In the last issue of ARTICLE 74 we presented analysis and a field report about the situation of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In this issue, journalists in Lebanon and Jordan  describe and analyze for BADIL the current situation of Palestinian refugees in these two countries.

The situation of Palestinians in Lebanon is distinct from the situation of other Palestinian refugee communities in Syria, Jordan or in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The particularity of their situation is derivative of the fact that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was created by the Nakba, in a country which, already then, functioned according to a very sensitive  balance between religious groups. This balance is upset by any, even slight, change in the status of one of its components, leading to a collapse of the whole Lebanese body. The experience of the series of civil wars from Lebanese independence until  the 1990 Ta'ef Agreement is a clear evidence of this sensitivity. The presence of  tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, therefore, continues to worry substantial sectors of the Lebanese population. These worries and concerns are expressed politically in discriminatory legislation aimed at the political, economic and social marginalization of  Palestinians in Lebanon and at preventing the absorption of Palestinians in the Lebanese social and economic fabric. This negative Lebanese position was formed by circumstances related to the interests of the different religious groups, and it continues to be the source of the spirit of hostility and hatred towards Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular.

Successive Lebanese governments have dealt with the Palestinian issue as a "security issue", handling refugee camps as "security islands" standing outside of the law. It seems that the cumulative impact of the above factors resulted in broad support of the official Lebanese position by a large segment of the public which considers Palestinians as unwelcomed guests. Exceptions exist, but have not effected a change in this attitude.  The role attributed to Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war must be seen in this context. Ignoring their responsibility for starting the civil war, a strong wing inside and outside  the government argued that the Palestinians were those responsible for the civil war and therefore had to pay the price. This argument increased the strong existential fear and concern among Palestinians in Lebanon. Existential fear, although experienced in different forms and ways by each Palestinian, is deeply ingrained into the Palestinian mentality. It is the result of the trauma of the war of 1948 and its collective memory, and kept alive by later experiences. The massacres of Sabra and Shatilla in 1982, and the War of the Camps in 1985, brought Palestinian camps on the verge of annihilation; numerous campaigns of hostility, eviction and expulsion have uprooted Palestinians and threatened their physical existance. Although it is true that similar fear and worries are found  among other Palestinian communities, they are - as a result of the factors described above - strongest among Palestinians in Lebanon.

Summarizing briefly and without going into the details of the complicated Lebanese-Palestinian relationship on the official and community level and its historical development, the uniqueness of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon is a result of life in a steadily deteriorating environment. The initial welcome at the time of al-Nakba was replaced by dislike and cool relations, which then turned into hatred. The hatred of today is an outcome of the positions and policies of the religious and sectarian forces which  form the current political leadership in Lebanon,  of their specific positions in regards to the Palestinian and Arab issue. It is aggravated by the unstable political, economic, and social situation, locally, regionally and internationally.

Palestinians in Lebanon: No to Resettlement

Palestinians in Lebanon understood spontaneously that the Oslo Accords failed to meet even their lowest hopes and demands. They understood that the Accords represented a step toward making their issue forgotten, and would lead to a framework of resettlement, an option they had always resisted and fought. An opinion pole conducted in 1994 and including a sample of Palestinians inside and outside the camps, shows that 54%  do not think that the Accords will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, 70%  believe that the Accords do not include the Palestinian right of return,  and 62% do not support the Accords and  agreements in their current form.1

The same poll also shows that Palestinians in Lebanon are supporters of  restitution by force, holding that armed struggle must accompany the  negotiation process, because this strengthens the Palestinian position.  Seventy percent reject completely any idea of resettlement in Lebanon, and  83% state that they prefer to live in Palestine.

By excluding the refugees, the Oslo Accords revived the issue of resettlement and increased prospects that resettlement would be imposed as a solution by force. The Oslo Accords therefore stirred fear and concern equally among both Palestinians and Lebanese. Resettlement scenarios presented by local and international forces, increased these fears and further complicated the situation. However, while Palestinian rejection of resettlement is rooted in their demand for the right of return to their home, the reasons for the rejection of the resettlement option by the various Lebanese parties are different. Some reject resettlement from the hostile position described above, others base their rejection on a position of solidarity and concern for the Palestinian issue and Palestinian national rights. The official Lebanese positon is, unfortunately, motivated mainly by the first.

An Environment of Deprivation

Economic and social suffering among Palestinians in Lebanon has reached a level never witnessed before. Various Lebanese and Palestinian factors, regionally and internationally, have contributed to the growth of poverty and deterioration of  health and social conditions:

I. Lebanese policies affecting civil and social life
The Lebanese government is implementing a set of policies basically aimed at isolating the Palestinian community in Lebanon in order to destroy hope and encourage emmigration. This policy has resulted in numerous restrictions which directly affect Palestinian daily life:

Restrictions on Housing:
The number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has multiplied since 1949, due to a natural population growth rate which, according to the surveys conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, equals 3.3% annually. The Lebanese government, however, has dealt with the growing population by policies based on three NOes: No to the reconstruction of the three destroyed camps (Tal al-Za'ater and Jisser al-Basha in the Beirut area, and al-Nabatiya camp in South Lebanon); no to the construction of new camps;  and, no to the expansion of existing camps. Construction materials are not allowed under any conditions to enter the camp in Sur, south Lebanon, and repairs of homes are possible only after receiving a special permission which is difficult to obtain. As a result of this policy, Palestinian camps in Lebanon lack basic human conditions, and overcrowding has reached extreme dimensions. In Ain al-Hilwa camp, for example, medium sized apartments of 100 sq.m. are shared by up to 18 persons.2  The situation is aggravated by the lack of safe water resources and the absence of sewerage systems.

The existance of Palestinian refugee camps is also threatened by the offical reconstruction plans for the city of Beirut. The Lebanese government has announced several times that its intention is to remove the camps of Sabra, Shatilla, and Burj al-Barajnah and to seize parts of other camps for the construction of new roads and highways. These plans have stopped the implementation of UNRWA's Building and Rebuilding Aid Program in all Palestinian camps in Lebanon.3  In addition, thousands of Palestinians are threatened with eviction from their temporary shelters by all sort of discriminatory measures. Dozens of Palestinian Families have been evicted from their homes without being offered suitable housing alternatives. Compensation payments provided are too low to purchase even a two-room home and cover less than two years of rent costs.

Restrictions to the right to work:
Lebanese legislation approved by successive Lebanese governments considers Palestinians living in Lebanon as foreigners who have no right to work without previous work permissions issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Based on these laws, Palestinians are denied access to more than 60 professions, among them medicine, pharmacy, accounting, engineering, secretarial work, arts, and public transportation.  The Palestinian work force is also excluded from large sectors of the Lebanese labor market, especially construction and agriculture. Moreover, Palestinian workers do not receive public social allowances, although a contribution is deducted from their salaries and wages.4 Despite these restrictions, the Palestinian work force constitutes a growing competition to other Arab and Asian workers employed in Lebanon.
 High and rising unemployment rates among Palestinians in Lebanon are the result. The current unemployment rate among the Palestinian work force (25.6% of the Palestinian population) is officially estimated at 13.1%.5  The actual rate is much higher, if different definitions of unemployment and the 53% of unstable and seasonal employment are taken into account.  The same survey also shows an increase of child labor: 11.6% of Palestinian children aged 10 to 17 years are already working or looking for work;  39% of the working children are employed in services; 12.4% in construction; and, 18% in agriculture. Rising child labor is a result of the bad living conditions, which encourage children and youth to drop out of school, especially at the secondary level, and to join the black labor market.

Restrictions on travel from and to Lebanon:
It may seem strange that while Lebanese government policy aims to push Palestinians to leave Lebanon, Palestinians wishing to leave are actually confronted with many obstacles which make it difficult for them to obtain travel documents. High expenses (up to US$100) prevent many from filing an application, and, while it is known that Lebanese citizens can obtain travel documents within three days, Palestinians must wait for one month until their documents are issued. Moreover, Palestinians can  obtain travel documents only if they are registered as refugees with UNRWA. This means that the thousands of Palestinians in Lebanon not registered with UNRWA for some reason, cannot obtain travel documents.

The General Security Services cancel Palestinian residency documents in Lebanon, if their owners hold citizenship or residency elsewhere. Some 25,000 residency permits have been thus cancelled in the last 10 years.6   Based on a new administrative measure approved by the Lebanese government in 1996, Palestinians wishing to travel abroad are obliged to obtain a special travel and a re-entry permit from the Lebanese Department for Public Security. This new regulation has tremendously increased the scope of Palestinian suffering, and payment of bribes has become a common means for obtaining these permits.

II. The Retreat of the PLO and its institutions
The 1982 evacuation of Beirut by the PLO marked the beginning of the retreat from PLO responsibilities and commitments for Palestinians in Lebanon. Many PLO institutions and Samed enterprises, which had employed a large portion of the  Palestinian work force, were closed. Health and hospital services offered by the Palestinian Red Crescent Association have declined steadily and operate today at the lowest level since their establishment. Salaries and social conditions of its medical and administrative staff also continue to deteriorate.

Matters were further complicated by the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the official PLO leadership, and the consequent establishment of the Palestinian Authority. This process resulted in a change of priorities of the Palestinian leadership, with PA affairs ranking on the top of the agenda, and all forms of support for the Palestinian Diaspora, including Palestinians in Lebanon, consigned to the bottom. The decline in PLO support for the families of Palestinian martyrs  is a strong example of the terrible deprivation resulting from this PLO priority change. In addition, the PLO proceeded to cut other aid services, such as retirement allowances, and student scholarships. The new PLO orientation and view of its obligations toward Palestinians in Lebanon is exposed clearly in speeches, such as Nabeel Sha'ath's, PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, who stated, "the Palestinians in Lebanon are not under the responsibility of the PA or the PLO, but part of the responsibility of UNRWA."7 

III. The Retreat of UNRWA aid and services
UNRWA has, since its establishment in 1950, blamed its dependency on donor support for its unstable financial position. There is not a single report by the Agency which does not include a point referring to the widening gap between actual refugee needs and UNRWA financial capacities. Despite this fact, UNRWA services in the field of education, health and welfare played a vital role, especially after the collapse of the Palestinian social and economic infrastructure in Lebanon. Recent reports by the UNRWA High Commissioner, however, describe a situation of collective disaster.
 It is a fact that the current crisis of UNRWA is caused by the neglect of donor countries of their obligations towards the Agency's regular and special programs. UNRWA's ability to provide adequate services has been further weakened by the absence of the PLO institutions and services, the withdrawal of many private institutions and international NGOs from relief work into new development programs. Mismanagement of UNRWA resources is an additional factor. Thus, the scope of the announced financial deficit reached US $22 million in 1997, an  expected deficit of US $60 million in 1998, and US $90 million for 1999.8  UNRWA responded to the crisis by reducing its services in a wide range of educational, health and social programs, the current results in Lebanon can be summarized as following:

Health:
In the field of health, UNRWA reduced its activity to the operation of several small hospitals in the five UNRWA field regions in Lebanon. Agency contributions to hospitalization cover only a part of the actual expenses and are limited to a period of 20 days. Also, financial assistance to persons in need of surgery is partial (open heart surgery costs US $10-15,000 of which UNRWA covers no more than US $2,700) and provided only for three types of surgery (open heart, cancer, and brain tumor). The fact that this kind of limited support is offered only to Palestinian refugees below the age of 59 years raises serious questions about ethics of UNRWA aid.

Examples of Palestinian families in Lebanon, living on or under the poverty line and confronted with tragic personal choices vis-a-vis unaffordable costs of hospitalization are numerous. Among others, there is 'Ommar Hamza from Shatilla camp who died in one of the Beirut hospitals. The hospital administration withheld his body for more than 15 days, until his family could cover oustanding hospitalization costs of more than 35 million Lebanese Lira (US $23,000). And there is Muna al-Zayat, a Palestinian woman who delivered triplets in a hospital which withheld her babies for more than 40 days, until a wealthy woman offered to pay the hospital bill of 40 million Lebanese Lira (US $26,000).

Palestinians in Lebanon (1998)
 

Original (pre-1948)	22,174
Refugees	408,008
Non-registered refugees	14,984
Registered refugees (RR)	393,024
RR in Camps	205,757
RR not in Camps	187,267
Total Population	430,183

Source: Salman Abu-Sitta, The Palestinian Nakba, 1948  (London: The Palestinian Return Centre, 1998)

Relief and Social Welfare:
UNRWA cut its previous program for the support of special hardship cases, a program which used to provide existence aid and relief to the very poor (i.e. more than
10% of the total Palestinian refugee population registered with UNRWA in Lebanon). These cuts also effect sub-programs with development aspects, such as the loan program, women activities program, and the disabled rehabilitation program. UNRWA's total 1998 budget reserved for aid to Special Hardship Cases was no more than US $500,000.

Education:
Most  UNRWA schools in Lebanon operate in two daily shifts in order to manage with a decreasing number of schools and a steadily growing student population. The Agency stopped hiring permanent staff. New personnel for its educational institutions is hired on the basis of annual contracts. While free distribution of stationary to students was stopped already ten years ago, UNRWA may, in 1998, also discontinue its currrent scholarship program due to lack of funds.

IV.  The Absence of an Address
Palestinians in Lebanon still consider the PLO as their sole representative, because they distinguish between the PLO as the framework of Palestinian unity and national identity, and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the product of the Oslo Accords. The tragedy of Palestinans in Lebanon is aggravated by the fact that, despite their loyalty, they lack a leadership that can serve as an address for their daily economic and social concerns. The current Palestinian leadership (PLO) shows little concern for the problems and the suffering of Palestinians in the diaspora, while it shows much concern and dedication to PA affairs, such as the establishment of its legitimacy by means of force and repression directed against the opposition, and the problems related to the complicated negotiations  with its arrogant Israeli counterpart.

While the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon reject the Oslo Accords,  Palestinian opposition groups did not succeed in  formulating a distinguished program which could offer solutions to the political, economic and social issues of the Palestinian Diaspora in general, and Palestinians in Lebanon in particular. This explains why these groups failed to become a trusted and respected address for the community. In regards to the existing Popular Committees, the situation is similar, because they duplicate the characteristics of the Palestinian opposition  groups and factions which they support. Representatives of Popular Committees are not elected in democratic elections, and they are not accountable to their constituency. Thus, these Committees restrict and inhibit, rather than promote, the development of the internal dynamics in the Palestinian communities, and prevent them from forming a trusted leadership  which could express refugees daily problems and suffering.

Whatever the situation of the Palestinian leadership, the Lebanese authorities do not recognize any of them and do not refer to them when dealing with the Palestinian problem in Lebanon.  Until now, the Lebanese government refuses to permit the re-opening of PLO offices in Beirut, and it continues to refuse to handle Palestinian problems via the Palestinian opposition factions or their affiliates. The most important point is that the Lebanese government is not ready to deal with Palestinian issues in the framework of civil and social rights, but insists in its traditional appoach towards Palestinian affairs as a "security matter" and a bargaining card in Lebanese-Syrian relations. Among the official offices is the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs which is part of the Lebanese Interior Ministry. It issues refugee ID cards and registers births, deaths, marriages, and divorces among the Palestinian population.

Despite the fact that UNRWA covers a broad sphere of Palestinian life by means of education, health and social services, the Agency has not become an address entrusted for the solution of refugee problems.  This is mainly due to Palestinian fears and suspicions in regards to UNRWA's political role and the withdrawal of its aid and services.
Finally, the future of Palestinians in Lebanon cannot be predicted without recognizing the importance of the political background which determines their lives and social situation. Political developments, in the past and present, have a strong and immediate impact on Palestinian lives in Lebanon and prevent the development of a stable situation. This may explain their expectations, their fear of the unknown, and their mistrust of the future.
Ahmad Ali Othman is a Palestinian researcher living in Lebanon