Exposed Realities Palestinian Residency Rights in the Self Rule Areas Three Years After Partial Israeli Redeployment by Manal Jamal & Buthaina Darwish
This report is an effort to shed light on the situation of Palestinian residency rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip three years after the partial Israeli redeployment from the areas designated for Palestinian self rule. It aims at presenting a comprehensive picture of the new institutional set-up involving both Israeli and Palestinian authorities and their respective decision making powers. It discusses the major problems, some of which are a direct inheritance of the old Israeli occupation system, others newly created by the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The final section includes a list of recommendations to Palestinian and international policy makers, as well as human rights activists. A report of this kind is overdue. No systematic effort at evaluating the legal status of Palestinians in the self rule areas has been made. Local and international media have been reporting misleading and contradictory news, and the Palestinian public has remained confused. We sincerely hope that this report will contribute to a better understanding of an issue which is vital for the Palestinian people who, for fifty years, has been struggling to remain in its homeland. We also hope that our report will enable human rights activists, researchers, policy makers and journalists to work towards the formulation of new strategies for the protection of Palestinian residency rights in the 1967 occupied Palestinian lands. Old strategies of legal assistance and public pressure used by human rights organizations until the hand-over of civil affairs to the Palestinian Authority in 1994 are no longer valid. A new concerted effort for encountering the deterioration of Palestinian residency rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remains yet to be made. We would like to point out, that this
report does not discuss Palestinian residency rights in 1967 occupied East Jerusalem. This
is because Israel's occupation policy has succeeded in further splitting up the
Palestinian people by excluding residents of East Jerusalem from the new framework created
by the Oslo Accords. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are subject of the ongoing
Israeli occupation and annexation policies. Thus, their situation has become
so different from the rest of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories that inclusion of
this subject in this report would have unnecessarily complicated the presentation of
affairs.(1) Chapter 1: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK Based on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993, the handling of civil affairs was transferred from the Israeli authorities (Military Government/Civil Administration) to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in May 1994. While the DOP was still open to interpretations implying that significant decision making power over Palestinian civil affairs would be given to the new PA in the interim period, the consequent Cairo Agreement (4 May 1994) did away with all ambiguity and established clearly that Israel would maintain ultimate control over all major issues, including those pertaining to Palestinian residency rights in the areas administered by the PA. Thus, during the interim period and until resolved otherwise in the final status negotiations, matters of population registration, entry to and exit from the PA areas by both local residents and foreign nationals, family reunification, etc., were to be handled jointly by the Israeli District Coordination Office (DCO) and the Civil Affairs Committee of the PA (CAC). The final decision making power in all these matters was to remain with the Israeli side. The institutional framework, first set up in the Gaza Strip
and Jericho after the partial Israeli redeployment there in 1994, has since been
replicated in the remainder of the West Bank. The headquarters of the CAC, i.e. the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PA headed by Jamil Tarifi, is located in Ramallah. The CAC functions as an intermediary between the Palestinian population, other PA ministries, and the Israeli authorities. Through other PA ministries, especially the Ministry of Interior, the CAC collects applications, requests and complaints and transfers them to the DCO. Later on, CAC liaison officers come to receive the Israeli answers and may negotiate requests not granted. Based on this mechanism, the CAC has become the only legitimate channel for raising Palestinian residency matters to the Israeli side. It replaced all former channels of direct intervention to Israeli decision makers and Israeli courts by residents, lawyers, and human rights activists. In the field of residency, the CAC has the following designated tasks:
Implementation and the practical division of tasks revealed themselves to be much more complicated and confusing than suggested by the text of the political agreements. The result is a series of severe problems - inherent in the new system - which have since prevented Palestinians from realizing their rights as residents of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, even within the narrow margins of the Oslo Accords. The problems listed below have obstructed Palestinian access to all those dimensions of residency rights discussed in the body of this report: a) Long Waiting Periods: The involvement of three parties (applicant - PA/CAC - Israeli DCO), restrictions on movement, bureaucratic and red-tape awkwardness, as well as frequent interruptions of Israeli-Palestinian coordination have led to a situation where Palestinian applicants are left waiting for extended periods of time (weeks and months), even for simple requests (i.e. a visitor's permit for a relative). b) Proneness to Abuse by the Politically Powerful Side: Since the functioning of the new institutional set-up for civil affairs in the PA areas is totally dependent upon the progress and functioning of the broader political process (peace process) between Israel and the PLO/PA, set-backs on the higher levels have an immediate and detrimental effect on the daily handling of Palestinian residency matters. Thus, for example, the breakdown of the political negotiations and meetings between the two sides since March 1996 has led to a situation where Palestinian requests requiring Israeli approval (visitor's permits, family reunification) have remained unattended. c) Lack of Legal Redress: Both the Palestinian and the Israeli authorities have upheld that - based on the agreements (1993 DOP, 1994 Cairo, 1995 Taba) - the Israeli-Palestinian liaison committees meeting at the DCO offices are the only body authorized to handle civil affairs. Therefore, human rights organizations and lawyers find themselves confronted with a situation where they can no longer represent their clients by legal means. Several Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations received official notice from the Israeli military governor's office at Beit El, informing them that they were expected to abstain from intervening on behalf of cases from the PA areas. In most cases, Israeli authorities and courts refuse to accept appeals on behalf of their clients, arguing that - based on the political agreements with the PLO - all petitions by Palestinian residents must be channeled through the CAC and the DCO. d) Overlapping Legislation: The situation is exacerbated by the fact that approximately all of the 1,200 Israeli military orders issued in the occupied territories between 1967 and 1993 have not been canceled. They continue to apply parallel to the provisions of the political agreements. e) Lack of Public Information: Following the Israeli redeployment, the population was confused and had difficulty finding the Palestinian or Israeli offices which would actually handle their requests. The Israeli DCO continued to handle some types of requests, (e.g. entry permits to Israel), others had to be submitted first to the PA Interior Ministry, and others directly to the CAC offices. Persons living in areas B or C would sometimes succeed in filing their applications with the local Palestinian offices. At other times, the Israeli side would refuse to receive their applications via the PA-CAC and demand they be submitted directly to the Israeli DCO. PA information issued for the broad public and aiming to clarify the new procedures and policies remains scarce. f) Lack of coordination between the CAC and independent human rights organizations: The CAC continues to be reluctant to inform human rights organizations of PA policies and strategies. Moreover, important information about - and experience with - Israeli decisions and policies prior to the establishment of the PA could not be transferred to the PA-CAC by human rights experts. g) Nepotism and Bribery:
The awkwardness of the new system, the long waiting periods involved, and the practical
breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian coordination since March 1996, all encourage people to
seek alternative channels to obtain vital permits. Thus, persons with good relations with
staff of PA ministries or in other influential positions may get the needed permit
following the intervention of their contact. Also, persons who are able and willing
to pay money to mediators who can make things go smoothly have a good chance of obtaining
what they need. It seems obvious that nepotism and bribery cannot be fought effectively,
unless an efficient option for channeling requests through the official system can be
guaranteed.
Chapter 2: ISSUES OF THE INTERM PERIOD-AGREEMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 1. Becoming a Permanent Resident via Family Reunification The issue of family reunification (FR) was not mentioned explicitly in either the Oslo Accords (1993) or the Cairo Agreements (1994). The Taba Agreement (Oslo II, September 1995) finally reasserted the continuation of the Israeli quota of 2,000 cases of family reunification (i.e. up to 6,000 persons) to be granted annually. The only forum which dealt with family reunification rather extensively is the Refugee Working Group (RWG) of the multilateral negotiations initiated at the 1991 Madrid Conference. France, functioning as the responsible party (shepherd) for family reunification in the multilateral talks, made efforts to introduce standards which would oblige Israel to pursue a more transparent policy of family reunification in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories. However, all Israeli concessions in the RWG remained informal and have never been implemented. In 1995, multilateral negotiations went into crisis. No substantial debate about family reunification has occurred since then. Neither the multilateral RWG, nor the political agreements
between Israel and the PLO/PA have introduced significant changes in the Israeli way of
handling family reunification. FR functions until today in accordance with the military
orders and regulations elaborated by Israel between 1967 - 1993. The only major change
introduced by the political agreements is the new role of the PA-CAC as collector of
applications and messenger to the Israeli DCO. 1.1 Regulations and Procedures Annual Quota
The Israeli policy statement also provides that the annual quota would apply to persons belonging to one of three categories:
Regulations for Spouses Based on the 1992 High Court Agreement The 1992 High Court Agreement was achieved through public protest and broad media coverage, in Palestine, Israel, and internationally, of the extensive deportation of wives of Palestinian residents by the Israeli military authorities in June 1990. The High Court Agreement provides that spouses and minor children of residents of the 1967 occupied territories (East Jerusalem not included), who entered the country for at least one day prior to 31 August 1992 have a right to:
An extension of this agreement was included in the 1993 Israeli policy statement on family reunification and its 1994 clarification (see above). From then on, spouses and minor children who entered the country between 1 September 1992 and 31 August 1993 have been entitled to renewable six-month visitor's permits and all other rights listed above. However, they do not enjoy the main privilege of the group defined by the original 1992 agreement (family reunification applications from their side are part of the regular annual quota and thus subject to a long waiting period). 1.2 Implementation of Family Reunification 1994 - 1997: From Slow and Obscure Handling to Total Breakdown In May 1994, following Israeli redeployment from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the PA decided to suspend family reunification procedures. At this early stage, the PA attributed little importance to individual family reunification, because the return of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 war was perceived as a likely outcome of the political negotiations during the interim period. Later on, the PA in Gaza realized that family reunification, especially family reunification in the framework of the 1992 Israeli High Court Agreement, was a tool for obtaining an immediate solution for separated families. Thus, in October 1994, the PA Interior Ministry in Gaza issued press announcements calling upon the people to file applications for the following categories:
By December 1994, 2,240 applications belonging to the above categories were gathered by the Gaza Interior Ministry, all of them pertaining to non-resident spouses. By April 1995, 100 of these applications were approved by Israel.(2) Following Israeli redeployment from the West Bank in November 1995, the new offices of the PA Interior Ministry were expected to handle the collection of family reunification applications in all West Bank areas. Then, the CAC was supposed to transfer them to the Israeli District Coordination Offices (DCO). Already by spring 1996, however, the procedure of family
reunification in the West Bank had come to a complete standstill. 1996 was characterized
by a drastic increase of open violence and Israeli repression in the area which resulted,
among others, in frequent interruptions of Israel-Palestinian coordination on all levels,
including CAC - DCO. Throughout 1996, the Israeli authorities were exclusively handling
family reunification applications submitted to Israel before the November 1995 hand-over
to the PA, and applications for spouses covered by the November 1992 Israeli High Court
Agreement.
In the West Bank, not a single family reunification application dating from 1996 or 1997 has been issued by Israel. According to he CAC, the breakdown of family reunification is the result of the ongoing controversy over the annual quota. In protest of the insufficient Israeli quota, the CAC-headquarters decided, in 1996 to suspend family reunification. Israeli DCO's responded by refusing to deal with family reunification applications, whenever approached on this matter by local CAC officers, who wanted to hand over applications despite the CAC's policy decision. The local PA Interior Ministry offices, on the other hand, were apparently not informed of the CAC headquarters' policy decision to suspend family reunification, a fact which is not surprising given the frequent lack of coordination between the two ministries. Thus, by November 1996, the PA Interior Ministry in Bethlehem interpreted the refusal of the Israeli DCO to process family reunification applications as nothing but pure provocation from the Israeli side. This interpretation was supported by the arrogant attitude of the Israeli liaison officers, who claimed in front of their Palestinian counterparts that, there is a quota which is full, and in fact it will remain full until the year 2,000. When the local Interior Ministry offices understood that they were unable to transfer new family reunification applications for handling, they completely stopped collecting applications, in order to avoid creating wrong expectations and becoming the subject of public criticism. The situation in the Gaza Strip is different. The CAC-headquarters in Gaza has complied to the rules set by Israel and accepted the quota system. Fees collected from applications benefit the Israeli side exclusively. Therefore, between 700 and 800 family reunifications - i.e. the quota reserved for the Gaza Strip - have been approved there by Israel in 1996 and 1997. 1.3 Family Reunification - Core Problems Although the situation described above suggests that some of the problems of family reunification in the PA areas are caused by inefficiencies in the PA system itself, it must be underlined that Israel continues to be solely responsible for the core problems. The specific problems - in addition to the major general problems mentioned already in the introduction to this report - are the following: a) Insufficient Israeli Quota: The current quota of 2,000 family reunifications granted by Israel annually is far from sufficient to reunite divided Palestinian families, even when considering only nuclear families as defined by western cultural standards. The major part of these cases should have been solved not by means of family reunification, but in the framework of the repatriation of the 1967 Displaced Persons. The lack of progress on that matter, however, leaves the current Israeli quota desperately low in comparison to Palestinian needs. b) Israeli Non-Compliance with Standards Set by the Multilateral Refugee Working Group (RWG) Denial of Family Reunification on Humanitarian Grounds: Humanitarian hardship cases are mentioned explicitly in the 1993 Israeli Policy Statement as a category eligible for family reunification. Moreover, in 1994, Israel promised in the multilateral RWG to issue criteria defining what it considers humanitarian reasons.(4) Despite this, by 1997 Israel has neither approved family reunifications for humanitarian reasons, nor specified the relevant criteria. Withholding of Data: In violation of all promises and agreements in multilateral and bilateral talks, the Israeli military government in the 1967 occupied territories continues to withhold records of pending applications from the CAC and the PA Interior Ministry. The CAC is supposed to process applications according to the respective submission dates. Yet, they have been unable to do so because Israel is not willing to transfer its lists, and Israeli DCOs continue to handle pre-1995 applications alone. Absence of Documentation:
According to summaries of the RWG multilateral talks in 1994 (Bajolet Report), Israel was
expected to provide the Palestinian side with precise documentation of its decisions on
family reunification (e.g. number of applications received, number of applications
approved/rejected, reason for rejection). Between 1994 - 1997, Israel regularly failed to
provide this information. Whenever annual figures on family reunification are issued by
Israel, these figures cannot be verified due to the lack of basic data. The same holds
true for frequent Israeli claims that the quota in district X for year Y is full. The PA Conclusion: Dealing with the Possible Efforts by human rights organizations to convince the CAC to protest against the Israeli quota in other ways than by suspending the collection of requests for family reunification were unsuccessful. Human rights organizations had argued that pressure against the Israeli quota could be built only, if a large number of requests, i.e. factual evidence of the need for family reunification, is gathered by the CAC. Unable to tackle the core problems of family reunification, and faced with frequent and lengthy interruptions of the joint meetings with the Israeli side, the CAC has been working to solve the cases of persons who applied prior to 1995 and to improve internal structures. Thus the CAC suggested the establishment of a central PA Family Reunification Committee to handle all applications in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, aiming to improve the transparency of PA procedures and prevent nepotism and bribery. The Committee would be staffed by the CAC, its subcommittee for Population Registry, the PA Interior Ministry, and the PA Preventive Security.(5) By autumn 1997, this central Family Reunification Committee was not yet established. Moreover, the CAC worked to formulate new suggestions and proposals which - due to the breakdown of the system of coordination - have never actually been presented to the Israeli side: Simpler application procedures for
family reunification: Changes in the quota system:
In October 1997, negotiations between the CAC and the Israeli military government (Beit El) were renewed, and family reunification was one of the issues discussed. In these negotiations, the CAC hopes to achieve finally an Israeli compromise with regard to the annual quota in the West Bank. According to CAC expectations, Israel will agree to raise the quota for 1998, the number of family reunifications to be granted for 1996 and 1997 will remain 1,200 for each year. The CAC also hopes that Israel will agree to lower the fees for applications from currently US $100 to approximately US $30. Pending a positive outcome of the new negotiations, the CAC is ready to start collecting family reunification applications for the 1996 and 1997 quota and to transfer them to the Israeli side. Applications will be handled by the CAC exclusively and not collected by the PA Interior Ministry as in the past. The Conclusion for the Palestinian people: Married in 1996 - United in 2001,2,3? The persistent Israeli denial of family reunification leaves Palestinians who wish to live in the West Bank or Gaza Strip with no other choice but to obtain a short term visitor's permit and to stay on after it expires. In response, the Israeli authorities repeatedly demanded the Palestinian CAC request persons illegally present in PA territory to leave the country. Moreover, Israel threatened to suspend all visitor's permits - including permits requested for married spouses. The breakdown of the system of family reunification has
strongly effected the lives of Palestinian residents in the PA areas. New marriages lead
to more suffering, as couples wed after November 1995 face forced separation with no
prospect of living united, legally, and secure, until after the turn of the millennium.
Israeli denial of family reunification to newly-wed couples represents a gross violation
of international law and standards which cannot be justified by references to the peace
process crisis.
Comment by Dr. Elia Zureik, member of the Palestinian team in the multilateral Refugee Working Group (8) The Refugee Working Group of the Middle East peace process has been meeting for five years to deal with the thorny issue of Palestinian refugees. Mr. Andrew Robinson, the current Canadian coordinator of the Refugee Working Group, was personally at hand to welcome the return of eight Palestinian refugee households from the Sinai desert to the Gaza Strip. He later commented that this return was a concrete expression of the benefits of the peace process. For someone who has been a member of the Palestinian delegation to this Working Group since its inception, this comment sounds comical had it not been for the sad reality it hides. Namely, according to the United Nations, there are more than three-quarters of a million Palestinian households, or more than four million individual refugees, stranded and waiting to go home. At this rate it is going to take two, three, or more centuries to return the rest. I trust that Mr. Robinson will keep faith and will be there to welcome the remaining refugees upon their return. Elia Zureik 2. AQUIRING RESIDENT STATUS VIA 'NATIONAL NUMBERS' ISSUED BY THE PA According to the Cairo Agreement (May 1994), PA personnel such as the police force, public servants, professionals and their families are to be allowed entry into the PA areas and to receive Israeli-issued ID cards. Repatriation via National Numbers is the only major channel for Palestinian entry to Palestine opened in the framework of the peace process. It is the only addition to the existent mechanism of family reunification which was installed in 1967. 2.1 Regulation and Procedures: Applicants must be registered on lists prepared by the PLO/PA. These lists are periodically submitted for screening by the Israeli side. Persons whose application is approved by Israel receive a special entry visa carrying their future ID number (national number) at the border crossing. Once in the country, PA personnel must submit an application for an ID card to the CAC. Then, the Israeli Military headquarters in Beit El issues an ID card carrying a special identification number. These ID cards do not authorize the bearer to enter Israeli territory, with the exception of high ranking officers and functionaries who are issued special VIP permits. Wives and children of PA personnel below the age of 22 are entitled to enter the country under the same conditions. Children above the age of 22 require a regular family reunification permit. They are, however, exempt from the usual application fees and not included in the regular annual quota for family reunification. 2.2 Problems related to Palestinian Entry via National Numbers a) The PA does not release data on national numbers. It is therefore impossible to know whether the functioning of this procedure was effected by a policy change of the new Likud government in Israel, and updated official figures of the number of persons who have entered the country by this means are not available. b) The undemocratic principle underlying entry via PA lists: The demand for the return of all Palestinian refugees and exiles has been a central component of the Palestinian struggle for national rights. It was widely expected that Israel, in the framework of the political agreements with the PLO/PA, would be ready for compromises to the effect that all Palestinians evicted from the 1967 occupied territories would be granted the right to return home. Based on this expectation, eligibility to repatriation would be determined solely by the question whether a persons belongs to one of the relevant categories (1967 displaced persons, deportees, persons whose ID card was revoked by Israel between 1967 and 1994) or not. The logic of PLO/PA listing is different; it is a matter of favor and not one of right. Whether or not an applicant belongs to a category scheduled for repatriation is secondary. The main factor determining whether a persons succeeds to be listed by the PLO/PA is his/her prior service in the PLO and/or his/her ability to obtain the support of influential PLO/PA functionaries. c) The political context of silent immigration: It is estimated that close to 60,000 people (PA personnel, police forces, civilians) have entered the PA areas via National Numbers since 1994. The absence of progress in the political negotiations over alternative channels of collective Palestinian return (repatriation of 1967 displaced persons, repatriation of persons whose ID cards were revoked by Israel in the past, return of 1948 refugees) on the one hand, and the break-down of the mechanism of family reunification on the other, has made return via PA lists the predominant means for entering the PA areas. A collusion of Israeli and PA interests seems supportive of this development: Israeli governments, on the one hand, seem less reluctant to compromise on Palestinian entry into the PA areas if it happens via a bureaucratic and unspectacular mechanism which remains hidden from the Israeli media, public opinion, and political pressure groups. The PA, on the other hand, has favored a mechanism of return which permits a selection of returnees according to immediate interests. The silent and selective mechanism of entry/return via PA lists serves the interest of both.(9) 3. PALESTINIAN "VISITORS " TO THE PA AREAS 3.1 Common Visitor Permits Until 1994, Israeli-issued temporary entry permits to the 1967 occupied territories constituted the only major means for maintaining family ties between Palestinian communities in the diaspora and their relatives in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Thus, each year, tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees crossed the Allenby bridge, the designated border crossing from Jordan. The application for a visitor's permit had to be submitted by a spouse, parent, or child of the requested visitor. Permits were valid for three months and renewable only with great difficulty. The Israeli-Palestinian agreements introduced no major changes to the old system of visitor's permits. Israel maintains control over issuing these permits to individuals destined for the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 3.1.1 Agreements and Regulations According to the 1994 Cairo Agreement, visitor permits granted by Israel are valid for 90 days. The PA is authorized to renew them once for an additional four months. Further renewals require Israeli approval. The 1995 Taba Agreement (Annex III, Article 28/13) included several procedural changes which promised a somewhat less restrictive situation:
Since May 1994, residents of Jericho and Gaza wishing to obtain a visitor's permit for a relative must submit an application to the PA Interior Ministry. The same applies to the rest of the West Bank since the Israeli redeployment in 1995. Applications collected by the PA Interior Ministry offices are then taken by the CAC to the nearest Israeli DCO for approval. One improvement reported by the CAC is the fact that payment of approximately NIS 80 (US $26) must be made upon receipt of the permit only, and not for the application as previously required. The PA had originally hoped to further improve the new
system created by the agreements with Israel. Among the ideas raised in 1995 was the
facilitation of applications directly from abroad: visitors would apply to the PLO/PA
representations abroad, the latter would forward the applications to the CAC in Gaza, then
they would be processed by Israel, after which the permit would be deposited at the border
where the visitor would receive it upon arrival. Gaza Strip and Jericho,
1994-5: West Bank 1994-5:
Two army raids in the villages of Qabalan/Nablus and Kharbatha/Ramallah resulted in the actual detention and deportation of several people to Jordan (al-Quds, 2/6/1995). Subsequently, human rights organizations intervened at the headquarters of the Israeli military government in Beit El. Yehuda Cohen, the officer in charge at Beit El, claimed that there was no new policy of deportation and the summons were personal initiatives of local Civil Administration officers. Consequently, confiscated ID cards were returned and human rights lawyers obtained temporary restraining orders for their clients. In summer 1995, two years after the signing of the Oslo Accords but prior to the Israeli redeployment from West Bank (except Jericho), human rights lawyers were informed by the Israeli State Attorney that non-resident spouses of West Bank residents not covered by previous agreements with the Israeli High Court would no longer be issued visitor permits. Their justification, there is a strong reason to suspect that they will not leave the country upon expiration of their visitor permits. (10) Such spouses would be allowed to enter the country only after they are granted family reunification, i.e. a procedure implying years of waiting (see Chapter 1 above). Following Israeli redeployment in the West Bank
(November 1995 - 1997): The only category of visitors not encountering
significant problems were spouses of Palestinian residents covered by the November 1992
Israeli High Court Agreement. As in the past, Israel continues renewing their six-month
visitor's permits. a) Israeli Re-interpretation of the Taba Agreement (Article 28/13): Israel requires - in contravention to Article 28/13 of the Taba Agreement - that applications for visitor's permits be submitted by a first degree relative (parent, sibling, child). Moreover, Israel introduced additional requirements not mentioned in the Agreement, e.g. applicants for visitor's permits must document that:
In contravention to the Taba Agreement, Palestinian visitors have not been permitted to cross the Israeli checkpoints into Israel and occupied East Jerusalem. According to the CAC, the chief Israeli negotiator on civil affairs under the Rabin-Peres government, Oren Shahor, informed the PA immediately after signing the Taba Agreement (September 1995) that Israel would not implement this provision of Article 28/13.(12) Since then, CAC negotiators have tried to obtain a compromise by offering various new formulas (e.g. a special Israel-entry visa attached to the visitor's permit), but to no avail. PA Interior Ministry staff in Bethlehem expressed the suspicion that this Israeli policy was part of a broader Israeli scheme, i.e. to prove to the population that the PA is inefficient.(13) For example, visitor's permits issued via the PA do not allow access to East Jerusalem and Israel, its holders are subject to the Israeli-imposed military closure, while Palestinians coming from Jordan on an Israeli-issued tourist visa are permitted to move freely and even allowed to cross the checkpoints in their private cars. By the end of 1996, PA Interior Ministry offices reported that the Israeli DCO refused to accept applications for visa extensions submitted by foreigners residing in the West Bank PA areas. Holders of foreign passports could only obtain a renewal directly from the Israeli Interior Ministry, or - if rejected - leave the country. The Israeli DCO at the Erez checkpoint/Gaza does not object to extending visas for foreigners residing in the Gaza Strip, however these visas, extended via the PA, do not permit entry into Israeli state territory. By mid-1997, Israeli DCO offices in the West Bank began adopting the policy of the DCO in Gaza. b) Denial of Visitor's Permits on Security Grounds:
c) Break-down of Israeli-Palestinian Coordination -
Pile-up of Applications: d) Illegal Visitors and Israeli Pressure on the PA:
Already in March 1996, only three months after the
hand-over of civil affairs to the PA, Israel informed the PA Interior Ministry in
Bethlehem of 960 allegedly illegal persons present in the district. The issue of
illegal persons is regularly raised by the Israeli side in joint meetings on all levels.
Israel claims that a total of 36,000 people with expired visitor's permits are currently
staying in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and demands action by the PA. The PA-CAC has
been trying to counter the Israeli pressure by preparing detailed case lists based on
field research. According to the CAC, these findings show that many of the allegedly
illegal over-stayers have either left the country, obtained other types of visas
(students, investors), or have been registered as residents. Therefore, the Israeli
figures are exaggerated.(15)
According to the Taba Agreement (Annex III, Article28/13), Palestinian professionals and investors may be issued special visitor's permits - again pending Israeli consent. Applicants must enter first on a regular visitor's permit or visa and then submit an application for a work permit to the local Palestinian Interior Ministry offices. The application is then transferred to the CAC, which negotiates each case with the Israeli side. If the application is approved, a six-month work visa is issued and renewed once for another six months. If the applicant holds a visa which permits entry to East Jerusalem and Israel, his/her work permit will also permit crossing the Israeli checkpoints. If the original visitor's permit is restricted to the PA areas, the attached work permit will include the same restriction. In 1995-6 the CAC filed 250 applications for professionals
working in PA institutions, investors, employees in the private sector (large enterprises
only) and in local and international NGOs. By December 1996, Israel had approved 140
special work visas. One implication of the 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel is the fact that - for the first time since 1948 - Palestinian citizens of Jordan, i.e. the vast majority of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, can visit Palestine on an Israeli tourist visa. Thus, the first alternative to the traditional Israeli visitor's permit system was established. Entering Palestine as a Palestinian tourist certainly has
many implications on the political-symbolical level. It symbolizes termination of the
Palestinian refugees' historical rights to Palestine. This symbolism has concrete
expressions also on the legal level. Palestinians entering on an Israeli tourist visa (and
not on a visitor's permit) cannot take advantage of the provisions of the November 1992
Israeli High Court Agreement (six-months renewable visitor's permits), nor of the new visa
arrangements based on the Israeli-Palestinian agreements (four-month renewal of visitor's
permit via the PA). The demographic policy of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1993 was characterized by two major components. First, Israel's open bridge policy with Jordan enabled Palestinians to leave for study and work abroad. This option was taken by tens of thousands given the lack of employment and specialized education at home. Second, Israeli restrictions on re-entry to Palestine caused many of those studying and working abroad to loose their right to return home. It was Israeli policy to revoke the ID cards of Palestinians who failed to renew their re-entry visa within a set period of time (after three years for persons who left with an exit permit via the Jordan bridge, after one year for persons who left via the Israeli airport on a laissez passer). The number of Palestinians who lost their resident status in this way is estimated to be 100,000, the large majority of them are currently living in Jordan. Once an ID card was revoked, the decision could be appealed to the Latecomers' Committee, a special body established by the Israeli military government in the early 1990s. The appeal had to include official documents proving strong reasons for the person's absence (e.g. medical reports, university documents). The Israeli authorities did not accept absence for economic reasons (work) as an adequate justification. Moreover, chances for a successful appeal decreased if the appellant had married and raised children abroad. 4.1 New Agreements and Procedures The 1993 Oslo Accords include no specific mention of Lost
IDs. The 1994 Cairo Agreement provides that residents of the self rule areas are free to
travel and return at their own discretion. The abolishment of the Israeli time limit on
the right of re-entry implied that ID cards of Palestinian traveling abroad would no
longer be confiscated. Yet, the Cairo Agreement does not offer a solution to the
already existing problem, i.e. to ID cards which were confiscated in the past.
Consequently, the issue of Lost IDs was raised by the Palestinian negotiating teams
in the multilateral Refugee Working Group (since 1993) and in the Quadripartite Committee
on the 1967 Displaced Persons, but without success. Once the Palestinian elections of January 1996 were successfully completed, and the PA somehow adapted to operating under the restrictive situation of military closure imposed by Israel in March 1996, the CAC made an effort to organize for the upcoming negotiations on Lost IDs. In April 1996, the CAC established a special Population Committee authorized to prepare for these negotiations. The CAC-Population Committee disseminated forms for the registration of persons whose ID cards were revoked by Israel. The forms were transferred to local offices of the PA Interior Ministry which began case registration. The first Israeli-Palestinian meeting, a preliminary
discussion of the question of Lost IDs, took place on 16 May 1996. In this meeting, the
Israeli delegation of the Military Government Headquarters in Beit El took advantage of
the vague wording of the Taba Agreement, claiming that Article 28/3 of Annex III
(see above) did not refer at all to Palestinian residents whose ID cards were revoked
while staying abroad, but to residents who physically lost their ID cards while present in
the country (e.g. in a taxi, in the market). The Palestinian negotiators were thrown off
balance by this unexpected Israeli argument, and the CAC consulted human rights
organizations. The latter provided letters of the Beit El Legal Advisor addressed to human
rights lawyers which stated that Article 28/3 of the interim agreement states that an
Israeli-Palestinian Committee will be established to solve the problem of the renewal of
ID cards for those residents who lost their resident status.(16) The
ridiculous Israeli argument was finally refuted. Regardless, valuable time was lost
and negotiations over Lost ID Cards have yet to be renewed. Absence of a mechanism for dealing with Lost IDs:
By 1997, hundreds of such requests have been brought to
human rights organizations and the office of the PA Interior Ministry by discouraged
relatives of victims of ID card confiscation. These cases have been partially registered
and transferred to the CAC. Moreover, also the PA population census to be conducted
in December 1997 includes questions on family members whose ID cards were revoked by
Israel. However, the issue of lost IDs is not on the agenda of the negotiations renewed in
October 1997, and a clear policy for handling this problem is unforeseen.
Between 1967 and 1992, Israel deported 1,657 Palestinians from the 1967 occupied territories, usually for reasons of state security. Among them were 385 alleged activists of the Islamic movement who were temporarily deported to South Lebanon in 1992 and returned in 1993. All other deportation orders issued by the Israeli Military government were issued without a time limit. Following years of pressure by human rights lawyers, the Israeli military government agreed to establish, in the early 1990's, a special Appeals Committee authorized to handle petitions for the cancellation of deportation orders. Until 1993, five deportees obtained Israeli permission to return home in this way. (17) Remarkably enough, none of the political agreements between Israel and the PLO contain an explicit reference to the issue of Palestinian deportees. On the other hand, international norms and common sense suggest that deportations - like political imprisonment - are inherent components of the belligerent conflict which must be reverted immediately with the signing of a peace accord. In the case of Palestine-Israel, however, political prisoners have not been released and the majority of the deportees (approximately 1,000) have not been permitted to return home. Since the establishment of the Quadripartite Committee on 1967 Displaced Persons, the PLO/PA has been raising the deportees' issue in this forum. Israel persistently rejected including deportees in the agenda of this forum. Therefore, no progress has been achieved. 5.1 New Agreements and Regulations (18) a) In the absence of explicit reference to the issue of Palestinian deportees in the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, Israel has handled this issue in the framework of its confidence building measures and good will gestures towards the PA and the Palestinian people. Between April 1993 and May 1994, 88 Palestinian deportees and their families returned collectively in small groups. Thereafter, no such Israeli gesture followed. b) 141 deportees, mainly Fatah activists and functionaries, returned individually via the PA names' lists approved by Israel (National Numbers) between September 1993 and January 1996. c) In January 1996, Israel decided to approve the return of all 482 members of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). This, in order to facilitate their participation in PNC meetings to be held in the 1967 occupied territories, and especially in the PNC vote on the change of the Palestinian Charter as demanded by Israel. As a result, 25 deportees, members of the PNC, returned between January and March 1996. d) Unlike in the case of Lost IDs (see above), in the
case of deportees the Israeli Military government did not abolish the legal channel of
appeal (Appeals Committee) established prior to the Oslo Accords. Thus, Palestinian
deportees, represented by a lawyer, may still submit a request for abolishment of their
deportation order directly to the Israeli military government. Sixty-six deportees used
this option successfully between September 1993 and January 1996. The Forgotten Majority: 6. POPULATION REGISTRY BY THE PA Between 1967 and 1994, the Israeli military government's Civil Administration was the only authority handling the Palestinian population registry in the 1967 occupied territories. Only Palestinians included in the population census conducted by the military occupation in 1967 and their descendants were considered legal residents and issued Israeli ID cards (orange colored with an identification number which distinguished them from citizens of the State of Israel). In January 1995, shortly before the hand-over of West Bank civil affairs to the PA, Israel issued a new order concerning child registration in the 1967 occupied territories.(20) The new order provided that a child of Palestinian parents can be registered in the Population Registry if:
As a result of the old military order, which had conditioned child registration with resident status of the mother, thousands of Palestinian children in the 1967 occupied territories were left unregistered. This new military order promised a partial solution of this already unbearable problem. In addition, the new order permitted registration until the age of 18 (not 16 as was the case previously). However, the actual impact of this new order remained marginal, because its implementation was delayed until the September 1995 Taba Agreement and the consequent hand-over of civil affairs to the PA. A positive aspect of the September 1995 Taba Agreement was that it provided, for the first time, procedures to establish a Palestinian population registry handled by the PA, including voter, birth, and death registration, and a provision about new ID cards to be issued by the PA (Annex III). It was expected that the empowerment of the PA to handle the population registry would contribute to securing the residency rights of all Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 6.1 New Agreements and Regulations a) PA Travel Documents
(Palestinian Passport): b) PA Identity Cards (Taba
Agreement, Annex III/Article 28/4): c) Child Registration (Taba
Agreement, Annex III/Article 28/12): Article 28/12 is more liberal than the previously issued new Israeli military order (see above). No longer is proof of domicile in the West Bank/Gaza Strip required. Any Palestinian resident holding an Israel-issued ID card, no matter where s/he lives, can register his/her child in Palestine. The age limit set by Article 28/12 is 16, not 18 as in the new Israeli military order. This inconsistency can only be attributed to the Palestinian negotiators' lack of familiarity with the military orders and regulations issued by the Israeli occupation authorities prior to re-deployment. d) Registration of Unregistered
Persons (Taba Agreement, Article II of Annex I/1/1/g: Voter Registration):
6.2 Implementation: The PA Experience with Population Registration Under Limited Sovereignty a) PA Passports and ID Cards: Until 1 January 1997, Palestinian residents of the West Bank could still travel to Jordan with an Israeli-issued exit permit and their Jordanian passport. Many people who did so were faced with a new restriction. Israel decided not to issue exit permits to persons holding an ID card issued before 1985. So, travelers had to obtain a new Israeli ID card (and pay the requested fees). Already by 1995, Palestinians wishing to travel from Israel's international airport could do so only if they had obtained a new Palestinian passport. Initially, many travelers were delayed, because their new serial number was not entered into the Israeli border computers in time. Further complications resulted when new passports issued in Gaza were stuck due to long Israeli military closures and failed to reach their holders in the West Bank. By late 1997, only Palestinian travelers holding new Palestinian passports can leave Palestine. This includes Palestinian residents of the 1967 occupied territories who hold a second passport. The Palestinian travel document is recognized by the majority of the Western states, but many Arab states (e.g. Lebanon, Syria, Libya) refused to do so based on their opposition to the Oslo Accords. By October 1997, new Palestinian ID cards are not yet available. Prototypes of the new ID card were designed by the CAC in 1996, however, its issuance was delayed. The main reasons for the delay were Israeli objections to the new coding system proposed by the PA on the one hand, and technical-administrative shortcomings of the PA (lack of printing and processing facilities) on the other. By fall 1997, the PA is ready to print, process, and disseminate the new ID cards. Thus Palestinian residents of the PA areas will soon receive ID cards produced by the PA (and not by Israel as has been the case so far).(22) Due to ongoing disagreements about the serial coding, the numbers on the new ID cards will, however, remain the same old Israeli serial numbers. Media announcements of the new PA-issued ID cards were accompanied by a myriad of false information and interpretations. Irrespective of all rumors, the fact is that the PA will have no decision making power in deciding who are the Palestinians to be issued new ID cards. As long as there is no Palestinian sovereignty over entry to and exit from the borders of the Palestinian territories, the decision about who has a right to reside in the PA areas will remain with Israel. b) The PA Population Census: Two years ago, the CAC was expecting to receive wide-scale authority over population registration. The Palestinian population census mentioned in the Taba Agreement (Annex III), was considered by the PA as the tool which would allow the PA to include all those who did not succeed in registering as residents in the past. Expectations of this actualizing stopped after increasing experience with Israeli interpretations of the terms of the agreements. Today the CAC recognizes that it will be able to issue new PA ID cards only to persons already holding an old, Israeli-issued ID card. The Palestinian population census, currently under preparation by a special commission, (composed of the PA Statistical Bureau, the CAC, the PA Interior Ministry a.o.) will include all persons staying in the PA areas, as well as Palestinian residents whose ID cards were revoked by Israel. The census will be conducted between December 1 - 24, 1997. It will, however, not have implications on the issuing of PA ID cards. c) Child Registration: The start of child registration by the PA was obstructed for months because Israel and the PA could not agree on the fees to be collected.(23) By mid-1996, a compromise solution finally enabled Palestinian parents to register their children. The compromise provides that child registration is free of charge within 10 days of birth (based on the Israeli military regulation). Later registrations require payment of a fine set by Israel (between NIS 70 - 120). Still, the problem of overlapping legislation has not been resolved: Article 28/12 (Annex III of the Taba Agreement) applies parallel to Israeli military order #1421 (17 January 1995). The first sets the age limit for child registration at 16, while the latter sets it at 18. Meanwhile, PA Interior Ministry offices continue to register children only if they are 16 years of age or younger. d) Registration of Unregistered Persons: By 12 December 1995, the official registration period for previously unregistered persons expired, according to Annex I/1/1g (Voter Registration, Taba Agreement). Only approximately 5,500 applications were gathered by the CAC in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, this opportunity was entirely missed. There, the CAC received only 180 ID card applications. Lack of public information and confusion concerning eligibility and procedures were the major reasons for the low application turn-out. Approximately 50% of the applicants were spouses of residents who were already entitled to ID cards via family reunification based on the 1992 Israeli High Court Agreement. They were required to pay the application fee set by the PA for this special registration procedure (US $100), even though Israel had already exempt them from additional fees. The CAC clerks lacked necessary background information. Since Israeli agreement to use the computerized information of the Israeli population registry was not obtained, the CAC tended to accept only applications which included a full record of entry permits for the past three or four years, something many could not provide. Moreover, applications could be only submitted to the CAC headquarters, representing an additional obstacle for people from remote areas. By April 1996, 3,000 of the 5,500 applications from the West Bank had been approved. Freedom of Movement Freedom of Movement for Palestinian residents is intrinsically related to the issue of residency rights in the PA areas. The first type of closure, i.e. closure of the green line (1967 cease-fire line) and a system of Israel-entry permits, was established permanently in March of 1993, prior to the Oslo Accords. Immediately following Israeli redeployment in the West Bank (November - December 1995), a new system of Israeli travel restrictions between West Bank towns was imposed (March 1996), in addition to the ongoing closure of the first type. This second type of closure was of a new kind; it included the closure of Palestinian areas A and cantonization of the Palestinian self rule areas. This cantonization took a more solid form after the virtual land-locking of the Gaza Strip. Between 30 March 1993 and the end of 1996, approximately 329 calendar days of comprehensive closure were imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.(24) This same policy continued throughout 1997. Absence of Safe Passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Annex II of the Oslo Accords (DOP) provides for a safe passage to be established between the Gaza Strip and Jericho. No such passage has been provided by Israel. Gazan's wishing to travel to other parts of Palestine are totally dependent upon obtaining entry permits to Israel. Such permits are issued only in exceptional cases. Residents of the West Bank wishing to travel to the Gaza strip must obtain a special entry permit as well . These permits are usually refused. By 1997, the separation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from each other, from Israel, and East Jerusalem has become a de facto reality. Closures within the West Bank are frequent. The cantonization has had a detrimental effect on Palestinian employment, business, commerce, medical treatment, and social relations. Palestinian residents of the West Bank wishing to change their address to the Gaza Strip (or vice versa) require legal assistance for a matter which now is almost as difficult as obtaining family reunification.(25) Palestinian college and university students have suffered
tremendously from the lack of access to their place of study and frequent interruptions of
their academic program. In December 1994, the Israeli authorities introduced a tight
security check of Gaza students wishing to study in West Bank universities and colleges.
500 Gaza students failed to receive permission to cross into the West Bank by April
1995, losing an entire academic year. Since then, the number of Gaza students studying in
the West Bank has dropped drastically. The majority of those enrolled in West Bank
universities are forced to risk staying there illegally. Investigation into the situation of Palestinian residency in the PA areas - four years after the Oslo Accords and three years after the start of partial Israeli redeployment - shows a dark picture. Problems inherited from the old Israeli occupation system have remained unsolved, new problems have been added by the awkward new system of Israeli-Palestinian coordination, and the prospects for negotiated improvements are slim. Devoid of legal protection and subjected to arbitrary decisions and policies, Palestinians living in the 1967 Israeli occupied territories are in urgent need of protection of their right to live in their homeland. Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations are called upon to re-establish coordination and to engage in a concerted effort towards:
The PA continues to allocate major resources to the negotiation process with the Israeli side. Family reunification, the new PA identity cards and passports have been given priority. However, it is likely that neither these issues, nor other issues scheduled for treatment at a later stage (lost IDs, visitor's permits) will find an adequate solution in the negotiations conducted on the level of technical committees (i.e. CAC and the Israeli military government in Beit El). Therefore, the PA-CAC is called upon to shift its focus from the futile negotiation process towards community based action aimed at protecting Palestinian residency rights by:
International interest in the actual situation of Palestinian residency rights is vital.
Palestinian Migration to the PA Areas (1994 - 1997) 1. Persons entering on visitor's permits and staying after expiration
2. Persons granted residency via family reunification (average of 3 persons/case)
3. Spouses granted family reunification based on November 92 High Court Agreement (est. 1,000 cases, i.e. 50% of total)
4. Persons granted residency based on the Election Agreement/Taba
5. Palestinian Deportees permitted to return
6. PNC members permitted to return (without deportees and persons returned earlier via the PA)
7. Persons entering with PA national numbers
Total (1 - 7) 91,800- 121,800 Note: This estimate is based on The Silent Migration
(1994 - March 1996), ARTICLE 74 Bulletin, no. 15 (April 1996), p. 7, and on updated
estimates provided by the CAC-headquarters in November 1997. No survey
available. Sources and References ARTICLE 74 Bulletin for the Promotion of Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, nos. 13 - 21 (June 1995 - September 1997), AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights. Civil Affairs Committee of the PA (CAC), Ramallah: Protocols of meetings with human rights organizations (21-12-95 to 2-11-1997). Family Reunification Criteria and Procedures, Report prepared by the Israeli-Palestinian Coalition of Human Rights Organizations for Family Reunification for the Palestinian Delegation to the Multilateral Refugee Working Group, December 1993 (unpublished). Guidelines for Palestinians Who Wish to Reside in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or in Jerusalem, AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, Jerusalem, March 1994 (Arabic and English). Guidelines for Palestinians in Jordan Who Wish to Live in Occupied Palestine, AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, Amman, February 1995 (Arabic). Israeli State Attorney, letters to Atty. Lea Tsemel/AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, 9 August 1995 and 9 January 1996. Memorandum 2/97: Palestinian Deportees: The Leaders Returned - The Soldiers Remaining in Exile?, Muhammad Jaradat/AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, January 1997 (Arabic). Ministry of Interior of the PA/Bethlehem: Protocols of meetings with the AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights (8-10-96, 23-3-1997). Palestinian Deportees' Committee: Special Report on the Right of Return of the Palestinian Deportees and their Families; Amman, 1 May 1995. Palestinians Displaced of 1967 & the Peace Negotiations, Proceedings of a Seminar Organized by SHAML on 18 November 1995 (Abbas Shiblak, Tayseer Amr, Walid Salem, Abdul-Karim Abu al-Haija, Walid Zaqout, Rizq Shuqair, Ahmad al-Ruweidi, Ingrid Jaradat), Ramallah, 1996 (Arabic). Residency Rights in the Territories Administered by the Palestinian National Authority, Preliminary Report, Ingrid Jaradat Gassner/AIC-Project for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, 1 November 1994 (English and Arabic). Salim Tamari, Palestinian Refugee Negotiations: From Madrid to Oslo II, Washington DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996. Second Report by the French Emissary on Family Reunification (Bajolais Report), Multilateral Working Group on Refugees, Tunis Meeting (October 12 - 14, 1993) (unpublished). Status of Family Reunification Issues - Achievements and Problems, Report Submitted by the Palestinian Delegation to the Intercessional Meeting of the Refugee Working Group on Family Reunification, Paris, November 15-16, 1994 (unpublished). UNSCO Special Report: An Analysis of the Israeli Closure
Policy, Spring 1997. (1) For detailed information on
Palestinian residency rights in occupied East Jerusalem, see: Nathan Krystall: Urgent
Issues of Palestinian Residency in Jerusalem, AIC, June 1994 (English and Arabic); Atty.
Lea Tsemel, Ingrid Jaradat Gassner: The Trap Is Closing on Palestinian Jerusalemites ,
AIC, Memorandum 1/96, February 1996 (English and Arabic); B'tselem & Hamoked: The
Quiet Deportation, April 1997. |
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