The Nakba and the Solution, Accomplishments and Failures of the Popular Movement for Defense of the Right of Return
The last few years witnessed enormous popular efforts to defend
the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. These
efforts included raising awareness about the refugee problem and
its importance as a basis for solving the Palestinian problem.
These efforts took root in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and inside
the ‘Green Line’; among Palestinians in exile whether it be in Arab
countries or the US and in European countries, in addition to
various international fora.
The popular movement for the defense of the right of return
resisted all attempts – Palestinian, Israel and international – to
distort the right of return. Such distortions included notions of
return as return to areas under the control of the Palestinian
Authority and return to a future Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. The popular movement emphasized one concept which
calls for the return of refugees to a fixed and specific place
which is their original lands and properties from which they were
displaced in 1948. The movement also emphasized that compensation
for loss and suffering over the past fifty-six years is a parallel
right and not a substitute for the right of return.
At the same time, the movement has failed to prevent the emergence
of enormous dangers facing the right to return, especially with the
development of racist, right-wing ideologies and streams within
Israeli society, mounting extremism, the unified Israeli stance
against the right of return and Israel’s insistence that the
Palestinian people and its leadership, Arab states, and the
international community recognize Israel as an exclusive Jewish
state. The latter demand will make it impossible for Palestinian
refugees to exercise their right of return and it will prepare the
ground for the expulsion of Palestinians still residing within the
‘Green Line.’
The Israeli insistence on denying Palestinians their right to
return was manifested in the United State’s written guarantees (14
April 2004) to the Israeli Prime Minister. The continued daily
aggression and destruction of Palestinian camps in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip are part of Israeli efforts to eradicate the
right to return. Israel’s policy of destroying camps, carrying out
extra-judicial killings, and further displacement of refugees is
based on the belief that these camps represent a living example of
the survival of the refugee problem and the refugees’ persistence
to return to their homes.
The popular movement also failed to deter those who conspire
against the right to return. This includes certain individuals
within the Palestinian leadership who claim to adopt a realistic
and objective approach to the issue. We all know that those who
initiated the Geneva Accords (or Nusseibeh-Ayalon) are part of the
Palestinian leadership, whether from the Executive Committee, the
Council of Ministers or the Legislative Council. These bodies did
not adopt a strong position in order to stop these attempts to sell
the right to return or to hold responsible those who attempt to
cede the basic rights of the Palestinian people.
These individuals still enjoy the same positions and continue their
efforts in the Arab and international arena to promote their
initiative as representatives of the entire Palestinian population
without strong objections from the President of the PA, Mr. Yasir
Arafat, the Council of Ministers or the Legislative Council. This
passive response may be interpreted by Israel, Arab leaders and the
international community as readiness to bargain over the right to
return. Since 2000 there is a noticeable deterioration in the
official position towards the right of return.
The popular movement also failed to make the refugee issue a
popular issue in the Arab world. The concept of the right of return
is still unclear among wide sectors of the Arab population. This is
due, in part, to the focus on Jerusalem and the state, and the
leadership’s negligence to explain the right of return. It can also
be explained by the Arab media which followed in the footsteps of
the Palestinian leadership. The absence of PLO institutions in the
Arab world, moreover, contributed to the almost complete disconnect
between the Palestinian popular movement and its counterparts in
the Arab world. These institutions, essential for national
liberation, merged prematurely with the administrative organs of
the PA, before the PLO had completed its national program,
including implementation of the right of return.
An additional factor that explains the lack of success of the
popular movement to date is the major deterioration in
international support for the Palestinian struggle among
non-governmental organizations and solidarity committees in the
aftermath of the Oslo agreements. While the second Palestinian
intifada has reinvigorated support for Palestinian rights, the
right of return remains least advantaged. The lack of attention to
the right to return may not be the only reason behind the still
limited international support. In the past, the popular movement
limited advocacy efforts to insistence on this right without
providing adequate explanations about how this right could be
implemented. Additionally, they did not respond to the Israeli
claims regarding demographic dangers as a result of the
implementation of this right.
The popular movement for the defense of the right of return (after
forming a unified and organized structure for such a movement)
should put forward a proposal for return based on co-existence with
the other and not replacing the other. The proposal must also find
a formula that will comfort the other, i.e. the other will not be
considered as a minority in the government providing that he
abandons practices of racial discrimination, in addition to his
adherence to more realistic and democratic concepts. The popular
movement must then prepare and educate itself and its citizens on
such concepts. This will not be an easy task. It will take ample
time and effort to implement.
Dr. Abdallah Hourani is the Head of the Political Committee in the
Palestinian National Council, a former member in the Executive
Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the
Director of the National Center for Studies and Documentations.
This article first appeared in Haq al-Awda (May 2004). Translation
from Arabic by Rana Mousa.