Interview with Diana Buttu, PLO Negotiations Support Unit

 BADIL: As confusion appears to prevail on this matter, could you please summarize briefly the official Palestinian negotiating position on the refugee question?

Diana Buttu: During the last round of negotiations at Taba in 2001, as in previous rounds, the PLO’s position was that Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes. This position is based on international law and practice. The leadership also held that Israel should apologize and accept responsibility for the plight of the refugees over the past 56 years due to its refusal to allow the refugees to return.

Taba represented a slight shift in approach to the refugee question, because for the first time there was also discussion about the question of implementation. The PLO’s position was that refugees must be presented with real choices. It is up to the refugees themselves to choose a solution. This is not a question for Israel, the Palestinian Authority or the international community. At Taba the PLO discussed four choices. Refugees would be able to choose to go to the Palestinian state, stay where they are in current host states, resettle in third countries like Canada, or return to their homes in Israel.

At theCamp David talks in July 2000 there was no discussion about solutions for the refugees, and in earlier stages there was no thinking about implementation of the right of return, including how to reconcile implementation of this right with Israel’s concern about demography. Until today I don’t have an answer to this question. Personally, I feel that as long as refugee choice is influenced by demographic concerns refugees will not have a real choice.

Do you have any thoughts about why a certain degree of confusion about the position of the PLO on the refugee question continues to prevail?

I think this confusion is due, in part, to the great number of statements by officials which are in themselves very confusing. In addition, some former members of the leadership, who had participated in the Taba negotiations, also participated in the discussions that led to the Geneva Accord, which is not based on international law. Under the provisions of the Geneva Accord most refugees would not be able to return simply because they are not Jewish.

President Arafat’s opinion piece published in the New York Times in 2002 stating that the PLO understands Israel’s demographic concerns and his more recent interview with Ha’aretz in which he recognizes the Jewish character of Israel also contribute to this confusion. In general the confusion can be attributed to statements that are given in response to political circumstances and pressure, and to the fact that members of the Palestinian leadership are territorialists rather than advocates of people’s rights. Nevertheless, the positions set out at Taba in 2001 remain the official positions of the PLO.

Could you shed some light on the scenario that has evolved since the breakdown in negotiations? Do Palestinians ‘have a partner’ for peace? Where do you feel we are heading given the situation on the ground?

Palestinians do not have a partner. The government of Israel, whether it is a Labor or Likud government, does not relate to the Palestinians as an equal partner. Rather, Palestinians are viewed as a demographic and security threat. The Israeli government will do anything it deems necessary to contain this perceived threat.

Where are we heading? The path already exists: bantustanization, separation of Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and isolation of Palestinians within the West Bank through settlements, military checkpoints and, most recently, through the wall. This means that the world in which Palestinians live is ever shrinking.

The intent of these policies is to erase anything called Palestine. They even try to beautify the wall so that when Israelis see it they can pretend that it doesn’t exist, just like they want to believe that Palestine does not exist. This is not a new policy. Since the advent of political Zionism, the position has been that Palestine is for Jews and for Jews only.

How does this impact the prospect of a two-state solution to the conflict?

The PLO still supports a two-state solution to the conflict through Palestinian sovereignty over a viable state established on the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories. Increasingly, however, the Palestinian leadership is realizing that such a state might be a dream, because Israel’s activity on the ground is eating up the viable part of Palestine. The international community, represented by the Quartet and donor states, is ten to fifteen years behind reality in addressing the conflict in Palestine. Unfortunately this has been the situation historically. Only the first intifada made the international community realize that Palestinians want to be free and that the PLO was ready to recognize Israel. This was fourteen years after the PLO had unofficially recognized Israel, an event which had passed unnoticed by the international community. Still, western states, failed to amend their foreign policy to reflect this development.

The two-state solution became official international policy only in the 1990s. However, by then a two-state solution had already become unrealistic because by 1994, there were already more than 200,000 Jewish settlers in the occupied territories and settlements were expanding. In general, the international community continues to approach the conflict based on the assumption that everything can somehow be reversed. There is no real thinking about how to reverse the facts on the ground after thirty-seven years, or fifty-six years if the refugee question is to be included. Policy is not based in reality.

Two events with major impact on Palestinian lives in the 1967 occupied territories are currently unfolding: the construction of the separation/apartheid wall and the Sharon Plan for disengagement from the Gaza Strip. What do you think will be the outcome and effect of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall and of the possible disengagement from Gaza?

The wall and the Sharon plan are linked. They mask what is really going on in the occupied territories, and that is that a few settlements will be ‘exchanged’ for large parts of the West Bank. Sharon is looking for gains. Disengagement from Gaza will be presented as a concession and in return he will be demanding a reward – more territory and erasing the right of return.

The ICJ has been asked to rule on the legal consequences of the wall. The General Assembly has already declared that the wall is illegal. Much can emerge from the ICJ ruling, but the impact of the ruling will depend on the will of the international community. The ICJ case against South Africa over Namibia, for example, was instrumental in changing policy towards South Africa. I hope that a similar thing will happen with Israel, but I’m afraid that the international community will fail to exert the same degree of political will.

It is important to remember that the ICJ ruling will only be an advisory opinion. It will not be binding on states. Political will therefore becomes very important. My hope is that a strong statement by the court will force states to realign their foreign policy to reflect the court’s decision. The court could specify policies such as trade sanctions in relation to settlement products. This is the best case scenario. In the worst case, the ICJ could rule that the wall is temporary and therefore the courtcannot assess its legal consequences. This would be a terrible blow.

Regarding the disengagement plan, this should not be confused with withdrawal. Even if Israel goes forward with the plan, it will maintain military control over the Gaza Strip. The Fourth Geneva Convention will therefore continue to apply to Gaza regardless of whether or not the settlements and Israel’s military presence is removed. The plan will mean that Gaza is one big prison cell, which it already is.

Israel wants to reserve the right to control the airspace, which means control of mobile phones, satellite communication, and air transport. It wants to control the natural resources including water, fish stocks and fuel reserves off the coast. It wants to control border crossings with Egypt and Jordan including entry and exit, which means that it will be able to prevent free export and import of goods. The economy will continue to be besieged and dependent on the Israeli economy.

Israel also wants to reserve the right to invade the Gaza Strip as it wishes. It wants to expand the Philadelphi road along the Egyptian-Rafah border. It wants to reserve the right to continue to demolish homes, which means primarily the homes of refugees. Already, 19,000 Palestinians are homeless in Gaza as a result of Israel’s demolition policy. There are no provisions for a territorial link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The plan will have a detrimental impact on a host of basic rights.

In exchange for disengagement, Israel wants to reserve the right to continue construction of the wall in the West Bank and expand major settlements. Moreover, it reserves the right to annex these settlements to Israel. Over 43 percent of the West Bank will be de facto annexed to Israel leaving only 12 percent of historic Palestine for Palestinians.

The international community has its head in the sand. It has welcomed the disengagement plan simply as a means of getting out of the current political stalemate. It has been pressuring Palestinians to accept the plan, despite the fact that it repeats the failed strategy of Oslo. At the same time, I have doubts that the plan will be implemented. The latest Israeli cabinet decision, in effect, rejected the idea of dismantling settlements.


How do you understand the letter of assurances from President Bush to Ariel Sharon? Does the letter represent a substantive shift in US policy?

I am of two minds on the letter of assurances. On the one hand it does represent a substantive shift in stated foreign policy. On the other hand, on the ground so to speak, it simply reflects a culmination in US foreign policy. For example, the US has officially opposed the construction of settlements in the occupied territories, but practically, it has financed the settlements and related infrastructure including bypass roads. The US has officially upheld Palestinian refugees’ right of return, but practically it has done nothing for its implementation. The letter thus reflects the culmination of fifty-six years of US foreign policy of stating positions without taking action to implement them. The last vestiges of historic Palestine were lost in 1967. Since then the international community has adopted positions about solutions to the conflict, including that of refugees, but in practice it has done nothing to realize those positions.

How do you understand the US position in relation to the EU?

The only difference between the US and the EU is that the latter at least continues to state that international law matters, that settlements are illegal and refugees have rights. But this has meant very little in practice. The EU could be enforcing the trade association agreement with Israel, pushing Israel not to construct settlements and pressing for the right of return. Neither the US nor the EU, however, have protected Palestinian rights, not in Palestine, nor in exile.

In your opinion, what are the basic components of a viable peace process?

One of the most important things for an effective peace process is the framework. Until now negotiations have been characterized by the absence, rather than presence of law. Palestinians have sought third-party assistance due to the imbalance in power with Israel, but mistakenly looked to the US, which simply adopted Israel’s position that might equals right. Palestinians have thus been pressured to be ‘practical’ and ‘realistic’ in the face of the balance of power.

Agreements in other conflicts are grounded in international legal principles. In the absence of legal principles, everything in the Palestinian case has become disputed, from the size of the West Bank, whether or not it is occupied, to the settlements and the right of return. I remember a discussion during the last round of negotiations when one of the Palestinian negotiators asked his Israeli counterpart about the basis for a proposed deviation from international law. The Israeli negotiator responded that Israel will respect international law when the international community forces Israel to do so. Until then, it is me and you alone he said.

According to these dynamics, Palestinians have been forced to negotiate with the occupying power while they are still under occupation. This is completely different from a situation where Israel would be forced to end the occupation and then negotiate with Palestinians as equal partners. After there is a recognition of basic principles, everything becomes easier to negotiate.

What do you consider the major obstacles for a more effective role of international law in international efforts at crisis management and peace making? Is there any prospect for change?

The major obstacle is power-based negotiations combined with the absence of a neutral third party. The US cannot be a so-called honest broker as long as it continues to adopt Israel’s positions. The US has been the perfect conflict manager rather than a conflict resolver. I don’t see much prospect for change. The US continues to act unilaterally as it is the only superpower. The EU cannot act together, also because of the domestic interests of some member states, particularly Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, with Israel.

Unfortunately I fear that the situation will get worse. International law develops based on the practice of nation states. Changes in how nation states act, including Israel’s actions, as far as they are not challenged, could lead to a shift in international practice over time. This is a slippery slope which could lead to the sanctioning of inequality by the international community itself. The situation in Iraq only underlines the sad reality in which the international community is unwilling to do anything to censure the US for the illegal war, despite criticism of the decision to invade Iraq. This is not unlike the position of the international community towards Israel. With the focus on Iraq and so-called democratization of the Middle East, Israel is likely to pressure the US to act against other Arab states in the region. Syria, perhaps, could be the next target. I don’t see the focus changing much with the next administration in the US, regardless of whether it is a Republican or Democratic administration.

What are possible options for the Palestinian leadership? In your opinion what is likely to be done?

I see three options that hold the potential to capture world attention in a positive way. But they all require a significant shift. First, the Palestinian Authority could simply decide to dissolve itself. This is an option currently discussed in Palestinian academic circles. Under the current circumstances the Palestinian Authority is unable to function; it doesn’t make sense to function. It continues to uphold the myth that there are two equal parties to the negotiations. There are not. Such a move would also place the burden of ending the occupation back on Israel and the international community. The Palestinian Authority was set up as a temporary body, but it has become permanent. It was not established to be a security sub-contractor for Israel. Moreover, Israel and the international community have used the Palestinian Authority as a convenient scapegoat for everything that is wrong with the political process. The Palestinian leadership are blamed but it is the Palestinian people that pay the price.

The second option is for the PLO to declare statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. This would shift the response of states to the situation on the ground. The international community would no longer be dealing with an occupation but the invasion of another state with all the ensuing consequences.

Finally, the third option would be a move away from the two-state solution towards a single state in all of historic Palestine. Practically, a single already exists. There is a single currency, Israel controls all the borders and is responsible for all major security issues. But it is a ‘state’ with two classes of people. Israel’s policies are making a viable Palestinian state impossible. The struggle would thus shift from a struggle for equal statehood to a struggle for equal citizenship.

Of course, there is a fourth option, and that is crisis management. This is the default option, to do nothing. Unfortunately, this is probably the most likely option. The international community simply has its head in the sand. The Palestinian leadership has responded to various demands, including the creation of the post of unelected prime minister and support for the Road Map which represents a shift away from international legal principles. International policy has not adapted to reflect these changes nor the situation on the ground. In the end, it will probably be the people who will change the situation and not some words on paper.

What is the Palestinian leadership doing to ensure that basic rights are protect and will be protected in future negotiations?

As far as the negotiations are concerned, if and when there will be negotiations in the future, the PLO still emphasizes the importance of international law for a negotiated solution to the conflict. This includes recognition of the right of return and self-determination. Unfortunately the reality on the ground is changing. While Palestinians continue to talk about international law, deals made behind closed doors may be very different. It may no longer be relevant what the Palestinian leadership says about law and rights. We may be heading backwards to an era when talks are conducted on behalf of the Palestinians, but Palestinians are not participating actively.

I was shocked and dismayed by President Bush’s statement of 14 April 2004. It felt as if we had gone back in time. Everyone was talking for the Palestinians and their future but the Palestinians themselves. Now with the disengagement plan for Gaza, it is the Egyptians and Jordanians that are consulted, but not the Palestinians. It feels like we have gone back in time to the period before November 1974 and President Arafat’s first speech to the UN General Assembly which signaled international recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

Israel and the US continue to view the Palestinian people, and refugees in particular, as some nameless, faceless, amorphous body. I remember at Camp David in 2000, President Clinton was constantly concerned about Israeli public opinion. But when it came to Palestinian public opinion, the mere idea that there was such a thing as a Palestinian public, let alone public opinion, was simply brushed aside. There is an image of President Arafat as a leader with a magic button, who is able to control the Palestinian people. There is a certain degree of racism in this view.

How would you define the best possible strategy for protecting the rights of Palestinian refugees in the current circumstances?

Immediately and in the short term, the best way to protect the rights of the refugees is for the refugees to protect their own rights. Of course, it is the responsibility of the leadership to protect these rights, but it is also very much up to refugee groups themselves. In the medium and long term refugee rights must be better represented in future negotiations. The fact that refugees lacked presentation beyond the PLO was very detrimental in past negotiations. The PLO had to handle both files, territory and the right of return, while Israel was trying to exchange one for the other and swap rights.

I am not sure about what exactly would be the most appropriate mechanism for additional representation of refugee rights in the future. However, it is obvious that the rights of the refugees, 1967 displaced and internally displaced must be represented more strongly. This could be achieved through the additional involvement of international refugee protection agencies like the UNHCR, or through direct participation of representatives of the refugees and displaced, or maybe even both.

Finally and at all stages, it is extremely important that the voice of the Palestinian exile is heard. Israeli policies over the past fifty-six years have resulted in the scattering of the Palestinian communities. We have Palestinians in Israel, those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and those in exile. Each group holds and raises different perspectives, priorities and preferences regarding the solution, and each of these groups must be heard clearly.

Diana Buttu is a spokesperson for the PLO Negotiations Support Unit. The interview was conducted by BADIL on 22 June 2004.