Palestinian Internally Displaced Persons inside Israel:
Challenging the Solid Structures

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Socio-historical Overview

Internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel are part of the larger Palestinian refugee population that was displaced/expelled from their villages and homes during the 1948 conflict and war in Palestine (i.e., al-Nakba). Most of the refugees were displaced to the Arab states and the Palestinian territories that did not fall under Israeli control (i.e., the West Bank and Gaza Strip). At the end of the war, some 150,000 Palestinians remained in the areas of Palestine that became the state of Israel. This included approximately 30-40,000 Palestinians who were also displaced during the war. Like the approximately 800,000 Palestinian refugees who were displaced/expelled beyond the borders of the new state, Israel refused to allow internally displaced Palestinians (IDPs) to return to their homes and villages.

Displacement did not end with the 1948 war. In the years following the establishment of Israel, internally displaced Palestinians, a small number of refugees who had returned spontaneously to their villages, and Palestinians who had not been displaced during the war were expelled for security and other reasons. Israeli officials also carried out forced transfer of Palestinians from one village to another within the borders of the state in order to facilitate colonization of these areas. This included, for example, Palestinians from the villages of Iqrit, Bir’am, al-Ghabsiyya, Krad al-Baqqarah and Krad al-Ghannamah. Residents of these villages were expelled to Lebanon and Syria or transferred and resettled in nearby Palestinian villages. During the 1950s, Israeli military forces forced the Bedouin of the Naqab (Negev) to abandon their traditional nomadic lifestyle; some 110,000 Bedouin were concentrated in designated zones in the north of the Naqab. The forced transfer of Bedouin has continued.

During the 1950s Israel military forces destroyed most of the depopulated Palestinian villages. Some of the mosques, the churches and the cemeteries remained. According to Palestinian historian Walid al-Khalidi, out of 420 villages, only 6 villages were not destroyed; some of the villages were resettled by Zionist immigrants. The Israeli government established Jewish settlements on the land of destroyed Palestinian villages. Between October 1948 and August 1949, for example, it built 109 settlements on the land of depopulated Palestinian villages. The government also planted forests in order to “hide” the Palestinian villages. Some of the Jewish settlements on the destroyed Palestinian villages also took the names of the villages.

At the same time, Israeli authorities built new housing units for some IDPs in designated “shelter villages” in order to partially resolve the housing problems faced by internally displaced Palestinians. The number of housing units constructed by the government, however, was marginal compared to overall IDP housing needs after the war. In order to acquire government-constructed units, moreover, IDPs were required to cede their housing and property rights in their villages of origin. In addition, most of the land for government-constructed housing was confiscated from the existing Palestinian
villages (i.e., the shelter villages). In total, few IDPs benefited from the limited housing program in the shelter villages. IDPs who did benefit from the program often faced social rejection.

Between 1948 and 1966, internally displaced Palestinians, like other Palestinian citizens of Israel, were placed under military rule. Military rule enabled Israel to complete the expropriation of land owned by both the refugees and the internally displaced. It also facilitated Israel’s ongoing colonization in these areas. Israeli military forces declared depopulated Palestinian villages as ‘closed military areas’ in order to prevent the return of internally displaced Palestinians. The practice also blocked implementation of several Israeli High Court decisions permitting internally displaced Palestinians from the villages of Iqrit, Bir’am and al-Ghabsiyya from returning to their villages.

Numerous international organizations offered services and assistance to Palestinian refugees and the internally displaced inside Israel. These included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which was established in 1950. Since 1948 Israeli governments have refused to deal with the issue of internally displaced Palestinians as a “refugee problem”. The demand of internally displaced Palestinians to return to their villages of origin has been and continues to be rejected. Land owned by internally displaced Palestinians was confiscated by means of the same Israeli laws applied to confiscate the land of Palestinian refugees (e.g., British Emergency Regulations, 1950 Absentees’ Property Law). In 1952, following a request by Israeli officials, UNRWA transferred responsibilities for assistance to the internally displaced to the Israeli government. Israel viewed international involvement as one of the factors motivating internally displaced to raise the demand for the right of return, and one of the primary obstacles towards extinguishing the status of internally displaced Palestinians as internally displaced persons. In any case, Israeli assistance granted to the internally displaced was marginal and mostly focused on humanitarian relief.

Israel does not recognize internally displaced Palestinians, neither their rights, nor their representative associations. It does, however, recognize individuals when they are prepared to cede claims to their lands and accept compensation. Israel also refuses to allow internally displaced Palestinians from Iqrit, Bir’am and al-Ghabsiyya to return to their villages despite Israeli High Court decisions ruling in the favor of Palestinians from these villages.

The experience of displacement and dispossession more than fifty years ago continues to have a visible impact on the socio-economic status of the internally displaced. The loss of land has transformed village peasants into unskilled workers in the Israeli economy. In addition, many have had problems in rebuilding their lives in the villages that provided shelter in 1948. As Palestinian citizens of Israel, the internally displaced also face overt discrimination in the provision of governmental services when compared to Jewish...
citizens of Israel. Palestinian villages, moreover, suffer from higher rates of unemployment. As of 2000, for example, 21 out of 25 localities with the highest levels of unemployment (over 10 percent) were Palestinian. As Palestinian citizens, the internally displaced also suffer from massive discrepancies in the fields of health, social services, and infrastructure when compared with the Jewish population.

**Population**

Internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel are one of the unlucky categories of the Palestinian refugees as far as registration of status is concerned. The state of Israel has never recognized the IDPs as a separate sector of the population, nor has Israel recognized their status as “refugees” or “IDPs”. Unlike the majority of Palestinian refugees who are registered with UNRWA, there is no registration system for internally displaced Palestinians.

**Table No. 1 - Palestinian IDPs, Population According to Selected Sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year/date</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Bin-Gurion (Israeli first Prime Minister)</td>
<td>10.11.1948</td>
<td>17000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilel Cohen (Israeli researcher)</td>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>23000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>February 1949</td>
<td>25000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>June 1949</td>
<td>31000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jewish National Fund (JNF)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>10266, from 26 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Caiman (Israeli researcher)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>23000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>46000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish National Fund (JNF)</td>
<td>15.12.1950</td>
<td>19074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Labor Ministry</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>16000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majid Al-Hajj (Palestinian researcher)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>150000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramzi Rabah (Palestinian researcher)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>300000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badil Resource Center</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>250000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Using the data of UNRWA and ICRC (30,000 – 40,000 IDPs in Israel in 1949), and the average natural growth rate of Palestinians inside Israel (4.2%), the number of internally displaced Palestinians in Israel today is estimated to be around 274,000 persons. This estimate, however, does not include Bedouin displaced after 1948 in the Naqab, the urban internally displaced (e.g., from Haifa and Akka/Acre) who were permitted to return to
their cities of origin but denied the right to repossess their homes and properties, Palestinians who were transferred after 1949 from outlying village settlements (khirba) to the village proper in the A’ra valley, and Palestinians who remained in their village but lost their lands. If all these categories of displaced persons are included, the total number of internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel today exceeds 300,000 persons.

Patterns of Displacement

Displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 conflict followed two main patterns. The first pattern was characterized by direct displacement to the “permanent” places of refuge like the Arab states. This type of displacement describes the movement of most of the externally displaced Palestinian refugees. The second pattern was characterized by indirect displacement from one place to another (3-4 times on average) according to the sequence of the occupation of the Palestinian villages by the Zionist/Israeli troops. This type of displacement describes the movement of all the IDPs in Israel and part of the externally displaced Palestinian refugees. It was less organized and more anarchistic than external displacement, but still collective, according to the family or the village. The latter pattern was “continuous and severe” and spread out over a longer period of time than the first pattern of displacement.

Table No. 2 - Displacement Patterns of IDPs – Three Villages as a Microcosm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction of displacement</th>
<th>Shelter village</th>
<th>Shfara’amr</th>
<th>Tarshiha</th>
<th>Kabul</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved directly to the shelter village</td>
<td>47.8 %</td>
<td>6.5 %</td>
<td>37.7 %</td>
<td>37.7 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to Lebanon and came back to the shelter village later</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>61.2 %</td>
<td>17.3 %</td>
<td>17.3 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to another shelter village in Israel and came back to the shelter village later</td>
<td>47.8 %</td>
<td>32.3 %</td>
<td>45.0 %</td>
<td>45.0 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The IDPs in Shfara’amr from Wa’arat al-Sarris, Ksayer, Um Al-Zinat, al-Rwiss, al-Damoun, Sa’sa, and Husha.
** The IDPs in Tarshiha are from Iqrit, Sabalan, Amqa, al-Manshia, Suhmata and Deir Qasi.
*** The IDPs in Kabul are from al-Damoun, Mia’ar, al-Rwiss, and al-Birwa.
⇒The average distance between the village of origin and the shelter village is 2-10 miles.

Several factors explain the patterns of internal displacement inside Israel. Some IDPs found refuge in nearby villages in which they had relatives, family and friends. Nearby villages were also the most similar socially and culturally to the de-populated village. In A’raba, for example, 44 of 68 surveyed IDP families, chose A’raba as a shelter village.
because they had relatives and family in A’raba.\textsuperscript{12} The process of re-uniting from the same village of origin also played a central role in the subsequent movement of IDPs from one village to another.

Religion also played a role in the choice of shelter village, especially for the displaced Christian minority (some 10\% of the total IDP population\textsuperscript{13}). Displaced Palestinians from the village of Bir’am (a Christian village in the Galilee), for example, found refuge in the Christian village of al-Jish. But religion also played a role in the choice of shelter village for displaced Muslim population. Tamra village (a Muslim village in the Galilee) took in displaced Palestinian Muslims from al-Damoun, al-Rwiss, and al-Birwa etc’. This consideration was less important in relation to the “mixed” localities that included more than one religious group. Nazareth, for example, a largely Christian city before \textit{al-Nakba}, absorbed a large percentage of displaced Palestinian Muslims. Interestingly, Muslim IDPs preferred to live in the city periphery, in areas such as al-Safafri neighborhood (named after the depopulated village of Saffuriya), or the eastern neighborhoods which were close to the rural life. The few displaced Christians that came to Nazareth preferred to live in the city center and the Christian neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{14}

Economic considerations also influenced the choice of shelter village, especially in the latter part of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s after IDPs realized that the period of displacement would not be short as they had expected and hoped. Economic conditions generally in the shelter villages were miserable, due to restrictions on freedom of movement, the effects of the war on the Palestinian economy, and the limited resources in the villages. These conditions did not assist in the economic integration of internally displaced. Since the beginning of the 1950s, many IDPs migrated from the village to urban centers in search of better economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{15} IDPs from the depopulated village of Saffuriya, for example, migrated to Nazareth from the upper Galilee during the end of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{16} The Palestinian sociologist Majid Al-Hajj noted that during the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, approximately 35.5\% of the IDPs who came to Shfara’amr during this period were pushed by economic considerations.\textsuperscript{17} For many IDPs, economic prosperity was seen as an alternative to their refugee status. Local villagers, however, totally rejected urban migration for social and cultural reasons.

Israeli involvement in IDPs affairs was another factor affecting the choice of shelter village. For military and security reasons Israeli authorities transferred IDPs as well as local villagers from one place to another. This form of internal population transfer was often carried out to facilitate the repopulation of areas of the country targeted for Jewish settlement.\textsuperscript{18} While Israeli authorities also helped internally displaced Palestinians to rent empty homes in shelter villages\textsuperscript{19} or, in some cases, register the property in the name of IDPs, they also forced the internally displaced to give up their rights in their villages of origin.\textsuperscript{20}
In addition to the primary patterns of displacement described above, there were two rare patterns of IDP displacement that took place after 1948. Under the first Israel permitted some IDPs to return to their villages/cities of origin. Some of the IDPs from the cities of Haifa, Akka, Jaffa, and IDPs from the villages Sha’ab and Eilut, for example, were allowed to return to their localities, but were not permitted to repossess their homes and property. They were only permitted to look for new housing in their localities of origin. Under the second rare pattern of displacement, a small number of displaced communities were able to rebuild their neighborhoods on land beside their village of origin. Part of the population that remained from the village of ‘Ayn Hawd, located in the Karmel area of the Galilee, for example, rebuilt homes adjacent to their original village which was settled by Israeli artists. Further examples include al-Mansora in the A’ra valley, as well as the case of displaced Bedouin communities in the north and south of Israel. Many of these villages are not recognized by the government (i.e., ‘unrecognized villages’) and do not receive government services.

**Distribution**

Internally displaced Palestinians (90%) are primarily located in the north of Israel. In total some 162 Palestinian villages in the north were depopulated during the war. IDPs originate from approximately 44 villages, including 11 in which the majority of the village population remained within Israel’s borders. From the 44 villages with IDPs that remained inside Israel, 10 villages had a population of more than 500 persons, 17 villages had a population of 100-500 persons, and another 17 villages had a population of less than 100 persons.

It is estimated that 47 out of 69 Palestinian villages that remained after the war, in addition to the cities of Lydda, Jaffa and the village of Abu Ghosh, provided shelter to internally displaced Palestinians. Today, internally displaced Palestinians reside in most of the Palestinian villages and towns that remained in the territory that became the state of Israel in 1948. In several villages internally displaced Palestinians comprise the majority of the population today. Most, however, reside in separate neighborhoods organized around the structure of their village of origin. These neighborhoods are often named after the village of origin. A similar phenomenon can be found in Palestinian refugee camps throughout the region.

The internally displaced also reside in Palestinian cities in Israel, including Nazareth and Shafa’amr, and in cities with a mixed Jewish-Arab population, such as Haifa and Akka.
Living in the Shelter Village: Social, Economic and Political Aspects

Despite local differences, the phenomenon of social distinction within the shelter village is highly visible. Social distinction is largely the result of competition over limited power and important resources. It should be noted, however, that during the first stage of displacement, IDPs did not face social obstacles, primarily due to the fact that local Palestinian residents considered assistance of IDPs as a national and ethical duty. Moreover, IDPs (as well as refugees), and the locals, in addition to the Arab governments, viewed the situation of the IDPs/refugees as a temporary. Friction between IDPs and the locals arose, however, when IDPs started to build “permanent houses” in the shelter villages.

Despite the fact that IDPs do not live in refugee camps, which are often considered as one of the mechanisms that segregates refugees from their external environment (i.e., the host society), internally displaced Palestinians who live in segregated or separate areas within the shelter village share the same spatial orientation as Palestinian refugees. In the shelter village of Kabul, for example, IDPs from the depopulated village of Mi’ar live in the “Mi’ari” neighborhood. In Nazareth, the “Safafri” neighborhood is named after the depopulated village of Saffuriya. While refugee camps in Arab host countries are also organized according to the village of origin, the main difference between IDPs and the refugees in this context is that refugees in camps share the same status of refugees even though they originate from different villages. Inside the shelter villages in Israel, however, there is a distinction in the place of origin and in refugee status – i.e., there is a dichotomous separation in the shelter village between “locals-strangers/refugees”.

The spatial separation characteristic of IDPs inside Israel is a result of several factors. Disadvantaged or weak groups often find security and solidarity in the presence of other members of the same group. In the case of Palestinian IDPs, it is also related to the structural nature of the Palestinian village that is based on the family/hamoulla (larger family) and the distinction between sects, that plays a primary role in the spatial organization of the village. Each family or hamoulla has a separate neighborhood.

The spatial separation of IDPs according to the village of origin in the shelter village was one of the main reasons for the re-naming of IDP families according to the village of origin, and the re-organizing of social interactions between the IDPs themselves and the other IDPs and the locals. The name of “Damouni”, for example, was given to all the IDPs from the depopulated village of “al-Damoun”. This process in turn enhanced the affinity of IDPs (based on the village of origin) within the Palestinian/Arab social structure.

The intensity of the social distinction is dependent on two basic aspects of the shelter village. The first is the degree of “homogeneity” within the shelter village. When the shelter village is more homogenous culturally and socially, the social distinction between...
the locals and the IDPs become more pronounced. The most evident social distinction is one of “locals-refugees”. Alternately, when the shelter village is more “heterogeneous”, IDPs have more opportunities to integrate within the social structure of the village. The second aspect is the size of the IDP population in the shelter village. Social distinction was less evident in those villages where most of population are IDPs. In Sheikh Danoun (Galilee), for example, the majority of the inhabitants are IDPs from the depopulated village of al-Ghabsiyya. The social integration within the shelter village is therefore more evident. In those villages where IDPs are considered more of a “threat” to local residents, the internally displaced may exercise greater political power toward the political center of the village. To be small majority or large minority can be the most evident distinction between the locals and the IDPs.

Social distinction is also related indirectly to economic development. The 1948 war led to the total collapse of the Palestinian economy, the village economy in particular (not to mention the political and social structure of Palestinian society). In this context, the economic status of IDPs was not so different or worse from other Palestinians in comparison to Palestinian refugees in exile, especially in light of the fact that the confiscation of Palestinian land continued in those Palestinian villages that remained after 1948. Due to the fact that most of the Palestinians and especially the villagers were peasants (fallahin), and therefore dependent on the land for their livelihood, displacement and dispossession resulted in greater dependency on external assistance and the Israeli economy. The shortage of land in the shelter villages gradually led IDPs (and also the locals) to enter the Israeli economy as part-time and unskilled laborers. The process of de-agriculturalization led to a process of forced proletarianization.

While the dependence of Palestinian locals and IDPs on the Israeli economy reduced economic gaps between them, the degree of dispossession experienced by IDPs is one of the primary reasons for IDP economic underdevelopment and their inferior status in the social class structure. The limited resources accessible to IDPs precluded the possibility of social and economic integration in the shelter village. The end of military rule on Palestinians in 1966, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 opened Palestinian markets to Israeli goods. While the economic gap between IDPs and the locals in the Palestinian villages was reduced, the general economic gap between the Palestinians in general and the Jewish sector remained. In general, the economic challenges faced by IDPs has become less distinct with time, due to the common problems faced by both sectors of the Palestinian community inside Israel (IDPs and locals), including the lack of agricultural land, dependence on the Israeli economy, and the absence of an independent Palestinian economic structure.

In general, the economic adaptation of IDPs within the shelter villages was quicker than the process of social adaptation. Over time, some IDPs succeeded with time to establish stores and markets in the shelter villages. Most of them were the most enthusiastic towards social integration. Therefore, they do not define their stores as “refugee stores”.

9
At the same time, they themselves demonstrate resentment when IDPs patronize non-refugee stores. In general, most of the IDPs (some 70%) feel that there is a distinction between “refugee stores” and “non-refugee stores.”42 Locals often treat IDPs as “strangers” especially in response to attempts by IDPs to establish their own stores and acquire lands.43 The sense of “estrangement” was transferred from the generation of the Nakba to the second and third generations who also realized that they were not integrated in the shelter village. While the relationship between the Nakba generation and the village of origin was a connection of remembrance, the connection to the village of origin with the second and the third generation is more romantic. At times the village of origin becomes a “shelter” from the shelter village.44 Mixed marriage has constituted one of the mechanisms to reduce social distinction between IDPs and locals.45

Politically, it should be noted that during the first stage of displacement, in which internally displaced Palestinians, as a group, were not yet organized, IDPs adopted a neutral stance towards local conflicts. This position led to a dynamic where the local population offered more benefits to IDPs in order to win their support. This also gave IDPs greater status in the shelter village. In those villages where IDPs are considered a small majority or large minority, however, IDPs were often one of the parties to local conflicts. In these villages IDPs participated in local elections under political parties related to the village of origin. In Yafia’ village, for example, refugees from the depopulated village of Ma’alul participated in elections under the banner of the “Ma’alul refugees” party. These political parties often focused on issues of interest or concern to all the population and not only refugees (i.e., question of integration) as a means of attracting political support from local parties.46

At the national level, IDPs are more politically active in comparison to other sectors of Palestinian society in Israel. Some members of the Knesset are IDPs (generally as representatives of the non-Zionist political parties).

In summary, the problem of IDPs within the shelter village is double, they have to deal with the integration question within the state of Israel as a Palestinian minority and they have to deal with the integration question within the shelter village as IDPs, a situation that al-Hajj named a “minority within minority”.47

The Challenge of Return

During the first stage displacement, it seemed that Palestinians refugees, in general, and IDPs, in particular, had “disappeared behind their problem.” Refugees and IDPs were referred to by the absent pronoun “they” rather than the present pronoun “we.”48 Nevertheless, the campaign of refugees and IDPs to return to their homes or origin started
with the first days of displacement. Over the last decade, this campaign has assumed new proportions.

al-Nakba (1948-1967):

During this stage, which began with the Nakba in 1948, the majority of the Palestinian people became refugees through two primary waves of displacement: (1) during the 1948 war; and, (2) during the 1967 war. Israeli military forces occupied all of Palestine during this period. During this period, the Palestinian case was generally viewed as a “problem of refugees in need of humanitarian assistance.” The political rights of Palestinians disappeared in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that had unfolded across the country. The entire Palestinian people had either become refugees, were occupied, or both. Within a period of less than two decades the majority of the Palestinian peasant population had become an occupied and/or refugee minority living in foreign states. With the end of the 1948 war, the remaining Palestinians inside Israel including the IDPs became a “minority within their homeland”, living under a foreign and oppressive Zionist majority.

During the conflict and the beginning of the displacement, the main challenge faced by Palestinians was to escape from the danger. Refugees and IDPs, in addition to the locals and the host societies, believed that the return of the refugees and the IDPs would be a “matter of time”. Displacement would be temporary. By the end of the war, many of the IDPs and some refugees from Syria and Lebanon tried to return to their villages by crossing the armistice lines, often in the middle of the night despite threats issued by the Israeli government against returnees (referred to as ‘infiltrators’). Israeli military forces deported or killed most of these persons.

IDPs and all Palestinians inside Israel tried to return to their villages of origin by sending letters to the Israeli ministries. These letters were generally written by the “Mukhtars” and the villages dignitaries, and focused on the good relationship between the residents of the village of origin and their Jewish neighbors, and their desire to live in peace under Israeli rule. The Israeli response to these letters was negative. At the same time the Israeli government announced its willingness to assist the IDPs but only in situation of resettlement in a new shelter village. In the letter that was sent by the IDPs from Mi’ar de-populated village to the Israel Minister of Minorities, for example, villagers wrote:

*We left the village based on the incorrect propagation that the Israeli army killed the men, the children and the women ... and when we tried to return, we were prevented from doing so by the army of Qawaqji ... we did not participate in the war, and we request our return in the name of the justice and humanity...*

The shock of the 1948 war, in addition to the collapse of the national leadership, was one of the reasons surrounding the confusion on norms for the struggle against Israeli governmental policies. Palestinian refugees and IDPs inside Israel, moreover, still harbored the hope intervention by Arab states would bring about return and liberation.
Military rule of the Palestinian population inside Israel, which lasted between 1948 and 1966, moreover, limited effective political participation. Out of fear, IDPs refrained from publicly expressing their political views. IDPs were not allowed to visit their villages due to the fact that the destroyed villages were declared “military closed zones”. The only Israeli party working to resolve the IDP and refugee problem during this period was the Israeli Communist Party (ICP). This led to greater support among IDPs for the ICP. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the ICP has demanded that the government resolve the problems of the IDPs including allowing them to return to their villages of origin. A number of IDPs also established a “Democratic Public Committee”, that raised the demand of IDPs to return to their villages of origin. In general, the absence of the Palestinian leadership and organizations assisted the Israeli government in its attempts to shift the case of the IDPs to a humanitarian rather than a political issue. Awareness of the plight of IDPs, moreover, was local and related to the specific village of origin.

The hope expressed by Palestinian refugees that the Arab states would defeat Israel, and secure Palestinian return and self-determination disappeared by the end of this stage. This situation led finally to the Palestinian revolution by the mid 1960s and the 1970s.

Return is not First (1967-1993):

This stage began in the mid 1960s. The primary factor leading to a shift in focus of the campaign to return was the 1967 war, in which Israel occupied the rest of the Palestinian territories, and displaced more than 350,000 Palestinians. The war also led to the collapse of Arab national unity and the failure of the Naserist movement. Up until this time Palestinians had expected that the Arab states would liberate Palestine. Following the 1967 war, however, Palestinians began to look towards themselves for a solution to their plight rather than Arab states – i.e., Palestinians would have to resolve their own problem. This stage was characterized by several events, including the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, the beginning of the Palestinian revolution against Israel in 1965, and the battle of Karama in 1968 as the first “face to face” fight between Palestinians and the Israeli army since 1948. Refugees in living in exile initiated all of these events. Inside Israel, new political movements were established, including al-Ard (The Land), which was established in 1964 as a nationalist Arab movement and Rakah (the new communist party) comprised primarily of Palestinians and IDPs. While Palestinian refugees outside adopted the principles of Shahada and Fidaa (martyrdom and self-sacrifice for liberation), the Palestinians inside Israel in general and the IDPs in particular adopted al-Sumod (steadfastness) in their struggle.

By the end of the 1960s, the intensity of debate among IDPs and refugees for return declined because of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. IDPs focused on their relationship with Palestinians in the occupied territories in addition to their economic development. According to the Knesset statements index (Divri
Haknesset), for example, there is a significant decline in statements by Palestinian members of the Knesset in the 1970s and 1980s related to IDPs. This led also to fewer governmental efforts to address the IDP problem. The secret “Koenig” report, written by an official from the Israeli Interior Ministry, for example, discussed mechanisms of domination of Palestinians inside Israel, the political power of Rakah on the Palestinian street, the Palestinian students in the Israeli universities, and the “demographic problem”, but did not mention the issue of internally displaced Palestinians. While internally displaced Palestinians continued to advance economically during this period, the demand of return was not mentioned by any political parties including Palestinian parties inside Israel until 1992.

This period also witnessed an increase in academic research and writing on IDPs inside Israel. This included Palestinian academics. The “rediscovery” of the Palestinians ran parallel to the increase in academic output. Some researchers have thus argued that there is a relationship between academic writing and the development of the Palestinian people culturally, historically and socially as well as its ability to build a separate identity. This is also true for Palestinians inside Israel, Palestinian refugees, and the IDPs inside Israel. Academic writing thus plays an important role in the process of nation building.

Through this stage the problem of the IDPs was “hidden” behind the political demands of the Palestinian parties inside Israel that focused since 1967 on two basic rights: withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories, and the building of an independent Palestinian state; and, equality for the Palestinians inside Israel. In exile, the right of return was hidden behind the Palestinian revolution, self-determination and the struggle for liberation.

**A New Process of Organizing (1993-):**

The beginning of this stage coincided with the beginning of the negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO in the early 1990s, the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, and the establishment of the Palestinian National authority in the “liberated” cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This current stage is also characterized by the development of a mass campaign for return headed by the IDPs and the refugees themselves.

IDPs and the refugees felt that the Oslo peace process had ignored their right of return. Despite difference between IDPs and refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, the response to the peace process was similar. Popular committees were established in both places in order to protect the rights of the refugees and the IDPs. This was the first time that the refugees built their committees to lobby for their rights – i.e., committees “by refugees and for refugees”. During the latter part of the 1990s, return committees and organizations were also established in Arab states (including Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan) in addition to Europe and North America. The emergence of this campaign was related to
the exclusion of refugee rights from the negotiation process and reflects a crisis of representation at the Palestinian national level.69

One of the positive aspects the Oslo peace process in relation to refugees, however, is that the process engendered increased interest and awareness about Palestinian refugees and IDPs. As the different parties searched for solutions to the conflict, there was a need to study the main “obstacles” between the Palestinians and the Israelis, including the refugee issue.70 Moreover, refugees themselves have had the opportunity to voice their point of view, their needs and their rights.71

In April 1992, internally displaced Palestinians organized the first public meeting in which they established a follow-up committee concerning the affairs of IDPs inside Israel. The committee reaffirmed that IDPs are part of the Palestinian people, and voiced protest that the negotiations with the Israeli government were ignoring their rights.72 The committee also demanded implementation of UN resolutions related to Palestinian refugees including General Assembly Resolution 194(III), 11 December 1948.73 Three years later, the follow-up committee called for a meeting of IDPs in the village of Ebilin (11 March 1995). Representatives of some 28 de-populated villages74 (some 280 persons in total) participated in the meeting. The participants decided to establish a National Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Internally Displaced Palestinians inside Israel (officially registered as an association in 1998), as a response to the exclusion of IDPs and refugees from the Oslo process. The Association is comprised of representatives of the villages of origin. On 16 March 1995, the larger Follow-up Committee of the Palestinian citizens inside Israel announced its support for IDPs, and welcomed the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Internally Displaced Palestinians (ADRID) as the representative forum of IDPs inside Israel.75 ADRID calls upon the government of Israel to implement UN Resolution 194 to allow the IDPs and the refugees to return to their homes; organizes activities in the villages of origin, including marches into the villages of origin; collects materials on the villages (archives); in addition to cooperation in the Knesset with Palestinian political parties. ADRID also encourages the establishment of local committees of the villages of origin.76 ADRID is considered as the legitimate representative of the IDPs.

[The important and historic resolution to establish the National Committee [ADRID] as the legitimate representative of the IDPs in Israel, [was adopted] in order to stop Israeli designs, supported by Arabs and the international community, against the Palestinian side to exchange the right of return of the refugees and the IDPs in for the right of self-determination [i.e., a Palestinian state]. We totally reject this. 77

One of the important activities of IDPs through ADRID is the annual commemoration of the Nakba on the date of the establishment of the state of Israel (15 May). Marches are organized every year from one of the shelter villages to the nearby village of origin.78
Other national dates around which activities are planned include Land Day and the dates of village occupation. The National Association also supports the publication of research related to the IDPs experience.

In March 2000, internally displaced Palestinians organized a second conference in Nazareth, with the participation of local committees, Palestinian political parties, and representatives of the PLO. The final statement of the conference reaffirmed the final statements of the first conference in Ebilin (1995), including the reaffirmation of the right of return of IDPs and refugees. During 2000, ADRID organized, in coordination with the local committees of the de-populated villages, more than 20 organized visits to the de-populated villages, during the commemoration of the Nakba. More local IDPs committees also became members of ADRID during the year.

ADRID also coordinates with other refugee committees and organizations in the West Bank based on shared principles, including UN Resolution 194. ADRID participates in international conferences with full coordination with the refugee organizations. In addition, ADRID cooperates with refugees organizations in organizing common activities such as the International Day in Solidarity with the Palestinian People. In 2001, for example, ADRID organized a central march in Nazareth. In October 2000, November 2001, and November 2002, ADRID participated in the annual coordinating meeting between Palestinian refugee committees and organizations held respectively in Cyprus, Brussels, and Copenhagen. One of the main results of these meetings was the establishment of a “Palestinian Right of Return coalition” as an umbrella union for most of the refugee and the IDPs organizations. ADRID is a member of this coalition. The IDP campaign has become one of the main centers of the Palestinian right of return, despite the particularities of their case (i.e., IDPs are citizens of Israel and not refugees).

In addition to ADRID, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of tens of committees for the local de-populated villages, including the popular committee of Suhmata, Hittin Committee, Iqrit Committee, Saforia Committee, al-Damoun Committee, Bir’am Committee, and al-Ghabsiyya Committee. All the local committees are members of ADRID except the committees of Iqrit and Bir’am that have a special struggle due to previous Israeli High Court rulings on their case, and express caution concerning coordination with ADRID and the IDPs in general.

The struggle of the internally displaced inside Israel is not easy. In the past, IDP committees had to confront interference in their work by the PLO, which was concerned that IDP activities could damage the peace process with the Israeli government. The committees face other problems, including, for example, the problem of defining policy vis-a-vis Israeli public opinion. Other questions include the position of the committee towards IDPs who received compensation from the Israeli government, and the relationship of the situation of IDPs to the larger refugee case.
The campaign of the Palestinian IDPs inside Israel has also been affected to a large extent by the process of building Palestinian civil society inside Israel. Palestinian civil society structures virtually disappeared in the aftermath of the 1948, the establishment of the state of Israel and the mass displacement of Palestinians.

With the end of the military rule inside Israel in 1966, some of these organizations reappeared especially in the political arena and in the area of social services. During 1990s, some 656 new Palestinian associations were registered inside Israel. In 1995, Ittijah (the Union of Palestinian NGOs inside Israel) was established. Today Ittijah includes some 55 Palestinian associations as members, and offers services to more than 150 Palestinian associations. Approximately 66.7% of the member organizations were established after 1990 (36 from 54 in total), and some 24.0% were established during the 1980s (13 from 54 in total). Some of these associations work, including the Al-Aqsa Islamic association, Gallil society, the Association of the Forty for the unrecognized villages inside Israel, and Adalah Legal Center, work with ADRID which is also a member of Ittijah.

At the political level, an increasing number of Palestinian political parties have focused on the problem of internally displaced Palestinians. Through the 1996 Israeli general election, for example, Hadash and Balad raised the case of the IDPs as one of the main issues affecting Palestinians inside Israel. Other Palestinian parties have also raised the issue of IDPs, in addition to some of the Zionist left forums like Ta’ayosh and Gush Shalom movements.

**Conclusion**

The peace process that started at the beginning of the 1990s between the PLO and the Israeli government pushed Palestinian refugees, including the IDPs inside Israel, to protect their rights by themselves. The success of the campaign for refugee and IDP rights that has been organized primarily by political activists cannot be explained outside the context of the shelter villages in which IDPs continue to have a distinct social identity as displaced persons. The campaign for IDP rights, including return that began in the 1990s has raised the issue to the national level. There, the conflict is with Israeli authorities and not with locals in the shelter villages. On the contrary, locals and other Palestinians have given the IDP campaign support at the national level.

In general, the refugee identity of IDPs inside Israel has been continuous since 1948. The negative identity of “I’m not from here” (i.e., from the shelter village) illustrates the problem of social distinction. At the same time, IDPs inside Israel continue to express a positive identity of “I’m from there” (i.e., from the village of origin). These two main identities together comprise the collective identity of internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel today. IDPs in Israel are challenging two main solid structures. The first is Israel’s continuous rejection of their right to return to their villages, despite the fact that
they are citizens of Israel (not to mention the fact that several unimplemented Israeli high court decisions have ruled in favor of the return of some villagers), nor will it change the demographic balance inside Israel. The second one is the structure of the Palestinian shelter village, where the relationship between locals and IDPs is still one of “estrangement” despite the fact that IDPs are living in their homeland.
Biography

Arabic references


Hebrew References
English references


Endnotes


4 Ibid.

5 The Israeli settlement on the destroyed village Beit Dajan was named “Beit Dagan”, and Kibutz “Sa’sa’” was built in Sa’aa’ village, “Bietzit” on al-Bassa village, Tziburi on Safuria village, Mushav “Amka” on the land of Amqa village, Mushav “Eilanit” (tree in Hebrew) was established on the land of “Al-Shajara” village (tree in Arabic), Kibutz Lavea was built on the land of Lubia village. See, Wakim (2001,a).

6 In Um Al-Fahem, Yamma and Sha’ab and Ein Rafa near Jerusalem, the Israeli government built some 20 housing units for the IDPs, in Jaljulia 10, Ramla 45, and in Nazareth more than 200. State of Israel Archives, The Housing Ministry file, 4410/61621, Cited in Cohen (2001).

7 In October 1958, the Israeli government confiscated some 56 plots from Tamra village in the Galil in order to resettle IDPs. After a few months the government confiscated almost 70 dunums in Judaida village, and 24 dunums in al-Jish. See, Cohen (2001).


16 See, Cabaha, M. Brazilai, R. (1996), Haplitim Bearzam, Haplitim Hapnimiem Bamdinat Yesrael 1948-1996 [Refugees in their Homeland, the Internal Refugees in Israel State 1948-1996], Skirot al Ha’aravim Bayesrael No. 2. Geviat Haviva: Institute for Peace Studies. The Migration of the IDPs from Safurriya village to Nazareth can be explained if we take into consideration the geographic proximity of Safurriya to Nazareth, and the process of the reuniting of IDPs from Safurriya into “al-Sfai’ri” neighborhood in Nazareth.


18 This include, for example, the transfer of Rehania IDPs in Kufr Kana, and the transfer of Tarshiha residents to Me’elia village. General proposals for the resettlement of IDPs in Majd al-Krum were discussed by the Transfer Committee headed by Joseph Weitz.

19 In 1950, the village department of the Custodian of Absentees Properties announced that it was going to study the question of renting empty houses in the shelter villages to IDPs in 20 villages. Israeli Defense Army Archive, 263/66/2, Cited in Cohen (2001).
In some cases, the Israeli authorities asked IDPs to register the houses of “secondary occupation” as permanent property in exchange for ceding their rights in the villages of origin. This includes IDPs in al-Jish, in April 1961. See, Sae’ed (1992).

In Nazareth, there was a high percentage of IDPs. Inside the city there were more than 4,500 IDPs and in the nearby villages there were an additional 5,000 IDPs. The Israeli government was afraid to allow such a high population of IDPs to remain in one place. It therefore decided to allow to the IDPs from Haifa, Akka and Jaffa to return to their cities of origin. A special ministerial committee recommended that IDPs from Eilut (560) and Hittin also return, but the military rejected the latter village for security reasons. The two Bedouin tribes of Krad al-Baqqara and Krad al-Ghannameh were transferred to Sha’ab village in 1956, which was empty and had been declared a “closed military zone.” Villagers from Sha’ab who had been displaced to the nearby villages were allowed to return to the village. See, Cohen, (2001).

The Association of Forty defends the rights of the unrecognized Palestinian villages. Ein Haud village was recognized in 1994 by the Israeli government as part of the local council of Hof Hacarmel.


This included Nazareth (3,000-6,000 IDPs), Akka (1,000), Majd Al-Krum (850), al-Rama (550-850), Yafa’ (370-750), Abu-Snan (400), Kufr Yasif (400), Kufr Kana (270-600), Shfara’amr (500). Ibid.

During the first stage of displacement, Palestinian refugees in the Arab States, on the another hand, faced bad treatment by the local Arab residents and from the authorities. Rosemary Sayegh who researched the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon claimed that the Palestinian refugees represented to the locals the Nakba and the defeat of the Arabs in 1948. The locals in Lebanon also viewed the refugees generally as “foreigners” especially through the first years. See, Sayegh, Rosemary: *Palestinians: from Peasants to Revolutionaries*. London: Zed Books. 1979.

Additional “Mi’ari” neighborhoods are located in Sha’ab and Araba shelter villages. See, Wakim, (2001,a).

For more examples of the IDPs separate neighborhoods, See, Wakim (2001,a); Sae’ed (1992); and Cohen (2001).

See, for example, Sayegh (1979); and Sha’aban, H. (2002), *Al-Mukhayamat al-Falastinia fi Lebnan, Min Al-Diafa Ela Al-Tamiez* [Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: From Hosting through Discrimination]. Jerusalem: PASSIA.

Every village consisted of 3-4 families/hamoulas and 3-4 neighborhoods.


The collapse of the Palestinian economy began with the beginning of the Palestinian revolution in 1936. While the Jewish-Zionist economy experienced considerable development, the Palestinian was hit hard by the British mandate administration.

This process is indicated by the percent of the agriculture in the total Palestinian labor force, 49% in 1955, 40% in 1967, 17% in 1977, and 10% in 1984. See, Al-Hajj (1994).


Ibid.


Cabaha and Brazilai (1996).

Cabaha and Brazilai (1996).

Cabaha, and Brazilai (1996).
On 24 May 1949, for example, Israeli military forces deported some 61 persons from Frriadia village and Samiria village. Military forces also deported two families from Mi’ar village who came from Arraba village. Yoman hamilhama shel hamimshal hazvai’, The IDF Archive, 850-721/72, IDF archive, 721-842/72, Cited in Cohen (2001).

The Mukhtars and the village dignitaries were the main mediators between the Israeli government and the Palestinians inside Israel.

These types of letters were sent, for example, to Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, and also to Bachour Shitrit, the Minorities Minister. Letters of IDPs were sent by IDPs of Haifa in Nazareth, and Madima village (Tibirias) in Nazareth, and Suhma in Bq’e’n, and the IDPs of Mi’ar in Kabul village. See, State of Israel Archive, Minorities Ministry file, 44/1319, 39/308, 35/1319, 41/1319. Cited in Cohen (2001).

This was an Arab army comprised of different Arab troops who came to Palestine to defeat the Israeli-Zionist forces.


al-Ittihad, the party newspaper, reported weekly about the problem of the IDPs. See, for example, Haifa IDPs in Nazareth in 3.1.1948., IDPs in Shfara’am in 7.1.1949, demand to return the IDPs from al-Damoun in 31.1.1949, demand to return the IDPs from Iqrit in Rama, against the closing of the de-populated villages in 10.7.1949, the displacement of al-Ghabsiyya villagers in 5.2.1950, 26.2.1950, and displacement of the IDPs of A’ra valley in 1.10.1950. Cited in Cohen (2001).

The members of Knesset of the Israeli communist party demanded in mid 1949 to allow the IDPs from al-Mjedil, Eilut, Ma’alul, Birwa, Damoun, Fargha, Iqrit, etc.’ to return to their villages of origin. See, Devti Hakneset, 1, 1949, 5-84. Cited in Cohen (2001).

The first popular conference for refugees was held in Al-Fara’a, a former Israeli prison in Nablus in 1995, and called upon Palestinian refugees to organize a lobby for return. Additional workshops were held in 1996 in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the “first refugee conference” which was held in Dheishe refugee camp in Bethlehem in 1996, and another refugee conference in Gaza in the same period. This popular campaign led to the reactivation of the Refugee Affairs Department of the PLO and the establishment of popular committees in each camp of the West Bank and Gaza. Workshops and protest activities continued in the following years. For more details on the campaign of refugees and IDPs in Palestine and Israel, see, Jaradat (2000).

The representatives of the de-populated villages are from 8 villages of more than 500, in addition to some 22 smaller villagers. See, Cohen 2001.

Wakim (2001, b).

Jaradat (2000).

Wakim (2001, b).

This includes the march to Safurriya village from Nazareth in 1998 on the 50th annual commemoration of al-Nakba, and the public march to the depopulated village of al-Damoun from Kabul shelter village in 2000. In the 53rd annual commemoration of al-Nakba the National Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced inside Israel organized a march from Yafia’ village to the depopulated village of Ma’alul with the participation of more than 5,000 persons. There was also a march to al-Birwa village on the same date. See, Wakim (2001, b); Ha’aretz, 15 May 1998; and Badil Resource Center (2001), *alleqaa al-Tansqi al-Awal fi Qubros* [First Regional Meeting for Coordination in Cyprus]. Bethlehem: Badil Resource Center.

The National Association organized, for example, a march from Sheikh Danoun village to al-Ghabsiyya de-populated village on 28 March 1998 in commemoration of land day.

as the publishing the book of the journalist Wadia Awawdeh on the IDPs case, “memory that is not die”.

Wakim (2001, b).


See, Badil (2001); and Badil (2002).

Ibid.

Ibid.

The popular committee of Suhmata organized a survey about the village population and their distribution inside Israel, in addition to its activities of visits and voluntary activities in Suhmata, and publications about the village. See, Sae’ed (1999).

This was established in 1978 on the 800th commemoration of the Hittin battle between the Muslims (led by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi) and the crusaders. The Committee organizes activities and voluntary activities in the village, and also the prayers on Friday and holidays in the Mosque of Salah al-Din in the village. Ibid.

The Committee is leading the special struggle of the village displaced in coordination with Bir’am Committee, and has annual activities in the village and outside. The committee is more developed than the other local committees. See, http://www.iqrit.org.

The committee was established in 1993, and organizes visits and meetings in the village, in addition to the survey done by the committee on the displaced from Safurriya. It also publishes materials on the village. See, Sae’ed (1999).

It was established in 1996 in order put pressure on Israeli authorities to return to the village. The committee maintains the village cemetery and organizes visits to the village. It also publishes materials on the village, such as “al-Damone: My Village”.

The committee of al-Ghabsiyya organized prayers in front the its closed mosque in March 2002 with the participation of some of the committee members. The participants called upon the Israeli government to reopen the mosque that was has been closed since 1997. It should be noted that al-Ghabsiyya committee organizes the Friday prayer weekly in front of the mosque even in the winter. See, al-Ittihad, 3 March 2002.


Ibid.


Some of the voluntary activities in the de-populated villages were organized by Al-Aqsa Islamic Association, especially cleaning the mosques and the cemeteries. In 1994, for example, the Association organized voluntary days to re-build the cemetery in depopulated village of Husha. The Association has a
cycle of activities in some of the de-populated destroyed villages such as Balad al-Sheikh, where the
cemetery of Iz Al-Din Al-Qassam is located. See, Cohen (2001).

96  The unrecognized villages are Palestinian localities in Israel that the Israeli government does not
recognize. They do not receive any services, including electricity, piped water, telephone, postal services
and infrastructure. The Association of the Forty was established in 1988 on the 40th anniversary of the
Nakba and the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights. Some of the Palestinians in the unrecognized
villages are IDPs such as the Palestinians from Ein Haud near Haifa. See, http://www.assoc40.org.

97  Saee’d (1999).