

# Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2010 - 2012 Volume VII



بديل  
المركز الفلسطيني  
لحقوق المواطنة واللاجئين



**BADIL**  
Resource Center  
for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights

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———— Survey of ————  
Palestinian Refugees  
and  
Internally Displaced Persons  
———— 2010 - 2012 ————  
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## About This Survey

This edition of the Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Volume VII) focuses on Palestinian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the period between 2010 and 2012. Statistical data and estimates of the size of this population have been updated in accordance with figures from the end of 2011. For the first time this edition includes an opinion poll surveying Palestinian refugees on specific humanitarian services they receive in the refugee camps.

The need to overview and contextualize Palestinian refugees and (IDPs) - 64 years since the Palestinian *Nakba* (Catastrophe) and 45 years since Israel's belligerent occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip - is derived from the necessity to set the foundations for a human rights-based approach through which a just and durable peace can be achieved. Not only do Palestinian refugees and IDPs constitute the largest and longest-standing unresolved case of refugees and displaced persons in the world today, but their numbers continue to grow in light of Israel's policies and practices, resulting in more forcible displacement of Palestinians on both sides of the 1949 Armistice Line (in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory [oPt]).

This Survey endeavours to address the lack of information, misrepresentation of, or misinformation about Palestinian refugees and IDPs. The editors of this survey undertook a professional review of the methodology used to determine and/or estimate, as accurately as possible, the current Palestinian refugee and IDP population. The editors reviewed and updated existing statistical data, including findings from the 2007 census conducted in the oPt by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS); latest reports and statistics of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); and the best available data published by host countries and other international and Palestinian concerned institutions and organizations. Hundreds of historical, legal, socio-economic and political supplementary sources have been used to collate, analyze and document the phenomenon of ongoing forced displacement and related statistical, legal and political matters. Nonetheless, in the absence of systematic monitoring and comprehensive registration of all displaced Palestinians, it remains difficult, and is sometimes impossible, to produce accurate statistical data reflecting the phenomenon. In such cases, the best available illustrative data is provided.

BADIL Resource Center has published the Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons since 2002. This edition provides an overview of the demography of Palestinian refugee and IDP populations and their trends within the last two years. Although, this survey is built upon previous editions, it differs in content, length and format. We are confident to say that although the 2010-2012 edition is shorter than previous installments, it is a richer resource. In this regard, the current edition can be considered a comprehensive coalescence of 10 years of vital work and momentum aimed at developing the survey's imperative substance. This revision provides stakeholders, duty bearers and researchers with a publication fulfilling their interests on the one hand and, on the other hand, contribution to a human rights-based approach by exploring durable solutions to the longest and largest unresolved refugee case worldwide. This survey:

Attempts to present the most accurate statistical data derived from the most reliable sources. The methodology applied in collecting, introducing and analyzing statistical data and estimates enhances the reliability of calculations. Furthermore, the survey avoids providing vague and inadequately supported information;

Contains a new chapter (*Palestinian Refugees Opinion Poll on International Humanitarian Assistance*) reflecting refugees' perspectives on central issues relevant to their ongoing plight. Incorporating this chapter is not only a new platform for voicing refugees' concerns, but also enhances BADIL's analysis, in particular, concerning the protection gaps and underprovided assistance that displaced Palestinians have endured for more than six decades;

Clarifies the historical background of Palestinian refugees' plight and the framework governing protection and assistance for this displaced population, but it does not re-address these issues in a depth detailed in earlier installments. This edition offers basic information regarding refugees' and IDPs' rights as they are established in international law and relevant UN resolutions while referring the reader to previous editions and other sources. The authors believe in offering objective information, particularly statistical data. This will exempt the reader from long and detailed historical, political and legal overviews, while maintaining the quality of data and defence of refugees' rights and demands;

Presents an overview of a rights based approach vs. politically-driven initiatives aimed at resolving the Palestinian refugee question outside the realm of international law, principles of justice and a lasting peace.

### ***Notes on Sources***

The information in the survey is compiled from a variety of sources, including published reports, books, United Nations documents, press reports and data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The information presented in the survey represents the most recent information available to BADIL Resource Center at the time of publication. Because of the nature of Palestinian displacement, registration and enumeration, and technical and political complications related to the collection of information about Palestinian refugees, systematic data and information for all groups of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons is not available. The most extensive data and information covers those Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 and registered with the (UNRWA). There is little data and information on Palestinian refugees residing in Europe, the Americas and other areas outside the Middle East. Systematic data and information is also lacking for internally displaced Palestinians in both Israel and oPt.

# Table of Contents

<i>Editorial</i> .....	ix
<i>Executive Summary</i> .....	xv
<i>Recommendations</i> .....	xix
<i>Historical Background and Causes of Palestinian Displacement</i> .....	xxi
<i>British Mandate (1922-1947)</i> .....	xxi
<i>The Nakba (1947-1949)</i> .....	xxii
<i>Israeli Military Government (1949-1966)</i> .....	xxiii
<i>The 1967 Arab-Israeli War</i> .....	xxiv
<i>Israel's Regime: Occupation, Apartheid and Colonization (1967-2009)</i> .....	xxv

## Endnotes

## CHAPTER ONE: POPULATION SIZE, DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS

<i>Preface</i> .....	2
1.1 The Current Scope of Palestinian Displacement .....	3
1.2 Distribution .....	6
1.2.1 Refugees Residing in Camps .....	9
1.2.2 Refugees Residing Outside of Camps .....	14
1.3 Characteristics of the Refugee and IDP Population .....	14
1.3.1 Demographic Indicators .....	15
1.3.2 Labor Force Indicators .....	17
1.3.3 Poverty and Food Insecurity .....	18
1.3.4 Housing .....	19
1.3.5 Education .....	20
1.3.6 Health .....	23
<i>Appendix</i> 1.1 Data Sources and Notes Regarding Estimates of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs .....	24

## Endnotes

## CHAPTER TWO: PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

<i>Preface</i> .....	32
2.1 PROTECTION .....	33
2.1.1 Protection of Refugees and IDPs under International Law .....	33
2.1.2 Israel's Failure to Protect Palestinians .....	35
2.1.2.1 Israel's Legal Obligations .....	35
2.1.2.2 Ongoing Forcible Displacement of Palestinians .....	37
2.1.3 International Protection of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs .....	38
2.1.3.1 International Protection Gaps .....	39
2.1.3.2 Protection Obligations of Host Countries and Countries of Asylum ...	41
2.1.3.3. Protection through International Organs, Agencies and Organizations ..	42
<i>UN Human Rights Bodies</i>	
<i>UN Human Rights Mechanisms</i>	
<i>The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</i>	
<i>Accountability Mechanisms</i>	

2.2. HUMANITAIRIAN ASSISTANCE .....	46
2.2.1 UNRWA .....	46
<i>Education</i>	
<i>Health Care</i>	
<i>Relief and Social Sevices</i>	
<i>Economic Development</i>	
<i>Emergency Assistance</i>	
2.2.2 Israel's Failure to Assist .....	49
2.2.3 Palestinian Refugees and IDPs in the OPT .....	50
2.2.4 Humanitarian Assistance by Arab Host States .....	50
2.2.5 International Humanitarian Assistance for Displaced Palestinians .....	51
2.2.6 International Humanitarian Organizations .....	51
<i>UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</i>	
<i>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)</i>	
<i>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</i>	
<i>Non-Governmental and Charitable Organizations</i>	

## **Endnotes**

# **CHAPTER THREE: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES' OPINION POLL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

<b>Preface</b> .....	62
3.1 General Characteristics .....	64
3.2 Education .....	65
3.3 Employment .....	67
3.4 Housing .....	68
3.5 Health Services .....	68
3.6 Sanitation Services .....	69
3.7 Priorities in Services .....	70
3.8 Assistance .....	70
3.9 Discrimination Against Refugees .....	72
3.10 Conclusion .....	73

<b>Appendix 3.1 Methodology And Questionnaire</b> .....	76
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<b>Appendix 3.2 Main Tables</b> .....	85
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## **Endnotes**



## *LIST OF TABLES*

Table (1.1):	Palestinian Refugees and IDPs by Group
Table (1.2):	Refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR, 1998-2011
Table (1.3):	Registered Palestinian 1948 Refugees, by Category
Table (1.4):	Distribution of 1948 Registered Refugees, by District of Origin and Field
Table (1.5):	UNRWA-registered refugees, including refugees in camps
Table (1.6):	Estimated Population of Palestinian Refugees in Camps (official and unofficial), End 2011
Table (1.7):	Percentage of Refugee Population in the oPt by Governorate, 2007
Table (1.8):	UNRWA Registered Palestinian Refugees by Major Age Groups, 2010
Table (1.9):	Total Fertility and Annual Growth Rates by Region, 2010
Table (1.10):	The Average Household Size of Registered Refugees by Region, 2000, 2010 (Persons)
Table (1.11):	Infant and Child Mortality Rates for Palestinian Refugees (per 1,000 births)
Table (1.12):	Refugee and IDP – Labour Force Participation
Table (1.13):	Unemployment Rates (%) for Palestinian Refugees and IDPs aged 15 years and above by Gender and Region, 2011
Table (1.14):	Registered Refugees Recorded in Special Hardship Assistance Program
Table (1.15):	Percentage of Camp Shelters with Access to Water Network and Sewage Facilities by Region, 2010
Table (1.16):	UNRWA Schools by Shift and Region, 2010/2011
Table (1.17):	Refugees Pupils Enrollment in UNRWA Elementary and Preparatory Schools by Sex and Region, 2010/2011
Table (1.18):	Drop-up Rates in UNRWA Elementary and Preparatory Schools Distributed by Sex and Region, 2009/2010
Table (1.19):	UNRWAs Health Infrastructure by Region, 2010
Table (3.1):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area
Table (3.2):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by refugee camp
Table (3.3):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by age group
Table (3.4):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by area and travel document
Table (3.5):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by area, age and sex
Table (3.6):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and sex
Table (3.7):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and refugee status
Table (3.8):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and marital status
Table (3.9):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and Education attainment
Table (3.10):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by reasons for dropping out of school and sex
Table (3.10.1):	Percentage distribution of refugees by reasons for dropping out of school
Table (3.11):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by reasons for dropping out of school and area
Table (3.12):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by main providers of employment and area
Table (3.12.1):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons by employment provider and areas
Table (3.13):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by main providers of employment, sex and area
Table (3.14):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by career/livelihood and area
Table (3.15):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by career/livelihood and sex
Table (3.16):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by housing unit type and area
Table (3.17):	Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by housing unit tenure and area
Table (3.18):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of received assistance and area
Table (3.19):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by support dimension, degree of satisfaction and area
Table (3.19.1):	Percentage distribution of sampled persons by degree of satisfaction with assistance
Table (3.20):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by needed support and area
Table (3.21):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by degree of dependency on UNRWA's support and area
Table (3.22):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of received assistance and sex
Table (3.23):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by support dimension, degree of satisfaction and sex
Table (3.24):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by needed support and sex
Table (3.25):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by degree of dependency on UNRWA's support and sex
Table (3.26):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by encountering frequent insult or humiliation (when receiving assistance), sex and area
Table (3.27):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by source of insult or humiliation encountered when receiving assistance, sex and area
Table (3.28):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by perception of quantity of assistance received this year in comparison with last year, sex and area
Table (3.29):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of feeling when receiving assistance, sex and area
Table (3.30):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by perception of UNRWA's role, sex and area
Table (3.31):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by reasons behind considering moving outside the camp, sex and area
Table (3.32):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by reasons behind NOT considering moving outside the camp, sex and area
Table (3.33):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by aspects of discrimination/prejudice, sex and area
Table (3.34):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by responsible institutions to file a complaint, sex and area
Table (3.35):	Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by criteria to choose responsible institutions to file a complaint, sex and area

## *LIST OF FIGURES*

- Figure 1.1: Percentage Distribution of Palestinian Population Worldwide by Type of Displacement, End of 2011  
Figure 1.2: Percentage Distribution of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs by Group, 2011  
Figure 1.3: Percentage of Registered Persons by Area, End of 2011  
Figure 1.4: Localities in Israel Hosting 100 or more Palestinian IDPs (1948–1950) IDPs as Percentage of 1951 Population  
Figure 1.5: Percentage of Overcrowded Households, 2007  
Figure 3.1: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by area  
Figure 3.2: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of displacement/type of registration  
Figure 3.3: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of housing unit  
Figure 3.4: Percentage distribution of refugees by main reason/s for dropping out of school and by area  
Figure 3.5: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of enrollment in non-UNRWA school.  
Figure 3.6: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by common problems in UNRWA's Schools  
Figure 3.7: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by funding source of housing maintenance  
Figure 3.8: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of maintenance (within the last 3 years)  
Figure 3.9: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's health services  
Figure 3.10: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's sanitation services  
Figure 3.11: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by public priorities for improvement of the camp  
Figure 3.12: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of assistance  
Figure 3.13: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by individual priorities  
Figure 3.14: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by degree of dependency on UNRWA  
Figure 3.15: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by assistance decline in comparison to last year  
Figure 3.16: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's role  
Figure 3.17: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason for moving outside the camp  
Figure 3.18: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason for staying in the camp  
Figure 3.19: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by aspect/feature of discrimination  
Figure 3.20: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by confidence in responsible institution/authority  
Figure 3.21: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of approaching responsible institution/authority

# Editorial

## Rights, Politics and Sustainable Peace

### Since Our Last Survey

Only a few days before sending this survey to print, a cease fire was announced in Egypt following eight days of an extensive Israeli military campaign against the Gaza Strip triggered by the assassination of Hamas leader Ahmed al-Jabari. Operation Pillar of Cloud resulted in the death of more than 160 and injury of 1.000 Palestinians the majority of whom were civilians, of whom at least 37 were children and 13 were women. The loss of lives, including cases of entire families killed, was accompanied by the destruction of farming lands, buildings and infrastructure.

As details of the memorandum of understanding announced by the new Egyptian government are still unclear, it is too early to assess whether the agreement can prevent future Israeli aggression, nor whether it will end the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the reaction of the revolutionary Arab governments, especially Egypt, to any Israeli breach of the understanding is ambiguous. No doubt, the political transformations in the Middle East over the past two years raise the hopes and expectations of Palestinians that Israel could be held accountable for its crimes, ending long decades of almost unchallenged impunity.

The involvement of Palestinian refugees in the ongoing and still unfinished armed conflict in Syria adds to the ambiguity of the unsettled situation in the Middle East. Palestinian refugees in Syria are victims of violence and further displacement, on the one hand, while they are pressured by both the government and armed groups to choose sides in the Syrian affairs on the other hand. Many variables are involved in addressing the ever-evolving situation in the Middle East. At this stage we can only speculate about the possible scenarios impacting Palestinians across the region.

In addition to these new variables, there are some important constants in the Palestinian reality that should not be forgotten. A few days prior to the attack on the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces forcibly displaced one thousand Palestinians from the northern Jordan Valley, in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), adding to the growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons. This action marks another step in the ongoing systematic displacement of Palestinians. The Zionist-Israeli endeavour aims at emptying Mandate Palestine (historic Palestine) from its indigenous inhabitants, including from areas that lie within the borders of Israel proper. In September 2011, the Israeli government approved the Praver Plan for mass expulsion of the Palestinian Bedouin community in the Naqab. According to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, “[i]f fully implemented, this plan will result in the forced displacement of up to 70,000 Arab Bedouin citizens of Israel and the destruction of 35 ‘unrecognised’ villages.”

The forcible displacement of Palestinians is paralleled by a relentless campaign of settling Jewish-Israelis in settlements (colonies), illegal according to international law. Israeli governments regularly approve the construction of thousands of ‘housing units’ in these colonies, which are populated at a rate of more than double the growth rate in Israel itself. Such projects often receive the attention of media, and the condemnation from even the closest allies of Israel – the US, but have not been halted.

Efforts to colonise Palestine with Jewish immigrants (settlers/colonists) at the expense of the indigenous Palestinians by creating a predominantly Jewish entity there, is coupled with new Israeli legislations (January 2012) that prevent Palestinian couples from the two ‘sides of the Green Line’ to live together in Israel. Building on a strategy to ‘preserve the Jewishness’ of Israel, the new citizenship law was preceded (October 2010) by the proposition of a loyalty oath bill requiring all future non-Jews applying for Israeli citizenship to swear loyalty to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The bill received government endorsement, but has not yet received support from a Knesset majority.

Failure to revitalize the deadlock in the ‘peace process’ between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) / Palestinian Authority (PA) led the Palestinians to seek United Nations recognition from both the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2011. The Palestinian bid for statehood status was curtailed by the US who threatened to veto the draft resolution and to cut funding to supporting states, the PA and to the UN. In light of this, the PLO / PA opted for a more limited upgrade to “non-member state” status. This option is reflected in the draft resolution submitted recently to the UNGA member-states and will be put to vote at the end of 2012. While this bid for recognition aims to ensure the Palestinian right to self-determination within identified borders, it is largely soft in terms of emphasizing Palestinian refugees rights, in particular the right of return. Although such softening could be justified by the need to obtain maximum approval from the UNGA, it may be considered a continuous failure of the ‘peace process’ as well as the international community to ensure a just solution for Palestinians.

The impasse in the ‘peace process’ between the Palestinians and Israel, in addition to Israel’s stark defiance of international law and norms, has led the international community to adopt a humanitarian assistance approach in dealing with the plight of Palestinians. This is so because official diplomatic efforts including those taken by the UN’s main organs (Security Council and General Assembly) – to find a solution to the Palestine question - are politically driven and emphasise the national interests of states, the balance of power between them, and the give-and-take of an open-ended bargaining process. Moreover, these efforts have influenced the role and function of the UN agencies, which is apparent in the adoption of humanitarian aid interventions rather than human rights-based approaches. There is no doubt that durable solutions to the conflict will be the result of a political negotiation process, yet this should not constitute an excuse to avoid addressing the root causes (colonialism, institutionalised discrimination/ apartheid and occupation) and/or to sideline the fundamental rights and freedoms (rights to self determination, return, independence and disposition of natural wealth, and resource and development) of the Palestinian people; the manifestly weak party in terms of balance of power.

## **Understanding The Roots of The Problem**

The conflict in Palestine exceeds the imbalance of power between two national movements; it is defined by the driving ideology of one national movement - Zionism. The conflict in Palestine is thus a struggle for rights of one party, rather than a competition between two equals. The Zionist Movement was formed in the late nineteenth century with the aim of creating a Jewish homeland through the formation of a ‘...national movement for the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel’. As such, the Zionist enterprise combined the notion of Jewish nationalism, which it aimed to create and foster, with the active colonialism of transplanting people, mostly from Europe, into Palestine through the support of Western imperial powers.

In other words, Zionism has necessitated forcible population transfer while ignoring the brutal requisites and consequences. In addition, Zionism has required a structure of racial discrimination against Palestinians in areas of nationality, citizenship, residency rights and land ownership. This system was originally applied in 1948 in order to dominate and dispossess all Palestinians, including the 150,000 who remained within the borders of the “1949 Armistice Line” and later became citizens of Israel. After the occupation of the remaining part of Mandate Palestine by Israeli forces in 1967, this territory became subjected to a similar regime.

Under the maxim: “a land without a people for a people without a land,” the Zionist movement faced three major obstacles when setting the scene to colonise Mandate Palestine in 1897. The following is a brief outline of these obstacles, and the ways the Zionist movement and then the State of Israel have addressed them:

1. The indigenous Palestinian people who were living in that territory: The central obstacle to the Zionist Movement, the Palestinian people themselves, has been addressed by various means. The

main manifestation of Zionism has been forcible population transfer. The task of establishing and maintaining a Jewish state on a predominantly non-Jewish territory has been carried out by forcibly displacing the non-Jewish majority population. Almost half a million Palestinians were displaced between December 1947 and May 1948 (after UN partition plan and before the establishment of Israel). The greatest outflow of refugees took place in April and early May 1948 as a result of the start of operations by Zionist paramilitary organisations. Today, 66 percent of the Palestinian people worldwide (more than seven million) are themselves, or the descendants of, Palestinians who have been forcibly displaced by the Israeli regime. Israeli laws such as the 1954 Prevention of Infiltration Law and military orders 1649 and 1650 have prohibited Palestinians from legally returning to their homes in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territory. This deliberate and planned forcible displacement amounts to a policy and practice of forcible transfer of the Palestinian population, or ethnic cleansing. This process began prior to 1948, and is still ongoing today throughout Mandate Palestine.

2. Palestinian property and land rights within that territory: The Israeli Absentee Property Law 1950 was used to confiscate Palestinian property, legally owned by forcibly displaced Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The term ‘absentee’ was defined so broadly as to include not only Palestinians who had fled the newly established State of Israel but also those who had fled their homes yet remained within its borders; the Israeli Land Acquisition Law (1953) was enacted in order to complete the transfer to the State of confiscated Palestinian land that had not been abandoned during the attacks of 1948. As a result of an overall Israeli land strategy, Palestinians, who owned more than 94% of Mandate Palestine pre 1948, today own less than 15 percent.
3. Lack of a sufficient number of Jewish people in that territory: To ensure a sufficient number of Jewish people in the colonised territory, the Israeli Law of Return 1950 was adopted. It provides that every Jewish person in the world is entitled to ‘Jewish nationality’ and can immigrate to Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship. Thus Jewish nationals enjoy the right to enter Israel even if they were not born in Israel and have no connection to Israel whatsoever. On the other hand, Palestinians, the indigenous population of the territory, are excluded from the Law of Return on the grounds that they are not of Jewish national origin, and as such do not enjoy the legal status of nationals under any other Israeli law; and have no automatic right to enter the country.

The essence of Israeli Zionism, therefore, can be aptly summarized as the creation and fortification of a specific Jewish national identity, the takeover of the maximum amount of Palestinian land, ensuring that the minimum number of non-Jewish persons remains on that land and that the maximum number of Jewish nationals is transferred to it. In other words, the clear imbalance of power between the Zionist movement and the Palestinians facilitated the almost-successful implementation of the ideal Zionist vision, not yet complete. The Palestinian endeavour is to achieve and retain their rights as the victims of Zionism. Thus, it is important to seek solutions rooted in a strict rights-based approach.

## **Rights-Based Approach**

Different UN agencies have adopted a human rights-based approach to their development cooperation, known as “The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies,” and the resulting experience, literature and debate prompted by this move has served to greatly enrich the concept both in theory and practice. Nonetheless, there is still no single agreed upon rights-based approach dealing with all aspects of peoples, groups and individual concerns and there is no workable approach, which caters to different situations and issues worldwide. There is, however, a general consensus as to the basic constituent elements of such an approach, which in turn would enable concerned actors to design unique rights-based systems and processes that fit to particular situations, issues or causes.

A human rights-based approach encompasses the norms, principles, standards and goals of international human rights and best practices of states, with its organs and processes seeking to ensure human dignity and



justice. It is characterised by mechanisms, methods, tools and activities that are designed to complement the notion of humanity's struggle for freedom, equality, justice and development for all. Irrespective of the debate regarding the level of overlap between human rights, peacemaking and peace building, it is agreed that both peacemaking/building and human rights deal with very similar issues. By its narrow or strict definition (stability, safety, and security), peace cannot be recognised when fundamental human rights and freedoms are violated. The interwoven concepts of human rights, human development and democracy are afforded much greater respect during peacetime, and are necessary for peacemaking and peace building.

The human rights-based approach that can lead to a sustainable and just peace for Palestine should be based upon international law, the key principles of justice and equality for all. Therefore it necessarily should include:

1. Recognition of rights, in particular the Palestinian people's right to self determination, the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to reparation (voluntary return, property restitution and/or compensations), the right of development (to freely dispose and enjoy of the natural wealth and resources and cultural heritage) and the right to peace.
2. Addressing the root causes of the conflict; namely colonialism, institutionalised discrimination and occupation. These are the driving factors underpinning a range of human rights violations, such as the denial of displaced people's right of return, illegal land confiscation, settler implantation and settlement/colony expansion, home demolitions, ongoing forcible displacement, restrictions on freedoms of movement and so forth.
3. Ensuring rights for all parties and victims without discrimination and without causing injustice or mass displacement/elimination of the other, during the course of enabling rights-holders to exercise their legitimate and legal rights.
4. Setting the foundations for peaceful and cooperative relations between people, groups, individuals and states. This will be an intrinsic component of a just peace and is essential for reconciliation, which in turn will be achieved through implementing transitional justice (both judicial and non-judicial) mechanisms and tools, including criminal prosecution, reparations, institutional reform, and truth commissions.

Balance of power, or a politically driven approach may result in a "peaceful agreement" for a specific set of conditions or a particular moment, but such a peace would be temporary only. Groups and individuals will always seek their rights to ensure that their humanity and dignity are recognised and protected. Therefore, a human rights-based approach is the only viable framework for constructing a (long-hoped for) durable solution for this protracted conflict.

## **Human Rights-Based Approach in Palestine**

The Oslo process intentionally did not seek to provide a solution to the refugee problem. The political 'track' to solving the refugee problem in particular and the conflict in general, is corrupted by ideological roots and an imbalance of power, as well as disregard for international law, particularly human rights. This is what created the Palestinian predicament and refugeeedom in the first place. It is, as a result, inherently unjust. The US and other international parties cannot be considered as impartial sides to negotiations as they have prioritised strategic alliances with Israel. Consequently, refugees were soon seen as an obstacle to the 'peace process.' Moreover, Israel persists, in complete defiance of international law and norms, in its refusal to recognise the rights of Palestinian refugees. Those rights include the protection of already existing refugees and the prevention of creating additional displaced persons.

From a human rights-based approach, in order to achieve just, effective and durable peace, the resolution of the refugee plight should be in accordance with international law. Indeed, political negotiations and agreements between Israel, the PLO/PA and the US, do not invalidate international law and UN resolutions.

The Oslo negotiations represent an effort to obtain – based on the unfavourable balance of power – a *de facto* solution of the refugee question outside the framework of international law and UN resolutions. However, an explicit renunciation of the right of return by the PLO/PA in a future political agreement with Israel cannot delegitimise the refugee claim, because – according to standards of international law – provisions of a political agreement do not ensure and grant rights equal to or beyond those defined by international law, are illegal and invalid accordingly.

Lastly, the ongoing absence of Israeli accountability in the Palestine-Israel situation undermines the legitimacy of international law, in particular human rights, humanitarian law and international criminal law. It is therefore time to ensure that international law is more than just utopian rhetoric, but instead a robust legal system, which protects rights, establishes obligations and most importantly, creates realities that mirror its core values and principles.





# Executive Summary

## Size, Distribution and Characteristics of Palestinian Refugee Population

Palestinian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are the largest and longest-standing case of displaced persons in the world today.

At the end of 2011, there were at least 7.4 million displaced Palestinians representing 66 percent of the entire Palestinian population (11.2 million) worldwide. Among them were:

- 5.8 million Palestinian 1948 refugees of whom 4.8 million are registered with and assisted by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and one million unregistered refugees;
- More than one million 1967 refugees and;
- 519,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) on both sides of the Green Line (1949 armistice line)

69 percent of registered refugees do not live in camps and 31 percent of UNRWA-registered refugees live in camps or 25.6 percent of the total Palestinian refugee population (registered and unregistered). Approximately 60 percent of registered refugees live in Arab host countries.

By the end of 2011, statistics of registered refugees and other persons show that:

- 40.0 percent live in Jordan;
- 23.8 percent live in the occupied Gaza Strip;
- 17.2 percent live in the occupied West Bank;
- 10.0 percent live in Syria, and;
- 09.2 percent live in Lebanon.

The percentage of refugees in the oPt is about 42 percent of the total population. Out of every 100 residents of the Gaza Strip, 58 are refugees, and out of every 100 residents of the West Bank, 42 are refugees.

Unemployment rates among the Palestinian refugee population range between 6 percent and 44 percent with the highest rates found in the occupied Gaza Strip.

In the oPt, households in refugee camps suffer from the highest rates of poverty: approximately 39 percent of camp households are poor compared with 29.5 percent of urban and rural households. By 2011, food insecurity remained high for both refugees and non refugees, reaching 42 percent among refugee households. For refugees living in camps, the level of food insecurity has risen from 25 percent in 2009 to 29 percent in 2011.

## International Protection for Displaced Palestinians

Due to a lack of political will among states, in particular Western states, and a failure to meet obligations of states set in international and/or regional instruments and mechanisms, no progress has been realized in closing gaps in the international protection mechanisms that Palestinian refugees are entitled to.

Israel has failed to respect and meet its obligations under international law, including UN resolutions, and continues its forcible displacement of Palestinians. For example, it continues to block the return of 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees to their homes of origin by means of discriminatory legislation that violates international law. It is apparent that Israel has so far failed to establish accountability mechanisms for law-based, independent, transparent and accessible investigations of breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, and ignored related international recommendations. Moreover, Israel continues to implement unilateral measures in violation of both the Road Map (the politically driven strategy for the

proposed Permanent Two-State Solution) and international law. These unilateral measures are applied in order to annex, *de facto*, the main Jewish colonies and large areas of Palestinian land (“Areas C”) in the occupied West Bank, and establish a Jewish majority in areas populated by Palestinians, in particular in occupied East Jerusalem, but also in the Naqab (Negev) and the Galilee.

In light of Israel’s failure to protect coupled with its policy of population transfer, the international community is obligated to protect the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the right to self-determination and the right of Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return to their homes and properties. The international community, through the United Nations, has largely failed to meet its obligations towards the Palestinian people for reasons primarily related to the lack of political will among powerful Western states.

The protection obligations of states that host Palestinian refugees are enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. In countries signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, including Europe and North America, most Palestinians are denied effective protection because national authorities and courts do not (properly) apply the Convention to them, in particular Article 1D.

The level of protection provided to Palestinian refugees under Arab regional and national instruments and mechanisms is significantly less than that provided to refugees elsewhere in the world. Ineffective protection including discrimination against Palestinian refugees and armed conflicts in Arab host countries give rise to secondary forcible displacement of Palestinian refugees.

Palestinian IDPs in Israel do not receive internal protection or assistance since UNRWA ceased to operate within the borders of Israel in the early 1950s. Since 2008, an inter-agency Displacement Working Group (DWG) led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has worked to improve the international protection response to internal displacement in the oPt. These recent efforts have yet to achieve tangible solutions, particularly in the areas of prevention of new forced displacement, medium and long-term protection and durable solutions.

International efforts for resolving the Palestinian refugee question continue to be guided by political power-brokering and interests, rather than a rights-based approach. While the Road Map to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the politically-driven approach) is still the prevailing international framework, the performance of concerned parties – in particular the Quartet – has declined significantly, undermining the creation of an independent and permanent Palestinian state.

## **International Humanitarian Assistance for Displaced Palestinians**

Displaced Palestinians continue to lack adequate humanitarian assistance necessary to ensure standards of wellbeing. In 2011, the UNGA and UNRWA once again urged international donors, agencies and organisations and non-governmental organisations to extend to the Palestinian people, and in particular to refugees, as rapidly as possible, emergency economic assistance and humanitarian assistance to counter the dire humanitarian situation in the oPt as well as in Syria. The majority of Palestinian refugees in UNRWA areas of operation receive partial protection through UNRWA health, education and social welfare programs.

In light of shortages in states’ contributions to the annual UNRWA budget; service reduction has become significant. BADIL’s opinion poll (chapter three of this study), which was conducted in the first half of 2012, shows that:

- 79.2 percent of refugee camp residents feel that UNRWA’s services have decreased over the last three years;

- 88 percent of refugee camps residents see that cessation of UNRWA's services or abolition of this Agency will harm their living conditions and rights;
- About three quarters of surveyed refugees feel that UNRWA plays an important role in sustaining the case of Palestinian refugees;
- The majority of Palestinian refugees in the five UNRWA areas raised the need to improve the quality and quantity of UNRWA services. Refugees' first priority is improvement of camps' public services, infrastructure and environments. Individually, refugees feel that improvements of services are particularly necessary in employment (86.1 percent), health services (77.7 percent), cash assistance (77.3 percent), food aid (75.6 percent), and education (63.9 percent).

In the absence of effective protection and lack of adequate humanitarian assistance, as well as in light of the failure of the international community and Oslo peace process, this survey attempts to re-emphasize the urgency of instituting a human rights based approach as the main means of ensuring humanity and dignity for all, putting rights into practice and leading to a just and lasting peace.



# Recommendations

## 1. Adopt and support rights-based durable solutions as a long-term strategy:

Members of the international community should support and facilitate durable solutions for Palestinian people including refugees and IDPs consistent with international law, relevant UN resolutions (UNGA 194(III) and UNSC 237) and best practices. Such a framework requires:

- *Studying and addressing the root causes of the ongoing forcible displacement of Palestinians by Israel.* After 64 years of a protracted *Nakba*, civil society and influencers continue to bear the duty of promoting awareness of and effective responses to Israel's system of occupation, apartheid and colonialism that prevents Palestinian self-determination and constitutes the root cause of Israel's policy of population transfer;
- *Reaffirming the fundamental rights of refugees and IDPs* to repatriation of their homes, lands and properties, and compensation for losses and damages;
- *Developing mechanisms and taking effective measures to bring Israel into compliance with international law.* Responsibility and accountability for injuries, loss of life and property should be pursued by international judicial mechanisms through investigations, ensuring reparations and prosecuting those guilty of serious international human rights and humanitarian law violations. Furthermore, states should adopt legislation ensuring universal jurisdiction and, thereby, prosecute international crimes in their domestic courts.

## 2. Ensure effective protection of Palestinian refugees, IDPs and those at risk of forced displacement in Palestine and host countries:

Implementing international protection standards for Palestinian refugees and IDPs requires:

- *Clarifying the mandates of agencies and bodies responsible for developing and implementing durable solutions.* The UNRWA, UNHCR, UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and other relevant bodies should clarify mandates in order to coordinate effective temporary protection for all Palestinian refugees;
- *Establishing a comprehensive registration system for Palestinian refugees and IDPs.* The UN should coordinate a comprehensive registration system for ensuring protection, crafting durable solutions, and fulfilling reparations. Such a system should include all categories of Palestinian refugees and IDPs, and recognise instances of multiple displacements;
- *Incorporating Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention* into national legislation of states signatories to the convention and ensuring proper interpretation and application of Article 1D to Palestinian refugee asylum cases;
- *Utilising the League of Arab States' regional mechanisms for refugee protection.* The LAS should implement existing regional instruments (1965 Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinians, 1992 Cairo Declaration) and strengthen their monitoring mechanisms;
- *Increasing financial support for assistance and protection of Palestinian refugees and IDPs.* Donor states should increase the quantity and stability of financial contributions to UNRWA emergency appeals and its General Fund in line with annual growth of the refugee population and their needs;
- *Improving the response mechanism of the UN-led Protection Cluster in the oPt* by focusing efforts not only on short-term emergency aid, but also on preventing forced displacement through filling protection gaps of IDPs' medium and long-term needs.

### 3. Ensure and facilitate refugees and IDPs participation:

Including the Palestinian refugee and IDP communities in the process of crafting solutions and identifying protection gaps will strengthen democratic principles and structures, expand the range of solutions, and lend greater legitimacy to peace making. This process requires:

- *Enhancing representation of Palestinian refugees outside of the oPt and Palestinian IDPs within Israel;*
- *Rebuilding and activating the representative structures of the PLO.* Representation of Palestinian refugees and IDPs in the PLO is essential for self-determination and for legitimising the PLO leadership, who should represent all political-ideological affiliations of Palestinians worldwide;
- *Strengthening the capacity of the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs* so that refugees can better access assistance and protection from their representatives;
- *Holding regular elections of popular committees in refugee communities* to renovate the legitimacy of popular committees, strengthen local representation and promote political participation.



Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem, 2009 (© Mohammad al-Ayasa)



# Historical Background and Causes of Palestinian Displacement

*At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, most Palestinians lived inside the borders of Palestine, which is now divided into the state of Israel and the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Until 1947, Palestinians owned and used approximately 90 percent of Palestine's land. Five major episodes of forcible displacement have transformed Palestinians into the largest and longest-standing unresolved refugee case in the world today.*

The major periods or waves of forcible displacement include:

1. *British Mandate (1922-1947)* when more than 150,000 Palestinians were displaced within and beyond the borders of Palestine in the context of British support of Zionist colonisation;
2. *Nakba (1947-1949)* when over 750,000 Palestinians were displaced in the context of a UN General Assembly recommendation to partition Palestine, armed conflict, ethnic cleansing and the establishment of the State of Israel;
3. *Israel's military government (1949-1966)* when 35,000 to 45,000 Palestinians out of the 150,000 who had managed to remain in the area that became the State of Israel in 1948 were displaced, including many refugees who returned in early 1950s.
4. *1967 Arab-Israeli war* when 400,000 to 450,000 Palestinians were displaced in the context of armed conflict and Israel's occupation of the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Egyptian Sinai peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights;
5. *Israel's occupation, apartheid and colonisation (1967–2012)* when these practices have displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and continued forced displacement throughout historic Palestine (Mandate Palestine).

## British Mandate (1922-1947)

During the First World War Allied forces under British command occupied Palestine, which was then one of several Arab territories conquered by the Ottoman Empire. The British government had secretly come to terms with France and Tsarist Russia in the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, determining that parts of Palestine would fall beneath its sphere of influence with the anticipated decline of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, in November 1917 the British cabinet issued the Balfour Declaration: a one-page letter from Arthur Balfour, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Lord Rothschild, head of the British Zionist Federation. The Balfour declaration granted explicit recognition of, and support for, the idea of establishing a Jewish “national home” in Palestine through immigration and colonisation.<sup>2</sup>

In 1920, the League of Nations entrusted the temporary administration (“Mandate”) of Palestine to Great Britain, as a “Class A” Mandate – a categorisation closest to independence.<sup>3</sup> The Mandate for Palestine, however, aimed to facilitate the colonisation of the country through Jewish immigration and settlement in order “to secure the establishment of the Jewish national home,” in line with the political commitment set out in the Balfour Declaration.

“[I]n the case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine,” observed the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs privately, “we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country,” (as was required by the League of Nations). “Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”<sup>4</sup> The British Mandate of Palestine was thus based on an inherent contradiction: the simultaneous establishment of an independent state of Palestine for all its citizens on the territory of Mandate Palestine, and a Jewish national home within or on that same territory.

The British administration in Palestine promulgated new laws including the *1925 Citizenship Order* and the *1928 Land (Settlement of Title) Order*, which enabled Jews from around the world to acquire citizenship and immigrate to Palestine. Thousands of Palestinian Arabs who were abroad at the time were unable to acquire citizenship under the 1925 law.<sup>5</sup> By the early 1940s, the average rural Palestinian Arab family had less than half of the agricultural land required for their subsistence.<sup>6</sup>

In early 1947, the British government informed the newly-established United Nations of its intention to withdraw from Palestine, ending more than two decades of British rule. The UNGA subsequently appointed a special committee to formulate recommendations concerning the future status of Palestine. The UNGA rejected requests by Arab states to obtain an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the appropriate legal outcome of the British decision to terminate the Mandate in Palestine, as well as the legal authority of the UN to issue and enforce recommendations on the future status of the country.<sup>7</sup>

In September 1947, the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) presented its final report, which included majority and minority proposals that reflected the Committee members' inability to reach consensus on the future status of the country.<sup>8</sup> The majority opinion supported the partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish. The minority proposal called for one federal state for Arabs and Jews. Committee members of the minority were clear in their warnings of the consequences of partition: "Future peace and order in Palestine and the Near East generally will be vitally affected by the nature of the solution decided upon for the Palestine question. In this regard, it is important to avoid an acceleration of the separatism that now characterizes the relations of Arabs and Jews in the Near East, and to avoid laying the foundations of a dangerous irredentism there, which would be the inevitable consequences of partition in whatever form. [...] Partition both in principle and in substance can only be regarded as an anti-Arab solution. The Federal State, however, cannot be described as an anti-Jewish solution. To the contrary, it will best serve the interests of both Arabs and Jews."<sup>9</sup>

Despite the warnings, on 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181(II) recommending the partition of Palestine.<sup>10</sup> This Resolution proposed two states, one Arab and one Jewish, in which all persons were to be guaranteed equal rights.<sup>11</sup> The proposed Jewish state was allotted 56 percent of the land, even though the Jewish community comprised less than one-third of the population of Palestine at the time and owned no more than 7 percent of the land, including 714 km<sup>2</sup> acquired by Zionist colonisation associations mostly from large landowners who did not live in Palestine.<sup>12</sup> The dispersal of the Arab and Jewish populations in the country also meant that nearly half the population of the proposed Jewish state consisted of Palestinian Arabs, who owned nearly 90 percent of the land.<sup>13</sup>

From the beginning of the British Mandate in Palestine in 1922, to the end of 1947 when the United Nations recommended the country be partitioned into two states, an estimated 100–150,000 Palestinians - nearly one-tenth of the Palestinian Arab population - was expelled, denationalized or forced to leave their homes. Tens of thousands of Palestinians were internally displaced as a result of Zionist colonisation, the eviction of tenant farmers and punitive home demolitions by the British administration.

### **The Nakba (1947-1949)**

The UN recommendation to partition Palestine triggered armed conflict between local Palestinians and Jewish-Zionist colonists. This fostered an environment in which the Zionist movement could induce massive Palestinian displacement so as to create the Jewish state.

Plan D, or Plan *Dalet*, resulted in the greatest outflow of refugees in April and early May 1948, before the start of the first Arab-Israeli war. In accordance with Plan D, Zionist forces deliberately employed tactics of violence aimed at forcibly removing Palestinians from their homes and encouraging flight. The



massacre of Dayr Yassin on 9 April 1948 by Zionist forces was among those tactics that contributed to the fear and panic, which led to the mass displacement of Palestinians.<sup>14</sup>

The unilateral declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel by the Zionist movement in Tel Aviv on 14 May 1948 coincided with the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine and the collapse of the UN partition plan. The subsequent entry of Arab forces into Palestine on 15 May 1948 marked the beginning of the first Israeli-Arab war. Palestinians fled their homes as a result of attacks on civilians by Israeli forces, massacres, looting, destruction of property and other atrocities. At least 70 massacres took place throughout the *Nakba*.<sup>15</sup> The choice of a village was not random. Often there existed a clear relationship between the timing of a massacre in an outlying village and the assault on a major nearby town or city.<sup>16</sup>

Palestinians fleeing their villages in search of temporary refuge were fired upon to ensure their departure. Incidents like these occurred in major cities throughout the country, including Haifa, Jaffa, Akka (Acre), al-Ramla (Ramle), Lydd and Jerusalem, as well as in many villages.<sup>17</sup> Many sought temporary refuge elsewhere after hearing news of atrocities against the civilian population.<sup>18</sup> This included a spate of nine reported massacres in October 1948, in which Palestinian Arab villagers were raped, bound, executed and dumped in mass graves.

Israeli military forces systematically destroyed hundreds of Palestinian villages during the war, as one of six measures included in a “Retroactive Transfer” plan approved in June 1948 by the Israeli Finance Minister and Prime Minister to prevent Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes.<sup>19</sup> The destruction of homes and entire villages was accompanied by large-scale looting.<sup>20</sup>

750,000 to 900,000 Palestinians (55 to 66 percent of the total Palestinian population at the time) were displaced between the end of 1947 and early 1949. Half of these were displaced before 15 May 1948, when the first Arab-Israeli war began. Ultimately, 85 percent of the indigenous Palestinian population who had been living in the territory that became the state of Israel was displaced.<sup>21</sup> Most refugees fled to what became the West Bank and Gaza Strip (22 percent of Mandate Palestine) or in neighbouring Arab countries following the cessation of hostilities.

### **Israeli Military Government (1949-1966)**

After the war, more Palestinians were expelled from their homes and lands primarily during military operations aimed to optimise Israel’s demographic and strategic positioning, border corrections (based on 1949 armistice agreements) resulting from armistice agreements, and by policies and practices of the Israeli military government. Palestinian communities in the northern border villages, the Naqab, the “Little Triangle” (an area ceded to Israel under the armistice agreement with Jordan), and those in villages partially emptied during the war were most significantly affected by internal population transfer and expulsion.

The war ended in 1949 when armistice agreements were signed with Egypt in February, Lebanon in March, Jordan in April, and Syria in July. Within days of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, some 2,000–3,000 Palestinians from the villages of Fallujah and Iraq al-Manshiya were beaten, robbed and forced to leave their homes by Israeli forces, despite stipulations in the armistice agreement that nothing would befall their population after the Egyptian troop withdrawal.<sup>22</sup>

In 1950, Israeli forces expelled the remaining 2,500 Palestinian residents of the city of al-Majdal (today’s Ashqelon) into the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.<sup>23</sup> Between 1949 and 1956, more than 20,000 Palestinian Bedouin were expelled from their traditional tribal areas, mostly located in the Naqab.<sup>24</sup> Some 5,000 Palestinian Bedouin in the north were expelled to Syria.

Israeli police carried out raids on Palestinian villages searching for refugees who had returned to their

homes or lands. Returnees (referred to as “infiltrators”) were subsequently transported to the border and expelled.<sup>25</sup> In January 1949, for example, refugees from the Palestinian towns and villages of Shafa’amr, Ma’ilya and Tarshiha who tried to return home were met with hostility as Israeli forces detained them, confiscated their passports and money, and loaded them onto trucks, drove them to the border, and forced them to cross into Jordan.<sup>26</sup> Israeli forces transferred other Palestinians to new areas within the state in order to break up the concentration of Palestinian population centres, and to open up further areas for Jewish settlement. Many of the government records from this period remain sealed.

Following the 1948 war, Israel established a military government in the Galilee, the “Little Triangle,” the Naqab, and the cities of Ramleh, Lydd, Jaffa, and Majdal-‘Asqalan to control the Palestinian population remaining inside Israel and to prevent the return of Palestinian refugees.<sup>27</sup> Freedom of expression was severely restricted, and Palestinians were confined to controlled areas. For example, Palestinians leaving their towns and villages needed written permission from the military commander.<sup>28</sup> In contrast, a civilian government governed affairs of the country’s Jewish population.

A web of new land laws was adopted to facilitate the expropriation of refugee property and its transfer to the state and the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Between 1949 and 1966, Israel expropriated some 700 km<sup>2</sup> of land from Palestinians who remained within the territory of the new state. In this period, Israel displaced 35,000 to 45,000 Palestinians. Tens of thousands of Palestinians lost their homes and lands, the majority during the 1950s. By the mid-1950s, Israeli authorities had expelled 15 percent of the Palestinian population in Israel and approximately 195,000 Palestinians remained.<sup>29</sup>

### **The 1967 Arab-Israeli War**

In the 1967 War, Israel launched a surprise attack against Egypt, Jordan and Syria.<sup>30</sup> Israeli plans to control and colonise the remainder of British Mandatory Palestine (the Jordanian controlled West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip), existed since 1948, and preparations for instituting a military government there had been ongoing since 1963.<sup>31</sup>

As in 1948, Israeli military forces attacked numerous Palestinian civilian areas that had no military significance.<sup>32</sup> Both The Guardian and The London Times reported that “Israeli aircraft frequently strafed the refugees on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, destroying and burning.”<sup>33</sup> The refugee camps of Ein el-Sultan and Aqbat Jaber in Jericho were bombed by the Israeli air force, leading to an exodus of tens of thousands of refugees.<sup>34</sup>

Palestinians were also driven from their homes by Israeli military forces.<sup>35</sup> Palestinians were forcibly transferred out of the West Bank on buses and trucks provided by the military.<sup>36</sup> In some cases, young Palestinian men were forced to sign documents stating that they were leaving voluntarily. “When someone refused to give me his hand [for finger-printing] they came and beat him badly,” said one Israeli officer participating in the expulsion campaign. “Then I was forcibly taking his thumb, and immersing it in ink and finger-printing him...I have no doubt that tens of thousands of men were removed against their will.”<sup>37</sup>

By the time the 1967 war came to an end, Israel had occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (oPt), as well as the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai. More than one-third (400,000 to 450,000) of the Palestinian population of the oPt were displaced during the war. Half of them (193,500) were refugees of 1948 and displaced for a second time, while 240,000 were displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time.<sup>38</sup> Up to 95 percent of these displaced persons went to Jordan, while some found refuge in Syria and Egypt. Israel expropriated 849 km<sup>2</sup> of Palestinian land, including more than 400 km<sup>2</sup> owned by Palestinians who had been displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the war.

## Israel's Regime: Occupation, Apartheid and Colonisation (1967-2012)

As a result of the 1967 occupation of the oPt, Israel effectively controlled the entire territory of Mandate Palestine. Since then Israel has developed a legal, political and military regime over the Palestinian people that combines occupation, apartheid and colonisation,<sup>39</sup> and facilitates the forced displacement of Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the oPt, John Dugard, has identified the existence of these overlapping regimes throughout the oPt, and underscored the international community's consensus around them, "as inimical to human rights."<sup>40</sup>

**Belligerent occupation** is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict though under the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law), it is intended to be a temporary state of affairs. Israel has a temporary right of administration over the oPt but is not allowed to exercise sovereignty over it. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force and is obliged to abide by the relevant rules of the law of armed conflict—principally the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949—in its administration of the territories.

**Colonisation**, is a practice of colonialism, defined in the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (1960) as a state in which the acts of a State have the cumulative outcome that it annexes or otherwise unlawfully retains control over territory and thus aims permanently to deny its indigenous population the exercise of its right to self-determination. Colonialism is considered to be a particularly serious breach of international law because it is fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order.

**Apartheid** is one of the most severe forms of racism, "a political system where racism is regulated in law through acts of parliament."<sup>41</sup> Article 3 of the *Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* (CERD) defines apartheid as a form of racial segregation. The *Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid* (1976) defines apartheid as "similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in southern Africa" which have "the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them, in particular by means such as segregation, expropriation of land, and denial of the right to leave and return to their country, the right to a nationality and the right to freedom of movement and residence (Article II). The *Rome Statute* defines apartheid as inhumane acts "committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime." Apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity. Members of organisations and agents of an apartheid state are subject to criminal prosecution, irrespective of the motive involved, and whenever they commit, participate in, directly incite or inspire, directly abet, encourage or cooperate in the commission of the crime of apartheid (Article III, 1976 anti-Apartheid Convention). All states are obliged to condemn, suppress and punish those involved in the crime of apartheid.<sup>42</sup>

Racial discrimination against the indigenous Palestinian people was formalized and institutionalised at an early stage through the creation by law of a "Jewish nationality" that is distinct from Israeli citizenship. Significantly, there is no such thing as "Israeli" nationality. The 1950 *Law of Return* is an effective nationality law, because it entitles all Jews, regardless of their geographic location, the rights of nationals, namely the right to enter "*Eretz Israel*" (Israel and the oPt) and immediately enjoy full legal and political rights. "Jewish nationality" under the *Law of Return* is an extra-territorial status and therefore contravenes international law norms pertaining to nationality.<sup>43</sup> It includes Jewish citizens of other countries, irrespective of whether they wish to be part of the collective of "Jewish nationals," and excludes "non-Jews" (i.e., Palestinians) from nationality rights in Israel.<sup>44</sup> In combination with the 1952 *Citizenship Law*,<sup>45</sup> Israel

has created a discriminatory two-tier legal system whereby Jews hold nationality and citizenship, while the remaining indigenous Palestinian citizens of Israel hold only citizenship.<sup>46</sup> Palestinian residents of Jerusalem hold restricted residency status, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip hold no more than identification documents and Palestinian refugees hold no legal status at all.

Since 1967 Israel has extended its colonial apartheid regime to the oPt in the guise of belligerent occupation. Modelled on its military regime of 1949-1966, a second Israeli military government was established in the oPt in 1967 in order to control and oppress the occupied Palestinian population. With more than 1,200 military orders issued since 1967, Israel as the occupying power has altered the administrative and legal situation in the oPt in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL). Other parts of the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, were annexed by Israel immediately after the 1967 war and colonisation of the occupied city is an ongoing violation of international law.<sup>47</sup> Alongside the five main periods of forcible displacement outlined in this chapter, there exist a multitude of discriminatory practices and means employed by Israel which seek to influence all aspects of Palestinian life, and which share the same purpose of mass displacement of non-Jews. These include:

1. Residency rights revocation and refusal to grant residency statuses, including almost total denial of family-reunification and the restrictions on child registration by Palestinian parents with different political statuses issued by Israel – such as the Jerusalem ID and the West Bank ID;
2. Suppression of any form of resistance including systematic arrests, military operations and torture in Israeli prisons;
3. The construction of the Apartheid Wall and its associated checkpoint and permit regime which severely restricts freedom of movement within the oPt;
4. Restrictive zoning and planning policies including house demolitions and land confiscations including official or *defac-to* annexation of huge amounts of land;
5. Settler-colonist implantation in the oPt and settler-colonist violence and harassment carried out with impunity;
6. Individual and mass deportations or preventing the return of Palestinians due to political activities and involvement in national resistance;
7. The denial of return and/or freedom of movement within Mandate Palestine and the political and geographic separation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East-Jerusalem;
8. Restrictions and limitations on the utilization of essential natural resources, most importantly water, and the undermining of livelihoods in particular among the herding and agriculture-based communities;
9. Marginalization and exclusion of Palestinians - with or without Israeli citizenship - from the Israeli (Jewish) society and the benefits and privileges connected to the 'Jewish nationality'.

These practices, policies, and means of displacement generally, should not be viewed as being limited to certain historical timeframes, but as a systematic and ongoing process coordinated by the Israeli authorities to remove the indigenous Palestinians from their homeland.

## Endnotes

- 1 The British were allotted direct rule over Haifa and Akka, and the south of the country was to be part of the "Arab state under British protection." The heartland of Palestine was to be under the control of all three powers.
- 2 The Balfour Declaration is reprinted in *Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Reprinted in full with permission from Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, p. 1. Prior to issuing the final Declaration, the British obtained the assent of the United States. The U.S. Congress subsequently adopted a resolution on June 30, 1922, "[f]avoring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." McCarthy, Justin, *The Population of Palestine: Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 21.
- 3 The Mandate did not come into force until 29 September, 1923. Class A Mandates was designated for areas deemed to "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." The Mandate for Palestine, 24 July, 1922, is reprinted in *Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991, pp. 4–11.
- 4 Statement by Arthur Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Office No. 371/4183* (1919), in *The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem 1917–1988*, Part I. New York: United Nations, 1990.
- 5 Out of 9,000 citizenship applications from Palestinians outside the country, British officials approved only 100. Based on an average family size of six persons, more than 50,000 Palestinians may have been affected. *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, Cmd. 5479. London: HMSO, 1937, p. 331. For a description of the problem facing Bethlehem families, see Musallam, Adnan A., *Developments in Politics, Society, Press and Thought in Bethlehem in the British Era 1917–1948*. Bethlehem: WIAM – Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center, 2002.
- 6 *Toward the De-Arabization of Palestine/Israel 1945–1977*. Nijim, Basheer K. (ed.). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1984, p. 10. Because of the reliance on agriculture, the impact of the loss of land went far beyond the amount of land lost to Zionist colonization during this period. Palestinian ownership of land declined approximately 4% as a result of the sale of land, primarily by large absentee landlords. Khalidi, Rashid, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 113–114. A smaller number of Palestinian Arab farmers lost their lands due to financial insolvency.
- 7 For the proposed texts of the questions to be submitted to the ICJ, see Iraq (UN Doc. A/AC.14.21); Syria (UN Doc. A/AC.14/25); and Egypt (UN Doc. A/AC.14/14).
- 8 Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, *The Question of Palestine*. UN Doc. A/364, 3 September, 1947. Committee members unanimously approved 11 general recommendations, including a UN-supervised transition period, protection of religious and minority rights, and citizenship and property rights.
- 9 *Ibid.*, Chapter VII Recommendations (III), paragraphs 10 and 11. Incidentally, the United States State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, staff of the National Security Council and the newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were united in warning of the dangers partition might inflict to strategic US interests. In public and private statements they also explained that the UN partition proposals were not workable and in contravention with international law and the UN Charter: "[they] ignore such principles as self-determination and majority rule. They recognize the principle of a theocratic racial state and go even so far in several instances as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons outside of Palestine. We have hitherto always held that in our foreign relations American citizens, regardless of race or religion, are entitled to uniform treatment. The stress on whether persons are Jews or non-Jews is certain to strengthen feelings among both Jews and Gentiles in the United States and elsewhere that Jewish citizens are not the same as other citizens." Loy Henderson, State Department Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 22 September, 1947, in Donald Neff, "Truman Overrode Strong State Department Warning Against Partitioning of Palestine in 1947" *Washington Report*, Sept./Oct. 1994.
- 10 GA Resolution 181(II), 11 November 1947, UN GAOR, 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., UN Doc. A/64 (1947).
- 11 *Ibid.*, para. 10(d).
- 12 For the population of Palestine, see Table 2.18, "The Population of Palestine by Religion, 1870 to 1946", McCarthy, Justin, *The Population of Palestine: Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 37. For Jewish landownership, see Lehn, Walter, *The Jewish National Fund*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1988, p. 74.
- 13 The proposed Jewish state had a population of 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Palestinians, including 90,000 Bedouins. The proposed Arab state had a population of 725,000 Palestinian and 10,000 Jews. Jerusalem was to be under international status, with a population of 105,000 Palestinians and 100,000 Jews. Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, *The Question of Palestine*. UN Doc. A/364, 31 August, 1947. State land comprised less than 3% of the proposed Jewish state.
- 14 Leaders of Zionist militia organisations at the time reported that 245 people had been killed in the village. These reports were broadcast by Arab and foreign media. For a study of the massacre, see Khalidi, Walid, *Dayr Yassin: Friday, April 9, 1948* [Arabic], Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999.
- 15 Abdel Jawad, Saleh. "Zionist Massacres: the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem in the 1948 War", in Benvenisti, E., Gans, C. and Hanafi, S., *Israel and the Palestinian Refugees*, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 2007, pp. 59–127.
- 16 For example the massacre in Nasir el-Dien was just a few days before Tiberias was besieged. The multiple massacres in Ein Zaytoun were used to 'soften up' Safad before the final assault on that city, in *ibid.*
- 17 For descriptions of specific incidents during this period, see, e.g., Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 41, 102, 107, 117–118, 121, 200, 213–14 and 220. Also see Abdel Jawad, op.cit.
- 18 This included massacres in Mansurat al-Khayt (18 January, 1948), Dayr Yassin (9 April, 1948), Khirbat Nasir el-Din (12 April, 1948), Hawsha (15 April, 1948), Khirbeh Wa'ra al-Sawda (18 April, 1948), Husayniyya (21 April, 1948), Balad ash-Sheikh (25 April, 1948), Ayn az-Zaytun (2 May, 1948), Burayr (12 May, 1948), Khubbayza (12 May, 1948), Abu Shusha (14 May, 1948), Tantoura



- (21 May, 1948), al-Khisas (25 May, 1948), Lydda (10 July, 1948), al-Tira (16 July, 1948), Ijzim (24 July, 1948), Beer Sheeba (21 October, 1948), Safsaf (29 October, 1948), al-Dawayima (29 October, 1948), Khirbeh as-Samniyya (30 October, 1948), Saliha (30 October, 1948), Sa'sa (30 October, 1948), Eilaboun (29 October, 1948), Jish (29 October, 1948), and Majd al-Kroum (29 October, 1948). For accounts of these massacres, see Morris, *op.cit.*, pp. 72–3, 113–15, 120, 156, 206–7, 213–14, 222–23, 228–30 and 350.
- 19 "Retroactive Transfer, A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel," three-page memorandum signed by Yosef Weitz, Ezra Danin and Elias Sasson, in Morris, *op.cit.*, p. 136.
- 20 For descriptions of incidents of looting and destruction of property, see, e.g., Morris, *op.cit.*, pp. 32, 50, 52, 54, 62–3, 88, 101–2, 106, 112–13, 116, 119, 125, 128, 215, 221 and 230. Also see Segev, Tom, 1949: *The First Israelis*, New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. 68–91. In the city of Jaffa, for example, it was estimated that the Israeli military removed 30,000 pounds worth of Palestinian movable property daily (Segev, p.73.) Looting was so widespread that Ben Gurion described it as "the mass robbery in which all parts of the population participated." Theft of Palestinian property was not restricted to individual acts, which in any case were widespread, but was a practice systematically carried out by the army. Israel designated a "Custodian of Abandoned Property", to oversee warehouses in which Palestinian property from 45,000 homes and apartments, 7,000 shops and business, 500 workshops and industrial plants, and 1,000 warehouses was stored away and eventually redistributed or sold off. This aside from the enormous agricultural wealth left behind from over 800,000 acres of orchards and fields. Israeli police Minister Behor Shitrit would later tell a colleague in the Ministerial Committee for Abandoned Property that he had seen the looting with his own eyes: "From Lydda alone the army took out 1,800 truck-loads of property."
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Morris, *op.cit.*, p. 243.
- 23 Morris, Benny, 1948 and After: *Israel and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 257–69.
- 24 Israeli Foreign Ministry reports indicate that some 17,000 Bedouin were expelled from the Naqab between 1949 and 1953. "Investigation Report," Simon and Vermeersch, UNA DAG-13/3.3.1–18, in Morris, Benny, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949- 1956 Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 170.
- 25 Reviewing official Israeli government documents, Benny Morris estimates that 30–90,000 Palestinian refugees attempted to return to their homes and villages between the middle of 1948 and 1953. Most were expelled. Morris, (1993), *op.cit.*, pp. 152 and 39.
- 26 State Archives, Foreign Ministry, Arab Refugees 2444/19, in Segev, Tom, 1949: *The First Israelis*. New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. 19.
- 27 For a detailed description, see Jiryis, Sabri, *The Arabs in Israel*. Monthly Review Press; updated edition, 1977.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 29 At least 30,000 Palestinians were expelled from Israel between 1949 and 1956. By 1955, there were about 195,000 Palestinians living inside Israel. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 52 (2001), Table 2.1, "The Population by Religion and Population Group."
- 30 "To Live or Perish: Abba Eban 'Reconstructs' the June 1967 War," in Finkelstein, Norman *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict* (London: Verso, 2001), pp.123–49. Also see "Rethinking Israel's David-and-Goliath past", Sandy Tolan, *Salon* 4 June, 2007.
- 31 See Segev, Tom, 1967 *Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*, Metropolitan Books, 2007, p.458.
- 32 For a description of specific incidents, see, e.g., Masalha, Nur, "The 1967 Palestinian Exodus," in *The Palestinian Exodus 1948–67*, Karmi, Ghada and Cotran, Eugene (eds.), London: Ithaca Press, 2000, p. 94; Neff, Donald, *Warriors for Jerusalem: Six Days that Changed the Middle East*, New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 228–29; and Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim, *River without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees*, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969, pp. 40–42.
- 33 Masalha, Nur, *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians*. London: Faber & Faber, 1997.
- 34 "According to UNRWA, the population of Aqbat Jaber refugee camp decreased from 28,008 in June 1967 to 4,991 in September 1967. Likewise, the population of 'Ein el-Sultan refugee camp decreased from 19,042 to 2,310 between June and September 1967." *Under the Pretext of Security: Colonization and Displacement in the Occupied Jordan Valley*, Ramallah, Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestinian Monitoring Group, July 2006, p. 3.
- 35 For descriptions of specific incidents, see, e.g., Masalha, Nur, *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians*. London: Faber & Faber, 1997, pp. 81, 85, 87 and 91–94.
- 36 Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim, *River without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees*, p. 40; and Masalha, Nur, *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians*, p. 92.
- 37 Masalha, Nur, *The Politics of Denial, Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem*. London: Pluto Books, 2003, p. 203.
- 38 In Syria, more than 115,000 people were displaced when Israeli forces occupied the Golan Heights and the Quneitra area. Among them were some 16,000 Palestinian refugees who were uprooted for the second time. Many moved towards Damascus and some to Dera'a further south. Takkenberg, Lex, *The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law*, Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1998, p. 17.
- 39 For analysis of Israel's apartheid, colonialism and occupation, see the study of the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa (HSRC): "Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A Re-Assessment of Israel's Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under International Law", Capetown, South Africa, May 2009. See also: Davis, Uri *Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the Struggle Within*, London: Zed Books, 2003; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967, John Dugard, Human Rights Council. A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007, pp. 2-3; "United Against Apartheid Colonialism and Occupation: Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People": Palestinian Civil Society Strategic Position Paper for the Durban Review Conference. Palestine, November 2008.

- 40 "The international community has identified three regimes as inimical to human rights - colonialism, apartheid and foreign occupation. Israel is clearly in military occupation of the oPt. At the same time elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law." "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard Implementation Of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 Of 15 March 2006", A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007.
- 41 Davis, op. cit., 2003, p. 37.
- 42 See, for example: Roger S. Clark, "Apartheid", International Criminal Law, Second Edition, Volume I, Edt. M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1991, p. 645.
- 43 Thus, for example, former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir explained: "the frontier [of Israel] is where Jews live, not where there is a line on the map." Sou'ad A. Dajani, *Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine*, Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and BADIL, 2005, p.72.
- 44 Palestinians are not expressly identified as a racial/national group in laws and public documents of the State of Israel. Palestinians are designated by the term "persons outside the scope of the Law of Return" in Israel's laws. Other designations used by the administration, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and the official media are "minorities" or "Arabs." Such designations reflect the denial of Palestinians as a national group and serve to hide the discriminatory character of Israeli laws and policies. For detailed legal analysis see W. Mallison, "The Zionist-Israeli juridical claims to constitute 'the Jewish people' nationality entity and to confer membership in it. Appraisal in public international law", 32 *George Washington Law Review*, 1964, pp. 983 – 1075; also: Roselle Tekiner, "Race and the Issue of National Identity in Israel", *Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23 (1991), pp. 39 – 55; and, Adalah, "Institutionalized Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel", Report to 2001 WCAR, Durban, August/September 2001.
- 45 In the official translation into English, this law is misleadingly called "Law of Nationality."
- 46 Tekiner, op cit. (1991).
- 47 For an overview, see Shehadeh, Raja, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985, p. 63–75. The illegal annexation of Jerusalem was first brought about by an amendment to the Law and Administrative Ordinance 1948, passed on 27 June, 1967. For the response of the United Nations, see UNSC Resolution 252 of 21 May, 1968, which "[c]onsiders that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status." See also UNSC Resolution 478 of 20 August, 1980, affirming that "the enactment of the 'basic law' by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the Palestinian and other Arab territory occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem" and "[d]etermines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent 'basic law' on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith." See also Security Council Resolutions 267 (1969); 298 (1971); 446 (1979); 465 (1980); 476 (1980); 605 (1987).

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## POPULATION SIZE, DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS

### *Preface*

*By the end of 2011, at least 7.4 million (66 percent) of 11.2 million Palestinians worldwide qualified as forcibly displaced persons. Among them were at least 6.8 million Palestinian refugees and 519,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Palestinian refugees are one of the largest displaced populations in the world today, constituting more than one third of UNHCR refugees worldwide (15.2 million as of 2011).<sup>1</sup>*

*Palestinian refugees fall into three general categories. The largest group (5.8 million) is composed of 1948 refugees, among them, 4.8 million UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) registered refugees in addition to 318,032 registered non-refugee persons. 1967 refugees (about one million) constitute the second major group. The third category is comprised of an unknown number of Palestinians who are neither 1948 nor 1967 refugees but who have also been displaced outside the area of Mandate Palestine (Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt)).*

*There are two main categories of Palestinian IDPs. The first (360,000) is composed of Palestinians who have been internally displaced inside Israel since 1948. The second (159,000) is composed of Palestinians who have been internally displaced in the oPt since 1967. The second category includes Palestinian refugees who have suffered multiple displacements in the oPt.*

*There is no single authoritative source for the global Palestinian refugee and IDP population. Estimates of the current size of Palestinian refugee and IDP populations are based on available data, which is uneven and shifting, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive registration system, frequent forced displacement, and the lack of a uniform definition of a Palestinian refugee.*

*The majority of the Palestinian refugee and IDP population is distributed throughout the Middle East, primarily in Arab countries that border Israel and the oPt. Most Palestinian refugees (approximately 69 percent) live outside the 58 UNRWA-serviced camps.*

*No data is available on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Palestinian refugee populations outside UNRWA's area of operation, and little reliable data is available on the characteristics of internally displaced Palestinians in Israel and the oPt. Available data suggests that differences between the Palestinian refugee populations and their non-refugee counterparts are negligible in most Arab host states, with Lebanon constituting the only major exception because of severe restrictions imposed on their civil, social and economic rights .*

## 1.1 The Current Scope of Palestinian Displacement

The Palestinian refugee and IDP population described here comprises the total estimated number of Palestinians and their descendants who have been forcibly displaced from their homes and properties located in Mandate Palestine (now divided into Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and who do not have access to voluntary durable solutions and reparation, including the right to return to their homes and places of origin. Estimates are for the end of 2011, unless stated otherwise. Information about the applied methodology is included in Appendix 1.1 at the end of this chapter.

**Figure 1.1: Percentage Distribution of Palestinian Population Worldwide by Type of Displacement, End of 2011**



Bedouin children of al-Jahalin, Jordan Valley, 2009 (© Anne Paq/BADIL)

By the end of 2011, 66 percent or 7.4 million of the worldwide Palestinian population of 11.2 million were classified as forcibly displaced persons.<sup>2</sup>

The largest group of displaced Palestinians is made up of those who were forced to flee their homes and country in 1948 (the *Nakba*) and their descendants. These total approximately 5.8 million, a figure that includes the 4.8 million Palestinian refugees who are registered with and assisted by UNRWA (often referred to as “registered refugees” or “Palestine refugees”), and a further one million refugees who were also displaced in 1948, but are not eligible or did not register for assistance with UNRWA. (See: Non-registered 1948 refugees in Appendix 1.1 at the end of this chapter).

The second major group of displaced Palestinians is comprised of those displaced for the first time from their homes and country in the context of the 1967 war and their descendants. The number of Palestinian refugees originating in 1967 is estimated to be 1,022,546 persons (See: 1967 Palestinian refugees, Appendix 1.1 at the end of this chapter).

Internally displaced Palestinians can be divided into two groups. The first is composed of persons displaced in the area that became the state of Israel in 1948. This group includes those who were displaced in the 1948 *Nakba*, (approximately 360,000 persons today) as well as those subsequently displaced by the state of Israel. The second group (approximately 159,000 persons today) is composed of Palestinians internally



Table (1.1): Palestinian Refugees and IDPs by Group					
Year	UNRWA registered 1948 Refugees ****	Non-registered 1948 Refugees***	1967 Refugees	IDPs in Israel since 1948	IDPs in the oPt since 1967**
1950	*914,221	304,740	–	47,610	–
1955	905,986	301,995	–	56,546	–
1960	1,120,889	373,630	–	67,159	–
1965	1,280,823	426,941	–	79,763	–
1970	1,425,219	475,073	266,092	94,734	16,240
1975	1,632,707	544,236	316,034	112,514	23,901
1980	1,844,318	614,773	375,349	133,631	31,920
1985	2,093,545	697,848	445,797	158,712	41,041
1990	2,422,514	840,838	529,467	188,500	49,889
1995	3,172,641	1,057,547	628,841	223,879	59,444
2000	3,737,494	827,022	743,257	264,613	72,758
2001	3,874,738	857,564	765,555	272,551	74,900
2002	3,973,360	878,050	788,521	280,728	77,064
2003	4,082,300	897,255	812,177	289,150	79,540
2004	4,186,711	916,700	836,542	297,824	81,800
2005	4,283,892	935,641	861,639	306,759	98,673
2006	4,396,209	957,963	887,488	315,962	102,798
2007	4,510,510	975,373	912,870	325,441	111,803
2008	4,671,811	999,993	939,070	335,204	128,708
2009	4,766,670	1,017,639	966,115	343,250	153,367
2010	4,966,664	1,042,420	993,939	351,488	156,182
2011	4,797,723 <sup>(3)</sup>	1,028,130	1,022,546	359,924	159,447

\* Excluding the 45,800 persons (1948) in Israel who received relief from UNRWA until June 1952.

\*\* Including refugees displaced at least twice. The figures above reflect estimates according to the best available sources and population growth projections. Figures are therefore indicative rather than conclusive. For more details about these estimates, see Appendix 1.1 at the end of this chapter.

\*\*\* The figures were revised starting from 2007 based on the final percentage of non-registered refugees in West Bank and Gaza, which estimated to 1.43%.

\*\*\*\* Recent digitization of UNRWA's registration records enables us to present more detailed beneficiary statistics. Other registered persons include those eligible to receive services. In 2011, 318,032 persons were described as "other registered persons". See: UNRWA in Figures, January 2012: <http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20120317152850.pdf>.


displaced in the oPt since 1967 as a result of Israel's regime of occupation, apartheid and colonisation. As 1948 refugees reside and physically exist throughout the oPt, this figure of IDPs includes Palestinian refugees who suffered subsequent secondary forced displacement inside the oPt. However, the number of 1948 refugees displaced a second time in 1967 is largely unknown due to the absence of a comprehensive registration system or a follow-up system, as well as the high frequency of displacement.

Not included in this estimate is an unknown number of displaced Palestinians who are neither 1948 nor 1967 refugees, but who have also been displaced outside the area of Mandate Palestine and are also likely to qualify as refugees under international law. The majority of these Palestinians have likely been forcibly displaced from the oPt since 1967 as a result of the policies and practices of Israel's regime aimed at forcibly displacing the Palestinian people. This population now resides abroad and is unable or unwilling to return to the oPt or Israel owing to a fear of persecution.

**The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** maintains records of and statistics on Palestinian refugees who fall within its mandate, are outside UNRWA's area of operations and are eligible for protection. Data reported by UNHCR country offices generally reflects the view of the host country, and their statistics are provisional and subject to change.

In general, UNHCR has registered a minority of the Palestinian population not covered by UNRWA's mandate. By the end of 2011, Palestinians registered as refugees under the UN 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol in accordance with the UNHCR Statute numbered 94,150 and an additional 1,635 were registered as Asylum Seekers.<sup>4</sup> The total number of Palestinian refugees not covered by UNRWA's mandate and, thereby, within UNHCR's scope is 2,022,546 peoples (See Appendix 1.1).

**Figure 1.2: Percentage Distribution of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs by Group, 2011**



**Table (1.2): Refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR, 1998-2011**

End of year	Refugees <sup>1</sup>	Asylum-seekers	Returned refugees	IDPs protected/assisted <sup>2</sup>	Returned IDPs	Stateless persons <sup>3</sup>	Others of concern <sup>3</sup>	Total
1998	11,480,900	977,800	1,016,400	5,063,900	207,200	..	1,378,500	20,124,700
1999	11,687,200	1,027,400	1,599,100	3,968,600	1,048,400	..	1,491,100	20,821,800
2000	12,129,600	1,087,500	767,500	5,998,500	369,100	..	1,653,900	22,006,100
2001	12,116,800	1,072,700	462,400	5,096,500	241,000	..	1,039,500	20,028,900
2002	10,594,100	1,093,500	2,426,000	4,646,600	1,179,000	..	953,300	20,892,500
2003	9,592,800	997,600	1,094,900	4,181,700	237,800	..	905,300	17,010,100
2004	9,574,800	885,200	1,434,400	5,426,500	146,500	1,455,900	597,000	19,520,300
2005	8,662,000	802,100	1,105,600	6,616,800	519,400	2,383,700	960,400	21,050,000
2006	9,877,700	743,900	733,700	12,794,300	1,864,200	5,806,000	1,045,500	32,865,300
2007	11,391,000	740,100	730,600	13,740,200	2,070,100	2,937,300	68,700	31,678,000
2008	10,478,600	827,300	603,800	14,405,400	1,361,400	6,572,200	166,900	34,415,600
2009	10,396,540	983,420	251,478	15,628,057	2,229,540	6,559,573	411,698	36,460,306
2010	10,549,686	837,478	197,626	14,697,804	2,923,233	3,463,070	1,255,579	33,924,475
2011	10,404,806*	895,284	531,907	15,473,378	3,245,804	3,477,101	1,411,848	35,440,128

**Source:** A Year of Crisis: UNHCR Global Trends 2011.

<sup>1</sup> Since 2007, people in refugee-like situations are included in the refugee estimates. 2007 figures are therefore not fully comparable with previous years.

<sup>2</sup> Since 2007, people in IDP-like situations are included in the IDP estimates. 2007 IDP figures are therefore not fully comparable with previous years.

<sup>3</sup> Stateless persons were included in the category "others of concern" until 2003.

\* The 4.8 million registered 1948 Palestine refugees are not included in this figure.

UNHCR data regarding Palestinian refugees refers to their country of origin as the "occupied Palestinian territory." This classification does not reflect Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel (approximately 78 percent of Mandate Palestine) and hence, it is not possible to identify how many Palestinian refugees of concern to the UNHCR might be listed as stateless. Palestinian IDPs in Israel and the oPt are not included in the UNHCR data regarding IDPs worldwide.

## 1.2 Distribution

During the major waves of displacement in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Palestinian refugees tended to remain as close as possible to their homes and villages of origin, based on the assumption that they would return once armed conflict ceased. In 1948, an estimated 65 percent of the Palestinian refugees remained in the territory of Palestine which was not under Israeli control at the time – i.e., the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, comprising 22 percent of the territory of Mandate Palestine. In the West Bank, the Palestinian population swelled from 460,000 to 740,000 due to the mass influx of 1948 refugees.


The impact of mass influx into the areas of the former Gaza District that became known as the Gaza Strip was even more dramatic. The population nearly quadrupled. The remaining 35 percent of the Palestinian refugee population displaced in 1948 found refuge in neighbouring states, including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. An unknown exact number of Palestinians were abroad at the time of the 1948 *Nakba* in Palestine, and were unable to return to their places of origin inside Israel following the cessation of hostilities; they became refugees *sur place*.

By the end of 2011, approximately 40 percent (2,047,367) of all UNRWA-registered persons were residing in Jordan. 23.8 percent (1,217,519) in the occupied Gaza Strip, 17.0 percent (874,627) in the occupied West Bank, 10.0 percent (510,444) in Syria, and 9.2 percent (465,798) in Lebanon.<sup>5</sup>

Table (1.3): Registered Palestinian 1948 Refugees by Category


	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Total
<b>REGISTERED REFUGEES</b>	1,979,580	436,154	486,946	727,471	1,167,572	<b>4,797,723</b>
<b>OTHER REGISTERED PERSONS</b>	67,787	29,644	23,498	147,156	49,947	<b>318,032</b>
<b>TOTAL REGISTERED PERSONS</b>	<b>2,047,367</b>	<b>465,798</b>	<b>510,444</b>	<b>874,627</b>	<b>1,217,519</b>	<b>5,115,755</b>

Figure 1.3: Percentage of Registered Persons by Area, End of 2011



The majority of Palestinian IDPs in Israel were displaced in 1948 in the north and the centre of the country (85.5 percent of the total Palestinian population residing in the north at the time 75.1 percent of the population residing in the centre). A smaller number were displaced between 1949 and 1967 (7.1 percent of the population in the north and 18.1 percent in the centre). These IDPs found refuge in some 47 Palestinian Arab villages that remained within the state of Israel after the 1948 war.<sup>6</sup> Palestinians in the south of the country were mainly displaced after 1967 (77.2 percent).<sup>7</sup>

Figure 1.4: Localities in Israel Hosting 100 or more Palestinian IDPs (1948–1950)  
IDPs as Percentage of 1951 Population



Source: Kamen, Charles, "After the Catastrophe I: The Arabs in Israel, 1948–51", *Middle East Studies* 23, no.4, October 1987.

Most Palestinian IDPs in Israel are currently concentrated in the northern (Galilee) region of the country in cities such as Nazareth and Shafa'Amr, and in cities with a mixed Jewish-Palestinian population, such as Haifa and Akka (Acre). IDPs are also located in the south (i.e., the Naqab). The actual distribution of IDPs inside Israel is difficult to determine due to the lack of a registration system and frequent relocation (three to four times on average per family).

The majority of Palestinians displaced from the oPt during the 1967 war found refuge in neighbouring states. Most (95 percent) were displaced to Jordan, with smaller numbers displaced to Syria, Egypt and Lebanon.<sup>8</sup> The areas of the West Bank closest to Jordan suffered the highest population loss, while in the central highlands most Palestinians sought temporary refuge in nearby fields and villages, and were able to return to their homes after the war.<sup>9</sup> In addition, it is estimated that some 60,000 Palestinians were abroad at the time of the war and were unable to return to the oPt.<sup>10</sup>

The distribution of Palestinians displaced from and within the oPt since 1967, including those displaced for the first time, is difficult to determine given the lack of a registration system and frequent displacement over four decades of military occupation.

Changes in the distribution patterns of Palestinian refugees across host countries during six decades of forced exile are primarily the result of armed conflicts following 1948 and 1967, during which Palestinian refugees were again expelled or forced to flee host countries in search of safety. Changes in political regimes and discriminatory policies in host countries, the relationship between the PLO and host country authorities, and economic push-and-pull factors have also influenced patterns of forced displacement and distribution of the Palestinian refugee population since 1948.

#### IDPs in UNRWA schools in Syria as of 26 November 2012

UNRWA estimates that over 300,000 Palestinian refugees (three-fourths of the population) are directly affected by the Syrian conflict and in need of aid. To date, UNRWA has received requests for emergency cash assistance from over 59,000 refugee households in Syria and project that the Agency will receive 100,000 applications by the year's end. Due to the conflict, a total of 2,906 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are sheltering in six UNRWA school buildings, 76 percent of whom are women and children. There has been further displacement beyond the nation's borders, with approximately 1,900 registered Palestinian refugees who fled from Syria to Jordan. In Lebanon, 9,666 registered Palestinian refugees from Syria approached UNRWA. At least 12 Palestinian refugees have died in Damascus due to conflict-related incidents.

Source: UNRWA, *Syria Humanitarian Response*.<sup>11</sup>



The 1967 war and subsequent Israeli occupation led to a significant decrease in the number of refugees residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to a dramatic increase in the refugee population in Jordan. Over time, the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has decreased due to internal conflict, conflict between the PLO and Israel in Lebanon, and legal and political obstacles that have obstructed Palestinian refugees' temporary asylum in Lebanon. During the 1980s, many Palestinian refugees fled Lebanon to Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia.

Higher numbers of Palestinian refugees in the Gulf from the 1950s onward reflect patterns of economic migration, while a dramatic decrease in the number of refugees in Kuwait occurred as a result of the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Many Palestinians migrated or were expelled from Iraq and Gulf States, eventually finding shelter in Canada, Scandinavia, the US, or other countries in the Arab world. Currently, many of the Palestinian refugees experiencing persecution in Iraq are fleeing to Jordan and other countries, with some reported as far as India and Thailand.

Al-Tanf refugee camp in the no-man's land between Iraq and Syria, 2006 (© Paris Match/UNHCR)



#### **Palestinians in Iraq: Secondary Displacement**

Actions against Iraq's Palestinians in Baghdad (particularly the Baladeyat area) and other cities have taken the form of kidnapping, torture, detention without trial, neighborhood bombardments, house raids and threatening propaganda (delivered through pamphlets and over megaphones). These practices have forced many Palestinians to flee to refugee camps on Iraq's borders with Syria and Jordan. Frequently due to extreme restrictions on the rights of Palestinian refugees in Iraq and bordering countries the refugees who have undergone multiple displacements continue seeking opportunities for asylum in countries outside the Arab world. As a result, says UNHCR, the number of Palestinian residents in Iraq has dropped from 35,000 before the American invasion to fewer than 7000 by the beginning of 2012.

**Source:** *Palestinian Refugees in Iraq, and whom under Threat of Deportation Back to Iraq*, Euro-Mid Observer for Human Rights Report, 2012.

Today, Palestinian refugees are living in forced exile in many parts of the world. Despite the changes in the pattern of distribution of Palestinian refugees over the last 64 years, the majority of refugees still live within 100 km of the borders of Mandate Palestine, where their homes of origin are located. In Syria, for example, 70 percent of the registered 1948 refugees are from the Galilee. The number is slightly higher in Lebanon, where 72 percent of the registered 1948 refugees are from the Galilee.

Similarly, a large majority of the refugees in the occupied Gaza Strip originate from the adjacent areas of the former Gaza District. The majority of the refugees from the former Jerusalem District are at present either in the occupied West Bank or in Jordan. The proportion of Palestinian refugees (6 percent) within the



Table (1.4): Distribution of 1948 Registered Refugees by District of Origin and Field

District of Origin	Host Countries/Territories					Total (all fields)
	Jordan	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Lebanon	Syria	
Jerusalem	20.0	33.0	0.2	0.5	0.7	13.5
Gaza	17.0	7.0	66.0	0.1	0.4	22.5
Lydd	40.0	30.0	33.0	8.5	7.3	30.0
Samaria	4.0	12.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	3.5
Haifa	10.0	16.0	0.5	18.8	22.0	11.0
Galilee	9.0	2.0	0.1	72.0	69.5	18.5

**Source:** UNRWA, 2000. The six regions of the British Mandate period were Jerusalem (Jerusalem, Ramallah, Hebron, Bethlehem); Gaza (Gaza, Khan Younis, Majdal, Isdud, Beersheba); Lydd (Jaffa, Ramle, Lod, Rechovot); Samaria (Tulkarem, Nablus, Jenin, Natanya); Haifa (Haifa, Hadera, Shafa 'Amr); Galilee (Nazareth, Beisan, Tiberias, Acre, Safad).

total combined population of host states in the region has remained stable since the first wave of massive displacement in 1948.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the passing of 64 years in exile, the village unit has tended to remain intact to some degree, even after mass displacement. In other words, the majority of the residents of a particular village tended to be displaced to the same host country, and often to the same area within the host country. According to data for Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, 72 percent of all 1948 displaced Palestinian villages found refuge in one area, with only 20 percent fleeing to two areas. Only eight percent are distributed between more than two areas.<sup>13</sup> Distribution according to village of origin is evident in the structure of Palestinian refugee camps, which are divided into quarters based on the village unit. In Syria, for example, al-Yarmouk camp is divided into quarters based on the refugee villages of origin of al-Tira, Luby, Balad al-Sheik, and Ein Ghazal.

The same phenomenon is also evident in those Palestinian villages inside Israel that provided refuge for internally displaced Palestinians in 1948. In many villages, neighbourhoods are named for the origin of the displaced persons who reside in them. The Palestinian village of 'Arrabeh, for example, includes the neighbourhood of the Mi'aris (i.e., displaced persons originating from the village of Mi'ar). Likewise, displaced persons from al-Birwa who took shelter in the village of al-Judeideh live in the Birwani neighbourhood.

### 1.2.1 Refugees Residing in Camps<sup>14</sup>

According to UNRWA records, 1,485,598 Palestinian refugees were registered in UNRWA's 58 official refugee camps throughout the oPt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria by the end of 2011. Refugees registered in camps comprise 31 percent of the total UNRWA-registered refugees. However, only 25.6 percent of the total Palestinian refugee population (registered and unregistered refugees) resides in camps. In addition, about 200,000 Palestinian refugees reside in one of at least 17 unofficial camps in the oPt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The majority of Palestinian refugees registered in camps are refugees from 1948 and their descendants.

A smaller number of refugees displaced for the first time in 1967 also reside in refugee camps, primarily in Jordan and Syria. A small but growing number of poor non-refugees, including Palestinians and other Arabs, also reside in refugee camps.

**Table (1.5): UNRWA-registered refugees, including refugees in camps**

Year	Total Registered Refugees	Registered Refugees in Camps	% Registered Refugees in Camps
1953	870,158	300,785	34.6
1955	912,425	351,532	38.5
1960	1,136,487	409,223	36.0
1965	1,300,117	508,042	39.1
1970	1,445,022	500,985	34.7
1975	1,652,436	551,643	33.4
1980	1,863,162	613,149	32.9
1985	2,119,862	805,482	38.0
1990	2,466,516	697,709	28.3
1995	3,246,044	1,007,375	31.0
2000	3,806,055	1,227,954	32.3
2003	4,082,300	1,301,689	32.0
2004	4,186,711	1,226,213	29.0
2005	4,283,892	1,265,987	30.0
2006	4,396,209	1,321,525	29.7
2007	4,504,169	1,337,388	29.7
2008	4,618,141	1,363,496	29.5
2009	4,718,899	1,385,316	29.4
2010	4,820,229	1,417,370	29.4
2011*	4,797,723	1,485,598	31.0

\* Figures as of 30 June each year except 2011 for end of year, which also exclude 318,032 other registered persons

Source: UNRWA website: [www.unrwa.org](http://www.unrwa.org)

The largest camp population resides in the occupied Gaza Strip (526,891 or 45 percent of UNRWA registered refugees in Gaza at the end of 2011), comprising about 31 percent of all camp-registered refugees. In the occupied West Bank, there are fewer refugees in camps (211,665 at the end of 2011). Approximately 39 percent of all UNRWA registered refugees in the oPt reside in camps.

The second-highest number of camp refugees is found in Jordan (359,410 at the end of 2011). However, Jordan is also the host country with the lowest percentage of Palestinian refugees in camps: only 18 percent of the UNRWA registered refugees in Jordan reside in camps. This reflects the status afforded to most Palestinian refugees in Jordan as Jordanian citizens and the high percentage of Jordanian citizens with Palestinian origins (Palestinian refugees).

Lebanon and Syria are the host countries with the largest portion of camp refugees. In Lebanon, approximately 53 percent of refugees (233,509 at the end of 2011) live in official camps. The high percentage of camp refugees in Lebanon is directly related to the restrictions placed on the right to property and freedom of movement by the Lebanese government, the lack of resources for alternative housing outside of the camps, and concerns about physical safety. In Syria, where approximately 32 percent of refugees (or 154,123) live in official camps, more Palestinian refugees live in unofficial camps (185,426) because some unofficial camps, in particular Yarmouk, are located close to the capital of Damascus and offer good services.



Rashidieh refugee camp, Lebanon: 2012 (©Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP)

**Table (1.6): Estimated Population of Palestinian Refugees in Camps  
(official and unofficial), End of 2011**

Host Country	Camp (local name)	Population	Year established
<b>Gaza Strip<sup>a</sup></b>			
<b>Official camps</b>	Jabalia	114,675	1948
	Beach (Shati)	87,324	1948
	Nuseirat	66,126	1948
	Bureij	33,198	1948
	Deir el-Balah	22,104	1948
	Maghazi	25,397	1948
	Khan Younis	72,315	1948
	Rafah	105,592	1948
<i>Sub-total</i>		<b>526,891</b>	
<b>West Bank<sup>b</sup></b>			
<b>Official camps</b>	Aqbat Jaber	7,175	1948
	Ein el-Sultan	2,149	1948
	Shu'fat <sup>c</sup>	12,237	1965
	Am'ari	11,728	1949
	Kalandia	12,261	1949
	Deir Ammar	2,644	1949
	Jalazone	12,475	1949
	Fawwar	9,036	1949
	Arroub	11,626	1950
	Dheisheh	14,395	1949
	Aida	5,305	1950
	Beit Jibrin (al-Azzeh)	2,323	1950
	Far'a	8,453	1949
	Camp No. 1	7,532	1950
	Askar	17,726	1950
	Balata	25,965	1950
	Tulkarm	20,419	1950
	Nur Shams	10,229	1952
	Jenin	17,987	1953
	M'ascar <sup>d</sup>	Evacuated	1948–1955/1956
<i>Sub-total</i>		<b>211,665</b>	
<b>Unofficial camps<sup>e</sup></b>	Silwad	431	1971/72
	Abu Shukheidim	NA	1948
	Qaddoura	1,361	1948
	Birzeit (As-Saqaeif)	NA	1948
<i>Sub-total</i>		<b>1,792</b>	
<b>WB &amp; GS: Total</b>		<b>740,348</b>	

Jordan			
Official camps <sup>f</sup>	Amman New Camp (Wihdat)	54,847	1955
	Talbieh	7,252	1968
	Irbid	26,953	1950–1951
	Husn ('Azmi al-Mufti)	23,635	1968
	Souf	21,441	1967
	Jerash (Gaza)	25,496	1968
	Jabal el-Husseini	31,676	1952
	Baq'a'a	99,823	1968
	Zarqa	19,794	1949
	Marka (Hittin)	48,492	1968
Sub-total	359,410		
Unofficial camps <sup>g</sup>	Madaba	7,455	1956
	Sakhna	6,438	1969
	Al-Hassan	12,199	1967
Sub-total	26,092		
Jordan : Total	385,502		
Lebanon			
Official camps	Mar Elias	654	1952
	Burj el-Barajneh	16,878	1948
	Dikwaneh (Destroyed in 1970s) <sup>h</sup>	9,939	..
	Dbayeh	4,273	1956
	Shatilla	9,056	1949
	Ein el-Hilweh	49,921	1948–1949
	al-Nabatieh (Destroyed in the 1970's) <sup>h</sup>	7,862	1956
	Mieh Mieh	4,913	1954
	Al-Buss	10,313	1948
	Rashidieh	28,782	1948
	Burj al-Shamali	20,703	1948
	Nahr el-Bared	34,608	1950
	Bedawi	17,345	1955
	Wavell (al-Jalil)	8,273	1948
	Jisr al-Bashah (Destroyed in the 1970's) <sup>h</sup>	–	1952
	Gouraudi		1948 evacuated 1975
Sub-total	233,509		
Unofficial camps <sup>j</sup>	Al-Ma'ashouq	4,493	–
	Shabiha	6,295	–
	Al-Qasmia	3,433	–
	Kufr Bada (Abu al-U'sod)	1,060	–
	Al-U'rash (Adlon)	1,888	–
	Shhim	2,579	–
Sub-total	19,749		
Lebanon: Total	253,258		

Syria			
Official camps	Khan Eshieh	22,581	1949
	Khan Dynoun	11,815	1949
	Sbeineh	25,233	1958
	Qabr Essit (As-Sayyida Zeinab)	26,693	1968–1967
	Jaramana	4,578	1949
	Dera'a	6,451	1950–1951
	Dera'a Emergency	5,775	1967
	Homs	17,458	1949
	Hama	10,069	1949–1950
	Neirab	23,469	
Sub-total		154,123	
Unofficial camps <sup>k</sup>	Ein el-Tal (Hindrat)	5,417	1962
	Al-Yarmouk	140,842	1956–1957
	Ramadani	1,251	1956
	Latakia	7,951	
Sub-total		155,461	
Syria: Total		309,584	
Grand Total		1,688,692	

Sources: BADIL: Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009.  
UNRWA website: [www.unrwa.org](http://www.unrwa.org), it was based on proportion of camps for 2008.



Wavel refugee camp, Lebanon: 2009 (©BADIL)

- During the 1970s, the Israeli military administration destroyed thousands of refugee shelters in the occupied Gaza Strip under security pretexts. Large refugee camps were targeted in particular. Refugees were forcibly resettled in other areas of the occupied Gaza Strip, with a smaller number transferred to the occupied West Bank. In the occupied Gaza Strip, several housing projects were established for these refugees. Some of these projects today are referred to as camps. These include the Canada project (1972), the Shuqairi project (1973), the Brazil project (1973), the Sheikh Radwan project (1974), and the al-Amal project (1979).
- There are thousands of ex-Gaza refugees distributed throughout West Bank camps.
- Thousands of Palestinians are estimated by UNRWA to be living in the camp as a result of Israel's policy of residency revocation in Jerusalem.
- The camp was closed because of unsanitary living conditions, and residents were relocated to Shu'fat refugee camp.
- Estimated figures based on 2007 PCBS census considering the growth rate for the years 2008-2011: [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_Rainbow/Documents/ramallah.htm](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/ramallah.htm).
- Baq'a'a, Husn, Jerash (known as Gaza Camp), Souf, Talbieh (mainly inhabited by displaced persons not 1948 refugees) and Marka (known as Hitin) refugee camps were set up after the 1967 to accommodate Palestine refugees and displaced people who left the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
- Population figures for unofficial camps in Jordan are for 2000, including annual population growth of 3 percent from 2000 to 2008 and 2.4 percent for the years 2009-2011. In 2000, the population of Madaba was 5,500; Sakhna, 4,750; and al-Hassan, 9,000.
- Dikwaneh and Nabatieh were completely destroyed in the 1970s, but refugees who were in these camps maintain their registration numbers with these centers until such time as UNRWA's new Refugee Registration Information System (RRIS) is developed.
- The camp was evacuated and residents moved to Rashidieh camp.
- Population figures for unofficial camps in Lebanon are for 2001, updated based on 3 percent annual growth until 2008, and 2.0 percent for the years 2009-2011. In 2001, the population of al-Ma'ashouq was 3,447; Shabiha, 4,829; al-Qasmia, 2,634; Kufr Bada (Abu al-U'sod), 813; al-U'rash (Adlon), 1,448; and Shhim, 1,978.
- The statistics for the unofficial camps in Syria are for 2002, including annual population growth of 3 percent until 2008 and 1.6 percent for the years 2009-2011. The 2002 population of Ein el-Tal was 4,329; al-Yarmouk, 112,550; Ramadani, 1,000; and Lattakia 6,354.



## 1.2.2 Refugees Residing Outside of Camps

Most registered refugees (approximately 69 percent) live outside UNRWA's 58 camps. These refugees reside in and around cities and towns in the host countries, often in areas adjacent to refugee camps.<sup>15</sup> Many West Bank villages and towns host a significant refugee population. There are approximately 100 localities in the occupied West Bank in which 1948 refugees comprise more than 50 percent of the total population.

Based on the Palestinian Census in 2007, the percentage of registered refugees in the oPt is about 42 percent of the total population: Out of every 100 residents of the Gaza Strip, 58 are refugees, and out of every 100 residents of the West Bank, 42 are refugees. Between 1997 and 2007, the proportion of refugees living in the West Bank showed a significant change in certain governorates. For instance, the percentage of refugees in Jerusalem decreased from 40.8 percent to 31.4 percent; the refugee population increased in Qalqilya from 39.9 percent to 47 percent and in Jenin from 28.8 percent to 32.8 percent.

**Table (1.7): Percentage of Refugee Population in the oPt by Governorate, 2007**

Governorate	% of Refugees	
	1997 <sup>a</sup>	2007 <sup>b</sup>
Gaza	52.2	52.8
Deir al-Balah	85.5	86.1
North Gaza	70.9	72.1
Rafah	83.9	84.3
Khan Younis	56.9	58.0
Gaza Strip	65.1	66.8
Tubas	15.8	15.7
Jericho	49.7	51.3
Jerusalem	40.8	31.4
Ramallah	28.9	29.3
Jenin	28.8	32.8
Tulkarem	31.5	33.6
Nablus	25.4	26.3
Bethlehem	28.0	28.4
Qalqilya	39.9	47.0
Hebron	17.4	17.9
Salfit	7.7	8.3
West Bank <sup>c</sup>	26.5	27.4
oPt	41.4	42.0

**Sources:**

a. PCBS, 1998. *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 1997*.

b. PCBS, 2012. *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007. Census Final Results in The Palestinian Territory – Summary (Population and Housing)*

c. UNRWA, *West Bank and Gaza Population census of 2007, Briefing paper, January 2010*. Available at: <http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010012035949.pdf>

In Lebanon, UNRWA reported that 49.9 percent of the Palestinian refugee population was registered outside of camps. Other sources report that between one third and 40 percent of the Palestinian refugee population resides in gatherings, cities, villages and other non-camp localities.<sup>16</sup> A gathering is defined as a community of 25 or more Palestinian households living together. In Syria, almost 40 percent of Palestinian refugees live in urban centres, with a small number living in rural areas.

## 1.3 Characteristics of the Refugee and IDP Population

Demographic and socio-economic indicators reflect the vulnerability of internally displaced Palestinians and refugees during six decades of displacement. Lack of personal security, socio-economic wellbeing and stability are the result of Israel's policies and practices of occupation, apartheid and colonisation and a series of armed conflicts in the region,<sup>17</sup> in particular where refugeehood is compounded with statelessness, ineffective protection and insufficient assistance.<sup>18</sup>

Due to the lack of registration and documentation, no statistical data is available on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Palestinian refugee populations outside UNRWA's areas of operation, and little reliable data is available on the characteristics of internally displaced Palestinians on both sides of the green line.

Such data is available almost exclusively for the

population of UNRWA-registered 1948 refugees, who constitute 70 percent of refugees worldwide.



### 1.3.1 Demographic Indicators

Differences between the Palestinian refugee populations and the local non-refugee populations are negligible in most Arab host states, with Lebanon constituting the only major exception.<sup>19</sup>

The Palestinian refugee population is young. Approximately 27 percent of all registered refugees are below the age of fifteen. The occupied Gaza Strip has the youngest refugee population: 34.4 percent is under 15 years, while Lebanon has the lowest percentage of youth: 19.3 percent of the registered refugee population is under 15 years. The large share of children and youth creates high dependency ratios, a burden on the labour force, and a persisting need for health and education services.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, about another one fifth of registered refugees are between 15 and 24 years.

No data is available about the age distribution and other demographic indicators of Palestinian IDPs. However, as differences between refugee and non-refugee populations in major Arab host states are negligible, demographic indicators for Palestinian IDPs are likely to be similar to that for the overall Palestinian population.<sup>21</sup>

**Table (1.8): UNRWA Registered Palestinian Refugees by Major Age Groups, 2010**

Age	0-14		15-24		25-64		65+		Total	
Region	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Jordan	25.0	25.2	19.7	20.3	46.1	45.3	9.2	9.2	100	100
Syria	26.8	24.6	18.3	18.2	46.5	47.6	8.4	9.5	100	100
Lebanon	19.2	19.5	17.5	18.2	53.2	50.6	10.1	11.7	100	100
West Bank	25.8	25.9	19.8	20.8	47.4	43.3	7.0	10.0	100	100
Gaza	34.2	34.6	21.9	20.5	38.7	38.1	5.2	6.8	100	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*



Children in Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem: 2010 (© Jowanna Brown/BADIL)

Refugees have a high fertility rate, however there has been a consistent decline in the fertility rate among Palestinian refugees, in particular in the occupied West Bank (from 6.17 in 1983-1994 to 4.2 in 2006 and 3.9 in 2010), Jordan (from 6.2 in 1983-1986 to 4.6 in 2000 and 3.5 in 2010), Lebanon (from 4.49 in 1991 to 2.3 in 2006 and 3.2 in 2010) and Syria (from 3.8 in 2000 to 2.4 in 2006 and 2.5 in 2010). In the occupied Gaza Strip, the fertility rate increased between 1983 and 1994 (from 7.15 to 7.69), followed by a slow decrease from 2000 onwards.<sup>22</sup> It reached 4.3 in 2010. Declining fertility rates are the result of later marriage, more female enrolment in higher education, increased use of contraceptives and a slight rise in the participation rate of women in the labour force.<sup>23</sup> The Palestinian refugee and IDP population has a high, albeit declining, growth rate. This is similar to the Palestinian population as a whole. The average annual growth rate of the UNRWA-registered refugee population for the period 1955-2008 is 3.3 percent according to the agency's records, while according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the average annual growth rate of the entire Palestinian population was 3.5 percent for 1949-1999, and 3 percent for 2000 – 2008. In 2010, the annual growth rate for Palestinians in Jordan was 2.4 percent, while it was 1.6 percent in Syria, 2.1 percent in Lebanon, 2.3 percent in the West Bank and 2.6 percent in Gaza Strip.

**Table (1.9): Total Fertility and Annual Growth Rates by Region, 2010**

Region	Total Fertility Rate	Annual Growth Rate
Jordan	3.5	2.4
Syria	2.5	1.6
Lebanon	3.2	2.1
West Bank	3.9	2.3
Gaza	4.3	2.6

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*

The average household size of registered refugees declined over the last decade at about 10 percent, although household sizes are still high ranging from 4 to 5 persons per family.

**Table (1.10): The Average Household Size of Registered Refugees by Region, 2000, 2010 (Persons)**

Region	2000	2010	Change %
Jordan	5.6	4.8	-14.3
Syria	4.3	4.1	-4.3
Lebanon	4.1	3.9	-4.9
West Bank	4.5	4.0	-11.1
Gaza	4.9	4.5	-8.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>-10.2</b>

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*

The mortality rate of the Palestinian population in the oPt is relatively low, similar to that in Western countries in the early 1960s.<sup>24</sup> Infant and child mortality rates among refugee populations have declined over the past six decades. Infant mortality rates, for example, declined from around 200 per 1,000 births in 1950, to around 24 per 1,000 births in the oPt in 2006, and 8 per 1,000 births in Israel in 2003.<sup>25</sup> Mortality rates of refugee infants and children under five have declined in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Lebanon and there is no available recent data on Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Syria.

Table (1.11): Infant and Child Mortality Rates for Palestinian Refugees (per 1,000 births)

Country	Infant Mortality	Child Mortality
Jordan	22.6	25.7
Lebanon	19.0	21.7
West Bank	19.5	24.4
Syria	28.2	31.5
Gaza Strip	20.2	25.3
Israel (Palestinians)*	6.9	0.7

Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue November, 2011. For Palestinians in Israel: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011. "Statistical Abstract of Israel . No. 62."

\* Data for child mortality from 2008.

### 1.3.2 Labour Force Indicators

Levels of labour force participation and unemployment indicate the economic wellbeing of populations.<sup>26</sup> High rates of labour force participation and low unemployment are indicators of a healthy economy that provides a better quality of life. Low levels of participation in the labour force and high unemployment are related to low income levels, high poverty rates and unhealthy living conditions.

In 2011, labour force participation was the highest among refugees in Syria at about 49 percent, and the lowest was in the occupied Gaza Strip at about 38 percent. While the highest participation rate for Palestinian females was in Israel at 28 percent.

Table (1.12): Refugee and IDP – Labour Force Participation

Country	Total Labor Force Participation %	Participation by women %
Jordan <sup>a</sup>	40.9	12.9
Lebanon <sup>b</sup>	42.5	15.2
Syria <sup>a</sup>	49.3 <sup>27</sup>	18.0
Israel <sup>c</sup>	46.9	28.3
West Bank <sup>d</sup>	44.4	18.0
Gaza Strip <sup>d</sup>	38.2	14.4


**Sources:**

a. The data for Jordan and Syria is from "Statistical Abstract of Palestine", Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010.

b. Data for Lebanon is from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012. Labour Force Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2011: Main Results.

c. This number reflects the labour force of the entire Palestinian population in Israel, including IDPs. See: "Palestinians in Israel: Socio-Economic Survey 2011", prepared by Ahmad El Sheikh Muhammad.

d. PCBS, 2012. Labour Force Survey Database 2011.



Labour force participation among refugee women is very low compared to refugee men. Participation generally increases with higher education, especially among women. Research published in 2003 shows that young refugee women aged 15 to 24 in Lebanon and Jordan identified family duties (44 percent and 43 percent respectively) and study (30 percent and 41 percent respectively) as the most important reasons for not participating in the formal labour force; among older women, family duties were given as the single most important reason (varying between 66 percent and 86 percent among women over 25 years old). Academic study was given as the most significant reason for unemployment among young men (15–24 years old), while discouragement was the most commonly cited reason by young adult men (25 - 45 years old). Older men cited health reasons and retirement as the principal reasons for economic inactivity.<sup>28</sup>

**Table (1.13): Unemployment Rates (%) for Palestinian Refugees and IDPs (aged 15 years and above) by Gender and Region, 2011**

Country	Lebanon*	Israel**	West Bank***		Gaza Strip***	
Gender	all	all	refugees	non- refugees	refugees	non- refugees
Males	6.8	5.6	20.1	14.5	26.5	24.6
Females	14.7	10.5	27.5	21.1	44.0	43.9

**Sources:**

\* Data for Lebanon is from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012. Labour Force Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2011: Main Results.

\*\* "Palestinians in Israel: Galilee Society: Socio-Economic Survey 2011," prepared by Ahmad El Sheikh Muhammad.

\*\*\* Refugees in West Bank and Gaza: PCBS, 2012; Labour Force Survey Database 2011.

Unemployment rates among the Palestinian refugee population range between 6 and 44 percent, with the highest rates found in the occupied Gaza Strip. In 2011, the unemployment rate among refugees in the Gaza Strip was 26.5 percent for males and 44 percent for females, compared with 20.1 percent for males and 27.5 percent for females in the West Bank.

No disaggregate data is available for the socio-economic characteristics of the Palestinian IDP populations in Israel and the oPt. For IDPs in Israel, data pertaining to the general Palestinian population serves as an indicator: the unemployment rate among the total Palestinian labour force in Israel is 10.5 percent for females and 5.6 percent for males.<sup>29</sup>

### 1.3.3 Poverty and Food Insecurity

In the oPt, households in refugee camps suffer from the highest rates of poverty as measured according to consumption patterns. Approximately 39 percent of camp households are poor compared with 29.5 percent of urban and rural households. The poverty index indicates also that the situation is worse for refugee households (33.3 percent) compared to non-refugee households (29.1 percent).<sup>30</sup> This can be explained by higher unemployment rates, the higher dependency ratio and the large size of refugee households compared with urban and rural households. In the West Bank, disparities between refugees and non-refugees were 3 percent: 20 percent compared to 17 percent respectively.<sup>31</sup>

In 2010, 66.4 percent of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were poor and 6.6 percent were extremely poor. This indicates that almost 160,000 refugees could not meet their basic food and non-food needs, and 16,000 refugees found to be extremely poor did not meet their essential food requirements. Poverty in its two forms (general and extreme) was higher for refugees living inside the camps than those in gatherings: the poverty headcount reached 73.2 percent in camps, compared to 55 percent in gatherings, while the extreme poverty rate within camps was almost double that of surrounding areas (7.9 percent compared to 4.2 percent). A significantly higher percentage of residents of camps report food insecurity at all levels of food insecurity, indicating that camp dwellers experience food insecurity more commonly than those who live in gatherings (71 percent of those reporting severe food insecurity reside in camps).<sup>32</sup>

While statistics from 2010 show that 21 percent of families in Israel live below the poverty line, the study reflects a large gap between Palestinian and Jewish families. In 2010, 53.2 percent of Palestinian families in Israel lived under the poverty line compared with 14.3 percent of Jewish families, a difference of 38.9 percent. The poverty rates in Palestinian families where a woman worked (22.4 percent) were 42.7 percent lower than in families in which a woman did not work (65.1 percent poverty rate).<sup>33</sup>

UNRWA statistics show that about 73,000 refugee families were registered in special hardship assistance programs in 2010, assisting about 288,000 persons. Although, the assistance is a significant contribution to poverty reduction, the aid is still inadequate to provide all those in need with assistance.

Table (1.14): Registered Refugees Recorded in Special Hardship Assistance Program

Year	Detail	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	West Bank	Gaza	Grand Total
2010	Persons	55,466	37,224	54,267	36,867	104,581	288,405
	% as of registered refugees	2.8	11.9	7.5	4.3	9.0	5.8
	Families	15,587	11,468	13,481	11,807	21,013	73,356
2011	Persons	54,761	37,613	56,656	38,686	106,002	293,718
	% as of registered refugees	2.6	12.1	7.3	4.4	8.7	5.7

Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011  
UNRWA in Figures as of January 2012, available at: <http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/20120317152850.pdf>

As with poverty rates, food insecurity is higher in refugee communities than in non-refugee communities. In the West Bank, food insecurity rates have improved falling from 22 percent of the population in 2010 to 17 percent (almost half a million people) in 2011. On average, food insecurity in the non-refugee communities was 5 percent lower than refugee communities of the West Bank.<sup>34</sup>

With regards to the Gaza Strip, especially in the aftermath of the Israeli aggression over the course of December 2008 and January 2009, food insecurity remains very high. In comparison to the West Bank's food insecurity (17 percent of the population), the Gazan population's rate of food insecurity is much higher: 44 percent in 2011.<sup>35</sup> As with the West Bank, Gazan refugees<sup>36</sup> are more food insecure than non-refugees by an average of 6 percent between 2009-2011.<sup>37</sup>

The decline of food insecurity in the Gazan population is explained by an increase in external assistance to the besieged Gazans, as well as the proliferation in the use of tunnels to provide supplies to this area of Palestine. Food insecurity has sharply declined by 16 percent (from 60 percent to 44 percent) between 2009 and 2011. However, this decrease has been matched by a 7 percent increase in this population's vulnerability (from 9 percent to 16 percent) as well as an increase in the marginally secure population (from 7 percent to 16 percent), the trend is due to Gaza's siege-damaged economy. Only one fifth of the population (among both refugees and non-refugees) are food secure.<sup>38</sup>

### 1.3.4 Housing

Sub-standard housing is an indicator of underdevelopment. Inadequate housing is also related to poor health and has a disproportionately severe impact on women, children, handicapped people and the elderly. Overall, housing conditions for Palestinian refugees are best in Syria and Jordan, followed by the oPt and, lastly, Lebanon. However, within these geographical areas, housing conditions differ widely.<sup>39</sup>

Housing problems tend to be more pronounced in refugee camps. Nevertheless, as a result of international assistance, official camps often have better infrastructure than unofficial camps and refugee communities in areas outside of camps. While the territorial growth of refugee camps has generally remained the same over the last 64 years, their population has more than quadrupled. In areas where construction is permitted, residents have expanded homes and buildings vertically. The government in Lebanon, for example, has prohibited vertical construction in the camps.

According to findings from 2004, Palestinian refugee homes comprise an average of three rooms. Average housing capacity is lowest in Lebanon and Syria.<sup>40</sup> UNRWA data demonstrates that almost all registered refugee shelters are connected to drinking water, while the connections to sewage facilities still has significant shortages especially in West Bank camps.<sup>41</sup>




**Table (1.15): Percentage of Camp Shelters with Access to Water Network and Sewage Facilities by Region, 2010**

Region	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	West Bank	Gaza
Access to water network %	99.4	100	100	100	100
Access to Sewage Facilities %	93.0	96.1	91.7	62.5	93.4

**Source:** UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011

A shortage of land for development affects Palestinian households in Israel including IDP households. Some 19 percent of Palestinian households have suffered from land confiscation between 1948 and 2007, while 10.8 percent of households have had their homes demolished or confiscated by the Israeli government during the same period.<sup>42</sup> In 2011, 55.2 percent of households expressed a need for at least one new housing unit in the next ten years, while 65.5 percent of all households said they were currently unable to build necessary housing units.<sup>43</sup>

**Figure 1.5: Percentage of Overcrowded Households, 2007**



**Sources:** Jacobsen, Laurie Blome, "Community Development of Palestinian refugee camps: Analytical support to Jordan's preparations for the June 2004 Geneva Conference on the humanitarian need of Palestinian refugees", *The Material and Social Infrastructure, and Environmental Conditions of Refugee Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria*, FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo, 2004, Table 1. Data for the West Bank and Gaza Strip represents the entire population for 2007: *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 9*, PCBS, 2008.

The international standard for overcrowding is defined as three or more persons per room. Overcrowding is related to a lack of resources with which to expand existing shelters or build new ones, planning and building restrictions, and household size. Overcrowding is most severe in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan where one in three households are affected. In the oPt, Syria and Lebanon, overcrowding is slightly less of a problem. There are no significant differences in crowding between non-refugee households and refugee households outside camps in Jordan and in the oPt. Refugee households outside camps in Lebanon, however, are more overcrowded than households of Lebanese nationals.

### 1.3.5 Education

Under conditions of a protracted refugee crisis, Palestinians value education highly as an opportunity for a better life and as a means of affirming identity. A study commissioned by UNRWA on adolescents' knowledge of and attitudes towards family, reproductive health issues and lifestyle practices, showed that 76 percent of respondents aspired to higher education.<sup>44</sup> Most refugees benefit from elementary and



preparatory education provided by UNRWA schools except refugees in Lebanon who are also offered secondary education by UNRWA, while in other host-countries refugees attend public (non-UNRWA) secondary schools. Few study in private schools. Access to secondary and higher education is restricted in some host countries. Many factors, particularly financial constraints, prevent other refugees from continuing education.



Israeli soldiers search the bags of Palestinian students in Hebron, 2012 (©CPT)

By the end of 2011 there were 529 physical obstacles [several in the form of checkpoints, roadblocks road gates road walls road barriers...etc.] obstructing Palestinian movement. This system continues to hinder the access of the Palestinian population to livelihoods and basic services including health employment education and water supply. As a result of all types of movement restrictions there were some 70 villages and communities in the West Bank at the end of 2011 with a combined population of nearly 200,000 forced to use detours that are between two to five times longer than the direct route to the closest city.

**Source:** OCHA, *Fragmented Live, Humanitarian Overview, 2011, May 2012.*

During the civil war and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, some refugee children lost more than a year of schooling. In the oPt, refugee children lost between 35 percent and 50 percent of class time during the first *Intifada*. The second *Intifada* also negatively affected access to education and the quality of education provided in the oPt.<sup>45</sup> More recently, the Syrian crisis has significantly affected Palestinian refugee students facing security problems that inhibit movement from their homes to school facilities.



A family escapes fighting between the Free Syrian Army and government troops in Idlib refugee camp, northern Syria: 2012. (©AP)

#### Impacts of armed conflict in Syria on Palestinian refugees:

*The armed conflict [in Syria] continues to cause temporary disruptions to UNRWA's services. In particular, conflict conditions coupled with the presence of displaced persons in UNRWA schools have meant that many of UNRWA's 64 double shift primary schools were not functional in what should have been the first week of the 2012-2013 school year. To respond to this contingency, the Agency is preparing materials for a home learning education framework.<sup>46</sup>*

**Source:** UNRWA, *Syrian humanitarian response, September 2012.*

Nearly all refugee children are enrolled at the elementary stage, and no statistical differences exist between male and female enrolment at the elementary and preparatory stages. The 700 UNRWA schools across its five areas of operation are inadequate to host all registered refugees. As a result, 72 percent of these schools function on a double shift, which affects the quality of delivered education.<sup>47</sup>

**Table (1.16): UNRWA's Schools by Shift and Region, 2010/2011**

Region	Schools	Single shift	Double shift	% Double shift
Jordan	172	16	156	90.7
Syria	118	4	114	96.6
Lebanon	74	57	17	22.9
West Bank	98	97	1	1
Gaza	238	23	215	90.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>700</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>71.9</b>

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*

**Table (1.17): Refugee Pupils Enrollment in UNRWA Elementary and Preparatory Schools by Sex and Region, 2010/2011**

Region	Elementary				Preparatory			
	Boys	Girls	Total	% Girls	Boys	Girls	Total	% Girls
Jordan	35,828	35,368	71,196	49.7	25,304	23,178	48,482	47.8
Syria	23,598	22,516	46,114	48.8	10,242	10,044	20,286	49.5
Lebanon*	9,639	10,023	19,662	51.0	4,118	4,984	9,102	54.8
West Bank	15,136	20,834	35,970	57.9	7,466	10,518	17,984	58.5
Gaza	80,547	71,078	151,625	46.9	30,285	30,461	60,746	50.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>164,748</b>	<b>159,819</b>	<b>324,567</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>77,415</b>	<b>79,185</b>	<b>156,600</b>	<b>50.6</b>

\* The number of pupils in secondary schools in Lebanon is 3427, of which 64.3% are girls, 2010/2011.

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*

UNRWA School in the Gaza Strip, 2012.  
(©Labour Friends of Palestine)



**Table (1.18): Drop-up Rates in UNRWA Elementary and Preparatory Schools Distributed by Sex and Region, 2009/2010**

Region	Elementary		Preparatory	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Jordan	0.74	0.71	2.87	3.01
Syria	0.39	0.4	3.81	2.07
Lebanon	1.41	0.64	3.2	2.12
West Bank	0.42	0.19	2.54	0.95
Gaza	0.65	0.14	3.01	1.05

*Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011*

### 1.3.6 Health

Palestinian refugees' health status is transitioning from a developing to a developed stage. The health of women and children has improved dramatically over the course of the last six decades. Although UNRWA supervises health and other medical centres, it also facilitates some services through existing health centres in host countries. Public hospitals are especially used to facilitate UNRWA services in the West Bank where UNRWA only runs one hospital in the city of Qalqilya.

**Table (1.19): UNRWA's Health Infrastructure by Region, 2010**

Region/ Infrastructure	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	West Bank	Gaza
Primary Health Care*	24	23	29	41	20
Hospitals	0	0	0	1	0
Laboratories	24	21	17	40	18
Dental Clinic**	33	19	21	23	22
Radiology Facilities	2	0	4	9	6
Physiotherapy Clinics	1	0	0	6	10
Community rehabilitation centres	8	5	1	15	7
Womens' program centres	12	5	9	16	7

\* Including PHC inside and outside camps

\*\* Including stationed and mobile clinics

Source: UNRWA Statistics-2010, selected indicators. First Issue-November, 2011, available at: <http://www.unrwa.org>

#### Conflict-affected refugees in Syria:

Emergency health care needs have become acute as UNRWA health centres attempt to meet the needs of conflict-affected refugees. There are 24 UNRWA health centres throughout Syria, of which 16 are currently operational and eight have been temporary closed. Health centres in Douma and one in Yarmouk Camp have remained closed for several weeks due to security concerns.<sup>48</sup>

Source: UNRWA, Syrian humanitarian response, September 2012.



Mahmoud, a 21 year-old Palestinian resident of Syria, recovers in a field hospital after he was found blindfolded, beaten and sprayed with bullets. 2012 (©AP)



## Appendix 1.1: Data Sources and Notes Regarding Estimates of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs

### Data Sources

There is no single authoritative source for the global Palestinian refugee and IDP population. Available data on the size of the Palestinian refugee and IDP populations is uneven and shifting, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive registration system, frequent forced displacement, and the lack of a uniform definition of a Palestinian refugee.<sup>49</sup> Internal displacement is also difficult to track because ceasefire lines have changed frequently and there is no internationally recognised border between Israel and the oPt.

UNRWA has registered 1948 Refugees since 1950 and has recorded over 75 percent of this group of refugees.<sup>50</sup> UNRWA registration data is not statistically valid, however, as reporting is voluntary. UNRWA has never carried out a comprehensive census of all Palestinian refugees under its mandate.



UNRWA administers registration of Palestinian refugees as part of its relief and social services program.<sup>51</sup> The eligibility and registration program maintains historical records of refugees to determine registration and eligibility for UNRWA services. Registration cards are continually updated, mainly with information regarding births, marriages and deaths.

In general, UNRWA registration records do not include:

1. Refugees displaced in 1948, who:
  - a. Failed to meet UNRWA's definition of "Palestine Refugee";
  - b. Were outside the areas of UNRWA operation (and have not filed for registration under UNRWA's 1993 revised eligibility criteria);
  - c. Were dropped from the records owing to financial constraints limiting the number of relief recipients;
  - d. Are descendants of refugee mothers and non-refugee fathers;
  - e. Had an independent income or property (and have not filed for registration under UNRWA's 1993 revised eligibility criteria);
  - f. Improved their economic situation to the extent that they no longer met eligibility criteria (prior to the 1993 revision of eligibility criteria);
  - g. Refused to register for reasons of pride.
2. Palestinians displaced for the first time in 1967;
3. Palestinians who are not 1948 or 1967 refugees, and are unable (due to revocation of residency, deportation, etc.) or unwilling (owing to a well-founded fear of persecution) to return to the oPt;
4. Palestinians registered in UNHCR records who have never registered in UNRWA or dropped from the Agency records;
5. IDPs in Israel and the oPt.

In 1952, the state of Israel took responsibility for the task of assisting those Palestinians displaced in its territory. UNRWA transferred its IDP registration files to the government of Israel in June 1952 and has not updated them since.<sup>52</sup> In 1982, the UN General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Commissioner General of UNRWA, to issue identification cards to all 1948 Palestine refugees and their descendants, irrespective of whether or not they received rations and services from the Agency, as well as to all 1967 refugees and their descendants.<sup>53</sup> The initiative failed, however, due to lack of co-operation among host states concerning information on previously non-registered refugees.

Until 1993, refugees wishing to register with UNRWA had to meet requirements of need and initial flight in 1948 into a country where UNRWA operated. Revision of UNRWA's eligibility and registration criteria in 1993 eliminated these two requirements, which led to the registration of some previously undocumented Palestinian refugees.

In 2006 (and reaffirmed in 2009), UNRWA issued new consolidated eligibility and registration instructions. These extended services to the children of registered refugee women married to non-refugees. In 2006, 90,446 such children were enrolled in this new category, mainly in response to the humanitarian crisis in the oPt. They are, however, non-refugees in UNRWA's registration records.<sup>54</sup>

**Census data and population growth projections** represent an additional source of estimates of the Palestinian refugee and IDP populations. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) has conducted two population censuses in 1997 and 2007 which include refugees as a category, as well as questions regarding ongoing forced displacement. PCBS however, only has access to the Palestinian population in the oPt. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics publishes little statistical data about Israel's Palestinian citizens and does not keep separate records on internally displaced Palestinians.<sup>55</sup> Few host countries carry out a regular census of their resident refugee population, and some do not include Palestinian refugees as a category of refugees. Some countries, such as Jordan, include Palestinians as a census category, but this data is not publicly available. In North America and Europe, Palestinian asylum-seekers are often included in a general category of "stateless" persons, or classified according to their place of birth, or the host country that issued their travel documents.

## Notes Regarding Estimates of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs

**UNRWA registered 1948 refugees:** UNRWA reported 4.8 million registered refugees as of 31 December 2011. UNRWA figures are based on data voluntarily supplied by registered refugees. UNRWA registration statistics do not claim to be and should not be taken as statistically valid demographic data. This information is collected by UNRWA for its own internal management purposes, and to facilitate certification of refugee eligibility to receive education, health, and relief and social services. New information on births, marriages, deaths, and change in place of residence is recorded only when a refugee requests the updating of the family registration card issued by the Agency. UNRWA does not carry out a census, house-to-house survey, or any other means of verifying place of residence. Refugees will normally report births, deaths, and marriages when they seek a service from the Agency. Births, for instance, are reported if the family makes use of UNRWA maternity and child health services, or when the child reaches school age if admission is sought to an UNRWA school, or even later if neither of these services is needed. Deaths tend to remain under-reported. While families are encouraged to have a separate registration card for each nuclear family (parents and children), this is not obligatory. Family size information may therefore include a mix of nuclear and extended families, in some cases including as many as four generations.

**Non-registered 1948 refugees:** Approximately 1,028,130 Palestinian 1948 refugees are non-registered refugees. This is calculated based on the assumption that “UNRWA registered refugees represent approximately three-quarters of Palestinian refugees worldwide.” This assumption was applied to the calculation for the three regions: Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. As for the oPt, the results of the 2007 PCBS censuses revealed that non-registered 1948 refugees represent 1.43 percent of the total population in the oPt. As for the growth rate it was revised to 2.86 for 2007, 2.87 for 2008 and 2.88 for the years 2009-2011.<sup>56</sup>

**Alternative estimates:** Based on *The Palestinian Nakba 1948: the Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine*, London: The Palestinian Return Center, 1998; this source assumes that non registered refugees compose about 27.1% of the registered refugees. This leaves the figure at approximately 1,300,183 which is higher than the above proposed figure.

**Estimates of the 1948 Palestinian refugee population:** The total number of 1948 refugees is calculated by combining UNRWA-registered refugees and non-registered refugees as described above; it amounts to 5,825,853 at the end of 2011.

**Alternative estimates:** Based on *The Palestinian Nakba 1948: The Register of Depopulated Localities in Palestine*, London: The Palestinian Return Center, 1998; this source assumes an average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent for the Palestinian refugee population based on British demographic data from 1947. Accordingly, the total number of estimated 1948 refugees at the end of 1998 is 4,942,121. If an adjusted annual growth of 2.5 percent is applied from 1999 onwards – giving proper consideration to the decline of the fertility rate and the annual growth rate - the total number of 1948 refugees (registered and non-registered) amounts to 6,812,768 by the end of 2011.

**1967 Palestinian refugees:** Approximately 1,022,546 persons as 1967 refugees calculated at end of 2011. This was calculated by projection of 240,000 non-refugees who were displaced for the first time in 1967. It is based on a growth rate of 3.5 till 1999, 3.0% during 2000-2006, 2.86 for 2007, 2.87 for 2008 and 2.88 for the years 2009-2011. Figures are derived from *The Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 (EX-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967)*, UN Doc. A/6797, 15 September 1967.

This figure includes only persons who were externally displaced for the first time in 1967. It does not include internally displaced persons and 1948 refugees displaced for a second time in 1967. See also Takkenberg, Lex, *The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law*, Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1998, p. 17;



approximately 193,500 Palestinian refugees were displaced for a second time, while 240,000 non-refugees were displaced for the first time, bringing the total to over 430,000 persons displaced in 1967. The figure also excludes those refugees who returned under a limited repatriation program between August and September 1967. The figure does not account for Palestinians who were abroad at the time of the 1967 war and unable to return, refugees reunified with family inside the oPt, or those refugees who returned after 1994 under the agreements of the Oslo peace process.

**Palestinian IDPs in Israel since 1948:** According to Hillel Cohen, the author of a study on displaced Palestinians in Israel, and as stated by the National Committee for the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel: “[O]f the estimated 150,000 Palestinians who remained in Israel proper when the last armistice agreement was signed in 1949, some 46,000 were internally displaced, as per UNRWA’s 1950 registry record.”

Data was calculated on the basis of an estimated average annual growth rate of the Palestinian population inside Israel of 3.5 percent for the period 1949-1999, 3.0 percent for 2000-2008 and for the years 2009-2011 the growth rate estimated to 2.4.

**Palestinian IDPs in the oPt since 1967:** The estimate (159,447) includes:

1. At end of 2011, about 43,863 persons internally displaced from three destroyed Palestinian villages of Imwas, beit Noba, and Yallou in the oPt during the 1967 war (10,000 persons). This figure is adjusted on the basis of the average annual growth rate (3.5 percent until 2005, 3.0 percent for the year 2006, and 2.86 for 2007, 2.87 for 2008 and 3.0 for the years 2009-2011).
2. 64,343 persons displaced due to house demolitions. The estimates of demolished houses since 1967 is 24,130 including 6,000 directly after the 1967 war in the three villages of Imwas, beit Noba, and Yallou. A study conducted by OCHA and other agencies, stated that 57% of the inhabitants of demolished houses never returned to their homes. As such, the estimates of the displaced due to house demolitions amounts to 62,000.  $(24,130 - 6,000 = 18,130 * 57\% = 10,334 * 6 \text{ persons})$ . This figure includes displaced residents from the security zone south of Rafah in 2004-2005, the 2,000-4,000 demolished houses during the 2008-2009 war on Gaza and 2,343 people who were displaced between 2009 to 2011. These figures do not include the number of IDPs increased as a result of the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip in November 2012.
3. In previous installments of this survey, calculations were based on the assumption of the average number of Palestinians displaced by house demolition (1,037) each year between 1967 and 2008.<sup>56</sup> 1,037 house demolitions per year is not adjusted according to the average annual population growth as it is not known how many IDPs have been able to return to their homes. Internally displaced Palestinians over the last four years (including the effects of the war on Gaza) are about 68,000, which raises the average annual displacement by 5,000 more than the previous module.
4. 6,692 persons displaced as a result of harassment by Jewish settlers in the oPt: at least 1,014 Palestinian housing units in the centre of Hebron that have been vacated by their occupants in 2007, considering average household in Hebron city of 6.6 persons.<sup>58</sup>
5. Persons displaced as a result of revocation of residency rights in Jerusalem: the total number of ID cards confiscated since 1967 amounts to 14,233.<sup>59</sup> This number does not include the children (under the age of 16 years) of persons whose resident status was revoked (other sources estimate that 80,000 persons have been affected by the revocation of Jerusalem ID cards since 1967), and it does not account for ID cards that may have been reinstated due to the lack of information.
6. 30,316 persons who were displaced by the Wall. This number was calculated by adjusting the 2008 number of displaced persons (27,841) with a population growth of 2.88 percent for 2009-2011.<sup>60</sup>

*Note:* Estimates include 1948 Palestinian refugees who have subsequently undergone internal displacement in the oPt. No accurate data can indicate the percentage of 1967 IDP’s who were also refugees from 1948.

## Endnotes

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- 2 By the end of 2011, the registered Palestinian refugees constituted 45.6% of the total Palestinian population worldwide (11.2 million). *Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics*, "Press release on the 64<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Nakba," 2012, available at: [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_pcbs/PressRelease/nakba\\_64E.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/nakba_64E.pdf) (accessed 6 November 2012).
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- 8 *Report of the Secretary General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967)*, UN Doc. A/6797, 15 September 1967.
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- 11 *UNRWA, Syria Humanitarian Response. (issue 19)* available at: <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1529>, (accessed Nov. 27<sup>th</sup>, 2012).
- 12 The figure is derived from cited population estimates of the World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, "Part I, The Final Report and Appendices", in "Final Report" of the *UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (2001): p.1.
- 13 Abu Sitta, Salman, "From Refugees to Citizens at Home: The End of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," *The Palestinian Return Centre* (2001), p. 23.
- 14 A camp, according to UNRWA's working definition, is a plot of land placed at the disposal of the Agency by a host government for accommodating Palestinian refugees, and for setting up facilities to cater to their needs. The plots of land on which camps were originally set up either belong to the state, or, in most cases, are leased from local landowners by the host government. This means that the refugees in camps do not "own" the land on which their shelters stand, but have the right to "use" the land for a residence.
- 15 *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, (1 July 2004 – 30 June 2005) UN GAOR, Sixtieth Session, Supp. 13 A/60/13, 2005: para. 114, p. 27.
- 16 Ali Sha'aban, Hussein, "Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon from Hosting through Discrimination [Arabic]." *PASSIA*, 2002. See also: Ugland, Ole (ed.), "Difficult Past, Uncertain Future: Living Conditions Among Palestinian Refugees in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon," *FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science*, Oslo, 2003; and, Sari Hanafi and Åge A. Tiltnes, "The Employability of Palestinian Professionals in Lebanon: Constraints and Transgression," *Knowledge, Work and Society*, Vol. 5 (2008).
- 17 See chapter II, section 2.1.4.2 of this survey and *BADIL*, "Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009," December 2009. For examples of armed conflicts that have impacted Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries see: "Syria Humanitarian Response," *UNRWA*, last modified 2 November 2012, <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1488>
- 18 For a discussion of statelessness and protection gaps that impact the condition of Palestinian refugees and IDPs, see *BADIL*, "Chapter Three: Protection," in *Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009* (December 2009), p. 90.
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- 20 UNRWA available at: <http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html>.
- 21 39.7% of the Palestinian population in Israel is under the age of 15. See Table 2.1.3: Percentage Distribution of Palestinians in Israel by Age Groups and Sex (2007), "Statistical Abstract of Palestine 9", *Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics* (2008), 176. In the, 44.1% of the Palestinian population is under the age of 15. See Table 3.2.4: Projected Population in the Palestinian Territory in the End Year by Age Groups and Sex (2007), "Statistical Abstract of Palestine 9", *Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics* (2008), p. 251.
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- 27 It is worth noting that the economic characteristics of the Palestinian refugees in Syria may dramatically change due to the current situation.
- 28 Jacobsen, op.cit., pp.114–115. Also, see Opinion Poll, chapter three of this study.

- 29 Ahmad El Sheikh Muhammad, *Galilee Society*, "Socio-Economic Survey 2011."
- 30 *Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics*, "Press release on World Refugee Day 2008," (2008).
- 31 Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey, West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied Palestinian territory, FAO, WFP, UNRWA and PCBS. 2012., pp.16-18
- 32 *American University of Beirut*, "Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," (2010).
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- 36 The Gazan population has a much higher portion of refugees than in the West Bank. Three fourths of the Gazan population are refugees compared to one third of the West Bank population.
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- 38 "Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey," op.cit..
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- 40 These figures exclude kitchens, bathrooms, hallways and verandas. Non-camp figures for Lebanon and Syria only include refugee "gatherings" (defined as a community outside a camp with 25 or more households), in Jacobsen , p. 64.
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- 42 *The Galilee Society*, "Palestinians in Israel: Socio-Economic Survey 2007," (2008), pp. 111-132.
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- 46 "Syrian humanitarian response," UNRWA, updated 24 September 2012, available at: <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1437> (Accessed 25 September 2012).
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- 50 See *Annual Growth rate of registered Palestine refugees and female percentage, 1953–2000*: available at URL:< <http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html>>.
- 51 Original registration was carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Crescent Societies and (in the Gaza Strip) by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). During 1950–51, UNRWA carried out a census in all areas of operations, excluding the Gaza Strip, where it relied on AFSC records. UNRWA registration includes an individual registration number, a family registration number, and a family code that links the computerized demographic data in the family registration number sheet with the non-computerized data in the family files. The latter includes birth, marriage, and death certificates and a limited number of property deeds. For more information, see Tamari, Salim and Zureik, Elia, *Reinterpreting the Historical Record: The Uses of Palestinian Refugee Archives for Social Science Research and Policy Analysis*. Jerusalem: Institute for Jerusalem Studies, 2001.
- 52 *Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, 1 July 1951–30 June 1952. UN GAOR, 7<sup>th</sup> Sess., Supp. 13 (A/2171), 30 June, 1952, para. 8. Initial registration files for these internally displaced Palestinians include six boxes consisting of 11,304 family cards and 5,155 correction cards. Each card contains details such as names, age, sex, occupation, past addresses and the "distribution centre" to which the family was attached. UNRWA refers to these files as "dead" files. Tamari, Salim and Zureik, Elia (eds.). *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 45. UNRWA records show that about 45,800 persons receiving relief in Israel were the responsibility of UNRWA until June 1952. See <http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html>
- 53 UNGA Resolution 37/120 (I), 16 December, 1982. *Report of the Secretary-General*, 12 September 1983, UN Doc. A/38/382.
- 54 The children of refugee women and non-refugee fathers have remained ineligible for registration with UNRWA. This, although the Agency is aware of this discrimination and has promised since 2004 to revise this policy, "with a view to enabling descendants of female refugees married to non-refugees to register with UNRWA." UNRWA stated that the Agency "is of the opinion that the continued application of its registration rules is unfair and unfounded, as the status of refugees should not be based on such considerations, and discrimination between males married to non-refugees vs. females married to non-refugees is unjustified..." "The Agency estimates that this could potentially benefit approximately 340,000 persons, but expects that a significantly lower number will actually wish to register. Of those who will register, not all will be interested in availing themselves of the Agency's services. As a result, the quantitative impact of this modification in the registration rules on the Agency's operations is considered to be manageable." *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, 1 July 2003–30 June, 2004. UN GAOR, Sixtieth Session, Supp. 13 (A/59/13), 2005 para. 67, p. 19.
- 55 Israel last carried out a census of the IDP population in 1949, in order to plan for internal transfer of Palestinians who remained after the 1948 war. According to this census, which did not cover all areas, there were 7,005 IDPs from 56 villages of origin residing in 26 different Palestinian villages in the Galilee. Central Zionist Archive, A-206/246. Census documents are archived in the Yosef Weitz file, 296/246 and 206/246. Cited in Cohen, Hillel, *The Present Absentees: Palestinian Refugees in Israel Since 1948* [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute, 2000.
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- 58 B'Tselem/The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, *Report Ghost Town*, May 2007.
- 59 See PCBS, 2012: *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*, no.14, p. 204.
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Palestinian Bedouin village of Dkeika after a demolition by the Israeli military, South Hebron: 24.1.2011 (©Anne Paq/Activestills.org)





# PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

### *Preface*

*This chapter will deal with the issue of refugee protection and humanitarian assistance. Protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the human rights of refugees and IDPs, including the search for a durable solution to their plight. Durable solutions to refugee flows include repatriation, integration in a host-country, and resettlement in a third state. Of these three solutions, only repatriation is based on a recognised right under international law, namely the right to return. Durable solutions for the plight of IDPs are similar; yet since IDPs do not cross borders, these solutions are sought within their country. The key principle governing these solutions is that they involve voluntariness, that is, well-informed, free and individual choice by refugees and IDPs.*

*Additionally, refugees and IDPs have the right to assistance. Humanitarian assistance is an integral part of protection, and includes the provision of food, shelter, health and education services. In armed conflicts, the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to the needy civilian population rests with the parties of the conflict that are in effective control of the territory in which the population resides. International assistance is required when states are either unable or unwilling to act in accordance with their obligations to assist refugees and IDPs.*



Jerash refugee camp, Jordan: 2009 (Courtesy of Einkarem1948)

## 2.1 Protection

Under international law, states are the primary party obliged to provide protection for persons under their sovereignty or jurisdiction. States whose policies and practices constitute gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law that lead to the forcible displacement of such persons, by definition, violate their legal obligation to protect and must offer effective remedies and reparations.

The state of Israel that has caused - and continues to cause - massive forced displacement of Palestinians, is a state that has failed to meet its protection obligations. By refusing to permit the return of displaced Palestinians and provide housing and property restitution and compensation, the state of Israel also denies them durable solutions and reparations. Israel thereby violates three main bodies of international law: the law of nations as applicable to state succession, humanitarian law, and human rights law, including customary refugee law - each of which requires Israel to refrain from displacing Palestinians and to respect and protect the rights of Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return, housing and property restitution and compensation. Moreover, Israel has persistently ignored UN resolutions which affirm these rights, including UNGA Resolution 194 (1948) and UNSC Resolution 237 (1967).

International protection comes into play when states are unable or unwilling to provide effective protection. However in the case of Israel and the Palestinian people, states and the UN have lacked the political will to hold Israel accountable to its legal obligations and protect and promote the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the right to self-determination and the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their homes and properties. No UN agency, including UNRWA and UNHCR, considers itself as holding a mandate to promote rights-based durable solutions for all Palestinian refugees, and no single agency is currently mandated to protect Palestinian IDPs in Israel and the oPt.

The protection obligations of host states of Palestinian refugees are enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, most of Arab states, where the majority of Palestinian refugees reside, are not signatories to the Convention. Protection provided under Arab regional instruments is inconsistent and does not meet international standards, giving rise to secondary forcible displacement of Palestinian refugees in and from these states. In countries that are signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, most Palestinians are denied effective protection because national authorities and courts do not (properly) apply the Convention (Article 1D) to them.

Numerous UN mechanisms, organs and agencies, as well as international and local organisations and NGOs have been engaged in humanitarian assistance and protection of Palestinians, in particular in the oPt. Since 2008, an Inter-Agency Forced Displacement Working Group currently led by OCHA which was formed under the auspices of the Protection Cluster Working Group in the oPt, has undertaken to protect Palestinians from, during and after displacement, in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. These efforts, however, have so far resulted mainly in short term emergency aid, which is not complemented by effective intermediate and long-term responses. Limited and non-confrontational protection activities have neither resulted in durable solutions nor prevented new forced displacement of Palestinians.

### 2.1.1 Protection of Refugees and IDPs under International Law

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), protection encompasses:

“All activities, aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (*i.e.*, human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law).”<sup>1</sup>

By tracing the interpretation of international protection for refugees and IDPs in relevant jurisprudence, reports of the Executive Committee of UNHCR, best practices of states and non-mandated organisations (such as NGOs or agencies), it becomes clear that international protection encompasses three essential elements:

- Physical safety and security – protection against physical harm;
- Legal protection – ensuring and respecting fundamental human rights and freedoms including access to justice, legal status, ensuring security of properties/funds in home countries (the rights set in Refugee Convention of 1951 are the minimum), and finding a durable solution;
- Material security – ensuring the well-being of refugees, which is to guarantee their human dignity and equal access to basic goods and services.

States bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect their citizens. When governments are unwilling or unable to do so, individuals may suffer such serious violations of their rights that they are forced to leave their homes to seek safety in another place *within their own country* (internal displacement) or in *another country* (refugee situation). When the state's actions are the cause of forcible and arbitrary population displacement, the state is, by definition, not providing the protection required by international law. The state is rather committing an “internationally wrongful act” that triggers a legal obligation to make reparation.<sup>2</sup>

The international legal regime for the protection of refugees is enshrined in the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (“*Refugee Convention*”), its 1967 *Protocol*, and the 1950 *Statute of the Office of the UNHCR* (“*UNHCR Statute*”) governing the rights of refugees and state obligations towards them.<sup>3</sup>

IDPs who remain under the domestic jurisdiction of their country have many of the same protection rights and needs as refugees, but since they have not crossed an international border they do not fall within the scope of the *Refugee Convention* and its *Protocol*.<sup>4</sup> Unlike refugees, no single binding international instrument is exclusively devoted to the protection of IDPs, and identification as an IDP does not confer legal status under international law.

Whereas host countries are usually willing to accept international assistance when unable to assist refugees present in their territory with their own resources, states that cause forcible displacement are less likely to accept international intervention to protect displaced persons, in particular IDPs. According to principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, the UN is not allowed to interfere in a state's internal affairs without the state's consent, unless intervention is warranted under Chapter VII of the 1945 *Charter of the UN*.<sup>5</sup>

With the development of international human rights law, however, application of the principle of non-intervention has been relaxed where strict adherence would impede the protection of populations threatened by acts of their own government. Human rights law contemplates, therefore, that the “protection of the individual's human rights can no longer be considered as a domestic matter.”<sup>6</sup> In this context it has been argued that, “[a] massive violation of human rights as evidenced by the number of IDPs should always be interpreted as a threat to international peace and security [which justifies external intervention] even in the absence of transboundary effects such as refugee flows.”<sup>7</sup> Therefore, when the state is *unwilling* to protect displaced persons and denies international access to them, international intervention without the state's consent can be activated under Chapter VII of the 1945 *Charter of the UN* in order to “compensate for the resulting vacuum of responsibility.”<sup>8</sup>

### ***Durable Solutions***

A core component of international refugee protection is the search for durable solutions that allow the restoration of their human rights on a permanent basis. The three durable solutions promoted by UNHCR are repatriation, local integration in the host country or resettlement in a third country.<sup>9</sup> All durable solutions are driven by the pivotal principle of refugee choice.<sup>10</sup>

All durable solutions for refugees and IDPs include housing and property restitution, as well as compensation for damages and losses. According to UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 101, for example, “all returning refugees should have the right to have restored to them, or be compensated for, any housing, land or property of which they were deprived in an illegal, discriminatory or arbitrary manner before or during exile.”<sup>11</sup> The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* provides for the same rights in the case of internal displacement.<sup>12</sup>

### ***Full Reparation***

Under the *Law of State Responsibility*, states responsible for the commission of an internationally wrongful act must provide reparation. Successor governments remain bound by the responsibility incurred by predecessor governments. “Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”<sup>13</sup> Full reparation includes restitution, compensation and satisfaction, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition, as required by the circumstances.<sup>14</sup>

## **2.1.2 Israel’s Failure to Protect Palestinians**

### **2.1.2.1 Israel’s Legal Obligations**

The state of Israel has displaced and dispossessed the majority of the Palestinian population over a period of more than six decades. Therefore, Israel, by definition, is not providing Palestinians with the protection required by international law. Israel’s legal obligations apply in the entire territory over which it has sovereignty or exercises jurisdiction, that is, Israel and the oPt. In the oPt, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has protection responsibilities towards the Palestinian population but its ability to protect is constrained by the Israeli Occupying Power, which exercises effective control over both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>15</sup>

Under the Law on State Responsibility, Israel, as a new state, is also responsible for the conduct of Zionist militias during its establishment and is required to provide reparations for the consequences of wrongful acts committed by them.<sup>16</sup>

Based on the above, Israel must, *inter alia*, end all forced displacement of Palestinians. Israel must ensure that Palestinian refugees have access to durable solutions by facilitating voluntary repatriation “in safety and dignity without any fear of harassment, discrimination, arbitrary detention, physical threat or prosecution [...], and provide guarantees and/or amnesties to this effect.” Furthermore, Israel should assume responsibility for the elimination of the root causes of displacement and take all measures to ensure protection of returnees.<sup>17</sup> It also must provide full reparations to all Palestinian victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including forcibly displaced Palestinians.

### ***The Right to Return***

The right to return of all Palestinian refugees and IDPs is guaranteed in three main bodies of international law: the law of nationality as applied upon state succession; humanitarian law, and human rights law, including customary refugee law.<sup>18</sup>

**International Humanitarian Law (IHL)** - The 1907 *Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, and its annexed *Regulations*,<sup>19</sup> the *Charter of the International Military Tribunal*,<sup>20</sup> and the *Fourth Geneva Convention*<sup>21</sup> protect civilians during armed conflict and occupation. IHL explicitly prohibits (individual and mass) transfer and deportation outside of occupied territories, and





Palestinian refugees lost homes like the one above in 1948, Jerusalem, 2009 (©Tineke D'haese/Oxfam Belgium)

strictly limits the circumstances under which a civilian population may be temporarily transferred.<sup>22</sup> It also categorically requires that persons forced from their homes due to hostilities have the right to repatriate as soon as hostilities, or the reason for their displacement, have ceased.<sup>23</sup> The unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of protected persons is considered a “grave breach” under Article 147 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention* and a war crime under customary international law and the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, deportation and forcible transfer of a population constitutes a crime against humanity if it is knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.<sup>25</sup>

Israel is bound by customary international humanitarian law, including the *Hague Regulations*,<sup>26</sup> as well as the *Fourth Geneva Convention* to which it is a party. Under IHL, Israel also has an obligation to protect the Palestinian civilian population, so that people can remain in their homes and communities in the oPt. Israel must permit the return of all IDPs and displaced persons in/from the oPt as soon as hostilities have ceased in the vicinity of their communities.

**International Human Rights Law** - The right of return is a customary norm of international human rights law and is explicitly affirmed in many instruments, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*,<sup>27</sup> the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), and the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (CERD). Denial of return on discriminatory grounds, such as race, nationality or ethnic origin, is arbitrary and expressly prohibited under international human rights law.

Israel has ratified seven core international human rights conventions, including the ICCPR and CERD and is bound by them.<sup>28</sup> Israel has a legal obligation to respect, protect and promote the right of all displaced Palestinians (refugees and IDPs) to return to their respective place of habitual residence in Israel or the oPt, and to refrain from discriminatory policies and practices that result in more arbitrary forced displacement of Palestinians from their homes and homeland.<sup>29</sup>



## ***The Rights to Restitution and Compensation***

Under international law, all Palestinian refugees and IDPs have a right to housing and property restitution and compensation, based on legal protections of private property rights and the right to remedy for illegal governmental appropriation of private property.<sup>30</sup> Private property rights are protected and the right to compensation is regulated under several bodies of international law, including:

- Under the law of nations (relevant to state succession).
- International Humanitarian Law (specifically, the Hague Regulations)
- International Human Rights Law (specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

In light of the above, Israel has an obligation to halt unlawful destruction and appropriation of Palestinian property in the oPt, return unlawfully taken property to its Palestinian owners, including 1948 and 1967 refugees and IDPs, and provide an adequate and effective mechanism whereby Palestinian civilians in the oPt can submit claims for compensation for losses sustained as a result of Israel's IHL and IHRL violations. Israel is also obliged to refrain from discriminatory distribution or confiscation of Palestinian property in Israel and the oPt.

Israel's obligations are also confirmed by a range of UN Resolutions, dating back six decades. These affirm the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their homes of origin and repossess their homes and properties. The UNGA first affirmed the rights of all persons displaced in 1948 in its Resolution 194(III) of 11 December 1948,<sup>31</sup> which states:

“[T]hat the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”

### **2.1.2.2 Ongoing Forcible Displacement of Palestinians**

In practice, Israel has failed to respect and meet its obligations under international law, including UN resolutions, and continues forcible displacement of Palestinians.

It continues, for example, to block the return of 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees to their homes of origin by means of discriminatory legislation that violates international law. For instance, the 1950 *Law of Return* entitles all Jews, and Jews only, to enter “*Eretz Yisrael*” (Israel and the oPt) even if they have never been in Israel before. The 1952 *Citizenship Law* denationalized the 1948 Palestinian refugees and denied them their right to return on an arbitrary and discriminatory basis.<sup>32</sup>

Israel's failure to respect its obligations as a successor state results in the systematic and gross violation of the rights of return, property, restitution and compensation of the 1948 Palestinian refugees and of Palestinians who remained in the territory that became Israel in 1948, particularly IDPs. Legislative mechanisms such as the Absentee's Property Law and Land Administration Law allow Israel to ‘legally’ acquire and distribute land gained as a direct result of forcible displacement of Palestinians, whilst for more than 60 years, Israel has failed to provide reparations to the Palestinian refugees and IDPs, which by itself constitutes a blatant violation of international law.<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, “the current constitutional structure and legislation in Israel leaves little room, if any, for Palestinians to seek compensation for damage or loss incurred [...] during Israeli military operations...”<sup>34</sup> such as Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, 2008-2009. Nor does Israel consider itself to have any obligation to open criminal investigations for actions taken against Palestinians during such armed conflict. Such investigations are, therefore, the exception and not the rule. For instance, during Cast Lead, Israeli security forces killed in excess of 900 Palestinians who did not participate in hostilities, including 429 women and

children.<sup>35</sup> However, as of August 2012, only 1 Israeli soldier had been charged with manslaughter after his killing of an unarmed mother and daughter, and this solitary charge was subsequently downgraded to one of ‘illegal use of a weapon’.<sup>36</sup> The soldier in question pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 45 days imprisonment by an Israeli Military Court.

It is apparent that Israel has so far failed to establish accountability mechanisms for law-based, independent, transparent and accessible investigations of breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law and ignored related international calls and recommendations.<sup>37</sup> Israel’s forcible displacement and dispossession of Palestinians constitute grave breaches of the *Fourth Geneva Convention* and a war crime under customary international law and the *Rome Statute*.<sup>38</sup> The displacement and dispossession of Palestinians has been induced by unlawful policies and practices of the State of Israel over a period of six decades, with widespread impact affecting millions of Palestinians for the purpose of changing the demographic composition of the country. All this amounts to a crime against humanity because the forcible transfer of the Palestinian population (ethnic cleansing), is committed with Israel’s knowledge “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.”<sup>39</sup> These crimes are not historical, but ongoing and show no signs of abatement.

### 2.1.3 International Protection of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs

In light of Israel’s failure to protect and its policy of population transfer, the international community has an obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the right to self-determination and the right of Palestinian refugees and IDPs to return to their homes and properties.<sup>40</sup> The international community, through the United Nations, has largely failed to meet its obligations towards the Palestinian people for reasons primarily related to the lack of political will among powerful western states. Gaps in international protection have also resulted from the particular interpretation and application of international protection instruments and mechanisms to Palestinian refugees and IDPs.<sup>41</sup>

View of construction in the settlement of Gilo from Aida refugee camp, 2011 (©Mohammad al-Azza/BADIL)





### 2.1.3.1 International Protection Gaps

#### *The Case of Palestinian Refugees*

The *1951 Refugee Convention* and the *UNHCR Statute* single out Palestinian refugees for exceptional treatment. Article 1D of the *Refugee Convention* states:

“This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the UN other than the UNHCR protection or assistance.

When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the [UNGA], these persons shall *ipso facto* be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.”

According to paragraph 7 of the *UNHCR Statute*:

“The competence of the High Commissioner...shall not extend to a person: ...(c) Who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the UN protection or assistance.”

At the time the *Convention* and *Statute* were adopted, Palestinian refugees were already covered by a separate international protection and assistance regime embodied in the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) and UNRWA, which were established to work in parallel providing comprehensive protection (physical and legal protection including facilitating a durable solution) and humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees respectively.<sup>42</sup>

The UNCCP was established by UNGA Resolution 194(III) and mandated to provide essential protection and facilitate durable solutions for the 1948 Palestinian refugees (including IDPs), mainly through repatriation and compensation, and to facilitate a solution to all outstanding issues of the conflict. UNRWA, on the other hand, was established to provide assistance to the basic quotidian needs of Palestinian refugees, such as shelter, food and clothing in the Agency's five areas of operation: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>43</sup> While UNRWA's mandate was extended to encompass 1967 Palestinian refugees and

Beit Furik Israeli military checkpoint, 2009 (©Michael Loadenthal)



displaced persons,<sup>44</sup> UNCCP's protection mandate was never expanded to include any category apart from Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1948 war.

UNCCP failed to achieve progress towards a peace agreement between Israel and Arab states and repatriation of the 1948 Palestinian refugees. By the mid-1950s, UNCCP had ceased to provide Palestinian refugees with the basic international protection afforded to all other refugees. The Commission reached the conclusion that it was unable to fulfill its mandate due to the lack of international political will to facilitate solutions for Palestinian refugees consistent with UNGA Resolution 194(III) and international law.<sup>45</sup> Although it was never officially abolished, it ceased to make a substantial contribution towards the implementation of its protection mandate in the early 1950s.<sup>46</sup> Under the specific terms of its assistance mandate, UNRWA was not equipped to take over the protection role of the UNCCP,<sup>47</sup> and no replacement mechanism was established to fill the subsequent protection gap for 1948 Palestinian refugees.

At present, UNRWA and UNHCR cooperate by dividing their roles along geographic lines.<sup>48</sup> The current division of tasks is based on UNHCR's 2002 interpretation of Article 1D of the *Refugee Convention* as meaning that 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees who reside in UNRWA's area of operation are excluded from the benefits of the *Refugee Convention* and the mandate of UNHCR because "protection or assistance" is provided for them by UNRWA which has the primary mandate for this refugee population. Once such a refugee leaves or is outside UNRWA's area of operation, s/he automatically falls under the *Refugee Convention* and within the competence of UNHCR.<sup>49</sup> The above interpretation ignores that "protection has ceased" for Palestinian refugees because UNCCP failed to fulfil its protection mandate in the 1950s, and that:

"Article 1D's function was to ensure that if for some reason either of these agencies failed to exercise its role before a final resolution of the refugee situation, that agency's function was to be transferred to the UNHCR and the *Refugee Convention* would fully and immediately apply without preconditions to the Palestinian refugees. That is what 'protection or assistance' and the *ipso facto* language of Article 1D requires [whether or not they individually qualify as refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution.]"<sup>50</sup>

As for Palestinians who are neither 1948 nor 1967 refugees, but who are outside Israel or the oPt and unable or unwilling to return there due to a well-founded fear of persecution, it is UNHCR's position that such persons are within its competence and may qualify for refugee status and the benefits of the *Refugee Convention* based on refugee status determination under Article 1A(2).<sup>51</sup>

The lack of UNCCP protection, the limited protection of UNHCR afforded to Palestinian refugees outside UNRWA's area of operation, and the lack of a fully-fledged and explicit protection mandate for UNRWA, has resulted in a severe international "protection gap" for Palestinian refugees. No international agency is currently recognised as having a mandate to intervene on behalf of Palestinian refugees to represent their interests in an international forum, or to protect their human rights against infringement by states, or to facilitate and promote rights-based durable solutions to their refugee situation. Palestinian refugees are rendered without the protection mechanisms or guarantees which are accorded to all other refugees worldwide.<sup>52</sup>

### ***The Case of Palestinian IDPs***

1948 Palestinian IDPs were initially included in the respective protection and assistance operations of UNCCP and UNRWA. In 1952, however, Israel indicated that it would take on responsibility towards the displaced Palestinians in its territory. In response, UNRWA transferred its IDP files to the Israeli government and ceased its services for them.<sup>53</sup> Although no durable solution has been found to their plight, 1948 Palestinian IDPs in Israel are no longer a matter of international attention and policy, and no longer considered of concern to international humanitarian assistance or protection efforts.

No UN agency is primarily responsible for offering protection to Palestinian IDPs in the oPt since 1967. Most international agencies operating in the oPt either lack a protection mandate, or undertake limited and non-confrontational protection activities.<sup>54</sup> The first-line response to displacement in the oPt is provided by ICRC and UNRWA in the form of emergency assistance, which is not complemented by adequate intermediate and long-term assistance responses. No focused interventions are implemented to prevent forced displacement. Moreover, the current responses do not include a search for durable solutions as set forth in the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*.<sup>55</sup> In an effort to address these weaknesses, and as a result of collective efforts of local and international organisations, an Inter-Agency Displacement Working Group (DWG) currently led by OCHA, was formed in early 2008.

### 2.1.3.2 Protection Obligations of Host Countries and Countries of Asylum

Recognition of refugee status under the 1951 *Refugee Convention* triggers significant state obligations towards the person, such as the provision of residency rights, freedom of movement, the right to work, access to humanitarian assistance, housing, property ownership and education, as well as the right to identity papers, travel documents and social security. The *Refugee Convention* requires as a minimum standard that these rights be guaranteed at least at the same level as for other foreigners, while some rights such as the right to freedom of religion, right to rationing, and right to public elementary education (respectively articles 4, 20 and 22) be guaranteed at the same level as for nationals.<sup>56</sup>

#### *Protection in Arab Host States*

Most Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa where the majority of Palestinian refugees reside are not party to the 1951 *Refugee Convention*<sup>57</sup> and its 1967 *Protocol*, or either of the two conventions on statelessness.<sup>58</sup> Arab host states are nonetheless obliged to protect Palestinian refugees in accordance with the international standards set by the human rights conventions they are party to, and under customary international law. Arab host states largely fail to meet this obligation. The level of protection provided to Palestinian refugees under Arab regional and national instruments and mechanisms is significantly less than that provided to refugees internationally and regionally.<sup>59</sup>

In 1965 the League of Arab States (LAS)<sup>60</sup> formulated the *Protocol on Treatment of Palestinians (Casablanca Protocol)*, which is the primary LAS instrument governing the status and treatment of Palestinian refugees in Arab States. Under the *Casablanca Protocol* Palestinians have the right to employment on par with citizens of the host country,<sup>61</sup> the right to leave and enter host states,<sup>62</sup> freedom of movement,<sup>63</sup> the right to a travel document,<sup>64</sup> and the right to the same treatment as LAS citizens with regard to visas and residency applications.<sup>65</sup> However, the *Casablanca Protocol* is not binding and not all LAS member states are signatories. Although the majority of member states ratified the *Protocol*, Kuwait, Libya and Lebanon endorsed it with reservations<sup>66</sup> contradicting its provisions and purposes. Accordingly, the *Protocol's* implementation varied from state to state and LAS adopted *Resolution 5093* in 1991 authorizing states to treat Palestinian refugees in accordance with domestic norms and regulations.<sup>67</sup>

#### *Protection in State Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention*

The majority of Palestinians residing outside the Arab region in Europe, the Americas and elsewhere were unable to obtain effective protection in, or suffered renewed forced displacement from, Arab host countries and from Israeli occupying forces.

Most states in Europe and the Americas, with the exception of the United States,<sup>68</sup> are party to the 1951 *Refugee Convention* and the 1967 *Protocol*, and some states are also signatories of the 1954 *Convention on Stateless Persons* and/or the 1961 *Convention on Statelessness*, but most of them fail to accord Palestinian refugees the protection they are entitled to under these international instruments.



### 2.1.3.3 Protection through International Organs, Agencies and Organisations

#### *UN Human Rights Bodies*

**The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP):** UNCCP was established under UNGA Resolution 194(III) in 1948 to take over the work of the UN Mediator on Palestine,<sup>69</sup> provide international protection to all persons displaced during the 1948 war, and “facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees.” Thus, the UNCCP mandate included protecting the rights of Palestinian refugees, among them the right of return, property restitution and compensation.<sup>70</sup> In addition, UNCCP was mandated “to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.” The UNCCP, among other things, called upon Israel to abrogate discriminatory legislation, and requested that Israel suspend all measures of requisition and occupation of Palestinian Arab homes. These requests were ignored. By the mid-1950s, UNCCP ceased to provide protection and actively search for a durable solution. Today, the Commission is no longer active. Every year, the UNCCP publishes a one-page annual report stating “it has nothing new to report.”

**The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):** UNHCR recognizes 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees outside UNRWA’s area of operation as *prima facie* Convention refugees under Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, it does not consider 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees who reside in the area of UNRWA operations as falling within its mandate. It recognizes the protection gap faced by 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees in the area of UNRWA operation, and has issued several calls to remedy the problem. On the other hand, it does not recognize Palestinian IDPs as a population of concern and does not take a role in protecting them.

**The UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (UNCEIRPP):** The UNCEIRPP was established in 1975 by the UN General Assembly, the Committee was tasked with making recommendations to the General Assembly and creating a program of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its rights. These rights were defined as: the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination without external interference; the right to national independence and sovereignty; and the right of Palestinians to return to their homes and property, from which they had been displaced and uprooted. Among its achievements were winning recognition of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, and preparatory work on the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held in Geneva in 1983. However, following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the Committee has failed to take a proactive stance on trying to secure Palestinian rights, and essentially shadowed the Palestinian Authority’s positions in its negotiations with Israel, including most recently, support for the continued diplomatic efforts of the Quartet, the Road Map, the Peace Initiative of Arab States, and the Annapolis Conference.

#### *UN Human Rights Mechanisms*


**The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories:** The Special Committee is an inter-governmental organ established in 1968 to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, namely the oPt and the Syrian Golan Heights.<sup>71</sup> The Special Committee reports to the General Assembly. Committee members gather testimonies of victims and experts in the region, but have been denied entry into the oPt by Israel. In its last report from 2012, the Special Committee has voiced grave concern over “...the continuing detrimental impact of ongoing unlawful Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [...] including the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying

forces against Palestinian civilians, resulting in the death and injury of civilians, [and] the widespread destruction of property and vital infrastructure”.<sup>72</sup> In addition, it has also urged the UN Security Council to consider “sanctions against Israel if it persists in paying no attention to its international legal obligations”.<sup>73</sup>

**The UN Human Rights Council (HRC):** The HRC is an inter-governmental body which was established in 2006 to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights. The mandate of the HRC is to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, including addressing situations of human rights violations and making appropriate recommendations.<sup>74</sup> The human rights of all displaced Palestinians fall under the HRC’s mandate. The HRC regularly discusses human rights violations in the oPt under Agenda Item 7 of its regular sessions. In addition, the Council holds special sessions when needed to address urgent matters. Since 2006, the Council has held 5 special sessions on Israel’s military operations in the oPt; more than any other geographical area of conflict.<sup>75</sup> In 2009, – in light of “Operation Cast Lead” against the occupied Gaza Strip – the HRC called both for Israel to end its occupation of all Palestinian lands since 1967<sup>76</sup> and also for immediate international protection to be provided to the Palestinian people in the oPt in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law<sup>77</sup>

**Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR):** In 1996, a stand-alone office was established in the oPt (OHCHR), with the mandate to strengthen the relationship and interaction between UN human rights mechanisms, the PA, and Palestinian civil society. In 2009, following Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip (“Operation Cast Lead”), the HRC explicitly requested OHCHR to also monitor and report on the violations of human rights of the Palestinian people by the Israeli Occupying Power.<sup>78</sup> This is a role performed by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights on Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. The current Special Rapporteur, Richard Falk, has recommended lifting the siege of Gaza,<sup>79</sup> conducting a study by the HRC into the adequacy of international law in dealing with a prolonged occupation,<sup>80</sup> as well as supporting a boycott of businesses profiting from West Bank settlements until their operations are in line with international human rights and humanitarian law.<sup>81</sup>

Richard Falk presented a speech on “The Economic, Legal and Moral Cost of War: A Forum on Israel, Palestine and the United States,” in Seattle, June 2012 (©Aditya.G.)



**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the oPt (OCHA):** OCHA was established in late 2000 in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the oPt caused by Israel’s military operations and closures. OCHA- aims to improve humanitarian aid and assistance by enhancing coordination between agencies to ensure effective distribution of humanitarian assistance, monitoring, documentation and reporting.

**The Inter-Agency Displacement Working Group in the oPt (DWG):** The DWG was formed in early 2008 as a result of collective efforts of local and international organisations, in order to raise awareness of the phenomenon of internal displacement in the oPt and develop a protection response in accordance with international standards, in particular the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. The DWG is currently led by OCHA and its “longer-term initiatives include

documenting and monitoring the situation with a view to improving advocacy efforts to mitigate and stop forced displacement, address vulnerabilities during a displacement event, and search for a durable solution.”<sup>82</sup>

### ***International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)***

The ICRC has a mandate to operate in armed conflict and is responsible for the promotion and respect of humanitarian law. The *Geneva Conventions* task the ICRC with visiting prisoners, organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families and similar humanitarian activities. As a neutral intermediary, the ICRC provides protection and assistance to all victims of armed conflict, including IDPs who are “first and foremost civilians, and as such protected by international humanitarian law.”<sup>83</sup> In general, the ICRC provides protection and assistance to displaced persons consistent with its mandate and capacities, and to the extent the relevant authorities or the security conditions allow.<sup>84</sup> The ICRC has publicly expressed concern regarding “the destruction or expropriation of Palestinian property and land and the forced displacement and isolation of Palestinian communities” as a result of the construction of the Wall and its regime.<sup>85</sup> In general, however, while seeking to protect those who are uprooted and to promote their return wherever appropriate, the ICRC favours a “confidential dialogue” with the parties to the conflict.<sup>86</sup> Along this vein, the ICRC carries out a range of activities to promote better protection of the civilian population in the oPt including: activities related to family reunification; detention and deportation; expropriation of land; and home demolition.

The ICRC assisted 86 year-old Aysheh Khamis Abu Sifan with her return to Gaza from Jordan where she was reunited with family, 2012 (©ICRC)





## Accountability Mechanisms

**The International Court of Justice:** Of major importance for displaced Palestinians is the fact that the International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory Opinion ruled that it was incumbent upon Israel to make reparation for all damage caused by its unlawful acts: “Israel is [...] under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the Wall in the [oPt].”<sup>87</sup> The Court also underscored Israel’s “obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the Wall’s construction.”<sup>88</sup> The Court recommended to the United Nations to “consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the Wall and the associated regime.”<sup>89</sup> The ICJ also affirmed the responsibility of the international community and states “not to recognise the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.”

**UN Register of Damage caused by the Construction of the Wall:** On 20 July, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon Israel and all UN member states to comply with the ICJ Advisory Opinion. The Resolution also instructed the UN Secretary General to establish a register of damages caused to all natural or legal persons concerned.<sup>90</sup> In practice, by 10 June 2011, the Board of the United Nations Register of Damage, documented a total of 18,007 claims which were collected from 76 Palestinian communities.<sup>91</sup> Although the Board reported that it has not experienced any difficulties in carrying out its technical work, it stated that “[t]he Government of Israel maintains its well known position of not cooperating with the Office of the Register and considering that any claims in relation to damage caused by the construction of the wall should be addressed through the existing Israeli mechanism.”<sup>92</sup> The Register, which has remained the only measure endorsed by the UN towards the implementation of the ICJ Opinion, has received little political support and financial resources.<sup>93</sup>

**International Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court:** The UN Security Council can establish an *ad hoc* international tribunal to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Israel and the oPt, as it did in the 1990s regarding the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Whether such an initiative would also be within the authority of the UN General Assembly is unresolved.<sup>94</sup> Israel is not a party to the *Rome Statute* and thus the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not have jurisdiction in its territory. In April 2012 the ICC prosecutor turned down an application from the Palestinian Authority for the war crimes tribunal to look into Israeli actions during 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza on the basis that Palestine was not considered a state by the relevant UN bodies or the ICC.<sup>95</sup> Alternatively, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can refer a situation to the ICC, as it has done in the case of Sudan. Yet, all such moves would likely be vetoed in the Security Council by the U.S.

**Universal Jurisdiction:** States signatories of the *Geneva Conventions* have an obligation to prosecute in their territory persons committing any of the “grave breaches” regardless of his or her nationality and should make appropriate domestic legislation for this purpose. Similar provisions for universal jurisdiction are included in other international treaties, such as CAT and the *International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid*.<sup>96</sup> Where appropriate domestic law is in place, courts can exercise jurisdiction over gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law, regardless of where they were committed, and often without the state having a connection to the perpetrator or the victim. Since 2002, numerous lawsuits have been brought against Israeli officials and military, as well as against foreign companies accused of aiding and abetting international crimes, in numerous countries, including Belgium, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Spain, and the U.K. So far, none of these cases has been granted a substantial hearing, because – due to political pressure and bias – courts have dismissed them at an early stage on procedural grounds.<sup>97</sup> In September 2011, the UK government passed legislation which made it more difficult to bring a case against individuals under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.<sup>98</sup> This was in direct response to US and Israeli fears that Israeli politicians would be the subject of such lawsuits.<sup>99</sup>

## 2.2 Humanitarian Assistance

Although Israel is the primary party obliged to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population in Israel and the oPt, under the Fourth Geneva Convention, its policies have been the primary cause of the population's acute vulnerability. Israel has employed limited assistance to Palestinian IDPs within its state borders as a political tool aimed at silencing claims for reparations, including return and housing and property restitution. In the oPt, Israel has deliberately obstructed the work of humanitarian personnel in the oPt, and used crippling blockades and repeated military assaults to devastate Palestinian communities, including refugees and IDPs. These measures aim to exert humanitarian pressure upon Palestinians to renounce their legitimate human rights, including the right to return, self-determination and the right to political representation.

While humanitarian assistance has mitigated the effects of the conflict on Palestinian refugees and IDPs, it can only be a temporary measure aimed at alleviating suffering and cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive political solution. In reality however, the contemporary regime of humanitarian assistance that has developed for Palestinian refugees and IDPs, has come to replace effective efforts to find durable solutions for the plight of these vulnerable groups as envisaged under international law and UN resolutions. The absence of an international agency with an explicit mandate to provide assistance to, and durable solutions for, Palestinian IDPs in Israel and the oPt helps facilitate Israel's ongoing policy of forced population transfer.

### 2.2.1 UNRWA

UNGA Resolution 302(V), 8 December 1949, established UNRWA with the purpose: “(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works program as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; (b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available.”<sup>100</sup> Since then, UNRWA has been the main provider of international assistance to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.<sup>101</sup> Its work can be divided into five main categories:

#### ***Education***

The Agency has four main educational programs: school development; technical and vocational education and training; teacher training; and education planning and management. UNRWA is the main provider of elementary and preparatory education to Palestinian refugees in the oPt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, followed by public schools. UNRWA provides only elementary and preparatory level education, except in Lebanon where it also provides limited secondary education. As of September 2012, UNRWA ran 699 schools and ten vocational training centers attended by approximately half a million refugee children and youth. UNRWA employed 19,217 education staff, the majority of whom are Palestinian refugees.

#### ***Health Care***

UNRWA has been the main primary health care provider for Palestinian refugees for the past six decades. The Agency safeguards and promotes the health status of the refugees within available means and in a manner consistent with the principles of the UN, the basic concepts and strategic approaches of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the *Health Millennium Development Goals* and the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. However, as a result of chronic under-funding, the Agency faces an immense challenge to maintain improvements in the health profile of Palestinian refugees and raise the quality of service delivery to meet international standards.<sup>102</sup>



UNRWA health services are divided into four main categories: medical care services; environmental health in refugee camps; nutrition and supplementary feeding; and program management. Medical care services are divided into primary, secondary and tertiary care. Primary medical care is provided directly and at no cost to refugees registered with UNRWA. This includes a comprehensive maternal and child program, family planning, treatment of common diseases, and dental care. UNRWA also provides specialist care, including physiotherapy, radiology, cardiology and ophthalmology.

Additionally, in 2010 under its health mandate, the UNRWA West Bank field office has created a pilot referral system in originally four refugee camps to deal with cases of domestic violence. It is based on the Family Protection Unit program. This unit addresses protection issues of vulnerable groups such as children, women, elderly and the disabled. Ideally, the system would work as a two-fold referral system. One referral would be initiated by the victim in the form of self-reporting and the other would be initiated when an UNRWA staff member or service provider identifies a case. However, the development of a comprehensive protection system was long overdue after UNRWA's more than 60 years of providing services to Palestinian refugees and it is too early in the project to judge whether it has improved the situation of refugees in the West Bank camps.<sup>103</sup>

### ***Relief and Social Services***

Humanitarian relief has historically constituted the core of UNRWA's activities. The goal of UNRWA's relief and social services program is to provide aid to the most vulnerable and neediest refugees. Beneficiaries include the elderly, female-headed households, sick and disabled persons.<sup>104</sup> Services provided by the relief and social services program include: food support;<sup>105</sup> shelter rehabilitation and cash assistance to families living in conditions of special hardship; community-based social services; access to subsidized credit and the maintenance; and the updating and preservation of records and documents of the registered refugee population.

In the Gaza Strip, essential medical supplies, including chemotherapy and haemophilia drugs, are frequently unavailable, 2012 (©ICRC)



## ***Economic Development***

In 1991, UNRWA launched a micro-finance and micro-enterprise program in the oPt in response to rapidly deteriorating economic conditions marked by high unemployment and spreading poverty in the wake of the first *Intifada* and the first Gulf War. The program was expanded to Jordan and Syria in 2003, and in 2005 a new housing micro-finance project was introduced in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA's microfinance department aims to promote economic development and to alleviate poverty among Palestinian refugees. During 2010, the department issued 33,593 enterprise, consumer and housing loans to clients in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan and Syria. These loans carried a total value of USD 42.29 million, taking overall investment of this nature to USD 256.86 million since 1991.<sup>106</sup>

UNRWA also seeks to promote economic recovery in the face of low and decreasing oPt labour force participation rates.<sup>107</sup> In the period from April – December 2011, UNRWA's temporary job creation program generated in excess of 55,000 job opportunities for Palestinian refugees.<sup>108</sup> Unemployed persons benefit from temporary employment inside and outside UNRWA in a range of skilled, unskilled and professional positions.

Regarding the possibilities of economic development in the oPt, the World Bank noted that “*currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians in the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between [Israel] and the PA.*”<sup>109</sup> In 2007, the World Bank noted that “*economic recovery and sustainable growth will require a fundamental reassessment of closure practices, a restoration of the presumption of movement, and review of Israeli control of the population registry and other means of dictating the residency of Palestinians within the [West Bank and Gaza Strip].*...”<sup>110</sup> Irrespective of the above, the World Bank reported that in 2008 economic, and movement, restrictions have increased,<sup>111</sup> and in July 2012 acknowledged that Israeli restrictions remain the ‘biggest impediment’ to Palestinians obtaining sufficient foreign investment upon which to build a stable economy.<sup>112</sup>

## ***Emergency Assistance***

UNRWA operates in a region profoundly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its consequences in terms of violence and a worsening socio-economic situation. Emergency conditions, especially in the oPt, “impose heavy operational and financial burdens on the Agency, threatening the sustainability and quality of UNRWA services and necessitating emergency appeals” to complement the fundraising activities for the regular budget.<sup>113</sup> Throughout six decades of operation, UNRWA provided emergency humanitarian assistance during political and humanitarian crises in its five areas of operation.

Since the second *Intifada* in 2000, UNRWA has administrated an extensive program of emergency assistance for refugees affected by armed conflict, closures and the deteriorating economic situation in the oPt and Lebanon. Interventions seek to: (1) provide social safety net assistance to alleviate the impact of increasing poverty and unemployment through targeted programs of food aid, temporary job creation and cash assistance; (2) guarantee access to essential public services; (3) protect the rights of refugees while using strategies that focus on the immediate and long-term impacts of the conflict.<sup>114</sup> However, in 2006, UNRWA, and other UN agencies, had to shift their operations from offering intermediate and long-term development to providing immediate emergency relief as a result of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the oPt.<sup>115</sup> This focus on immediate relief was again evident in Gaza in the aftermath of the Israeli military attack “Operation Cast Lead,” whilst in May 2011, UNRWA and the General Assembly once more drew attention to the “*deterioration of the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in the region and their significant negative impact on the provision of necessary Agency services to the Palestine refugees.*”<sup>116</sup>

Emergency scenarios overstretch the resources of organisations tasked with providing assistance to Palestinian refugees, and in response to such situations UNRWA has launched Emergency Appeals to the

donor community. However, the sum of donations pledged often fall short of the amount requested. For example, UNRWA received only 40 percent of the amount it sought in its 2011 Emergency Appeal<sup>117</sup> and has warned that insufficient responses from the donor community to such appeals prevent the agency from adequately addressing the humanitarian needs of refugees. This, in turn, results in further escalation of the emergency situation within the oPt.<sup>118</sup>

### 2.2.2 Israel's Failure to Assist

In 1952, Israel announced that it would assume responsibility for the 1948 displaced Palestinians in its territory. UNRWA subsequently ceased its services for this group of Palestinian IDPs thereby halting international humanitarian assistance for them.

In the period of Israel's military rule over its Palestinian population (1948 –1966), the Israeli Refugee Rehabilitation Authority (RRA) operated primarily in official and semi-official “shelter villages” to which the IDPs had fled. The RRA conditioned the provision of services to them upon the IDPs' relinquishment of their claims to property and lands in their villages of origin. The number of IDPs handled by the RRA was, however, small. It resettled 204 families (1,020 persons) in Israel, and transferred 1,489 persons outside the state's borders.<sup>119</sup>

In general, Palestinian IDPs have access to public services on par with other Palestinian citizens of Israel, who, as a group, experience institutionalised oPt discrimination and a lower level of services compared to Jewish citizens. Israel's policy of denying Palestinians, living in “unrecognised” villages, access to public services has induced ongoing forced displacement. This has been particularly stark in the Naqab which Israel has targeted for Jewish settlement expansion. Palestinian victims of subsequent, including contemporary, forced internal displacement do not receive humanitarian assistance from national authorities or international humanitarian organisations.

In Gaza City, a Palestinian girl stands on the remains of damaged houses:  
November 2012 (©ICRC)





### 2.2.3 Palestinian Refugees and IDPs in the oPt

Israel as the Occupying Power exercises *territorial jurisdiction* over the oPt. Under international humanitarian law, “the occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population. It should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”<sup>120</sup> Provision of assistance also means that if Israel’s supplies are inadequate, it must agree to relief provided by outside sources and is obliged to allow the free passage of objects necessary to the survival of the civilian population.<sup>121</sup>

In practice, between 1967 and 1994, Israel’s military government in the oPt maintained rudimentary public services for the occupied Palestinian population, through its “civilian arm”, the so-called “Civil Administration”. As a result of the interim agreements of the Oslo peace process since 1994, Israel transferred administration of civil affairs to the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA) in the oPt, thereby relieving Israel of the financial burden of providing public services and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population under occupation. Since then, Israel has on many occasions prevented or delayed the delivery of humanitarian assistance provided by the PA, PLO and international organisations. In effect, Israel deliberately obstructs the work of humanitarian personnel in the oPt, leaving the Palestinian victims, including refugees and IDPs, without basic medical attention, food, and other services in violation of both international human rights and humanitarian law. Since 2006 and still ongoing in 2012, Israel has implemented an ever-tightening blockade of the occupied Gaza Strip, where three-fourths of the population are Palestinian refugees from 1948. Moreover, Israel has been imposing arbitrary tax charges on humanitarian relief supplies that UNRWA provides to Refugees in the oPt.<sup>122</sup>

### 2.2.4 Humanitarian Assistance by Arab Host States

The nature and scope of assistance provided to Palestinian refugees in Arab host states has undergone changes over time and varies considerably between countries. In 1950, the League of Arab States (LAS) agreed to co-operate with UNRWA in the discharge of its responsibilities, “provided that every state

Nahr el-Bared refugee camp bombed by the Lebanese army, Lebanon: 2007 (Curtesy of nahralbared.com)



should declare its reservations to the said Agency in respect of the final settlement of the Palestinian problem and the right of refugees to return to their homes and to be compensated for their funds and properties.”<sup>123</sup> LAS emphasizes the importance of continued support for UNRWA as a sign of international responsibility for the Palestinian refugee case, until the refugee issue is resolved on the basis of UN Resolution 194(III).

Most Arab host states have established special bodies linked to the Ministry of Interior and/or the Ministry of Social Affairs to administer the humanitarian affairs of resident Palestinian refugees and co-ordinate delivery of international assistance with UNRWA. The only exceptions are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, where Palestinian refugees are a population of concern to UNHCR.

Arab host states generally provide Palestinian refugees with access to health care and education, as well as basic infrastructure for the camps. Some Arab states carry a significant financial burden in assisting Palestinian refugees in their territory, and contribute to humanitarian assistance in the oPt via transfers of grants and donations to Palestinian charities, national institutions, and the PA.

## 2.2.5 International Humanitarian Assistance for Displaced Palestinians

Since 1948, the United Nations has upheld the need for assistance of Palestinian refugees. In 2011, for example, the UN General Assembly, noted;

*“...with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not yet been effected, and that, therefore, the situation of the Palestine refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern and the Palestine refugees continue to require assistance to meet basic health, education and living needs.”*<sup>124</sup>

Furthermore in 2011, the UN General Assembly once again urged international donors, agencies and organisations and non-governmental organisations to extend to the Palestinian people, as rapidly as possible, emergency economic assistance and humanitarian assistance to counter the dire humanitarian situation in the oPt.<sup>125</sup>

## 2.2.6 International Humanitarian Organisations

Following the decision by private voluntary organisations to terminate relief operations in Palestine, the UN General Assembly established UNRWA 1949, to provide international assistance to all persons displaced during the 1948 war in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (UNRWA’s areas of operation). The General Assembly later expanded the Agency’s mandate to include humanitarian assistance on an emergency basis to Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 war and subsequent hostilities.

Palestinian refugees outside UNRWA’s area are eligible for assistance from UNHCR in line with the current interpretation of the 1951 *Refugee Convention* and division of roles between UNRWA and UNHCR.<sup>126</sup> Humanitarian assistance provided by UNHCR to these Palestinian refugees, however, has remained limited.

Currently, there is no international agency with an explicit mandate to provide assistance to Palestinian IDPs in Israel and the oPt. No international agency has provided assistance to IDPs in Israel since UNRWA ceased to operate there in 1952. Elsewhere, Palestinian refugees and IDPs receive international humanitarian assistance on an emergency basis.

In the oPt, the humanitarian crisis was aggravated by the international embargo imposed on the PA in the wake of the January 2006 election. Since the 2007 split of the PA, and given the international community’s



continuing censure of the Hamas government within Gaza, most international donor assistance has been channelled to the PA in the occupied West Bank whose medium term plan gives preference to economic development in urban population centres rather than to general humanitarian assistance. The ability of local authorities and the international community to deliver basic public services and humanitarian assistance has particularly decreased in the occupied Gaza Strip,<sup>127</sup> where the collapse of the local economy and Israel's blockade and military operations have had a disproportionate and devastating effect on vulnerable groups such as refugees and IDPs.<sup>128</sup>

First line response to forced displacement in the oPt is provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNRWA (for displaced refugees) in the form of emergency assistance. Delivery of intermediate and long-term assistance to forcible displacement has remained inadequate.<sup>129</sup> In addition to UNRWA, a number of humanitarian organisations contribute relief and services to the Palestinians, among them:

### ***UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)***

UNHCR is mandated with assisting those refugees who do not fall within the mandate of other UN bodies. Therefore, in relation to Palestinian refugees, UNHCR will only afford assistance to those who do not fall within UNRWA's area of geographic responsibility. As of January 2012, the total Palestinian population of concern registered with UNHCR stood at 95,785 individuals.<sup>130</sup>

The first Gulf war (1990-91) dramatically intensified Palestinian refugees' need for international protection and assistance. UNHCR played an extensive role in extending both material assistance and international protection to the displaced as a result of the conflict, including large numbers of Palestinians.<sup>131</sup> UNHCR's work during the conflict focused both within Iraq (particularly Baghdad and Mosul) as well as the Syrian/Iraqi border.

### ***UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)***

OCHA is the UN body charged with strengthening the coordination of humanitarian assistance to complex emergencies.<sup>132</sup> The OCHA office was established following the second *Intifada* in 2000 in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the oPt caused by Israel's military incursions and closures.

Palestinian refugees fleeing Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, Lebanon: 2007  
(©ICRC)



OCHA aims to improve the humanitarian situation by enhancing coordination between agencies to ensure effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.<sup>133</sup>

### ***International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)***

The ICRC plays an important humanitarian role within the oPt, with its water and sanitation projects benefiting roughly 775,000 Palestinians in 2011, whilst its livelihood-related projects assisted in excess of 59,400 individuals.<sup>134</sup> The ICRC also regularly intervenes with the Israeli authorities to remind them of their obligations under international humanitarian law and to address the humanitarian consequences of the state's actions. From 1948 to 1950, the ICRC included a unit focusing on providing services to Palestinian refugees. Since UNRWA took over this role, the ICRC has continued to have a presence in refugee communities. For example, the ICRC developed water and sanitation infrastructure projects benefiting some 703,000 people in the Gaza Strip.<sup>135</sup> 45 percent of UNRWA registered refugees reside in the Gaza Strip.<sup>136</sup>

### ***Non-Governmental and Charitable Organisations***

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) played a key role in providing assistance to displaced Palestinians during the 1948 *Nakba*. Major international non-governmental aid agencies in 1948 included the American Friends Service Committee, as well as the ICRC in cooperation with the League of Red Crescent Societies. Most NGOs, however, soon transferred responsibilities to the host country authorities and/or UNRWA.<sup>137</sup>

Until the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs played a limited role, and many Palestinian refugee communities did not receive aid from such organisations. By the 1990s however, the number of local NGOs offering various services to Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries had doubled. NGOs offered social, medical and financial assistance, culture and sports programs, as well as special services for women, disabled persons and youth. The growth of NGO activities can be attributed to the decrease in assistance provided by the PLO, greater political freedom, and growing international investment in the wake of the Oslo process, in particular in the oPt.

The Syrian regime forces bombarding the Free Syrian Army positions inside the Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp, Syria: 2012  
(©Reuters)



## Endnotes

- 1 "Third Workshop on Protection", background paper, (ICRC, 7 January 1999). See also: Sylvie Giossi Caverzasio (ed), *Strengthening Protection in War – A Search for Professional Standards*, Geneva: ICRC (2001). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has borrowed this definition in its policy paper on the protection of internally displaced persons. IASC, *Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, (New York, December 1999), pp.3-5.
- 2 See the Law of State Responsibility which is codified to a large extent in the *International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for international Wrongful Act*, which were commended to the governments in UNGAR 56/83 in 2001.
- 3 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, effective 22 April 1954. *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, adopted 31 January 1967, 19 UST 6223, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). *Statute of the Office of the UNHCR*, G.A. 428(v), U.N. GAOR, 5<sup>th</sup> Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
- 4 UNHCR, (December 2001), *op.cit.*, p.11.
- 5 See in this regard the *Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN*, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
- 6 *Ibid*, p.214.
- 7 Mass displacement, whether external or internal, constitutes strong evidence of grave human crisis. *Ibid*, p.208 – 209.
- 8 Phuong, Catherine, *The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 208.
- 9 UNHCR, *Agenda for Protection*, (Geneva, October 2003), p.74.
- 10 Susan M. Akram and Terry Rempel, "Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees", *Boston University International Law Journal*, Vol. 22:1 (2004), p. 6.
- 11 *Legal Safety Issues in the Context of Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees*, UNHCR Executive Committee No. 101 (LV), 2004.
- 12 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Principle 29- Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, available at URL: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c3da07f7.html>> (accessed 26 November 2012).
- 13 *Factory at Chorzów*, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, at 47.
- 14 UNGA Resolution A/RES/60/147, 21 March 2006.
- 15 The implementation of the "Disengagement Plan" in September 2005, raised questions regarding the continued status of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory, especially after the withdrawal of the Israeli army forces from Gaza. International humanitarian law adopts a pragmatic definition of occupation, that is, the effective (actual) control over a territory by a foreign military force. "Effective control" is understood as an effective military control coupled with an effective administrative control (Article 42 of the *Hague Regulations* and Article 6 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*). The ending of occupation is equally pragmatic. According to international humanitarian law, occupation ends when the Occupying Power no longer exercises effective military control over the occupied territory and does not apply government authorities there. "The presence of land troops has which have traditionally been a requirement to identify a territory as occupied. However, the test of 'effective control' should, in light of modern technology and new means of maintaining control, take into account all kinds of control exercised over a territory - both military control and control over civilian life. Despite the withdrawal of military troops in 2005, there are ongoing, as well as new, measures of Israeli military and administrative control in the Gaza Strip, which amount to "effective control". Therefore, the withdrawal of Israeli troops alone does not turn the occupied territory into unoccupied. The facts on the ground define the legal status of the territory. Israel maintains its effective control over the Gaza Strip by different means, such as control over air space, sea space and the international borders." Diakonia, *Does international humanitarian law apply to the Gaza Strip after the withdrawal?* 14 January 2009, [www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=842](http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=842). Nevertheless, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that Israel is not in "effective control" of the Gaza Strip and accepted the State's assertion that Israel's duties towards the Gaza population is limited to the prevention of a humanitarian crisis - a position which denies the Palestinian population in Gaza the protection it is entitled to under international human rights and humanitarian law. H.C. 9132/07, *Jaber Al-Basyouni v. The Prime Minister*, High Court of Justice (30 January 2008).
- 16 Article 10 of the *International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Act*, reads as follows:
  - "1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered an act of that state under international law.
  2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new state in part of the territory under its administration, shall be considered an act of the new state under international law.
  3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State if any conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of..."

Pre-1948 Zionist militias were an organized movement that achieved its aims and formed a new state in part of the Mandate Palestine. It is an accepted rule that this new state could not avoid responsibility for conduct earlier committed by it. See in this regard Crawford, James *International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Act: Introduction, Text and Commentaries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.116-118.
- 17 UNHCR, *Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection Handbook* (1996), Ch.2.
- 18 For more information please see Boling Gail, *Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return: An International Law Analysis*, Second Edition. BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 2007.
- 19 *Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land* and its annex: *Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, The Hague, 18 October 1907. The ICJ also held that *Hague Regulations* constitute customary norms. "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", Advisory Opinion (ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Wall), 9 July 2004, para.89. Article 43 of the *Hague Regulations* states the rule that belligerent occupants – because their presence is temporary – must let the local population continue its normal existence with a minimum of interference. This implies the right of protected persons to remain or return to their places of habitual residence. Boling, *op.cit.*, pp. 40-50.



- 20 See, *Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis*, 1945, reproduced in D. Schindler & J. Toman (eds.), *The Laws of Armed Conflict* 911 (3d ed. 1988).
- 21 The *Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
- 22 Articles. 45, 49 and 147 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*.
- 23 Articles. 45, 49 and 134 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*.
- 24 The *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia* has reaffirmed that forced displacements are crimes punishable under customary international law, *The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, IT-97-25, *Trial Chamber Judgment* of 15 March 2002. See also Articles 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the *Rome Statute*, UN doc. A/CONF.183/9 dated 17 July 1998, came into effect on 1 July 2002.
- 25 Article.7(1)(d) of the *Rome Statute*.
- 26 Although Israel was not (and is not today) a party to the *Hague Convention*, it is bound by its regulations, because by World War II, the Hague Regulations' provisions had become binding customary norms so that violations could be considered prosecutable war crimes. Kagan M., "Restitution as a Remedy for Refugee Property Claims in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Florida Journal of International Law*, Vol.19 (2007), pp.421, 445; see also Yoram Dinstein, *The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict* (2004).
- 27 Article 13(2) states that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
- 28 The other instruments that Israel is party to are: 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), UNGA Resolution 2200 A(XXI) of 16 December 1966; 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), UNGA Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979; 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), UNGA Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984; and 1989 *Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*.
- 29 See in this regard Art. 17(1) of the ICCPR, which complements the right not to be forcibly evicted without adequate protection and recognizes, *inter alia*, the right to be protected against "arbitrary or unlawful interference" with one's home. Also: Article 11(1) of ICESCR, and CESCR, *General Comment no. 7: the Right to Adequate Housing (Article 11(1): Forced Eviction*, 20 May 1997.
- 30 For legal analysis on this topic, see: Badil, "Follow-up Information to the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Regarding the Committee's 1988 Concluding Observations Regarding Israel's Serious Breaches of its Obligations under ICESCR" for the 13 November 2000 Convening of the Committee, pp. 28 - 32.
- 31 UNGA Resolution 194(III), UN Doc. A/910, at 21, 11 December 1948.
- 32 CESCR, *Concluding Observations on Israel*, E/C.12/1/Add. 90, May 23, 2003, para.18.
- 33 Lena El-Malak, "Reparations for Palestinian Refugees", *Forced Migration Review* 26, August 2006, p.46.
- 34 Goldstone Report, A/HRC/12/48, p. 520, para 1670.
- 35 *APCHR Report on the Israeli Military Offensive against the Gaza Strip (27 December – 18 January 2009)*, available at URL: <[http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/Reports/English/pdf\\_spec/gaza%20war%20report.pdf](http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/Reports/English/pdf_spec/gaza%20war%20report.pdf)> (accessed 6 November 2011).
- 36 *Away with Palestinian murder? IDF 'killer' given 45 days*, available at URL: <<http://rt.com/news/israel-soldier-45-days-525>> (accessed 6 November 2012).
- 37 See for instance, human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, *Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of resolution S-6/1*, A/HRC/7/76, 14 March 2008, para.58, PCHR, "Genuinely Unwilling: An Update, The Failure of Israel's Investigative and Judicial System to Comply with the Requirements of International Law, with particular regard to the Crimes Committed during the Offensive on the Gaza Strip," 15 August 2010. Also see the *Joint Parallel Report* submitted by Al-Haq, Addameer, BADIL and the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling to the UNCERD on 30 January 2012, "Suggested items to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) for the List of Themes for the State of Israel," Adalah 8 December 2011; "Adalah's Official Position Regarding the Or Commission of Inquiry Report: Despite Many Reservations, the Report is an Important Document and its Recommendations Should be Implemented Immediately" Adalah, 4 September, 2003; "The Price of Internal Legal Opposition to Human Rights Abuses" Michael Sfar *Journal of Human Rights Practice* Vol 1, Number 1, March 2009, pp. 37–50; OCHA, "Unprotected: Israeli settler violence against Palestinian civilians and their property", *Special Focus*, December 2008; "Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System's Failure to Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories", *Indiana International & Comparative Law Review*, 2001. 12, pp.75-105; Clark L. M. Yesh Din, *A Semblance of Law: Law enforcement Upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank*, June 2006; Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, "Israel's Evasion of Accountability for Grave International Crimes," Legal Brief, July 2012, FIDH, "Shielded from Accountability: Israel's Unwillingness to Investigate and Prosecute International Crimes," September 2011, Khoury-Bisharat H., "Israel and the Culture of Impunity", Adalah's Newsletter, Volume 37, June 2007, Weill S., "Israel's Culture of Impunity", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 2009.
- 38 Article 147 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*, Articles 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the *Rome Statute*. Also see footnote number 24.
- 39 Article 7(1)(d) of the *Rome Statute*. "forcible transfer of population" is defined by the Statute as "forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law." Article 7(2)(d).
- 40 "The General Assembly [...] Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, 1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty; 2. *Reaffirms also* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return..." UNGA Resolution 3236 (22 November 1974) A/RES/3236 (XXIX)
- 41 Closing Protection Gaps: Handbook on Protection of Palestinian Refugees in States Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, BADIL: Resource Center for Residency and Refugee Rights 2006.
- 42 A number of the Arab states had strong objections against including Palestinian refugees in the *Refugee Convention* as well as



under the mandate of UNHCR. The Arab governments' primary concern was that when included under the mandate of UNHCR the Palestinian refugees "would become submerged [with other refugee groups] and would be relegated to a position of minor importance", and that the prospect of their repatriation would be negatively affected if they were included in UNHCR's mandate. GAOR, 5<sup>th</sup> session, 3<sup>rd</sup> comment, 328<sup>th</sup> meeting, para.52. Therefore, the Arab states advocated that the Palestinian refugees should remain the responsibility of special UN attention, namely UNRWA and UNCCP. Consequently, the Arab states proposed an amendment to exclude the Palestinian refugees from the mandate of UNHCR. UN doc. A/C.3/L.128. Furthermore "consideration regarding continued funding by Western donors of the massive relief operation on behalf of the Palestinian refugees is likely to have played a major role." The Arab states were in a position that countries, which had supported the division of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel, "should continue to foot the assistance bill for the Palestinian refugees." Takkenberg, Lex (1998) *op. cit.*, p.66. Israel and Zionist organisations advocated for the UN decision to exclude the Palestinian refugees from the International Refugee Organization, which was the body that assisted Jewish refugees in Europe following World War II. The former were keen to prevent anyone from making any possible association or even comparison between the two cases. Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, (Oxford Press, October 2006), p. 235-236.

- 43 UNGA Resolution 194(III), UN Doc. A/910, at 21, 11 December 1948. See also Susan M. Akram, "Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law", Naseer Aruri (ed.) *Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return*, London: Pluto Press, 2001, pp.165, 169.
- 44 UNGA 2252(ES-V) of 4 July 1967. Despite the above UNRWA has never revised its working definition for "Palestine refugees" although it provides assistance to 1967 Palestinian refugees in accordance with UNGA resolutions.
- 45 UNCCP 19<sup>th</sup> Progress Report, UN Doc.A/4921 and Add.1, 13 October 1961; UNCCP, 21<sup>st</sup> Progress Report, UN Doc. UN Doc. A/5545, 1 November 1963.
- 46 Susan M. Akram and Guy Goodwin-Gill, *Brief Amicus Curiae to the United States Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review*, 2001, p.9.
- 47 *Ibid*, p.9
- 48 See, for example: *The United Nations and Palestinian Refugees*, UNRWA HQ, Gaza, 2007.
- 49 UNHCR, Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, 2002, p.2.
- 50 Akram S., "Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law", Naseer Aruri (ed.) *Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return* (2001), p.165, 174; Akram S. and Goodwin-Gill G. (2001), *op. cit.*, p.31. The Convention-definition in Article 1A(2) was never intended to apply to Palestinian refugees for several reasons: "First, as UN delegates involved with drafting the Refugee Convention pointed out: '[T]he obstacle to their repatriation was not dissatisfaction with their homeland, but the fact that a Member of the UN was preventing their return.' Second, Palestinians as an entire group had already suffered persecution by virtue of their massive expulsion from their homeland for one or more of the grounds enumerated in the definition. Thus, they were given special recognition as a group, or category, and not subject to the individualized refugee definition. The delegates dealt with the Palestinians as *de facto* refugees, referring in a general way to those who were defined by the relief agencies at the time (UNCCP and UNRWA) but not limiting the term 'refugee' to those Palestinians who were in need of relief. Although they did not define them as such, the delegates were referring to Palestinian refugees as persons normally residing in Palestine before 15 May 1948, who lost their homes or livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. Akram, S., (2001), *op. cit.*, p.167.
- 51 UNHCR, *Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of refugees to Palestinian refugees*, October 2002, p.2. Article 1(2) of the *Refugee Convention* defines "refugee" as follows: "Owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
- 52 Akram. (2001), *op. cit.*, p.165, 172 .
- 53 UNRWA's mandate, however, has not been amended to exclude the Palestinian IDPs of 1948. Thus, in legal terms, the Agency could resume its jurisdiction over these IDPs for purposes of providing humanitarian assistance.
- 54 Karine Mac Allister., "No Strategy of Vision that Aims to End Internal Displacement", *Al-majdal*, No.39/40 Autumn 2008/Winter 2009, p. 60.
- 55 Save the Children UK et. al., *Broken Homes: Addressing the Impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children & Families*, 15 June 2009, p.34.
- 56 See articles 7(1) and 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22(2), and 26.
- 57 Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen are signatories but host only small numbers of Palestinian refugees.
- 58 Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia have ratified the 1954 *Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons*. Libya and Tunisia have ratified the 1961 *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*. States' instruments of Ratification are available at [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org).
- 59 With regard to the comparison with other regional instruments see Akram S., and Rempel, S., (2004), *op. cit.*, pp.1 – 162.
- 60 The 22 Arab states that are members of the LAS are Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. For further information see Khadija Elmadmad, *An Arab Convention on Forced Migration: Desirability and Possibilities*, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461,466 (1991).
- 61 *Casablanca Protocol*, Article 1. "Whilst retaining their Palestinian nationality, Palestinians currently residing in the land of [...] have the right to employment on par with its citizens."
- 62 *Ibid*, Article 2. "Palestinians residing at the moment in [...] in accordance with the dictates of their interests, have the right to leave and return to this state. Their right of entry only gives them the right to stay for the permitted period and for the purpose they entered for, so long as the authorities do not agree to the contrary."

- 63 *Ibid*, Article 3. "Palestinians residing in other Arab states have the right to enter the land of [...] and to depart from it, in accordance with their interests. Their right of entry only gives them the right to stay for the permitted period and for the purpose they entered for, so long as the authorities do not agree to the contrary."
- 64 *Ibid*, Article 4. "Palestinians who are at the moment in [...] as well as those who were residing and left to the Diaspora, are given upon request, valid travel documents. The concerned authorities must, wherever they be, issue these documents or review them without delay."
- 65 *Ibid*, Article 5.
- 66 Kuwait reserves the right to interpret Article 1 of the Protocol as excluding the right to conduct "private business" on par with Kuwaiti citizens. Lebanon reserves the right to interpret Article 1 of the Protocol in accordance with prevailing social and economic conditions in Lebanon, and the right of Palestinians to maintain their nationality. It further reserves the right to interpret Article 2 with the added phrase "on equal terms with Lebanese citizens and in accordance with the laws and regulations in operation"; and Article 3 with the added phrases "whenever their interests demand it" and "allowing Palestinians into Lebanon is conditional upon their obtaining an entry visa issued by the concerned Lebanese authorities." It has also submitted reservations on Articles 4 and 5. The Lebanese reservations on the five articles of the protocol rendered it void of content: Khalil, Asem, "Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship Current Challenges and Future Perspectives", *CARIM Research Reports* 2007/07, Robert Shumann Center for Advanced Studies, p.31. Libya submitted reservations to Article 1 "since dealing with Palestinian citizens in Libya is on par with and equal to dealing with other Arab citizens residing in Libya." Abbas Shiblak, *The League of Arab States and Palestinian Refugees' Residency Rights*. Monograph 11. Ramallah: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (Shaml), 1998, pp. 35-36.
- 67 See Mohammad Khaled Al Az'ar, *Arab Protection for Palestinian Refugees*, Badil Resource Center, Working Paper, 8, 2004, and *Closing Protection Gaps: A Handbook on Protection of Palestinian Refugees in States Signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention*, Badil Resource Center, August 2005.
- 68 The United States is a state party to the 1967 Protocol only and has not ratified the 1954 Refugee Convention.
- 69 UNGA Resolution 194(III), 11 December 1948, para. 2.
- 70 UNGA Resolution 394(V), 14 December 1950, A/RES/394(V), para. 2(c).
- 71 UNGA, Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, 19 December 1968, A/RES/2443. In 1972, the GA requested to also investigate allegations concerning the exploitation and looting of the resources of the occupied territories; UNGA Resolution 3005 (XXVII), 15 December 1972.
- 72 Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, A/RES/66/76, 12 January 2012.
- 73 See, for example: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, A/63/273, 13 August 2008.
- 74 UNGA, *Human Rights Council*, A/RES/60/251, 15 March 2006.
- 75 United Nations Human Rights Council, available at URL: <<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Sessions.aspx>>(accessed 6 November 2012).
- 76 United Nations Human Rights Council, UNHRC, *The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Particularly due to the recent Israel Military Attack against the Occupied Gaza Strip*, 9<sup>th</sup> Special Session, A/HRC/S-9/2, 27 January 2009, para.4.
- 77 *Ibid*, para.9.
- 78 UNHRC, *The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Particularly due to the recent Israel Military Attack against the Occupied Gaza Strip*, A/HRC/S-9/2, 27 January 2009, para.11.
- 79 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, A/66/358, 13<sup>th</sup> September 2011
- 80 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, A/HRC/20/32, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2012.
- 81 Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, A/66/358, 13<sup>th</sup> September 2011, A/HRC/20/32, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2012 and A/67/379, 25<sup>th</sup> September 2012.
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- 84 *Ibid*, pp.491-500.
- 85 ICRC, *Annual Report 2004*, ICRC: Geneva, p. 285.
- 86 ICRC, *IDPs in armed conflict: Key Points*, 16 March 2007.
- 87 International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 151, 153.
- 88 *ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Wall*, para. 153.
- 89 *Ibid*, paras. 119–120, 163.
- 90 UNGA Resolution ES-10/15, 20 July 2004. 150 votes in favor and six against (United States, Israel, Australia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau). Abstaining were Cameroon, Canada, El Salvador, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
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- 92 UNGA, "Progress report of the Board of the United Nations Register of Damage Caused by the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," A/ES-10/498, 19 July 2010.
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- 96 The *Geneva Conventions* provide for imperative universal jurisdiction over any person committing any of the grave breaches regardless of his or her nationality, based on actual custody: Article 49 GC I; Article 50 GC II; Article 129 GC III; Article 146 and GC IV. Luc Reydam, *Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives*, (Oxford, NY 2006). See also Article V of the *International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid*, and Article 5 of the CAT.
- 97 For an overview and analysis of cases, see, for example, "Litigating Palestine", *Al-majdal*, no. 41 (Spring-Summer 2009), BADIL Resource Center.
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- 120 Article 55 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*.
- 121 Articles 23 and 59 of the *Fourth Geneva Convention*.

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- 126 Paragraph 1 of Article 1D of the *Refugee Convention* and paragraph 7(c) of *UNHCR Statute*. See Chapter Three.
- 127 See *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967*, A/HRC/20/32, 25 May 2012.
- 128 See the *UNRWA 2012 Emergency Appeal*, and *UNRWA Labour Market in the Gaza Strip: A Briefing on First-Half 2011*, December 2011.
- 129 Save the Children UK et. al., *Broken Homes: Addressing the Impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children & Families*, 15 June, 2009, p.34.
- 130 UNHCR 2012 Regional Profiles – Occupied Palestinian Territories, available at URL: <<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486826>> ( accessed 21 November 2012).
- 131 Takkenberg, 1998 op. cit .
- 132 UNHCR, *Handbook for Emergencies*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition 2007, p.5.
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- 134 ICRC, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, p.384.
- 135 Ibid., p.386.
- 136 See section 2.1.4.3.3 of this chapter, and section 3.3.5.8 BADIL, 2008-2009 Survey of Palestinian Refugees and IDPs, p.129.
- 137 In Syria, for instance, the Association for the Liberation of Palestine was formed in 1948 to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees. By mid-1948, however, the number of refugees in Syria had grown too large to manage effectively, and the association appealed to the Syrian government for help. Assistance included relief in kind and cash payments, extra allowances for pregnant women, and free medical care for the sick. Orphans were provided with food, lodging and primary education. In Egypt, the Higher Committee responsible for Palestinian refugee affairs, together with the Egyptian Red Crescent and international non-governmental organisations, established an assistance system for 5,000–7,000 Palestinian refugees with material supplied by the UN and later through USAID.









# Palestinian Refugees' Opinion Poll on International Humanitarian Assistance

### *Preface:*

*This chapter has been developed by BADIL to explore refugees' satisfaction with the international assistance they receive, particularly by UNRWA. It addresses: the quantity and quality of assistance, most prominent manifestations of assistance shortages, the effects of shortages on refugees, satisfaction with the performance of the institutions and authorities in charge (official or popular), and other relevant and interrelated matters. BADIL designed a questionnaire exploring several aspects, namely: education, employment, housing, health care, sanitation, forms, quantity and quality of assistance, and food support, as well as a section on refugee status, period and/or reason of displacement, and social background. Each section includes several questions handling relevant subjects (See Appendix 3.1: Methodology and Questionnaire and Appendix 3.2: Tables at the end of this chapter).*

*The population sampled for this survey consists of Palestinian refugees living in the refugee camps of the occupied Palestinian territory, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). It was carried out between March and June 2012 by a professional team. The 3,856 respondents (50% male and 50% female, all 18 years old and above) were randomly selected from the 5 targeted areas and from 30 refugee camps (See Methodology). Despite technical difficulties BADIL faced in conducting this opinion poll - mainly in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which resulted in delays of delivering the questionnaires - the research team (field and office-based researchers) is confident with the accuracy of the opinion poll.*

*This chapter is critical of international assistance provided to Palestinian refugees, but does not aim to undermine UNRWA's function. BADIL agrees with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA that "UNRWA - neither the cause, nor the solution to the question of refugees, but the only tangible support felt by many of*



them - is more necessary than ever.”<sup>1</sup> Although UNRWA’s limited mandate and shrinking budget is sorely felt by the Palestinian refugees whom it serves, the vast majority of respondents (88%) agree on the important role that UNRWA plays (Table 3.30). Although about 8 in every 10 refugees surveyed feel that UNRWA’s services have decreased over the last three years (Table 3.28), however they still feel that UNRWA plays an important role in upholding the rights of Palestinian refugees and thus feel that closing UNRWA would harm their living conditions (Table 3.30). Moreover, the findings suggest a strong correlation between political conditions within the UNRWA areas of operation and the well-being of Palestinian refugees. Consider, for example, that while imprisonment for political activism constitutes the primary reason for school dropout rates in the West Bank (40%) and Gaza (18%), students in the oPt are more likely to complete their education than are their counterparts in Lebanon. Whereas refugees in Lebanon do not face similar restrictions based on their political activities as do those refugees in the oPt, they suffer from a social isolation and political stigma unfelt in the oPt (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). Furthermore, the findings shed light on refugees’ priorities and the mandated authorities. For example, the findings show an urgent need for the maintenance and improvement of electricity and water nets in camps (Figure 3.11). In this regard, respondents emphasized the inadequate assistance and protection provided by host governments and expressed the need to establish and activate representative bodies of refugees as well as to develop complaints procedures (Tables 3.34 and 3.35 and Figures 3.20, 3.21, 3.22).

Finally, this chapter will attempt to broadcast refugee voices in the face of reduced services. This reduction is reported by Filippo Grandi, Commissioner-General of UNRWA who underlined “that UNRWA’s General Fund - which supports the education, health, relief, protection and social services – is in a perilous state. Overall contributions to the Fund have remained static for almost five years while refugee needs have grown and costs have increased.”<sup>2</sup> This reduction fits with a broader campaign of Israel and the Zionist Movement that targets UNRWA’s donor states and aims at abolishing the agency before durably solving the refugees’ question in accordance with international law and relevant UN resolutions.<sup>3</sup>

BADIL has chosen to give a basic reading of the findings, and it believes that these results demonstrated through the indexed tables will be a starting point for further reviews and development conducted by BADIL or other researchers.



Israeli bulldozers destroyed the only school in the village of Dkaika, South Hebron Hills: 2011 (©Jiri Kalat/CPT)



## 3.1 General Characteristics

Approximately 33% of the survey pool sample resides in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, while 14% resides in Lebanon compared to about 13% in the West Bank. Additionally, about 17% resides in refugee camps in Syria, compared to about 23% in Jordan (Table 3.1).

The refugees surveyed are mainly concentrated in seven refugee camps. The majority are from Jabalya (Gaza Strip), constituting about 13% of those surveyed, followed by Yarmouk (Syria) with 9%. Nusairat (Gaza Strip), Khan Yunis (Gaza Strip), Wihdat (Jordan), and Nahr el-Bared (Lebanon) each accounted for about 7% of the survey pool sample (Table 3.2).

This survey only targets persons 18 years and over living in the refugee camps (See Methodology and Table 3.2 at the end of this chapter). The sex ratio is 105 (105 male for every 100 females) and the median age is 34 (See Tables 3.5 and 3.6). The median age indicates that nearly half of refugee camps' populations are less than 34 years of age. Almost 38% of persons surveyed are between the ages of 18 and 29 years, while 13% are 50 years of age and above (Table 3.3).

The majority of the persons surveyed are UNRWA registered refugees and 3.3% are non-refugees (Table 3.7). About 80% of refugees cite the Nakba (1948 war) for their displacement, while only about 9% linked their refugee status to the 1967 war.

Nearly 6 out of 10 persons above the age of 18 are married (Table 3.8). Significantly, the percentage of persons who dropped out of school (46%) and the persons who never had a chance to enroll in school (6%) outnumber those who have graduated (roughly 30%) (Table 3.9). In the same context, 4 out of every 10 persons have completed less than the *Tawjihi* (High School) certificate, while less than one quarter possess a bachelor's degree or higher. Only 4% of refugees in the camps surveyed have a vocational diploma, indicating a low interest in that particular educational track.

**High drop out rate**

Only 4% of refugees in the camps surveyed have a vocational diploma, indicating a low interest in that particular educational track.

The survey results indicate that UNRWA is the key provider of primary education in the refugee camps. The majority of surveyed persons (90%) completed their primary education in UNRWA's schools. Approximately 75% of respondents stated that members of their household are currently enrolled in an UNRWA school (Table 3.9).

Figure 3.1: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by area





Figure 3.2: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of displacement/type of registration




**UNRWA as the main provider of primary education**

With regard to labour, the results demonstrate that service-based occupations constitute the main sector of the labour market. About 30% are employed in services, compared to 16% in commerce, 12% in construction and 9% in manufacturing (Table 3.14). Regarding the type of employment, the private sector comprises the highest ratio of employment at about 42%, compared to 26% employed by the refugees' host governments and about 15% by UNRWA (Table 3.12).

Houses constitute the most prevalent type of residential units in the refugee camps (57%) followed by apartments (38%). However, about 3% live in marginal units lacking adequate amenities (Table 3.16).

**Figure 3.3: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of housing unit**



## 3.2 Education

Figures for Lebanon-based refugees indicate an alarming dropout rate of about 66% (about two-thirds), compared to 52% among refugees in the West Bank (Table 3.9).

Of refugees who never had an opportunity to enroll in education,<sup>5</sup> Jordan recorded the highest percentage at 14%, compared to 7% among refugees in the West Bank (Table 3.9).

**Table (3.10.1): Percentage distribution of refugees by reasons for dropping out of school**

Reason	%
Hard economic condition of the family	53.2%
No interest in Education	35.4%
Inadequate school environment	12.2%
Mistreatment of students	10.4%
Political activities/detention	5.8%

More than half of Palestinian refugee students drop out of school due to the difficult economic conditions facing their families. Over one-third drop out due to a lack of interest in pursuing education, while nearly a quarter chose to do so due to the inadequate school environment and mistreatment of students. Just under 6% of the total persons surveyed dropped out of school due to political activities or detention, although the actual ratio in each host country varies. For instance, the dropout rate due to political activities and/or imprisonment is much higher in the oPt where it constitutes the cause of more than half of dropouts. Specifically, the rate in the West Bank (nearly 40%) is higher than that of Gaza (18%). In comparison, refugees in Jordan who drop out for similar reasons constitute about a quarter of all dropouts (Table 3.11).

Aggregation by sex has shown no significant difference between males and females regarding their reasons for dropping out. Political activities or detention are the exception, as males are three times more likely to drop out for this reason than females (Table 3.10).

Refugees in Jordan recorded the highest rate of school dropouts due to lack of interest (35%) and difficult economic conditions (28%). Meanwhile, Syria recorded the highest rate of dropouts due to an inadequate school environment (31%). An interesting result is among refugees in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip who attribute "mistreatment of students" as the basis for leaving school (slightly over 20%), compared to the ratio in Jordan and the West Bank (around 18% and 16%, respectively) (Table 3.11).




UNRWA girls' school, Silwan, Jerusalem: 2011 (©Bidna Caporella, Source: flickr.com)

**Figure 3.4: Percentage distribution of refugees by main reason/s for dropping out of school and by Area**


Area	% mistreatment of students
Lebanon	22.7
Gaza Strip	22.0
Syria	21.7
Jordan	18.0
West Bank	15.6

**Crowdedness of schools top the list of criticisms of UNRWA's education services**



Household members currently enrolled in non-UNRWA schools, attribute their choice of schools to inadequate instruction in UNRWA schools (16%), the location of school (9%) and an inability to register (8%).

**Figure 3.5: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of enrollment in non-UNRWA school.**



Residents of the refugee camps are critical of the quality of UNRWA's education services. Approximately 74% of respondents attribute their dissatisfaction with UNRWA education services to class crowdedness, 73% cite the lack of secondary and post-secondary educational opportunities, and 71% highlight the lack of schools. In addition to the lack of adequate resources, facilities and physical access to schools, more than half of those surveyed consider favoritism and patronage to play a role in enrollment at UNRWA's schools.



UNRWA boys' school, Shu'fat, Jerusalem: 2011 (©Bidna Caporella, Source: flickr.com)

**Figure 3.6: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by common problems in UNRWA's Schools**

Common problems in UNRWA's Schools	%
Crowdedness of classes	73.8%
Lack of secondary education	72.8%
Lack of schools	70.9%
Lack of post secondary education	70.0%
Morning and afternoon classes	66.4%
Favoritism/patronage	56.2%
Lack of pre-school facilities	55.0%
Insufficient number of teachers	50.8%
Lack of supplies/stationeries	46.8%
Low qualifications of teachers	42.5%
Inadequate infrastructure	41.6%
Lack of school supervision	41.4%
Weak curriculum/lack of topics covered	37.9%
Mistreatment of students	37.1%
Inappropriate administration of school	36.9%
School outside the camp	31.7%
Other	14.9%

### 3.3 Employment

Within each area, the private sector is the highest employment provider in Lebanon at 55%, compared to 46% in the West Bank and about 42% in Jordan (Table 3.12).

**Private Sector as main employer**

The private sector is the lowest employment provider in the Gaza Strip at 35%, compared to the host government as the highest employer there at about 38%. UNRWA is considered the lowest employment provider in Syria (6%) as well as the West Bank (7%), while it is the highest in Lebanon at about 23% (Table 3.12).

**Table (3.12.1): Percentage distribution of sampled persons by employment provider and areas**

Main Employment Provider	Area				
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon
UNRWA	18.6%	6.6%	14.4%	6.0%	22.8%
Host Government	33.7%	24.1%	28.2%	19.6%	14.6%
Private Sector	35.3%	46.4%	41.6%	39.3%	55.1%
Other	12.4%	22.8%	15.8%	35.1%	7.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

With regards to gender, the private sector is also considered the highest employer of females at about 37%, followed by host governments at about 26% (Table 3.13).

Within the Gaza Strip, the highest occupation activity is services at about 36%, compared to about 38% in the West Bank, and about 25% in both Jordan and Syria and about 28% in Lebanon (Table 3.14). Services remain the primary occupation for about one-third of males and females alike. The only significant gender variation is in construction activity, wherein males comprise 15% of all employees males compared to about 4% females (Table 3.15).

**Employment in construction is the lowest in Syria and the Gaza Strip**



## 3.4 Housing

Marginal housing units in the refugee camps are most prevalent in Lebanon at about 12% followed by Jordan at about 4% (Table 3.16). The room density is 3.25 person per room in all areas. The most common construction material used for housing is cement block at 50% followed by stone at 30%. As for the tenure of housing units, about two-thirds own housing units compared to one-fifth that live in rented housing units (Table 3.17). The host government is considered the main provider of basic services, including water (68%) and electricity (77%).



Regarding the cost for housing unit maintenance, one-fifth of respondents depend on their own savings to cover such costs, 17% borrow money from friends, relatives etc, and 11% depend on UNRWA's assistance.

Houses in Aida refugee camp, Bethlehem: 2009 (Source: flickr.com)

**Figure 3.7: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by funding source of housing maintenance**

Coverage of cost for maintenance of housing unit	%
Use savings	20.5%
Borrowing (from private individual)	17.2%
UNRWA	10.5%
Loan (from institution)	9.2%
Selling some belongings	8.3%
Other	6.4%

The results also show that only a little less than two-thirds made no maintenance to their housing unit at all, compared to 16% who made partial maintenance.

**Figure 3.8: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of maintenance (within the last 3 years)**

Type of Maintenance	%
No maintenance	62.2%
Partial maintenance	16.0%
New additions/extensions	10.8%
Overall maintenance	10.8%



## 3.5 Health Services

Regarding UNRWA's health services, nearly three-quarters of the refugees surveyed indicated that crowdedness of medical clinics and the lack of specialists are the main problems with the system as it currently stands. Deficiency of diagnosis and lengthy waiting times also top the list as detriments to the current UNRWA healthcare system. More than two-thirds believe that UNRWA's medical services lack medications, provide inadequate services, suffer from a shortage of doctors, and operate for an insufficient

number of hours. The most urgent actions needed include alleviating the crowdedness of clinics, the shortage of health specialists, and increasing the diagnosis time dedicated for each patient. Over 60% of residents view favoritism as a problem in health services. In addition, they feel that more attention is required for children and pregnant women. The survey respondents are least concerned with the location of health centers. This may indicate the adequacy of current locations.

Crowdedness of medical units tops the list of dissatisfaction with UNRWA's health care

**Figure 3.9: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's health services**

Perception about UNRWA's Health Services	%
Crowded medical clinics	75.6%
Shortage of specialists	75.4%
Not enough time given to diagnose patients	72.9%
Lengthy waiting time	71.9%
Shortage of doctors	69.2%
Lack of medications	67.8%
Low medical services	67.8%
Limited working hours of medical centers	66.5%
No medical insurance	65.3%
Favoritism/patronage	63.3%
Low competency of medical staff	63.2%
Lack of medical transfers (approvals) to hospitals	61.1%
Coverage of medical surgery	57.7%
Health care of children and pregnant women	47.5%
Complicated medical procedures	43.0%
Long distance from residence	33.1%
Medical center is outside the camp	30.2%

UNRWA health clinic in Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem: 2011 (©BADIL)



## 3.6 Sanitation Services

In addition, 6 out of every 10 persons consider the quality of other services inadequate, namely measures to protect public health provided by UNRWA. These include: a lack of waste containers, treatment of waste water, coverage and maintenance of sewage systems, street paving and waste disposal locations. Accordingly, residents feel that provision of sufficient waste containers in camps, speedy movement of waste and treatment of waste water requires urgent attention.

**Figure 3.10: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's sanitation services**

Perception about UNRWA's Sanitation Services	%
Lack of waste containers	63.8%
Accumulation of waste before collection	63.8%
Lack of waste water treatment	57.4%
Lack of sewage system coverage	56.6%
Lack of sewage system maintenance	56.4%
Lack of street paving	55.1%
Waste disposal nearby camp	52.5%
Other	26.4%

UNRWA-employed street cleaners work by hand and with little tools, cleaning rubbish from the narrow streets of refugee camps (©BADIL)



## 3.7 Priorities in Services

The top priorities for improvement of services in refugee camps are the maintenance and extension of electricity networks, followed by maintenance of housing units and an increase in cash-type assistance. Other areas considered to be of a high priority include the maintenance of water networks, improvement of medical and education services and an increase of relief services.

As for secondary priorities, respondents viewed housing density as the most urgent followed by an increase of in-kind assistance, introduction of university education, the addressing of water scarcity and the alleviation of water cut-off.

**Figure 3.11: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by public priorities for improvement of the camp**

Priority (1): Services for improvement in the camp	
Maintenance / extension of electricity network	16.0
Maintenance of housing units	13.8
Increasing cash-type assistance	11.0
Maintenance / extension of water network	9.1
Improving medical services	8.6
Improving education services	7.0
Increasing relief services	5.7
Priority (2): Services for improvement in the camp	
Treatment of housing density	6.1
Increase in-kind assistance	6.0
Introduction of university education	5.0
Treatment of water scarcity and cut-off	3.5

## 3.8 Assistance

More than three-quarters of residents in refugee camps benefited from UNRWA's assistance (Tables 3.18 and 3.22). The common type of assistance is concentrated in education at about two-thirds, followed by health services at about 62%. About half of the refugee camps' residents received food assistance, while 17% are recorded to receive cash assistance.

**Figure 3.12: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by type of assistance**

Type of assistance	%
Education	64.8%
Health services	61.5%
Food	49.2%
Cash	17.3%
Employment	15.6%

About 17% of refugee residents indicated favorable satisfaction with the quantity and quality of the support that they receive from UNRWA, while 4 out of every 10 persons viewed the quantity and quality as acceptable. With regards to the frequency of support, 11% ranked it as good compared to one-third who viewed it as acceptable. However, more than half of residents indicated no satisfaction at all with the frequency of the services (Tables 3.19 and 3.23).

**Table 3.19.1: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by degree of satisfaction with assistance**

Support	Good	Acceptable	Bad
Quantity of support	17.4%	42.4%	40.3%
Quality of support	17.0%	46.3%	36.7%
Frequency	10.9%	35.9%	53.2%
Type of support	14.9%	45.2%	39.9%



Distribution of UN aid to residents of Jalazone refugee camp, Ramallah: 2009 (©UNRWA)



Regarding the perception of the required services or shortage in services (Tables 3.20 and 3.24), the majority of respondents (86%) ranked employment as the top required service, followed by over 75% who ranked health services, cash support and food support as their highest priorities. Moreover, about two-thirds consider education to be a service that requires improvement.

**Figure 3.13: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by individual priorities**

Services	%
Employment	86.1%
Health services	77.7%
Cash	77.3%
Food	75.6%
Education	63.9%

Regarding the residents' degree of dependency on UNRWA's support, total dependency constitutes about 14%, compared to marginal dependency, which reaches about two-thirds. About one-fifth of residents indicate little dependency on UNRWA's support, compared to more than one-quarter who indicate a high dependency (Tables 3.21 and 3.25).

**Figure 3.14: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by degree of dependency on UNRWA**

Dependency	%
Marginal	35.2
Little dependency	28.6
Much dependency	22.3
Total dependency	13.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In comparison to last year, about three-quarters of residents view the current year's assistance as declining, compared to only about 5% who feel that assistance has increased. In the same context, about one-fifth of residents have not noticed any change in the quantity of the assistance that they receive from UNRWA in comparison to last year (Table 3.28).

**Figure 3.15: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by assistance decline in comparison to last year**

Assistance	%
Has decreased	73.3
Has not changed	21.9
Has increased	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

About 60% of residents who receive assistance indicate that the process awakens in them certain feelings that vary from remembering the *Nakba* (72%) to humiliation (63%). About 71% of residents consider assistance as a reminder of the importance of practicing of the right to return without delay to their original homes. Nevertheless, about 16% indicate a vague feeling that is hard to describe (Table 3.29).

About three quarters of surveyed refugees agree on the important role that UNRWA has played. Although about 8 in every 10 refugees feel that UNRWA's services have decreased over the last three years, (88%) still feel that UNRWA plays an important role in sustaining the case of Palestinian refugees and thus feel that cessation of UNRWA's services or abolition of UNRWA would harm their condition. About (45%) still consider UNRWA as intrinsic to the identification of Palestinian refugees and their fundamental rights. On the other hand, the results also show that six in every ten persons believe that conditional support to UNRWA weakens its independence and limits UNRWA's role in the course of meeting refugees' needs (Table 3.30).

**Figure 3.16: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by perception about UNRWA's role**

Role of UNRWA	%
Services of UNRWA have decreased in the last three years	79.2%
Cessation/abolition of UNRWA weakens the case of Palestinian Refugees	87.7%
UNRWA has played important role in keeping the case of Palestinian Refugees alive	74.0%
Conditional support to UNRWA weakens its independence and role.	61.5%
The role of UNRWA is limited to services	59.8%
UNRWA plays important role in defending refugee rights	55.3%
UNRWA is intrinsic to the identification of Palestinian refugees and their rights.	45.4%



About half of the residents consider moving outside of the refugee camps for various reasons. Specifically, three-quarters consider moving due to crowdedness, while about two thirds consider moving due to pollution or noise. Moreover, 63% consider moving due to the social environment in the camp and more than one third consider moving for other reasons (Table 3.31).

The majority of the camps' residents, who indicate that they would stay in the camps, cite a lack of financial means as their main reason (roughly 70%), while about two-thirds choose to remain in order to be near relatives and friends. Six in every ten persons choose to stay because the refugee camp has become their address physically and figuratively, while half feel that the camp holds certain advantages not available outside. Almost one-third would remain living in the camp for other reasons (Table 3.32).

**Figure 3.17: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason for moving outside the camp**

Reason for considering moving outside the camp	%
Crowdedness	73.5%
Pollution	67.8%
Noise	65.9%
Social environment	63.0%
Other	36.5%

**Figure 3.18: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason for staying in the camp**


Reason for staying in the camp	%
Lack of financial ability to move outside the camp	69.5%
Stay close to relatives and friends	65.2%
The camp is the symbol of refuge	59.4%
The camp is a distinguished place with advantages unavailable outside	52.3%
Other	31.9%

## 3.9 Discrimination Against Refugees

More than half of those surveyed feel that Palestinian refugees face discrimination in employment as well as in social relations. Moreover, more than 45% feel prejudice exists in health care services and higher education (Table 3.33).

In cases where residents seek to file a complaint, 60% prefer to seek initial assistance from host governments, compared to 54% who would approach UNRWA first and 30% who would approach either popular committees in the camp or political factions first. Only one-quarter choose to seek treatment of their complaint from NGOs (Table 3.34).

**Figure 3.19: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by aspect/feature of discrimination**



**Figure 3.20: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by confidence in responsible institution/ authority**

Parties to address complains	%
Host Government	59.5%
UNRWA	53.6%
Public committees in the camp	30.4%
Political factions	30.2%
Other	27.7%
NGOs	26.0%



The criteria for choosing a preferred institution when filing a complaint is largely dependent on its simplicity of procedures or one's trust in the institution (70%). More than two-thirds (66%) of respondents indicated that the specialization of the institution and its relevancy to the nature of the complaint influenced their choice, while 58% indicated that it depends on their previous experiences while submitting complaints (Table 3.35).

**Figure 3.21: Percentage distribution of sampled persons by reason of approaching responsible institution/authority**

Reason for approaching specific parties	%
Simplicity of complaint procedures	71.2%
Trust to take the complaint seriously	71.9%
Specialization of the institution - relevance to the nature of the complaint	66.3%
Previous experience - positive follow up	57.5%

## 3.10 Conclusion

When the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) established UNRWA in 1949, it was not envisaged that the latter would continue functioning until today. In fact, this is one of the features of the international community's failure in resolving the refugee question in accordance with international law and relevant UN resolutions. Since then, UNRWA has been the main provider of international assistance to Palestinian refugees. Undoubtedly, humanitarian assistance as an integral part of international protection has mitigated the effects of the conflict on Palestinian refugees and IDPs. However, humanitarian assistance can only be a temporary measure aimed at alleviating suffering and cannot substitute for a comprehensive political solution. Nevertheless, the contemporary regime of humanitarian assistance that has developed for Palestinian refugees and IDPs, not only has come to replace effective efforts to find durable solutions to the plight of Palestine refugees, but also has gradually decreased. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA reported that "[i]n this grim context, UNRWA continues to be a point of reference for five million refugees. Not only does it symbolize the international community's continued commitment to support them pending a solution, but it also provides crucial services, especially health and education, which for most refugees would not be affordable or available otherwise. However, two major challenges continue to affect the Agency's ability to provide basic humanitarian and human development services: the prevalence of conflict and the scarcity of funds."<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, the Popular Service Committees (PSCs) consider the reduction of UNRWA's services – among other things, a result of a broader policy of the international community. Moreover, the PSCs in refugee camps in the oPt expressed their concerns regarding the dramatic decrease of donor states' contributions to the UNRWA budget and the latter's failure to meet refugees' basic needs. The PSCs' statement of October 2012 reads:

Based upon the findings of this opinion poll, it is clear that while UNRWA

"We, the Popular Service Committees, call our people, in particular refugees residing in camps, to be aware of the seriousness of UNRWA's huge reductions and cuts in its services and programs. While enormous reductions inflicted education, health care and job creation programs, UNRWA cuts have been clearly realized during the past few years in ceasing the following programs:

- The basic food support program;
- The infant and babies feeding program;
- The relief services program (for the majority of refugees)
- The financial aid program for youth and women centres;
- The houses/units restoration program;
- The infrastructure and camp improvement program".

This is an unofficial translation of Popular Service committees statement, October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2012.



continues to provide an indispensable service, its limited mandate and shrinking budget is sorely felt by the Palestinian refugees whom it serves. In fact, nearly three-quarters of all respondents would leave the camps were it not for their inhibiting financial ability. Although the UNGA has incrementally expanded UNRWA's mandate to provide more protection for Palestinian refugees, it remains insufficient to combat these structural conditions endured by Palestinian refugees in the Middle East who constitute a protracted refugee population. However, even where UNRWA has complete jurisdiction, over relief and work conditions, its services are similarly inadequate. Respondents hailing from across UNRWA's five areas of operation complained of inadequate educational instruction, insufficient medical care, and dilapidated housing and community infrastructure within the camps. It is not clear whether these dire conditions are attributable to poor management, shrinking financial support from the international donor community, or both. What is clearly known is that the humanitarian condition of Palestinian refugees is cause for great concern and that UNRWA's services cannot adequately treat them.





## Endnotes

- 1 See Statement by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (Special Political and Decolonisation Committee), available at URL:  
<<http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1490>> (accessed 6 November 2012).
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 See among other BADIL, press release available at: <http://badil.org/en/press-releases/142-2012/3537-press-ara-26>.
- 4 The survey targets persons aged 18 years and over ONLY.
- 5 The majority of the persons who never had a chance to enrol in education fall into the segment aged 50 years old and above (13% of the surveyed persons).
- 6 The use of ownership here does not reflect the normal legal meaning of the concept; it refers to the right to use/access the land and constructions dedicated by UNRWA for refugees. The plots of land on which camps were set up are either state land or, in most cases, land leased by the host government/ and or UNRWA from local landowners. This means that the refugees in camps do not "own" the land on which their shelters were built, but have the right to "use" the land for a residence.
- 7 See Statement by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, op.cit. available at URL:  
<<http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1490>> (accessed 6 November 2012).

Balata refugee camp, Nablus (Source: flickr.com)





## Appendix 3.1: Methodology and Questionnaire

BADIL -Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights is an independent, community-based non-profit organisation specializing in research and advocacy work regarding refugees and displaced persons. The aim of this opinion poll is to identify the perceptions of refugees and displaced persons solely for research purposes, and specifically to be informed about:

1. The limits and type of assistance given to Palestinian refugees and displaced persons.
2. The extent of satisfaction per given assistance.
3. Shortages in merited assistance (the most prominent aspects).
4. The consequences of the shortage on the living conditions and the status of refugees and displaced persons.
5. The extent of satisfaction regarding the performance of the commissioned entities (official or popular), especially with regard to raising the demands of refugees and displaced persons and their humanitarian rights.

### Methodology

#### Target Population

It consists of all Palestinian households who are staying in the camps (mostly official camps) during 2012 (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria).

#### Sample size

The estimated sample size for 3856 person

Items for sample size	Value used
Estimation	proportions
Main indicator	50%
Marginal error	5%
level of confidence (95%)	1.96

#### Marginal error 0.05

$$\frac{t^2 * P * (1 - P)}{(e)^2}$$

$$\frac{1.96^2 * 0.5 * (1 - 0.5)}{(0.05)^2}$$

Sample size 3856 household

## Sample design

The sample is two stage stratified cluster sample:

**First stage:** selection a systematic random sample of 30 camps.

**Second stage:** selection a systematic random sample of households from each camp selected in the first stage.

## Sample strata

The population was divided by:

1. Area (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan)
2. Population group (camp size)

## Distribution sample and frame

Camp name	Sample all	Sample female	Sample male	Serial number	
				min	max
Buraj	136	68	68	1	136
Maghazi	104	52	52	137	240
Jabalya	450	225	225	241	690
Nusairat	270	135	135	691	960
Khan Yunis	296	148	148	961	1256
Ein el-Sultan	50	25	25	1257	1306
Ayda	50	25	25	1307	1356
Al Far'aa	50	25	25	1357	1406
Nur Shams	50	25	25	1407	1456
Ama'ari	50	25	25	1457	1506
Jalazoon	50	25	25	1507	1556
Askar	70	35	35	1557	1626
Jenin	72	36	36	1627	1698
Balata	104	52	52	1699	1802
Zarka	50	25	25	1803	1852
Souf	88	44	44	1853	1940
Wihdat	200	100	100	1941	2140
Azmi Al Mufti	96	48	48	2141	2236
Jabal Al Husein	130	65	65	2237	2366
Baq'aa	350	175	175	2367	2716
Mieh Mieh	50	25	25	2717	2766
Al Buss	50	25	25	2767	2816
Galil "Wavell"	50	25	25	2817	2866
Bedawi	72	36	36	2867	2938
Nahr el-Bared	144	72	72	2939	3082
Dera'a Emergency	50	25	25	3083	3132
Hamah	50	25	25	3133	3182
Khan Eshieh	80	40	40	3183	3262
Qabr Essit	94	47	47	3263	3356
Al Yarmouk	500	250	250	3357	3856
<b>Total</b>	<b>3856</b>	<b>1928</b>	<b>1928</b>		

The sample is proportional as it represents the registered population in each camp

The dissemination will be on the level of area (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria)

## Instructions on The field work

1. Go to acamp by using the list of camps in the sample;
2. Choose a household randomly as start point to be the first household;
3. Choose the next household after 3 households of the previous one;
4. Choose one 18+ years person from the selected household
5. For the odd numbers choose male, for the even numbers choose female and in the end of work the sample will be equally divided between males and females;
6. Use “the random table” to choose the person, if their more than one person aged 18+ years in the household from same sex;
7. Use either male or female “random table” separately;
8. Sot males or females persons in the household by the name alphabetic (A,B,C etc) separate male in the first table and female in the second table age group 18 +.

First table for male aged 18+ years

Number of male person aged 18+ in household	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Number of chosen person	1	1	2	3	4	4	5	1	6	2	4	9	13	13	15	5	12	11	18	8

Second table for female aged 18+ years:

Number of female person aged 18+ in household	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Number of chosen person	1	1	2	3	4	4	5	1	6	2	4	9	13	13	15	5	12	11	18	8

## Survey Questionnaire

<b>A01 - Questionnaire Number:</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<b>A02 - Locality name:</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>A03 - Camp's name:</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<b>A04 - Date:</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> / <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> / <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

B. Social background				
B01	Sex	1. Male 2. Female	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B02	Age	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
B03	Refugee status	1. Registered with UNRWA 2. Registered in another international agency 3. Unregistered refugee 4. Non-refugee	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B04	Are you a refugee because of	1. 1948 war 2. 1967 war 3. 1948 and 1967 wars 4. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B05	Document type	1. West Bank identity card 2. Gaza Strip identify card 3. Jerusalem identity card 4. Jordanian passport 5. Lebanese document 6. Syrian document 7. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B06	Marital status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Other/ specify...	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B07	Number of family members	Males <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	Females <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	Total <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
B08	The status of education	1. Graduated 2. Enrolled in studies 3. Dropped out of education 4. Did not have an opportunity to pursue education/studies	<input type="checkbox"/>	
B09	Have not continued education/studies because of.... 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. No interest in education 2. Hard economic condition of the family 3. Non-suitability of the school environment 4. Mistreatment of students 5. Political activities/detention 6. Specify/other	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
B10	Education level?	1. Did not complete Tawjihi (high school certificate) 2. Completed Tawjihi 3. College diploma 4. Vocational Diploma 5. Bachelor degree 6. Higher diploma 7. Master degree or above	<input type="checkbox"/>	



B11	Employment status?	1. Employed (full time) 2. Employed (part time) 3. Self-employed 4. Unemployed 5. Full-time study 6. Housewife 7. Other.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
B12	(For workers only) The sector s/he is working in	1. UNRWA 2. Palestinian government 3. Host country government 4. Private sector 5. Other...	<input type="checkbox"/>
B13	(For workers only) Vocation that you are practicing	1. Agriculture and fishing 2. Industry 3. Building and construction 4. Commerce 5. Services 6. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

C. Housing conditions			
C01	Type of housing that the family resides in	1. House 2. Apartment 3. Corrugated-tin shack 4. Other/...	<input type="checkbox"/>
C02	The material used to build the housing unit	1. Concrete block 2. Concrete 3. Stone 4. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C03	Real estate tenures	1. UNRWA possession 2. Rented 3. Other/ specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C04	How many rooms in the housing unit?		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
C05	The undertaker responsible for providing the housing unit with water	1. UNRWA 2. Host government 3. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C06	The undertaker responsible for providing the housing unit with electricity	1. UNRWA 2. Host government 3. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C07	The undertaker responsible for sanitation	1. UNRWA 2. Host government 3. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C08	The undertaker responsible for waste collection	1. UNRWA 2. Host government 3. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
C09	In the last three years, was the house that you were living in maintained / extended 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. The house was completely maintained	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Parts of the house were maintained	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. New portions have been added	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. No maintenance or extensions has been made	<input type="checkbox"/>
C10	How was the house extension / maintenance financed 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Assistance from UNRWA	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Savings	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Borrowing	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Selling movable property (furniture, car, gold...)	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Loan	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

D. Services			
D01	Have you received your basic education (elementary and secondary) in UNRWA's schools?	1. Yes    2 .No    3. Have not pursued studies	<input type="checkbox"/>
D02	Is there any one in your family enrolled in schools? 1. Yes 2 .No	1. The UNRWA	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. The government	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Private	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. None	<input type="checkbox"/>
D03	Are any of your family members enrolled in schools other than that of UNRWA, if so, what are the reasons? 1. Yes 2 .No	1. Have not had an opportunity to register	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. UNRWA's school is further from the place of residence	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Poor quality of education in UNRWA's schools	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Secondary/ university education is unavailable	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
D04	According to your perspective, to what extent do you agree to the existence of the following problems within the education services provided by UNRWA  1. Totally agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Totally disagree 5. I don't know	1. Crowdedness of classes	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Lack of schools	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Morning and afternoon classes	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Number of teachers not sufficient	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Low qualifications of teachers	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Mistreatment of students	<input type="checkbox"/>
		7. Misadministration of school	<input type="checkbox"/>
		8. Lack of supplies/stationeries	<input type="checkbox"/>
		9. Weak curriculum/lack of topics covered	<input type="checkbox"/>
		10. Inadequate infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>
		11. Lack of school supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>
		12. Lack of pre-schools facilities	<input type="checkbox"/>
		13. Lack of secondary education	<input type="checkbox"/>
		14. Lack of post-secondary education	<input type="checkbox"/>
		15. School outside the camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		16. Favouritism /patronage	<input type="checkbox"/>
		17. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
D05	In non-emergency cases, do you seek medical services from an institution that is under the auspices of	1. UNRWA	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Host government	
		3. Private sector	
		4. NGOs	
D06	In non-emergency cases, does your family seek medical services from an institution that is under the auspices of	1. UNRWA	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Host government	
		3. Private sector	
		4. NGOs	
D07	In the event of receiving medical treatment outside the scope of UNRWA's medical institutions, it is due to  1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Non availability of the required specialization	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. The long distance of the medical centre from place of residence	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Non availability of the required services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Lengthy waiting times	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Limited working hours at UNRWA's clinics	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>

D08	<p>According to your perspective, to what extent do you agree to the existence of the following problems within the medical services provided by UNRWA</p> <p>1. Totally agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Totally disagree 5. I don't know</p>	1. Crowded medical clinics	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Lack of medications	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Lack of medical transfers (approvals) to hospitals	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Shortage of doctors	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Shortage of specialists	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Low medical services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		7. Low competency of medical staff	<input type="checkbox"/>
		8. Lengthy waiting time	<input type="checkbox"/>
		9. Not enough time is given to diagnose patients	<input type="checkbox"/>
		10. Complicated medical procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>
		11. Long distance from residence	<input type="checkbox"/>
		12. Favouritism/patronage	<input type="checkbox"/>
		13. Coverage of medical surgery	<input type="checkbox"/>
		14. Health care of children and pregnant women	<input type="checkbox"/>
		15. No medical insurance	<input type="checkbox"/>
		16. Medical center is outside the camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		17. Limited working hours of medical centers	<input type="checkbox"/>
			18. Other
D09	<p>According to your perspective, to what extent do you agree on the following if it were among the problems that UNRWA services suffer in the waste and sanitation sectors</p> <p>1. Totally agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Totally disagree 5. I don't know</p>	1. Lack of Waste containers	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Waste disposal near by camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Accumulation of waste before collection	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Lack of street paving	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Lack of treatment to waste water	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Lack of coverage of sewage system	<input type="checkbox"/>
		7. Lack of maintenance of sewage system	<input type="checkbox"/>
		8. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
D10	<p>According to your perception, what is the level of priorities of the following</p> <p>1. Very high 2. High 3. Little 4. Very little 5. I don't know</p>	1. Maintenance/extension of water network	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Maintenance/ extension of electricity network	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Maintenance/ extension of sanitation network	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Improving waste collection in camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Maintenance of housing units	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Improving education services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		7. Construct/develop public facilities ( playgrounds, squares...)	<input type="checkbox"/>
		8. Introduction of secondary education	<input type="checkbox"/>
		9. Introduction of university education	<input type="checkbox"/>
		10. Improving medical services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		11. Increasing relief services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		12. Increasing in-kind assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>
		13. Increasing cash-type assistance	<input type="checkbox"/>
		14. Improving public transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>
		15. Addressing overcrowding in residences	<input type="checkbox"/>
		16. Addressing water scarcity and cut-off	<input type="checkbox"/>
		17. Improving public transportation services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		18. Addressing the dangers arising from the main roads near by the camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
	19. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	

D11	What are the three most important services which the UNRWA must improve in the camp (service numbers are above in the previous question)	Primary priority	Secondary priority	Third priority
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### E. Assistance

E01	Have you or any of your family members received any kind of assistance which was provided by UNRAW during this year.	1 .Yes    2 .No	<input type="checkbox"/>
E02	Type of assistance which you receive 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Food 2. Cash 3. Employment 4. Educational 5. Health services 6. Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
E03	How to evaluate the assistance that you or your family has received. 1. Good 2. Acceptable 3. Bad	1. Quantity 2. Quality 3. Frequency 4. Type of assistance	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
E04	What is the type of assistance that you need or is deficient? 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Food 2. Cash 3. Employment 4. Educational 5. Health 6. Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
E05	The extent of dependency on UNRWA's assistance	1. Total 2. Much 3. Little 4. Marginal	<input type="checkbox"/>
E06	Are you subjected to any abuse or insult when you receive assistance or inquire about it?	1. Often    2. Sometimes    3. No	<input type="checkbox"/>
E07	Have you ever been subjected to abuse or insult, if so, from whom? 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. The camp's administration 2. Distribution employees 3. Other recipients of assistance 4. Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
E08	In comparison with the previous year, the assistance provided by UNRWA	1. Has increased 2. Has not changed 3. Has decreased	<input type="checkbox"/>
E09	Do you have any particular feelings when you receive assistance	1. Yes    2. No	<input type="checkbox"/>
E10	What is the nature of this feeling 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Reminds me of Al Nakba 2. Reminds me of the importance of return 3. A sense of pride 4. A sense of insult 5. Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>



F. The role of the UNRWA			
F01	Some say that UNRWA is no longer needed or necessary, do you agree with this view?	1 .Yes 2 .No	<input type="checkbox"/>
F02	To what extent do you agree with these phrases .1 Yes 2 .No	1. UNRWA has played a role in preserving the issue of refugees.	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. The role of UNRWA is limited to services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. UNRWA is the identification of Palestinian refugees	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Closure of UNRWA weakens the case of Palestinian Refugees	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Services of UNRWA have decreased in the last three years	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Foreign support to UNRWA weakens its independence	<input type="checkbox"/>
		7. UNRWA plays important role in defending refugee rights	<input type="checkbox"/>
F03	Do you consider living outside the camp?	1 .Yes 2 .No	<input type="checkbox"/>
F04	Your consideration of moving away from the camp is due to	1. Overcrowding	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Pollution	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Social environment	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Noise	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Specify/Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
F05	You will stay in the camp because 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Lack of financial ability to move outside the camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. The camp is the symbol of refuge and should be preserved	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Stay close to relatives and friends	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. The camp is a distinguished place with advantages unavailable outside	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Specify/Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
F06	To what extent do you agree on the existence of discrimination against the refugee population in the society 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Discrimination in jobs	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Discrimination in receiving health services	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Discrimination in social relations	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Discrimination in higher education	<input type="checkbox"/>
F07	In the event of a complaint or request of a service, to whom do you go 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. UNRWA	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Host government	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Public committees in the camp	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Political factions	<input type="checkbox"/>
		6. Other/specify	<input type="checkbox"/>
F08	What are your own criteria in choosing the entity that you approach to file a complaint or request a service 1 .Yes 2 .No	1. Simplicity of complaint procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>
		2. Trust to take the complaint seriously	<input type="checkbox"/>
		3. Specialization of the institution - relevant to the nature of the complaint	<input type="checkbox"/>
		4. Previous experience - positive follow up	<input type="checkbox"/>
		5. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>Name of researcher</b>	<b>date:</b> /    / 2012
<b>Name of person in charge</b>	<b>date:</b> /    / 2012
<b>Name of the person who entered the data</b>	<b>date:</b> /    / 2012

## Appendix 3.2: TABLES

Table (3.1): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area

Area	%
Gaza Strip	33.1
West Bank	12.9
Jordan	22.5
Syria	17.3
Lebanon	14.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Table (3.2): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by refugee camp

Refugee Camp	%
<b>Gaza Strip</b>	
Burajj	2.8
Maghazi	2.3
Jabalya	13.3
Nusairat	7.4
Khan Yunis	7.3
Ein el-Sultan	0.2
<b>West Bank</b>	
Aida	0.5
Al Far'aa	1.3
Nur Shams	1.3
Ama'ari	1.6
Jalazoon	1.6
Askar	2.9
Jenin	1.9
Balata	1.6
<b>Jordan</b>	
Zarka	0.5
Souf	2.6
Wihdat	6.9
Azmi Al Mufti	2.6
Jabal Al Husein	3.8
Baq'a'a	6.3
<b>Lebanon</b>	
Mieh Mieh	0.6
Al Buss	1.6
Galil "Wavell"	1.3
Bedawi	3.5
Nahr el-Bared	7.2
<b>Syria</b>	
Dera'a Emergency	0.6
Hamah	1.5
Khan Eshieh	3.4
Qabr Essit	2.8
Al Yarmouk	9.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table (3.3): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by age group**

Age Group	%
18-19	7.5
20-24	17.9
25-29	12.4
30-34	11.9
35-39	9.6
40-44	11.4
45-49	7.3
50-54	6.8
55-59	5.2
60-64	3.7
65+	4.0
Not Stated	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table (3.4): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by area and travel document**

Area	Type of Identification Card								Total
	West Bank ID Card	Gaza Strip ID Card	Jerusalem ID Card	Jordanian Passport	Lebanese Travel Document	Syrian Travel Document	Other	Not Stated	
Gaza Strip	2.6%	95.8%	.3%	.5%	0.2%	0.6%	0.1%	0.0%	100.0%
West Bank	97.7%	.9%	.3%	.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%	100.0%
Jordan	5.8%	2.8%	.9%	87.8%	0.2%	0.9%	1.0%	0.5%	100.0%
Syria	0.0%	0.0%	.3%	3.4%	0.6%	95.4%	0.4%	0.0%	100.0%
Lebanon	2.9%	3.0%	3.9%	0.0%	88.5%	0.7%	0.2%	0.9%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.1%</b>	<b>32.9%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>20.6%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>17.0%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table (3.5) : Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by area, age and sex**

Age Group			Total
	Male	Female	
18-19	7.5%	7.5%	7.5%
20-24	16.5%	19.4%	17.9%
25-29	12.4%	12.5%	12.4%
30-34	10.7%	13.2%	11.9%
35-39	10.1%	9.0%	9.6%
40-44	11.1%	11.7%	11.4%
45-49	8.4%	6.2%	7.3%
50-54	6.5%	7.2%	6.8%
55-59	5.6%	4.8%	5.2%
60-64	4.2%	3.2%	3.7%
65+	5.1%	2.7%	4.0%
Not Stated	1.9%	2.7%	2.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.6): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and sex

Area	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Gaza Strip	50.2%	49.8%	100.0%
West Bank	51.3%	48.7%	100.0%
Jordan	52.1%	47.9%	100.0%
Syria	52.4%	47.6%	100.0%
Lebanon	50.1%	49.9%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>51.1%</b>	<b>48.9%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.7): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and refugee status

Area	Refugee Status					Total
	Registered Refugee - UNRWA Records	Registered Refugee - Other Int' Agency	Non-Registered Refugee	Non-Refugee	Not Stated	
Gaza Strip	96.2%	1.5%	1.6%	0.6%	0.0%	100.0%
West Bank	94.9%	0.3%	3.7%	0.8%	0.3%	100.0%
Jordan	91.2%	1.7%	5.2%	1.5%	0.5%	100.0%
Syria	99.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	100.0%
Lebanon	96.1%	0.4%	1.7%	1.0%	0.9%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>95.4%</b>	<b>1.0%</b>	<b>2.5%</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.8): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and marital status

Area	Marital Status				Total
	Single	Married	Other	Not Stated	
Gaza Strip	35.6%	62.5%	1.9%	0.0%	100.0%
West Bank	33.6%	59.3%	6.1%	1.0%	100.0%
Jordan	37.1%	56.2%	5.2%	1.5%	100.0%
Syria	37.7%	57.4%	4.9%	0.0%	100.0%
Lebanon	32.6%	62.7%	3.2%	1.6%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.6%</b>	<b>59.8%</b>	<b>3.9%</b>	<b>0.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.9): Percentage distribution of sampled persons (18 years and above) by area and Education attainment

Area	Education attainment				Total
	Graduated	Currently Enrolled	Drop Out	Never had a chance to enroll in education	
Gaza Strip	33.2%	19.9%	44.7%	2.2%	100.0%
West Bank	25.5%	15.1%	52.3%	7.1%	100.0%
Jordan	32.7%	16.6%	36.7%	14.0%	100.0%
Syria	33.3%	23.5%	39.8%	3.4%	100.0%
Lebanon	16.2%	14.7%	65.7%	3.4%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>18.5%</b>	<b>45.9%</b>	<b>5.9%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>



**Table (3.10): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by reasons for dropping out of school and sex**

Reason for dropping out of school	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
No desire in Education	53.0%	47.0%	100.0%
Hard economic condition of the family	54.1%	45.9%	100.0%
Inadequate school environment	50.6%	49.4%	100.0%
Inappropriate treatment of teachers	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
Political activities/detention	76.0%	24.0%	100.0%
Other	30.7%	69.3%	100.0%

**Table (3.11): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by reasons for dropping out of school and area**

Reason for dropping out of school	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
No desire in Education	23.3%	12.3%	34.5%	12.1%	17.8%	100.0%
Hard economic condition of the family	23.2%	19.1%	28.1%	12.5%	17.1%	100.0%
Inadequate school environment	15.1%	15.9%	22.4%	30.9%	15.8%	100.0%
Inappropriate treatment of teachers	22.0%	15.6%	18.0%	21.7%	22.7%	100.0%
Political activities/detention	18.0%	39.3%	25.0%	4.7%	13.1%	100.0%
Other	55.8%	20.6%	17.3%	1.4%	4.9%	100.0%

**Table (3.12): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by main providers of employment and area**

Main provider of employment	Area				
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon
UNRWA	18.6%	6.6%	14.4%	6.0%	22.8%
Host Government	33.7%	24.1%	28.2%	19.6%	14.6%
Private Sector	35.3%	46.4%	41.6%	39.3%	55.1%
Other	12.4%	22.8%	15.8%	35.1%	7.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table (3.13): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by main providers of employment, sex and area**

Employment sector	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
UNRWA	13.5%	17.0%	14.5%
Host Government	26.6%	25.6%	26.3%
Private Sector	43.9%	35.6%	41.6%
Other	15.9%	21.8%	17.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.14): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by career/livelihood and area

Career/Livelihood	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Agriculture, hunting & fishing	3.0%	2.0%	4.2%	2.0%	14.2%	4.8%
Manufacturing	6.0%	9.6%	15.2%	4.2%	6.9%	8.8%
Construction	9.3%	10.3%	12.8%	7.2%	21.8%	12.0%
Commerce	16.7%	13.3%	23.9%	3.6%	15.6%	15.9%
services	36.4%	37.5%	25.1%	24.3%	27.6%	30.2%
Other	28.6%	27.2%	18.8%	58.8%	14.0%	28.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.15): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by career/livelihood and sex

Career/Livelihood	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Agriculture, hunting & fishing	4.1%	6.7%	4.8%
Manufacturing	9.9%	5.9%	8.8%
Construction	15.1%	3.5%	12.0%
Commerce	17.1%	12.8%	15.9%
services	29.8%	31.3%	30.2%
Other	24.0%	39.8%	28.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.16): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by housing unit type and area

Housing Unit Type	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
House	76.4%	71.3%	75.0%	3.8%	36.3%	57.2%
Apartment	21.4%	28.3%	20.7%	96.2%	39.6%	37.7%
Marginal	1.6%	0.5%	3.6%		11.6%	3.1%
Other	0.6%		0.6%		12.5%	2.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table (3.17): Percentage distribution of refugees 18 years and above by housing unit tenure and area

Housing Unit Tenure	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Owned - UNRWA	72.8%	68.2%	58.5%	78.5%	44.1%	65.9%
Rented	13.2%	7.3%	28.9%	21.0%	38.3%	20.9%
Other	14.0%	24.5%	12.6%	0.4%	17.7%	13.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table (3.18): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of received assistance and area**

Received assistance	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Employment	36.50%	29.90%	22.70%	3.70%	7.20%	100.00%
Education	38.90%	10.10%	10.30%	29.00%	11.60%	100.00%
Health services	44.70%	12.90%	16.70%	7.40%	18.20%	100.00%
Other	12.80%	12.60%	71.50%	0.00%	3.10%	100.00%

**Table (3.19): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by support dimension, degree of satisfaction and area**

Support dimension	Degree	Area					Total
		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Quantity	Good	48.80%	8.30%	29.70%	0.00%	13.20%	100.0%
	Acceptable	47.50%	14.40%	21.50%	0.60%	16.00%	100.0%
	Bad	16.30%	15.50%	10.40%	46.90%	10.80%	100.0%
Quality	Good	64.00%	6.40%	15.70%	0.00%	13.90%	100.0%
	Acceptable	42.30%	16.20%	24.30%	1.10%	16.00%	100.0%
	Bad	13.00%	14.20%	11.80%	50.90%	10.00%	100.0%
Frequency	Good	48.50%	6.00%	26.30%	0.00%	19.20%	100.0%
	Acceptable	42.40%	13.30%	25.50%	0.70%	18.10%	100.0%
	Bad	27.80%	15.90%	11.80%	35.70%	8.80%	100.0%
Type	Good	50.70%	6.70%	25.60%	0.00%	16.90%	100.0%
	Acceptable	47.30%	14.60%	21.40%	0.20%	16.50%	100.0%
	Bad	16.50%	15.30%	11.70%	48.30%	8.20%	100.0%

**Table (3.20): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by needed support and area**

Needed / shortage Support type	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Food	38.80%	15.60%	22.00%	12.20%	11.50%	100.00%
Cash	32.50%	14.00%	20.40%	18.80%	14.30%	100.00%
Employment	34.80%	14.20%	20.50%	21.90%	8.50%	100.00%
Education	43.00%	15.10%	25.70%	6.10%	10.00%	100.00%
Health services	36.80%	15.10%	18.80%	19.80%	9.50%	100.00%
Other	19.90%	11.20%	42.20%	25.90%	0.90%	100.00%

**Table (3.21): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by degree of dependency on UNRWA's support and area**

Degree of dependency on UNRWA's support	Area					Total
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Total dependency	45.00%	2.30%	26.00%	0.00%	26.70%	100.00%
Much dependency	48.00%	7.20%	20.10%	0.30%	24.50%	100.00%
Little dependency	44.50%	21.00%	23.90%	0.70%	9.90%	100.00%
Marginal	11.70%	15.00%	17.90%	50.10%	5.30%	100.00%

**Table (3.22): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of received assistance and sex**

Type of received support from UNRWA	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Food	47.3	52.7	100%
Cash	50.1	49.9	100%
Employment	54.6	45.4	100%
Education	49.1	50.9	100%
Health services	49.7	50.3	100%
Other	61.1	38.9	100%

**Table (3.23): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by support dimension, degree of satisfaction and sex**

Support dimension	Degree	Sex		Total
		Male	Female	
Quantity of support	Good	43.2	56.8	100%
	Acceptable	53.7	46.3	100%
	Bad	51.5	48.5	100%
Quality of support	Good	46.8	53.2	100%
	Acceptable	52.4	47.6	100%
	Bad	51.2	48.8	100%
Frequency	Good	51.1	48.9	100%
	Acceptable	55.2	44.8	100%
	Bad	48.2	51.8	100%
Type of support	Good	45.5	54.5	100%
	Acceptable	54.7	45.3	100%
	Bad	49.1	50.9	100%

**Table (3.24): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by needed support and sex**

Needed / shortage Support type	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Food	50.9	49.1	100%
Cash	49.7	50.3	100%
Employment	50.5	49.5	100%
Education	50.5	49.5	100%
Health services	52.2	47.8	100%
Other	52.6	47.4	100%

**Table (3.25): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by degree of dependency on UNRWA's support and sex**

Degree of dependency on UNRWA's support	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Total dependency	51.2	48.8	100%
Much dependency	50.2	49.8	100%
Little dependency	49.1	50.9	100%
Marginal	52.6	47.4	100%



**Table (3.26): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by encountering frequent insult or humiliation (when receiving assistance), sex and area**

Frequency in encountering any insult or humiliation when receiving assistance	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Often	45.3	54.7	100%	22.3	18.2	37.2	0.0	22.2	100%
Sometimes	48.1	51.9	100%	33.2	13.0	39.5	0.5	13.8	100%
Never	52.7	47.3	100%	35.7	12.6	11.5	27.5	12.6	100%

**Table (3.27): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by source of insult or humiliation encountered when receiving assistance, sex and area**

Source of insult or humiliation	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Camp administration	55.7	44.3	100%	16.9	16.5	47.2	0.5	19.0	100%
Distribution staff	49.4	50.6	100%	34.0	11.5	35.8	0.4	18.3	100%
Other beneficiaries	47.9	52.1	100%	32.2	14.1	30.0	0.5	23.3	100%
Other	53.2	46.8	100%	25.4	11.7	54.4	0.3	8.2	100%

**Table (3.28): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by perception of quantity of assistance received this year in comparison with last year, sex and area**

In comparison with last year, the assistance this year has	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Increased	62.3	37.7	100%	12.7	5.5	60.3	0.0	21.4	100%
Not changed	51.0	49.0	100%	29.0	6.2	24.7	1.8	38.3	100%
Decreased	50.5	49.5	100%	37.0	15.3	17.6	24.4	5.7	100%

**Table (3.29): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by type of feeling when receiving assistance, sex and area**

Special feeling when receiving assistance	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Remember Nakbah	51.6	48.4	100%	31.2	16.6	31.8	3.1	17.3	100%
Realize the importance of return to original homes	51.6	48.4	100%	29.9	18.2	31.8	3.6	16.5	100%
Pride	54.5	45.5	100%	26.3	9.6	60.7	0.0	3.4	100%
Humiliation	55.4	44.6	100%	38.9	16.3	33.2	2.2	9.5	100%
Other	52.2	47.8	100%	24.7	16.1	43.8	12.3	3.0	100%

**Table (3.30): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by perception of UNRWA's role, sex and area**

UNRWA's Role	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Keeping the case of Palestinian Refugees	50.1	49.9	100%	34.4	13.4	17.1	20.3	14.8	100%
The role of UNRWA is limited to services	50.4	49.6	100%	38.7	13.2	23.3	11.2	13.6	100%
UNRWA is the identification of Palestinian refugees	48.7	51.3	100%	37.7	15.5	26.5	0.3	20.0	100%
Closure of UNRWA weakens the case of Palestinian Refugees	50.4	49.6	100%	32.4	13.4	16.9	22.9	14.5	100%
Services of UNRWA have decreased in the last three years	51.4	48.6	100%	35.9	15.3	17.5	21.8	9.4	100%
Foreign support to UNRWA weakens its independence	51.6	48.4	100%	33.0	12.3	19.6	25.4	9.7	100%
UNRWA plays important role in defending refugee rights	48.9	51.1	100%	39.4	13.2	23.4	9.4	14.6	100%

**Table (3.31): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by reasons behind considering moving outside the camp, sex and area**

Reason for considering moving outside the camp	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Crowdedness	52.3	47.7	100%	25.1	16.5	26.8	27.0	4.7	100%
Pollution	51.6	48.4	100%	23.5	15.5	28.4	29.3	3.3	100%
Social environment	51.6	48.4	100%	28.4	16.3	29.6	22.6	3.1	100%
Noise	52.5	47.5	100%	25.1	16.5	28.9	25.9	3.7	100%
Other	52.0	48.0	100%	12.0	8.4	21.6	57.6	0.4	100%

**Table (3.32): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by reasons behind NOT considering moving outside the camp, sex and area**

Reason for NOT considering moving outside the camp	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Lack of financial ability to move outside the camp	51.4	48.6	100%	31.4	18.0	22.2	20.4	8.0	100%
The camp is the address of refugee - So I would stay	53.2	46.8	100%	27.8	14.2	17.2	23.8	17.0	100%
Stay close to relatives and friends	52.1	47.9	100%	34.4	14.6	19.2	20.9	10.8	100%
The camp is distinguished place with advantages not available outside	54.2	45.8	100%	33.9	13.4	19.4	23.6	9.7	100%
Other	51.0	49.0	100%	9.7	6.4	21.0	61.9	1.0	100%

**Table (3.33): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by aspects of discrimination/ prejudice, sex and area**

Areas of Prejudice	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Employment	50.5	49.5	100%	39.7	14.0	30.2	3.9	12.2	100%
Health care services	51.8	48.2	100%	44.5	15.7	27.9	1.6	10.3	100%
Social relation	53.5	46.5	100%	38.8	17.9	27.0	7.5	8.8	100%
Higher education	53.1	46.9	100%	40.6	11.9	32.4	5.2	9.8	100%

**Table (3.34): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by responsible institutions to file a complaint, sex and area**

Institutions to whom you file a complaint	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
UNRWA	49.6	50.4	100	40.4	14.8	22.4	0.4	22.0	100
Host Government	53.3	46.7	100	20.3	13.8	28.8	32.6	4.5	100
Public committees in the camp	51.6	48.4	100	13.1	22.3	16.9	24.4	23.1	100
NGOs	48.7	51.3	100	25.0	19.0	17.1	15.1	23.9	100
Political factions	51.7	48.3	100	14.7	16.6	15.2	35.7	17.9	100
Other	51.3	48.7	100	11.1	8.5	12.5	66.9	1.0	100

**Table (3.35): Percentage distribution of persons 18 years and above by criteria to choose responsible institutions to file a complaint, sex and area**

Criteria in selecting specific institution to file a complain	Sex		Total	Area					Total
	Male	Female		Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	
Simplicity of Procedures to submit a complaint	50.3	49.7	100	22.4	12.9	23.2	25.6	15.9	100
Trust to take the complian seriously	51.0	49.0	100	24.3	12.0	22.9	25.2	15.7	100
Specialization of the institution - relevant to the nature of the complain	50.9	49.1	100	37.2	13.8	25.1	11.4	12.4	100
Previous experience - positive follow up	51.2	48.8	100	21.6	14.8	23.1	26.8	13.7	100
Other	54.1	45.9	100	10.8	5.5	13.8	68.6	1.4	100





This edition of the Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Volume VII) focuses on Palestinian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the period between 2010 and 2012. Statistical data and estimates of the size of this population have been updated in accordance with figures as of the end of 2011. This edition includes for the first time an opinion poll surveying Palestinian refugees regarding specific humanitarian services they receive in the refugee camps.

The need to overview and contextualize Palestinian refugees and (IDPs) - 64 years since the Palestinian *Nakba* (Catastrophe) and 45 years since Israel's belligerent occupation of the West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip - is derived from the necessity to set the foundations for a human rights-based approach through which a just and durable peace can be achieved. Not only do Palestinian refugees and IDPs constitute the largest and longest-standing unresolved case of refugees and displaced persons in the world today, but their numbers continue to grow in light of Israel's policies and practices, resulting in more forcible displacement of Palestinians on both sides of the 1949 Armistice Line (in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory).

This Survey endeavors to address the lack of information, misrepresentation of, or misinformation about Palestinian refugees and IDPs. The authors of this survey undertook a professional review of the methodology used to determine and/or estimate, as accurately as possible, the current Palestinian refugee and IDP population. The authors reviewed and updated existing statistical data, including findings from the 2007 census conducted in the oPt by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; latest reports and statistics of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); and the best available data published by host countries and other international and Palestinian concerned institutions and organizations. Hundreds of historical, legal, socio-economic, and political supplementary sources have been used to collate, analyze and document the phenomenon of ongoing forced displacement and related statistical, legal and political matters.