid-2007, the total number of Palestinian
refugees and IDPs, including descendants, was estimated to be 7.5 million.
Estimated Area of Palestinian Land
Expropriated/Confiscated, byPeriod
|
Year |
Area of ConfiscatedPalestinianLand(km 2) |
|
British Mandate: 1922–1947 |
– |
|
Partition to Armistice (Nakba):
1947–1949 |
17,178 |
|
Military rule in Israel: 1950–1966
|
700 |
|
1967 War |
849 |
|
Occupation: 1967–2006 |
3,558 |
|
Total |
22,285 |
The total area of historical
Palestine (Israel and OPT) is 26,323 km2.
Note: there is no single
authoritative source for the exact number of Palestinian forcibly displaced
since 1948, or for the exact amount of land expropriated from Palestinians
by Israel since 1948. The
figures above are based on available data and estimates. For a more detailed analysis of these
figures and comprehensive references, see: Survey of Palestinian Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons 2006-7, BADIL Resource Center.

From 1948 onwards, the state of
Israel provided a powerful vehicle for consolidating the war gains of
political Zionism: effective control of territory and borders provided for
the first time the conditions for unrestricted Jewish immigration. A military
government (1948 - 1966) set-up exclusively to control the remaining
Palestinian population served to prevent refugee return and facilitated
seizure of land of the Palestinian refugees and IDPs, as well as of those
who had remained. 36 By the
mid-1950s, Israeli forces had killed some 5,000 refugees (“infiltrators”) who had
tried to return to their homes37,
and the land area held by the state and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) had
increased tenfold (from 11% before 1948 to 90%). The names of more than 500
depopulated Palestinian villages were erased from the map, while the Arabic
names of geographical landmarks were replaced with Hebrew ones.38
Physical destruction of the depopulated Palestinian
villages continued until the mid-1960s; it was referred to as ‘cleaning up
the national views.’39
A discriminatory,
apartheid-like regime was promulgated by the state, in order to “legalize”
and sustain the massive population transfer and requisition of Palestinian
property accomplished before and during the firstArab-Israeliwar.The1952
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law facilitated the mass
denationalization of Palestinian refugees; because most Palestinian refugees
were outside the state of Israel on, or after, 14 July 1952, the date on
which the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law came into effect.
They have been unable to resume domicile in their homeland, while all Jews
in the world and their relatives are entitled to Israeli citizenship under
the 1950 Law of Return. A web of new land laws, including emergency
regulations and laws relating to so-called abandoned property, was adopted
to facilitate the expropriation of Palestinian-owned land and transfer of
title to the state, the Development Authority and the JNF. Under the 1960
Basic Law: Israel Lands, land held by these three bodies is not
transferable through sale or any other way. This land regime has ensured
exclusive use by Jews of most of “Israel Lands”, which are estimated to be
around 93% of the land in Israel. 40

At the same time, the state of
Israel continued to change the demographic composition of the country
through further population transfer:
Between 1949 - 1966,
Palestinians were forcibly transferred primarily from the northern border
villages, the Naqab (Negev), the “Little Triangle” (an area ceded to Israel
under the armistice agreement with Jordan), and from villages partially
emptied during the 1948 war. The 1965 Planning and Building Law
established 123 Arab communities with little or no space for expansion. No
new Palestinian community has been approved since then. All other
Palestinian communities, even if established prior to the creation of the
state of Israel, were classified as unauthorized and illegal (“unrecognized
villages”). Unrecognized villages cannot apply for building licenses, are
not entitled to public services, and homes can be demolished. “Nearly
100,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel – one in 10 – live in unrecognized
villages.” 41
Since 1967, the
official policy of Judaization
- i.e., the establishment of Jewish majorities in
every area of Israel - has led to more dispossession and internal
displacement of Palestinian citizens of Israel.42
This policy is
reflected in a 2004 emergency plan of then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to “save the
outlying areas” in the Naqab (Negev) and Galilee43,
as well as in Israel’s national development plan, “Tama 35” (2005). Since
the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in 2000,
moreover, plans for the transfer of Palestinian citizens outside of the
country have again become a legitimate matter of public debate and law
proposals. In July 2001, for instance, a bill was proposed to encourage the
emigration of Palestinian citizens of Israel on the grounds that “they do
not identify with the Jewish character of the state” and in order to
strengthen “Israel as a Jewish state and a democracy.”44
While various Israeli
official and unofficial transfer plans for “resolving” the Palestinian refugee problem
through encouraging permanent resettlement (e.g. in Iraq, Libya, Latin
America and elsewhere) have had little practical impact, Israel’s transfer
policy has been highly effective in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory
(OPT):
Israeli plans to take control
of and colonize the remainder of British Mandatory Palestine, i.e. the
Jordanian controlled West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and the
Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip, had existed since 1948, and preparations for
a military government there were ongoing since 1963. 45
In 1967, armed
conflict (the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) provided once more the context in which Israel
was able to induce massive forced displacement of Palestinians and establish
effective control over more Palestinian land.
During the 1967 war, Israeli
military forces again attacked numerous Palestinian civilian areas that had
no military
significance. Refugee camps in Jericho, for example, were bombed by the Israeli air
force, leading to an exodus of tens of thousands of refugees. Palestinians
were driven from their homes, others were transferred out of the West Bank
on busses and trucks provided by the military. 46
Israel completely destroyed several Palestinian
villages and thousands of homes; the entire Moroccan quarter in the Old City
of Jerusalem, adjacent to the Western Wall, was razed to make way for a
large plaza for Jewish religious and national events.

After the war, Israel’s regime
of military occupation in the 1967 OPT served to consolidate and sustain the
war gains. This regime of occupation combines overt military force with an
administrative regime based on a myriad of military orders, which were
modeled on the discriminatory, apartheid-like legal regime over
Palestinians in Israel for the same Zionist policy objectives:47
in the course of 41 years, Israel’s regime of
occupation has prevented refugee return, facilitated
confiscation of Palestinian land and Jewish colonization, and displaced more of the
occupied Palestinian population. These policies have been implemented
irrespective of the US-led peace efforts between Israel and the PLO (since
1991) and the presence in the OPT of the international community (since
1967) and the Palestinian Authority (since 1994). They have changed the
demographic composition of the country and prevented self-determination of
the Palestinian people: by 2007, the approximately 450,000 Jewish settlers
in colonies in the occupied West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem,
constituted 15% of the population in this area, Israel held at least 45% of
the land, and the construction of the Wall annexed, de facto, over
10% of the land of the West Bank.48
Rather than holding Israel to
account, the international community led by the Quartet (United
States, EU, Russia and the United Nations) has imposed sanctions against the
occupied Palestinians since 2006. A policy of economic and diplomatic
sanctions was combined with divisive
financial, diplomatic and military support, in order to bring down the Hamas-led
Palestinian Authority government elected democratically in 2006. The results
are unprecedented humanitarian crisis, the collapse of the Palestinian
political system, internecine armed conflict between the leading Palestinian
factions, geographical fragmentation of the OPT and lack of humanitarian
access due to Israel’s closure policy, in particular to the occupied Gaza
Strip – where 70% of the population are Palestinian refugees of the Nakba of
1948.
In this relentless process of
Israeli land-grab and Palestinian displacement, the Nakba continues for
Palestinians, and so does their struggle for dignity and justice. Both have
shaped Palestinian identity from generation to generation, in the homeland
and in exile.
How do Palestinian refugees
reflectontheirlives60yearsintotheNakba?Thisisthequestionaddressedin this
magazine through the life-stories told by 15 Palestinians living in places
as diverse as Britain, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon, Scotland,
Syria, The Netherlands, Canada, the United States and historic Palestine
(Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip). Their stories are different in many
ways. They
reflect loss, humiliation, hopes, efforts and successes at re-building lives, homes and communities in foreign,
often inhospitable, lands and societies that have become “hosts” not by
choice. At the same time, these stories are strikingly similar, because the
current attempts to destroy the Palestinian collective identity bind new
generations of Palestinians directly to the older ones, and the exile to the
home. And as the young grapple with the consequences of a shared but distant
past and reclaim a collective present, every one of them has somehow,
through all of the different journeys, arrived together at the same place.49
-------------------------------------
* Ingrid Jaradat Gassner is
the Director of Badil. She can be reached at info@badil.org
Endnotes
1) See: Survey of
Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006-2007,
BADIL Resource Center, 2007. Available at: www.badil.org
2) Fourth Geneva Convention
(1949), Article 147; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
entered into force on 1 July 2002, Article 7.2(d) and Article
8.2(b)(viii).
3) The Basle Program, 31
August 1897, excerpts reprinted in Documents on Palestine, From the
Pre-Ottoman/Ottoman Period to the Prelude to the Madrid Middle East
Peace Conference, Abdul Hadi, Madhi F. (ed.). Jerusalem: PASSIA,
1997, p. 14.
4) See Lehn, Walter, The
Jewish National Fund, 1988.
5) The Complete Diaries
of Theodor Herzl, Vol. I. Patai, Rephael (ed.). New York: Herzl
Press and T. Yoseloff, 1960, pp. 8–9.
6) See, for example:
Masalha, Nur, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of
“Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Washington, DC:
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. Also see Simons, Chaim,
International Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine 1895–1947, A
Historical Survey, Hoboken, New Jersey: Ktav Publishing, 1988. See
also Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford:
One world Publications, 2006.
7) Correspondence between
the Sharif of Mecca and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry
Mac Mahon (Mac Mahon – Hussein correspondence), see: Walid al Khalidi,
Before Their Diaspora, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut,
year, page?
8) Kathleen Kristisson,
Perceptions of Palestine. Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy:
University of Californian Press, 1999; p. 17.
9) Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, reprinted in Survey
of Palestine, Vol. I. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1991, pp. 2–3.
10) Covenant of the League
of Nations, 28 June 1919, Article 22.
11) The Treaty of Peace
between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, signed at Sčvres,
10 August 1920, Part II, Section VII, Art. 94.
12) Quigley, John,
Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1990, p. 8.
13) Statement by Arthur
Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Office No.371/4183(1919), quoted in The Origins and Evolution
of the Palestine Problem 1917–1988, Part I. New York: United
Nations, 1990.
14) The Mandate for
Palestine, 24 July 1922, is reprinted in Survey of Palestine,
Vol. I. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, pp.
4–11.
15) Out of 9,000
citizenship applications from Palestinians outside the country,
British officials approved only 100. Based on an average family size
of six persons, more than 50,000 Palestinians may have been
affected. Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 5479.
London: HMSO, 1937, p. 331.
16) Toward the De-Arabization
of Palestine/Israel 1945–1977. Nijim, Basheer K. (ed.). Dubuque,
Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1984, p. 10.
17) See, for example,
Sayigh, Yezid, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, The
Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993, Washington, DC:
Institute for Palestine Studies and Oxford University Press, 1999;
Gabbay, Rony, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish
Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study). Geneva: Librairie E.
Droz, and Paris, Librairie Minard, 1959, p. 66.
18) See Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter with its exceptions in the form of self-defense
(Article 51 of the Charter) and forcible measures undertaken by the
Security Council under Chapter 7 (Articles 39, 41-42).
19) For the proposed
texts of the questions to be submitted to the ICJ, see Iraq (UN Doc.
A/AC.14.21); Syria (UN Doc. A/AC.14/25); and Egypt (UN Doc.
A/AC.14/14).
20) Report of the UN
Special Committee on Palestine, The Question of Palestine. UN
Doc. A/364, 3 September 1947.
21) ibid,
paragraph 176.
22) ibid,
Chapter VII Recommendations (III), paragraphs 10 and 11.
23) Loy Henderson,
State Department
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,22.Sept.1947,quotedby Donald
Neff, “Truman Overrode Strong State Department Warning Against
Partitioning of Palestine in 1947. Washington Report,
September/October 1994.
24) Report of the UN
Special Committee on Palestine, TUN Doc. A/364, 3 September
1947.
25) Sir Alexander
Cadogan, Representative of the Mandatory Power, to the UN Palestine
Commission: “In the present circumstances the Jewish story that the
Arabs are the attackers and the Jews the attacked is not tenable.
The Arabs are determined to show that they will not submit tamely to
the United Nations Plan of Partition; while the Jews are trying to
consolidate the advantages gained at the General Assembly by a
succession of drastic operations […]”; in United Nations Palestine
Commission, First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council,
A/AC.21/7 of 29 January 1948.
26) Khalidi, Walid,
“Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” 28
Journal of Palestine Studies 1 (Autumn 1988), p. 8.
27) See: Recommendation
IV b), UN Doc. A/364, 3 September 1947.
28) See, for example:
Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine; Morris, Benny,
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198; Morris, Benny,
Correcting a Mistake – Jews and Arabs in Palestine/Israel, 1936–1956.
Am Oved Publishers, 2000; Kibbutz Meuhad Archives – Aharon Zisling
Papers 9/9/1, “Decisions of the Provisional Government,” 7 November
1948; Hashomer Haztair Archives (Mapam, Kibbutz Artzi Papers), 66.90
(I), protocol of the meeting of the Political Committee of Mapam, 11
November 1948; Segev, Tom, 1949: The First Israelis, New
York: The Free Press, 1986.
29) Abu Sitta, Salman,
The Palestinian Nakba 1948, Register, The Register of
Depopulated Localities in Palestine. London: Palestinian Return
Centre, 2001.
30) Rempel, Terry,
“Housing and Property Restitution: The Palestinian Refugee Case,”
Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights of Refugees
and Displaced Persons. Leckie, Scott (ed.). New York:
Transnational Publishers, 2003, p. 296.
31) Final Report of
the United Nations Survey Mission for the Middle East (Part I).
UN Doc. A/AC.25/6, which cites a
figure of 750,000 refugees. The total number of refugees rises to around 900,000 if the number
of persons who lost their livelihood but not their homes is added.
32) A/RES/273 (III) of
11 May 1949.
33) Kristisson, p. 94.
34) United Natons
Progress Report, from 23 January to 19 November 1951, A/1985, 20
November 1951.
35) See, for example,
UNGAR 2787 (1971) and UNGAR 3236 (1974).
36) For a detailed
description, see Jiryis, Sabri, The Arabs in Israel, London:
Monthly Review Press, 1976.
37) Morris, Benny,
Israel’s Border Wars, p. 147.
38) See Benvenisti,
Meron, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land,
Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000.
39) Jiryis, Sabri, “The
Legal Structure for the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands
in Israel,” Journal of Palestine Studies 4 (Summer 1973), p.
85; Also see Segev, Tom, “Where Are All the Villages? Where are
They?” Ha’aretz, 6 September 2002. Translated and reprinted
in Between the Lines, October 2002.
40) See, e.g., Boling,
Gail J., “Absentees’ Property Laws to Israel’s
Confiscation of Palestinian Property:A Violation of UN General Assembly
Resolution 194 and International Law,” 11 Palestine Yearbook of
International Law 73 (2000–2001); Ruling Palestine, COHRE
and BADIL, 2005; Halabi, Usama, “Israel’s Land Laws as a
Legal-Political Tool”, Working Paper No. 7, BADIL, December 2004.
41) See Jonathan Cook,
On the Margins: Annual Review of Human Rights Violations of the
Arab Palestinian Minority in Israel in 2005, Nazareth: Arab
Association for Human Rights, June 2006; p. 18.
42) ibid, p. 7.
43) See Mada al-Carmel,
The Arab Center for Applied Social Research, Israel and the
Palestinian Minority 2004, Sultany, Nimer, (ed.), Mada’s Third
Annual Political Monitoring Report, pp. 41–42.
44) Sultany, Nimer,
Citizens Without Citizenship. Mada’s First Annual Political
Monitoring Report: Israel and the Palestinian Minority 2000–2002,
Haifa: Mada, 2003, pp. 42–43.
45) See Tom Segev,
1967 Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East,
Metropolitan Books, 2007, p.458.
46) For a description
of specific incidents, see, e.g., Masalha, Nur, A Land without a
People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians. London: Faber &
Faber, 1997, pp. 81, 85, 87 and 91–94; Masalha, Nur, “The 1967
Palestinian Exodus,” in The Palestinian Exodus 1948–67, Karmi,
Ghada and Cotran, Eugene (eds.), London: Ithaca Press, 2000, p. 94;
Neff, Donald, Warriors for Jerusalem: Six Days that Changed the
Middle East, New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984,
pp. 228–29; and Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim, River without
Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees,
Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969, pp. 40–42, 92.
47) See, for example,
Ruling Palestine, COHRE and BADIL, 2005.
48) Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the 1967 OPT, John Dugard;
Commission on Human Rights, 62nd session, E/CN.4/2006/29, 17
January 2006, p. 5, para. 2.
49) See: Karma Nabulsi,
“From Generation to Generation”, in: al-Majdal (No. 24,
Spring 2006); BADIL.
Reflections on
the Palestine Return Movement
by Muhammad Jaradat*

W hen
the first news came
from Tunis and
Tel-Aviv in early
September 1993
about the secret
talks between the PLO and the Israeli government, the people of
Palestine inside and in the exile were torn between enthusiasm and
optimism on the one hand, and doubt and skepticism on the other. “Let’s
wait and see”, said many then.
The situation of
uncertainty did not last long. A week later, the secret Oslo talks were
revealed and we learned that the parties had concluded the talks with a
Declaration of Principles that was to pave the way for
final status negotiations
on the fundamental
rights of the
Palestinian people,
i.e. the agreement which became known as the Oslo Agreement or the
Declaration of Principles.
Later on, when the text of
the agreement was opened to the public, the Israeli press was the
first to publish. I ran to the Israeli Press
Office in West
Jerusalem to get
a copy- it was
published then only in Hebrew and
English. Reading the original English copy, I was not only shocked but
also deeply alarmed and upset, because I had expected that the PLO
leadership would not surrender and, at the minimum, uphold the
fundamental national rights and base any agreement on UN resolutions and
international law. Reading the agreement, I searched for references to
the core issue of the
conflict, i.e. the refugee issue, and found it mentioned only in a few words as an
issue scheduled “for discussion in the
final status negotiations. ”I thus understood that there were no guarantees or
principles recognized for dealing with this most central issue of the
conflict, and that the future of the large majority of the Palestinian people who
are refugees was uncertain.
The above immediately gave
rise to troublesome questions: what to do about such deterioration? Who
can do what? Is it possible to reinstate people’s rights as a solid
basis for peace and coexistence in the region? These questions and
hundreds more were ringing in the heads of activists, mainly those who
had been heavily involved in the first Intifada, not only in Palestine but
also in communities in exile. In fact, those concerned initially were a
very small number of people, while the scene in the streets was
heartbreaking: people were dancing and celebrating the coming peace and
a promising future on the eve of 13 September 1993; they had no idea
what the Israeli government had in store for them. These public
celebrations showed clearly that our people are keen for peace and
justice; they were ready to place
flowers on the jeeps of the Israeli occupation army which only a day before was
killing them. The scene was amazing and a clear statement by the
Palestinian people of forgiveness, tolerance and acceptance of the
other.
Those were the conditions
and circumstances in which early preparations for the grassroots right
of return movement started in 1993-4. More organized action followed in
1995, based on the first large popular conference convened in the former al-Fara’a
military detention center opposite the al-Fara’a refugee camp. Some
1,500 participants had come to this conference from all over historic
Palestine, and it marked the beginning of the grassroots right-of-return
movement. More initiatives, including specialized workshops and popular
conferences, followed the al-Fara’a conference between 1996 and 2000, in
places such as Nazareth, Bethlehem, Gaza, Beirut, Copenhagen, Berlin,
Washington, Vancouver, London and many others.
Still, the obstacles and
challenges for the activists who then led these initiatives were
tremendous:
The majority of the
Palestinian public still believed that their fundamental rights would
now be implemented, because they had formed the minimum national program
of the PLO for so long: the independent state with Jerusalem as its
capital and the return of the refugees to their homes.
There was a lack of popular
culture and experience with building lobbies or special interest groups,
and with shaping programs for campaigns that aim to advance
specific issues. Thus, for example, a campaign for the protection of
Palestinian residency rights in Jerusalem in the early 1990s was accused
of “fragmenting the national rights and the cause”, and similar
criticism was raised when the campaign for refugee rights started in the
mid-1990s. At the early stage, moreover, some people and many of the
Palestinian political leadership thought that the popular
right-of-return campaign would develop into a new political party or was
intended as an alternative to the PLO, and the campaign was accused of
being driven by “external forces” opposed to the PLO.
In Israel, the campaign was
immediately branded as being a challenge to Israel’s “right to exist”,
as “extremist” undermining the authority of then President Arafat, and
as “fundamentally opposed to peace.” Israeli journalists argued that the
campaign undermined Palestinian statehood, weakened the camp of moderate
Palestinians, and shifted the public mood from conciliation to
hostility. They did so, in order to put pressure on the Palestinian
leadership and political activists and cause internal division and
conflict.
The Palestine solidarity
movement in the West did not understand the campaign initially. Many
solidarity activists wondered what was the problem of these people, and
why they were speaking about the refugees in times when the Palestinians
were finally getting their state based on the Oslo Agreement. In short, the
international community at large thought that everything was settled and
that we should move on to something else.
Finally, the popular
right-of-return campaign was faced with a serious lack of resources.
Although hundreds, if not thousands of people were ready to contribute
as volunteers, there was a shortage of professional skills and
financial resources required for global networking, production of tools for
public education and awareness-raising and effective media work
These obstacles and
challenges, in particular those found in the internal, Palestinian
arena, have played a major role in shaping the campaign. They taught its
activists to work with and for the people, to be patient, tolerant and
modest, and to build solid partnerships. Education and awareness-raising
was undertaken in many different ways, through talking and writing,
small meetings with selected cadre that could
influence the political leadership, workshops with opinion leaders among
their communities, as well as through public rallies and demonstrations.
Initially, all these
efforts were focused on one main question: “how can we stop the
demoralization among the refugees in Palestine and in the exile and
bring back hope and strength?” The answer was found in the creation and
broad dissemination of slogans which
affirmed Palestinian refugee rights in a simple language, such as: “the right of return is sacred”,
“the right of return is possible and realistic” and “my home is my
dignity”. The next step was to give substance to these slogans by
introducing refugee communities to relevant international law and a
rights-based approach to the refugee issue through lectures, workshops
and discussions conducted in the camps, and to ensure the
widest-possible public outreach through the local media.

Nowadays, some 15 years
later, we should be proud of the Palestine Return Movement’s
achievements:
New community centers,
committees and NGOs have been formed wherever Palestinians live, and
Palestinian communities are more aware of their rights and better
organized. Efforts at training the youth and building a new generation
of community leaders have been started. Since 2000, individuals, groups
and organizations have become more connected across borders; they have
formed networks and coalitions, which jointly organize conferences and
function as pressure groups.
Research and literature
produced in this period have succeeded in closing gaps in information
and knowledge, while new and diverse tools of struggle have been
developed for stronger impact. Today, the repertoire of tools is no
longer limited to right-of-return rallies and demonstrations; it rather
includes fact finding visits, petitions, advocacy and lobbying among policy
makers, the use of elections as an opportunity for pressuring candidates
for a clear and rights-based position on the refugee question, and the
strategy global campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
against Israel which has gained considerable strength and momentum over
the past few years.
The Palestine Return
Movement has succeeded in revitalizing the Palestinian consensus about
the centrality of the right to return for the future of the Palestinian
people and peace in the region. This consensus is expressed in similar
language by a large majority of the Palestinian public, organized civil
society and the media, as well as in public statements of the
Palestinian leadership. Understanding and support of this Palestinian
consensus, as well as the need for a solution of the Palestinian refugee
issue in accordance with international law, have increased considerably
also among the global solidarity movement and a small but important
minority of Jews in Israel.
Looking forward for ways
this Movement can be sustained and become even more effective, we see a
need to move on, beyond the focus on the right of return per
se, and towards building a Palestinian culture and struggle for
actual return. Creative and practical plans and methods, as well as
more direct action, will be required for this purpose.
----------------------
*Muhammad Jaradat is the
Coordinator of the Campaign Unit of Badil. He can be contacted at camp@badil.org
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