Grassroots Organisations and Civil Society Organisations in Palestine: Reality, Role and Challenges

Grassroots Organisations and Civil Society Organisations in Palestine: Reality, Role and Challenges

by Nassar Ibrahim

    From the outset, emphasis needs to be placed on the following key notes:

    • Drawing a distinction between the following concepts: grassroots organisations and unions, trade unions, civil society organisations (CSOs), and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).
    • Evolution of CSOs, the concept of civil society, problematic concept (role of the State, organic social structures and CSOs, and social contradictions).
    • Debate is usually initiated in a reverse or erroneous manner, starting with a discussion of the nature and role of CSOs. Truly, it should begin with identifying the social reality, focusing on political, economic, and social developments, State/authority role, anomalies, challenges, and COS tasks.
    • In the Palestinian context: Consequences of the protracted Israeli colonial occupation, transfer, displacement, ghettoes, confiscation of land and natural resources, and economic dependence and domination require that the national liberation effort go hand in hand with democratisation and social resilience.

     

    Grassroots Unions, Organisations, and Trade Unions

    In Palestine, the evolution of grassroots unions and organisations as well as political forces has been linked to the specificity of the Palestinian context. Hence, challenges and questions faced by these groups are qualitatively different from those encountered by any grassroots organisations created in the normal course of evolution of any society.

    Following the 1948 Nakba and establishment of the State of Israel, millions of Palestinians were displaced and became refugees. The whole of Palestine was colonised in the aftermath of the June 1967 war. Consequently, the Palestinian grassroots movement and organisations (of students, workers, women, writers, fellahin, teachers, and journalists) found themselves confronted by major political duties, focused on protection of the Palestinian national identity and struggle to end colonisation and establish an independent national State. Grassroots organisations have, therefore, served as an incubator of political forces and parties (Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Communist Party, etc.).

    Against this backdrop, the main task of these grassroots organisations have centred on and treated as a top priority the political struggle. The social dimension was second on the list of priorities. Along this vein, grassroots groups became the battleground for severe political rivalry and conflict between Palestinian political forces and parties. The influence, impact, and national significance of these forces was measured by the extent of their capability of diffusion and control over grassroots organisations and trade union movement. This reality has triggered a set of manifestations.

    The role of the grassroots movement and organisations has experienced a historical shift, placing emphasis on the political dimension, rather than social tasks. Secondly, Palestinian political parties have formed their own trade unions and grassroots organisations, resulting in a state of dispersion and fragmentation. Thirdly, an attitude of hegemony and unilateralism has undermined the independence of grassroots organisations and essentially compromised their specificity and social role by dominant political forces and leadership.

    These predicaments have been compounded by the Israeli colonial occupation. Over decades, the colonial Power has entrenched occupation within the Palestinian social fabric and distorted the context of the Palestinian grassroots movement. In other words, political repression concretised by the coloniser’s social, economic, and cultural behaviour has manifested itself in a constant pursuit to instil a spirit of opportunism within grassroots organisations. This exercise was designed to drive these groups away from the core of the political struggle and continuously push them towards marginal social roles. At the same time, the colonial Power has implemented a fascist repressive policy against Palestinian political forces and factions. However, this policy was counterproductive thanks to powerful and dynamic objective challenges and contradictions, which govern the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The more the political forces and factions were subjected to colonial oppression, the greater their role and the more visible they were within grassroots organisations and trade unions. In addition to their role in the mass struggle, these actors served to provide protection and adaptation. As a result, the social role played by those trade unions and organisations has been further dominated the political role.

    Palestinian grassroots organisations and trade unions served as an incubator that harboured political factions. At the same time, the latter imposed their political and intellectual hegemony over those grassroots organisations and trade unions.

     

    Political Use of Grassroots Organisations by Political Forces and Parties

    When political forces felt that their role and status were under threat or when the political leadership sensed that it was under pressure, they used to invoke and set in motion grassroots organisations and trade unions to reduce that pressure. The most prominent example of this was seen in the first and second Intifadas of 1987 and 2000. It is thus noted that the grassroots movement, organisations, unions have been used as a bargaining chip by the political authority and forces when needed. Once again, grassroots organising was pushed into the corner and fine-tuned.

    More seriously, grassroots organisations and trade unions are utilised to both resolve and fuel internal inconsistencies. Most notable is the current contradiction between Hamas and Fatah movements. Each party drives their own constituencies and grassroots organisations to the street as if to display a show of force. This political conduct causes more rupture and pessimism within the grassroots movement, pushing efforts and potential away from their political and social priorities and interests, namely, struggle against colonisation and improvement of social and economic conditions.

    Palestinian grassroots organisations and trade unions reflect a large-scale movement, possess profound expertise, and fulfil the real requirements for action and influence. Still, these are in need of a political movement that is vital and ready enough to review programmes and visions. Accordingly, the grassroots movement will be able to influence and interact both organically and dialectically with those organisations, meeting the requirements of the Palestinian social and political context.

    National liberation and social construction tasks necessarily entail engagement and integration between the authority/State and CSOs (both before and after Oslo). This demands that each party be well aware of their role so that political forces and power structures do not dominate grassroots organisations or deprive them of their independence, specific character, and defence of the interests of represented sectors.

     

    CSOs, NGOs, and the Question of Democracy

    The root cause of the problem associated with the concept of Palestinian civil society lies in many politicians and intellectuals who turn a deaf ear to the political and social specificities, which have been historically shaped in the Palestinian context. Civil society is a socio-historical concept linked to the evolution of society. More specifically, it generates from the formation of the modern nation and State. The modern nation-state was formed as both an objective and a subjective response to economic and social transformations and discrepancies brought about by the bourgeois democratic revolution in Europe. These contradictions essentially lie in the bourgeois victory and domination over the State as a tool of class control.

    This transformation has put in place new questions and inconsistencies to European societies as well as political and social forces. These had a profound reaction in an attempt to manage and control these contradictions. Hence, an objective environment is created, enabling the establishment and evolution of CSOs as an intermediary between natural or organic social structures (family, tribe, denomination, etc.) on one hand, and the State as a tool of totalitarian control on the other. It aims at putting an end to prejudice and injustice inflicted by the State on some social groups and sectors. Therefore, these groups have found themselves compelled to fit into structures and institutions on the grounds of defending their common interests in disregard of their normal affiliations.

    Against this backdrop, the objective condition to build CSOs is evidenced in the existence of a nation- or national State and sovereignty of the democratic system. In other words, all parties must accept rules and principles of the democratic game within the framework of this formula, which is historically and socially shaped in the context of social evolution.

    Coming back to the Palestinian context, based on this understanding, we find ourselves facing profound dilemmas, all starting with a discussion of the hypothesis of the existence of Palestinian society in general, and civil society in particular. This involves fragmentation and creation of Palestinian communities in different social, political, and economic contexts (the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, 1948 territory, and Palestinians of the diaspora, who are subject to various social and political experiences, regimes, and settings.)

    To ensure that the debate does not end up in an intricate maze, focus will be placed on Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because it is subject to the same political, social, and economic contexts and conditions. In addition to the absence of a Palestinian state, these Palestinians are faced with a particular specificity, namely, the colonial occupation which dominates and controls all resources of the West Bank and Gaza. This objective reality is a prerequisite to review and understand experiences of the Palestinian people in both areas. The so-called Palestinian CSOs have been formed as political/social structures. With the primary goal of resisting the occupation, these CSOs were not basically created to defend interests of social groups or sectors or confront oppression of the national state apparatus.

    In the light of this situation, Palestinian CSOs act under the influence of pressing and overlapping dynamics.

    First, challenges are imposed by the coloniser at all levels. Palestinian CSOs came into being in response to requirements for the resistance of colonisation. The majority of CSOs have been created on the initiative of parties and organisations of the Palestinian national movement. As a result, the structures, programmes, and relationships of these actors are more akin to political parties. On the other hand, in the face of a stiff competition between political forces to seize control of the Palestinian street, grassroots institutions, organisations, and unions continued to be affected by a split and parallel democratic trade unions and organisations. This was the case of the workers’ union, women’s organisations, and many professional associations. Consequently, these groups have not been able to unite behind a democratic social programme or guide the social struggle to bring that programme into reality.

    Second, in light of the foregoing dynamics, the majority of grassroots institutions and organisations have positioned themselves on the peripheries of political forces. As a result, transformed into a standby force, these movements have lost an effective and influential role in countering the domination of political actors.

    Third, having had their social role dominated by a political function, this reality, characteristics, and roles have turned CSOs and grassroots organisations into an immediate target of the Israeli colonial occupation and Western financing institutions. To control them and seize their programmes, these groups would be used to compromise their political role and nudge them toward contradiction with the national movement and its liberation agenda.

    It is these dynamics that explain the shift which Palestinian grassroots and social organisations have experienced since the 1980s and 1990s until the present day. It is noted that these organisations has receded and set the platform for NGOs, creating a new phenomenon involving hundreds or thousands of elitist NGOs. By contrast, the significance and role of grassroots organisations and movements have declined, reflecting in the eroding publicity of political parties and organisations

    Fourth, the foregoing social and political dynamics have interacted and overlapped in the absence of political freedoms and democratic experience, making the birth of Palestinian CSOs similar to a caesarean section. Therefore, CSO structures and practices are controlled by a centralised hierarchy, limiting their ability to mobilise concerned social sectors and groups. This has, in turn, profoundly impacted their democratic role, vitality, and prompt initiatives in the face of political and social developments and challenges.

    In the light of the above, a performance assessment of Palestinian CSOs is highly ambiguous. This is due to colonial policies and measures on one hand, and deep overlapping between social and political roles on the other. In the absence of the national State, CSO activity has mainly focused on the struggle against colonisation.

    This reality has been shaped both politically and socially in a historical context, placing CSOs in a state of anomaly that has reached a crisis point following conclusion the Oslo Accords and creation of the Palestinian Authority. CSOs could not rebuild themselves and restructure their programmes in response to that paradigmatic shift. As a consequence, CSOs have failed to stand against the abuse of authority, concomitant corruption, and encroachment on citizens’ rights. The most glaring example of this decline is evidenced in the failure of civil society and grassroots movements to make a critical intervention to reverse the downward spiral of the Fatah and Hamas movements and slide into factional fighting.

    This fact raises major questions about how influential and deep-rooted these CSOs and movements are in the Palestinian social context. It also brings forward a threshold question about the nature and essence of the democratic process in the Palestinian experience. As mentioned above, CSOs are tied to a formula that controls the nexus between the individual and natural or organic structures (families, tribe, and denomination), civil society, the State, and democracy (as values, system, attitude, and culture). While human beings are individuals in natural structures, they are citizens vis-à-vis the State, expressing the conditions of their citizenship by their democratic choices, right to freedom of expression and opinion, and organising to form and set in motion lobbying forces with a view to protecting their citizenship and rights against infringements of the State regime.

    In Palestinian society, the democratic process is governed by the scope of political function, which is premised on commitment to settlement projects and conditions. Thus, democratic action within Palestinian society has been reduced to a mere electoral process that is polarised among political forces and intersecting or contradictory options. Meantime, civil and social structures as well as grassroots movements have been confined to a usage dictated by those forces.

    With the elevated intensity of political rivalry, e.g. in the context of the horrific polarisation between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian grassroots, social, and civil organisations have been affected by a similar state of polarisation. Consequently, the latter have lost their role and function as checks and balances on contradictions. On the other end, associations not aligned with a particular political faction or organisation have remained incapable of action and initiative taking.

    This problem has its roots in the predicament of initial establishment. As noted above, CSOs were formed on the initiative of political forces and continued to be subject to their dominance and terms of reference. They did not come into existence as an objective and subjective response to social organising or as a free choice to protect the interests of social groups, sectors, and segments against abuse of the State or authority or to counter domination of the policy party. This is a critical precondition to highlight the independence and democratic approach of any civil social institution or movement, which mirrors the freedom of affiliation and will of respective members.

    To address and trust the ability of Palestinian CSOs to protect the democratic process, the awareness of social and grassroots associations both of themselves and of their roles needs to be corrected. Accordingly, they can be established and evolve in a democratic fashion. For these, organising and practice will adhere to three decisive controls or conditions:

    • Free organising on the basis of defending the interests of a social group or segment or safeguarding social or human demands and rights, such as protection of the environment and campaigns to counter social violence, violence against children, or domestic violence.
    • CSOs’ social function will be tied to national liberation tasks as a regulatory prerequisite in the Palestinian context.
    • CSOs will be built on a democratic foundation, both in terms of internal structure and relationship with the social milieu.

    Only then can we talk seriously about effective and influential CSOs and social movements, which are capable of consolidating and protecting outcomes of the democratic process in Palestinian society. Democracy will multiply the force of and vitally scale up CSOs in conjunction with the evolving reality and concurrent social and political tasks.

     

    Threats to NGOs and grassroots organisations:

    • Particularly direct, tacit, and long-term funding conditions, imposing slow adaptation of CSO work and placing CSOs in contrariety with their tasks required on the ground. In practice, we have ended up as an entire society turned into a governmental institution.
    • Changing agendas of international donors.
    • Courage to raise the needs of all or some segments of the Palestinian people.
    • Contradiction between long-term and current goals, while opting for short-term programmes.
    • Recruitment and appointment of politicians and unionists to NGOs.
    • Normalisation.
    • Lack of local donors.
    • Obstruction of social solidarity and volunteerism.

    To sum up, we can only address or evaluate the current context of Palestinian grassroots organisations, trade unions, and CSOs from a historical and comprehensive perspective that is tied to the specific reality on the ground, but also within the framework of challenges and difficulties imposed by the colonisation and colonial tools. Still, the grassroots movement and political forces have formed a crucial force in the course of Palestinian struggle experience. In a nutshell, this movement serves as the social and political leverage of the question of Palestine. In this sense, it is capable of going on and evolving, but this is contingent on a reassessment of the experience and recognition of relevant contradictions and weaknesses. It is also deeply conditional on the ability of Palestinian political forces to realise their role and enhance their vision, programmes, and performance with a view to establishing a balance within Palestinian society and address imbalances of the Palestinian reality.

    To play this role successfully, we need to resolve chronic inconsistencies and imbalances in the relationship between political liberation and social democratic tasks. We have to get rid of the mentality of an opportunistic use of grassroots organisations and trade unions, scale up their role, and promote their independence to ensure an objective response to their objective function within Palestinian society.

    * Nassar Ibrahim is a Palestinian writer, researcher and analyst. He holds an MA degree in International Cooperation and Development. He is the director of the Alternative Information Center (AIC).